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Reconcilability between family and work is an issue thematised in various 
literatures. What is often missing from accounts of Feminist Political Economy and 
Economics, as well as Welfare State Research, is an engagement with the everyday 
and how time is experienced as a multifaceted issue for carers. Focussing in on 
time, this dissertation addresses parenthood in sequences, from the wish for 
children, through the first year after birth, and in the transition from familial to 
public childcare. Tracing the asynchronous temporal structures of labour markets 
and public childcare in everyday life in Cologne, Germany, it reveals how temporal 
disempowerment is affecting carers. In terms of a conflict between neo-familialist 
and third-way ideologies, findings suggest that the current state of affairs has not 
stabilised towards any hegemony. The results are broken institutional interfaces in 
the shape of scheduling and synchronisation problems, as well as psychological 
issues arising from a mismatch between experiences and expectations around work 
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Whenever I encounter a parent, from Germany, Britain, the US, Brazil or China – it 
does not seem to matter where from – and I mention that I study problems 
reconciling family with work life, these parents will tell me they too experience 
those problems. The issue has been widely discussed in global and local discourses, 
engaging policy makers, managers, newspapers and social media, and not in the 
least family members amongst themselves. The scope of the phenomenon alone 
may indicate why studying reconcilability is important. The resource whose scarcity 
seems to lie at the heart of German problematisations of reconcilability is time. 
This research project departs from the everyday experience of childcare 
practitioners and parents, ten years after substantial reforms have reorganised the 
German landscape of early childhood education and care (ECEC). These reforms 
have been promoted with the idea of improving reconcilability (Vereinbarkeit), and 
have generally been understood to facilitate a policy transition away from the male-
breadwinner-model. With the clear political intention of increasing female labour 
market participation and fertility, the German governments of the last decade have 
seen an expansion of public childcare as a necessary complement to the 
recommodification of women, in particular the “silent reserve” (stille Reserve) of 
mothers with young children (BMFSFJ, 2006a, p. XXV). A process alongside reforms 
expanding public ECEC infrastructure has been a gradual and controversial cultural 
shift, lowering the legitimate age at which children should be given away from the 
mother into institutional care from three to one. A parallel shortening of paid 
parental leave in combination with a – in tendency higher – income-related parental 
benefit has been implemented to create a safe space for families during a child’s 
first year of age and redistribute care work between the sexes (BMFSFJ, 2011a). 
From the second year of parenthood, however, the reforms incentivise a faster and 
more intense return of mothers to the labour market (Geis, 2017; Unterhofer, 
Welteke and Wrohlich, 2017).  
Situated at this junction of policy reforms in the last decade and the discourses that 
reflect these reforms, I am posing two research questions in this dissertation: 
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1. How do German parents and childcare practitioners experience family-work 
reconcilability as ‘time problems’? 
2. How have the reforms of family policy 2004-2015 shaped these problems? 
Analysing recurring patterns in the constructions and problematisations of everyday 
family lives and ECEC provision, I arrive at the central empirical argument of this 
dissertation, which states that changes to the temporal structures described above 
– the focus of parental care to the first year of life only, and the complementary 
expansion of institutional care for children age one to three – have been occurring 
asynchronically.  This asynchronicity – or temporal mismatch – comes about by a 
communication of reform targets that precedes the government’s ability to bring 
the infrastructure into place, and thereby creates expectations that are frustrated in 
everyday lives. More broadly, the temporal norms of the standard working week 
and male-breadwinner-model have eroded in the working world – but not to the 
same degree in the family world: Public childcare facilities have standard opening 
hours from 7:30-16:30; free-time activities for children and adults are organised in 
the afternoon and on weekends. The schedules of the ‘public’ and ‘private’ sphere 
often do not align. This makes traversing between spheres (i.e. reconciliation) 
difficult. 
Productivity pressures in the wage relation (as described by Marx, 1993), mediated 
by workplace culture, translate into temporal strains on family life. This has been 
theorised as the ongoing disintegration of the once-hegemonic gendered division of 
labour discernible in mid-20th century Western industrial societies, that is, the 
relative complementarity between the dominant temporality of the public and the 
respectively subjected temporalities of the private sphere (Glucksmann, 1998; 
Pateman, 1989). The flexibilisation and individualisation of employment has 
partially undermined the collective temporal structures of society, whereas the 
weakening of a gendered division of labour has challenged the ability and 
willingness of (female) carers to adjust to employment schedules (Daly, 2011a; 
Ostner, 2004). We should therefore speak not only of a decline of the male-
breadwinner-model, but simultaneously of a relative persistence of the female-
12 
 
carer-model. The distinction emphasises that processes that destabilise the 
breadwinner do not automatically translate into adjustments of the carer, nor vice 
versa, and that reconciliation needs to be studied as a set of imperfect and 
conflicted adjustments within transitioning economies of time (Harvey, 1999). 
Normatively, this transition is shaped by diverging ideas what constitutes ‘good’ 
time-use. This compels the political question how individualised or collectivised 
social rhythms should be – in other words, how much autonomy an individual 
should, can, or needs to have in various moments of life for a society to ‘function 
well’ as a collective.  
Positioning my contribution in the academic debates presented in chapter 1, I will 
address how reconcilability issues have been framed in the Feminist Political 
Economist literature on social reproduction (1.1), taking the argument of a 
contradiction between capitalist accumulation and social reproduction, a ‘crisis of 
care’ (Fraser, 2016), on into the Feminist Economist literature on the accounting for 
and (under-)valuation of care work (1.2). Given the overall economic stability and 
high living standards in Germany, notably for my target group of professionals, the 
verdict of long-term crisis and unsustainability promoted in these literatures cannot 
be applied in a straightforward sense of ‘economic crisis’ (poverty, unemployment, 
etc.). Professionals make a particularly relevant group to focus on; first, because 
they are the key target group of recent reforms towards an adult-worker-model; 
and secondly, because as a group living under economically rather secure 
circumstances, they more than other workers have the power to follow and 
politicise their preferences for certain styles of family and work life. The argument I 
seek to make about how a ‘crisis of care’ affects professionals is somewhat more 
subtle than for less economically privileged workers, positing a different loss for 
professionals. This loss takes the form of alienation, which is effected through 
temporal disempowerment (2.3.3). This inquiry necessitates a more detailed 
examination of local institutions on different scales, including the last decades’ 
social policy transitions as presented in the Welfare State literature (1.3). The 
German literature has extensively evaluated recent reforms, also from feminist and 
temporal perspectives (e.g. Auth, Buchholz and Janczyk, 2010; Bertram, 2009; Lange 
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and Heitkötter, 2007), but even the rather recent literature is dated due to the 
ongoing reform process. Furthermore the centrality of time in the public discourse 
has not been transported into the international (English) academic reflection. These 
‘gaps’ justify further academic engagement. But beyond updating and translation, 
this dissertation makes a more profound theoretical contribution by 
interdisciplinarily linking perspectives from the sociology of time with Feminist 
Political Economy and Welfare State research. The result is relevant in particular for 
the branch of Welfare State and policy research that has emphasised ‘ideas’ and 
‘discourse’ (Hall, 1993; Blyth, 2002; Schmidt, 2010) , because I present an account of 
change that zooms in on the complexities of transition in everyday life, and thus 
goes beyond established accounts of ideas in formal policy making and elite 
interaction (Fleckenstein, 2011; Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen, 2011). Especially given 
the construction of recent German policy undergoing a “paradigm shift”, and the 
proclamation of the “End of the Conservative German Welfare State Model” (Kuhn, 
2012; Seeleib-Kaiser, 2016), a glance at everyday life provides a much more 
nuanced account of the timing of change. This pertains practically to the 
complexities of policy enactment and real economic challenges that the 
government has not sufficiently predicted; but theoretically this dissertation also 
challenges the ‘neat’ model of paradigms through the empirical finding that social 
time exists in distinct institutional schedules, interconnecting on different scales 
(Lemke, 2000). For example, daily structures at the kindergarten are anchored in 
weekly schedules, weeks in years, years in practitioners’ working lives, and lives in 
organisations that ‘outlive’ the individual workers who enacted them. Reforms 
intended to restructure the everyday in the long-term need not only be triggered in 
parliament, but also to be enacted in all of those interwoven scales of institutions.  
 ‘Discovering’ the above argument of temporal disempowerment and asynchronicity 
in participant accounts inspired me to assemble a theoretical framework (chapter 2) 
based on the two concepts of experience and expectations. These concepts 
emphasise agents’ sense- and meaning-making of the past (experience) and 
anticipations of the future (expectations) as the micro-dynamic of reproducing 
social structures and social change. While the understanding of experience 
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mobilised here derives from Dorothy Smith’s standpoint epistemology, Butler’s 
understanding of sedimentation, and Sum & Jessop’s account of semiosis (Smith, 
2005, 1996; Butler, 1988; McNay, 1999; Sum and Jessop, 2013), I follow McNay in 
connecting these conceptualisations with Bourdieu’s work on anticipation 
(Bourdieu, 2000; McNay, 2003) into an overall discursive-constructivist, dialogical 
framework (Bakhtin, 1981; Voloshinov, 1973). Embedded in this framework is a 
dimension interrogating social relations in terms of ruling, based around Foucault’s 
account of gouverner and a Gramscian understanding of hegemony (2.3).  
Orienting this conceptual basis towards a temporal perspective required further 
engagement with time concepts. Some contributions conceptualise time only as a 
limited, quantifiable resource. This idea of chronos informs concepts such as 
opportunity costs or to some extent labour theories of value1 (Smith, 1904; von 
Wieser, 1914; Marx, 1971). Kairos, respectively, can be understood qualitatively as 
the ‘right time’, a category used in the classic study of rhetoric (Herndl and Licona, 
2007), also informing theories of social time drawing on Durkheim; timing, rhythms 
and schedules; and the experience of time (Bergmann, 1992; Zerubavel, 1976; 
Bourdieu, 1990). In the contemporary discussion on family policy, sociological 
approaches around the concept life-course have been influential in informing 
politics (Bertram, 2012a; BMFSFJ, 2006a, 2011a). The life-course scale of thinking 
about social time is particularly useful to understand the relation between 
generations, age, rites of passage, and also policy addressed to certain life stages 
(such as becoming a parent). What such a single temporal scale of investigation, 
however, is less capable of picking up are the details of everyday life which produce 
the irreconcilability between family and profession. To that end, time institutions 
(‘Zeitinstitution’, Heitkötter and Schneider, 2004) need to be considered in terms of 
their interfaces, between different institutions/spaces and between interlinking 
temporal scales (short-term–long-term) (Lemke, 2000, 2001). I will demonstrate 
throughout the empirical analysis how social relations in everyday life are informed 
by cultural norms and formal policies that shape time. These mechanisms generate 
                                                     
1 Labour theories of value (2.3.3) posit labour time as a resource – hence they deal with chronos. 
However, they also discuss the organisations and social relations of labour, which reconnects kairos.  
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complex situated selectivities (Sum and Jessop, 2013; Foucault, 1982) that 
contribute to sustain asymmetric power relations over time in the gendered 
experience of parenthood. Critically, I add to the debate that reconcilability 
problems grow because an increasing individualisation and flexibilisation of 
temporalities – by definition really – cannot establish a new collective temporal 
order of a ‘total social division of labour’ (Glucksmann, 2005). The result of 
excessive flexibility is social fragmentation and exclusion. How so? 
First, a synchronisation of dominant (paid) work and subjected caring activities, 
wherein the dominant activities are flexible, cannot be achieved without 
dramatically increasing the temporal disempowerment of those engaged in the 
subjected activities. For example, if both parents organise their lives according to 
their employers’ preference for an “unencumbered worker” (Acker, 1990, 2009), 
public childcare workers need to be more flexibly available, at worst 24/7, and 
children cannot choose their carer. Defamilialisation of childcare in the wider 
context of recommodification creates reconcilability at the expense of parents, 
practitioners, and children’s disempowerment over time together.  
Secondly, if schedules are flexibly and externally determined, the interfaces 
between employment and caring cannot be predictably organised by the individual, 
which creates a permanent need to ‘manage time’, which itself is often experienced 
as stressful and frustrating. The work necessary to coordinate time takes up an ever 
increasing amount of energy and time itself. Long-term planning in subjected 
spheres of life becomes more risky. Being ‘on call’ professionally undermines the 
ability to commit to family schedules, such as attending dinner or the daughter’s 
stereotypical ballet performance. Conflict is bound to follow. 
Thirdly, working and caring (even more so!) requires collective time: The perceived 
inability to coordinate the desired amount of time together, with co-workers and 
with family, can explain parents’ widespread experience of time scarcity. A key 
contribution this dissertation emphasises is that it is not ever simply time per se 
that is scarce. Nor can irreconcilability be fully explained by a lack of disposable 
time or a lack of autonomy over time. It is also a growing shortfall of the availability 
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of regular time together in combination with an unpredictability of the future that 
makes people unhappy. In other words, it is a growing mismatch of realisable 
collective and individual time allocations with cultural expectations what 
constitutes ‘good’ time-use, where the former have been forcefully restricted while 
the latter have been expanded. There is a conflict between chronos and kairos. The 
result is a higher risk for social exclusion due to a lack of matching schedules and 
individual limitations to improve that condition. As a political consequence, I 
suggest, regulatory measures to ease reconcilability problems need to address how 
collective social time needs to be reorganised so that individuals can use their 
disposable time more socially.  
Following the theoretical exposition in chapter 2, I will briefly clarify methodological 
practices and limitations in chapter 3, including statements on generalisability (3.1), 
interview techniques (3.2), participant selection (3.4), and analytical insights 
gathered throughout fieldwork (3.4). The latter pertain to methodological issues 
with time data and categories, and the political nature of coding time-uses. 
Empirically, this dissertation mobilises the above argument on collective time 
scarcity to critically analyse how childcare is governed and enacted locally in the 
case of the city of Cologne, North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW), Germany. I focussed on 
NRW, first, because public childcare in Germany is organised on the federal state 
level as the highest instance – consequently there is no ‘all German’ childcare 
regime to discuss; and second, the multitude of local relations which I aim to map 
makes it difficult to consider more than one federal state within the practical 
limitations of this study. The focus of this project is to study social relations and 
levels of governance in depth, rather than comparative breadth. The choice for 
Cologne as a municipality and NRW among all federal states was random from an 
academic perspective. Personal connections in Cologne made it the most accessible 
case. To delimit the case further, I have focussed on professionals, who are the 
primary target of recent reforms, and who have consistently been reported as those 
who experience time scarcities and who orient the most to ‘new’ adult-worker-
model (van den Scott, 2014; Hamermesh and Lee, 2007; Daly, 2011b). To assess the 
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hegemony of reform discourses, which I put in question, they provide a most-likely 
case. 
As I will elaborate in section 4.1, family-work reconcilability in Germany is 
predominantly understood in the terms of a discourse promoted by the family 
ministry. This narrative is rather openly instrumental in positing increased female 
labour market participation and fertility as a solution to skills shortages and 
shrinking/aging societies. It promises that a set of recent reforms (parental leave 
and public childcare expansion) have created a better environment for parents, in 
particular mothers, to remain active in the labour market while raising young 
children. Simply put, the discourse promotes the “adult-worker-model” (Daly, 
2011b).  
In response to my first research question I found that along different phases of 
parenthood ‘time problems’ take on different shapes: before birth, they occur in 
the question of whether children are wanted at all. If so, the question remains when 
children should be had (see section 4.2). Planning a pregnancy, in particular for 
prospective mothers, involved a series of judgments about the stability of her 
employment, and the proximity of additional support (notably grandparents). This 
time problem is situated on the life course scale for the age group 27-35, and has 
been discussed in terms of a “rush hour of life” in which developments in 
professional and private life tend to occur at a rapid pace, and come into conflict 
with another (Bujard and Panova, 2014). 
Throughout pregnancy the taking of parental leave needed to be coordinated (see 
section 4.3). Centrally this involves the decision which parent takes how much leave 
and when. This decision-making process is heavily informed by economic 
considerations, shaped by the logic how parental benefit is paid. Since she earned 
less, it was usually argued during my interviews, mothers took the bulk of leave. 
This gendered economic dynamic derives from labour market segregation and pay 
gaps. Decisions which professions young women choose precede family planning as 
a root for inequality. As an additional mechanism, expectations towards mothers by 
employers have remained quite conservative, which impacts hiring and promotion 
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decisions, and in turn the economic rationale of leave decisions by couples. This 
gendered pattern then reaffirms employers’ conservative image of mothers-as-
leave-takers in a vicious cycle. Daddy-months and similar policy incentives to 
promote shared parental leave have been tentative in scope and have thus not 
substantially altered this dynamic. In consequence, the double-burden and related 
experience of time scarcity affects mothers most, together with the disappointment 
and frustration of declining status in their professional lives. It is therefore 
understandable that highly-skilled women who anticipate these consequences and 
prioritise their profession remain intentionally childless. I conclude that only a 
significantly deeper involvement of fathers in domestic work and care can lead to a 
win-win situation between macroeconomic and equality concerns. The leave-taking 
dynamic described above works across different time scales: working weeks, leave 
months and years, as well as long-term life course consequences.  
Moreover, as previously indicated, the temporal structures of the ‘private sphere’ 
have not adjusted at the same pace as the ‘public sphere’ of employment (see 
section 4.4). Not ‘even’, but ‘particularly’ privileged professional parents have 
reconcilability problems. Realities diverge substantially from dominant discourses in 
their social milieu. The domestic division of labour in households remains gendered, 
despite a widespread inability to legitimise this fact. Especially mothers found 
themselves in a daily life that perpetually produced mismatches between ideals, 
expectations, and experiences. Manifold temporal norms and an inability to 
coordinate these without feeling rushed gave rise not only to a feeling of trying to 
‘live two or three lives within a single one’ , but also to work ‘two or three shifts 
within one single week’ (Hochschild, 2003b; Knauß, 2015). Caught between 
egalitarian ideals and gendered realities, couples appear to rely on certain 
narratives (‘family myths’) that justify their own domestic setting (4.4.1). In addition 
extended family, especially grandparents, takes on an important role in supporting 
parents (4.4.2.1). Beyond the family, civil society’s rhythms have also remained 
organised along the old standard working week (4.4.2.2). Not only does this limit 
participation for flexible workers; the provision of voluntary labour is also rooted in 
the ‘free time’ of workers. Inclines in voluntary work around children also suggest 
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that paid work in childcare needs this supplement. These resources, however, are 
under pressure by any further expansion of the full-time adult-worker-model. In 
total, the relative fixity of schedules in the ‘private sphere’ point to asynchronicities 
to the ‘unencumbered’ adult-worker-model that is expected from fathers, and 
which reconcilability Discourses promote for professional mothers beyond the 
parental-leave phase. The substantive temporal limitations to reconcilability, I will 
argue below, undermine the government’s struggle to establish an adult-worker 
hegemony. 
In response to the second research question I therefore argue that parental leave 
reforms have very clearly shaped the reconcilability problems experienced by 
parents, especially mothers. In fact, the discourse promoting the adult-worker-
model is in many respects responsible for their frequent frustration, because the 
government raised expectations it cannot fulfil. The adult-worker-model in its ‘ideal’ 
form requires a simultaneous organisation of work and family life across temporal 
scales for all parents. The current temporal structures in Germany do not make that 
possible. The consequence is a ‘one-and-half-breadwinner-model’, in which she 
works part-time. For highly-skilled women, the quality of part-time work is often 
unattractive. ‘Attractive work’ is commonly offered in a classical career structure, 
which requires an ‘unencumbered’ full-time worker, often beyond the tariff 
standards of ca. 40h/week. Breaks for parental leave, and subsequent part-time 
employment due to limited childcare and school opening hours, often still enforce a 
sequential life-course for mothers, which interrupts any possible career trajectory.  
The lagging expansion of ECEC infrastructure prevents a holistic move away from 
familialised childcare. The current consequence of this half-way transition is a series 
of broken interfaces between social (temporal) norms in different institutional 
schedules. For example: kindergartens are open between 7:30–16:30 cannot cover 
most working times, sometimes not even those of teachers in part-time 
employment (I24). 
Having established this narrative of variegated time problems in chapter 4, I will 
turn my attention in chapter 4 to the most important shift I perceive in the German 
ECEC landscape: the expansion of public childcare. In an introductory section (5.1), I 
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will address the ideational history of childcare in Germany, and how this affects 
contemporary debates. I will trace the emergence of the kindergarten during the 
industrial revolution, the clash of religious and democratic ideas informing early 
institutions; the distinct traditions between East and West Germany during the 
separation; and for the West German case the Kinderladen movement in the 
dynamic of 1968; and the social investment logic (Jenson, 2009) that comes to 
inform German family and education policy after the Sputnik (1970s) and PISA 
shocks (2000s). Both led to an expansion of public childcare, first for children over 
three, and now also for children under the age of three. This last expansion goes 
hand in hand with an ongoing moral debate over age-appropriate care for infants.  
I will then outline the organisational landscape of German childcare provision (5.2), 
discussing the central role of non-statutory welfare providers and the gradual 
replacement of subsidiarity with a market logic without privatisation. This lays the 
foundations for the central case study of the North-Rhine Westphalian “KiBiz” 
reform (5.3). First, I will discuss childcare slot scarcities and slot allocation 
selectivities (5.3.1). These selectivities are identity-bound in large part, but also 
have temporal dimensions, such as application timings, or the match between 
children’s age and the Kitajahr (business year of the childcare facility). Secondly, I 
will discuss the reasons why there is a slot scarcity, looking into the financial and 
substantive economy of public childcare (5.3.2). Financial resources put into 
expansion programmes have rapidly increased public provision in the last decade, 
yet supply lags behind booming demand in large and growing cities such as 
Cologne2. I will conclude that past political neglect and current underfinancing are 
perpetuating skills shortages due to unattractive working conditions. Strict price 
regulations in the KiBiz do not provide the necessary impulses for market growth. 
Thirdly, I will delve deeper into the time problems discernible in the provision of 
public childcare (5.3.3): next to a moral conflict between neo-familialist and third-
                                                     
2 In particular the large district-free cities such as Berlin, Hamburg, Leipzig, Frankfurt – as well as 
Cologne – are affected by reurbanisation and a baby boom resulting from the influx of young people. 
Between 2005 and 2015 these cities were inhabited by more than 15% additional children aged 0-6 




way ideologies in the political dynamic of reforms, the scarcity of slots and the 
modalities of allocation result in timing uncertainties in the transition of children 
from familial into institutional care. Planning uncertainties are exacerbated by 
institutional asynchronicities, such as exemplified by restricted opening-hours 
above.  
In the last section, 5.4, I will move to the perspective of practitioners and providers, 
and jointly discuss two issues: policy enactment and childcare quality. Child-staff 
ratios are the central quantitative measure for quality. This indicator has become 
part of more formalised accounting procedures prescribed for public childcare 
facilities. Formalisation has also taken place through the implementation of quality 
management systems, which include the systematic and written observation of 
children’s development. Documentation procedures come into conflict with 
practitioners’ ideas about good practice because they take time away from 
interaction with children. Time constraints also put pressure on participatory styles 
of leadership, which are important to practitioners. Here, time is a resource 
problem, translating into everyday scheduling issues. 
As the overall outcome, the resources – in particular time, that is to say, labour – 
dedicated to childcare remain too low to fulfil qualitative expectations of ‘good’ 
pedagogic or parental practice, or yield fair wages. In this relative sense one can 
speak of an unsustainable division of resources and power between production and 
social reproduction in Germany, even for privileged professional families. High 
normative standards for education and care produce guilty consciences for those 
who perpetually ‘have no time’. To solve the overall issue, more resources in public 
childcare and more time to build infrastructure are needed. The infrastructure 
problem might be resolved in another ten years, provided that public financing is 
further improved. But that does not resolve the power balance between those 
interested in commodified parents, and those interested in good living standards 
for families and good conditions for children to grow up well. Normative 




1 Three Narratives on a Crisis of Care: A Literature Review 
This project seeks to discuss reconcilability problems between family and 
professional life from an everyday perspective, centred on the social relations of 
parents: their relations to the labour market, and to childcare practitioners and 
managers. This research strategy is juxtaposed to, and critically examines, 
established narratives of social change in Feminist Political Economy (1.1), Feminist 
Economics (1.2), and Welfare State Theory, including policy analyses (1.3). Whereas 
feminist political economists identify a ‘crisis of care’ in the progression of 
neoliberal and third-way policy (Fraser, 2016), neo-institutional welfare state 
theorists have emphasised the resilience of the welfare state in the face of 
globalisation (Pierson, 1998). Amidst differing interpretations of changes in the 
coverage and quality of social protection, the ‘new social risks’ literature presents 
crisis as the development of new sources of risk that established welfare policies fail 
to address (Bonoli, 2005). Feminist economists have raised the central issue of 
gender equity and unpaid work to draw attention to the selective recognition of 
work, marginalising the activities carried out in the ‘private’ sphere (Himmelweit, 
1995; Power, 2004). Debates on changing life-courses under changing institutional 
regimes approach the topic through an analysis of German policy (Bertram, 2009). 
This chapter delivers a review of these narratives, outlining how the idea of a 
scarcity of care resources has been treated in the respective literatures.  
I will suggest that a time-focussed approach that problematises the institutionalised 
division of work and distribution of resources is necessary to show that 
reconcilability conflicts result from a contradiction between role expectations and 
temporal resources, which follows the increased labour market activation of 
women. While that overall conclusion is well-established in literature I discuss 
below, only the situated examination reveals the exact points of conflict, the 
mismatches between experiences and expectations, which only become observable 
in the actual micro-relations of the everyday. The German case is crucial as an 
example of a conservative welfare state under substantial reform – but as I will 
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discuss in the empirical sections, also as a society that is encountering substantial 
conflict over the morality and economy of ECEC.  
1.1 The Feminist Political Economy of Social Reproduction 
This section looks at reconcilability problems from the perspective established by 
the literature discussing a crisis of care. Encompassing phenomena of “time 
poverty”, “family-work balance” or “social depletion”, the crisis of care concept 
refers to various pressures that disable important capabilities to maintain families, 
communities, and societies (Fraser, 2016, p. 99). To unpack what crisis of care 
means, I will review how social reproduction has been theorised in Feminist Political 
Economy (FPE). 
Social reproduction is a key concept around which FPE evolves. It refers to the 
biological reproduction of human beings, but also to the care and educational 
work necessary to recreate social bonds, communities, values, and skills (Steans 
and Tepe, 2010, p. 809; Bakker and Gill, 2003b, p. 32). Relevant public discourses 
revolve around demographic change, population ageing, reconcilability of family 
and work, childlessness, public childcare, quality in education, and skills 
shortages. FPE has theorised disruptions in these processes as the effect of 
unfettered capital accumulation hollowing out capacities of communities and 
households for social provisioning, undermining the conditions for the 
reproduction of capital accumulation itself. According to Bakker & Gill, this leads 
to 
 “the emergence of a global contradiction between the extended power of capital 
(and its protection by the state) and not only sustainable but also progressive forms 
of social reproduction for the majority of the world’s population. (Bakker and Gill, 
2003a, p. 4) 





“My claim is that every form of capitalist society harbours a deep-seated social-
reproductive ‘crisis tendency’ or contradiction: on the one hand, social reproduction 
is a condition of possibility for sustained capital accumulation; on the other, 
capitalism’s orientation to unlimited accumulation tends to destabilize the very 
processes of social reproduction on which it relies.” (Fraser, 2016, p. 100) 
Fraser understands this crisis to be a result of a systemic contradiction between 
capitalism and social reproduction, in which the expansion of self-regulating 
markets threatens social security. She is drawing on Polanyi’s (2001) theory of 
fictitious commodities in order to problematise the marketisation of land, human 
labour, and money. Polanyi took the nature of these three production factors to be 
incompatible with commodification, because none were produced in markets 
themselves, and thus did not react to changes in demand. Frictions invariably 
ensuing over their use or disuse (e.g. unemployment) would bring about a double 
movement, in which political forces would gather to prevent further marketisation 
in order to protect society. Fraser criticises Polanyi’s framework for naturalising pre-
capitalist forms of production, whitewashing relations of domination inherent in 
non-market relationships, such as slavery, patriarchy, or feudalism (Fraser, 2014). 
Therefore she expands Polanyi’s dual framework of marketisation and social 
protection by a third pillar: emancipation. Emancipation refers to the liberations of 
dominated people from inequalities inherent in social structures such as race and 
gender. It becomes theoretically possible in Fraser’s model to consider the 
emancipatory effects marketisation can have on dominated groups, insofar as that 
market structures can lead to more equitable outcomes than other cultural 
hierarchies. For these groups “exploitation represents an advance” (Fraser, 2014, p. 
551).  
Struggles around the provision of care represent a clear example of such a three-
sided conflict between marketisation, emancipation, and social security. Shifting 
responsibilities between market, state, and family indicate a new configuration of 
economic exchange, redistribution, and reciprocity (Polanyi, 1957, p. 250). 
Observed shortages in social reproduction suggest that recent reconfigurations – an 
expansion of market relations, but also a retrenchment of the welfare state in 
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developed countries – are leading to unsustainable practices in the distribution of 
risks and resources, contributing to human suffering and insecurity. These shifting 
economic and social relations clearly exhibit an international dynamic. Diminished 
capabilities or incentives to care for privileged strata of women displace care work 
along global care chains, deferring care shortages to disadvantaged women (Young, 
2001; Fraser, 2016). Examples for this are Philippine maids in Hong Kong, Polish 
nurses in German elderly care, or Latin American nannies in the US.  
A central concern articulated from this feminist perspective is that whereas care 
requires resources, predominantly in the form of labour, this labour is often un- or 
underpaid and thus does not sustain the economic independence of the carer. 
Expectations that females should provide the bulk of this labour in domestic 
settings (male-breadwinner-model) are incompatible with demands for gender 
equality that emphasise the economic independence of the individual from the 
family (adult-worker-model, Daly, 2011b). Structurally disadvantaged in an 
economic system that distributes resources in exchange for money, women have 
been pressed to find ways of participating in paid work on top of their caring duties, 
whereas men’s involvement in care has not risen much (see 1.3.1 for details). 
Where the partial shedding of care work by more privileged women is understood 
as emancipation, the ‘burden of care’ is placed upon those with less resources, 
lower wages, and so forth, instead of being shared more equally by all members of 
society. This redistribution of care work is part of a broader struggle in the relations 
of social reproduction outlined above.  
To make sense of care work in more theoretical and historical depth, I will turn to 
conceptual discussions of the nature of ‘work’, unpaid labour, and the division of 
labour within and beyond the nuclear family below. Empirical findings will be 




1.2 Unpaid Work, Affective Relations 
The concept of unpaid work was developed by feminist economists as a critique 
to the exclusion of the domestic sphere from standard economic theory. Seminal 
in this field is the contribution of Susan Himmelweit (1995). Whereas the 
‘discovery of unpaid work’ may be seen as one of the great successes of second-
wave feminism, Himmelweit identifies this expansion of the concept ‘work’ as 
deeply problematic. She suggests that general understandings of work are 
modelled on male industrial labour relations, emphasising three characteristics: 
1) the time and energy work takes, and hence its opportunity cost; 2) the division 
of labour; and 3) work as something independent from the worker – a 
commodity.  
“First, work took time and energy for a purpose and therefore had an opportunity 
cost in terms of what could otherwise be done; women who did housework were 
therefore disadvantaged by having their time and energy taken up in this way. 
Second, work formed part of a division of labor; women doing housework therefore 
contributed to the division of labor both at the household and at the societal level. 
Third, work is separable from the worker and could be done by others; there was no 
inherent reason why women had to do all the housework; men could and should do 
their share of it too.” (Himmelweit, 1995, p. 4) 
Whereas this conception made it possible to address the arbitrariness of 
women’s traditional role, it also advanced an impersonal view of social relations 
that, as I will elaborate further, is deeply problematic when applied to care. 
The first aspect of work underlines the physical limits to the amount of work that 
can be done, time as “an  ‘endless bottleneck’ of individual and collective 
activity”  (Bergmann, 1992, p. 109). Understandings of time scarcity, efficiency, 
and opportunity costs depend on such a view of working time (chronos). 
Incentives directed at time-use, for instance policies aiming to increase female 
labour market participation, apply this perception of work and time 
instrumentally.  
The second aspect highlights a central phenomenon in capitalist development: a 
specialised division of labour, and the social hierarchies that interlink with 
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occupational status. This pertains to the development of industrial social strata, 
as well as to the division of labour between the market and the household, men 
and women. It further extends to the roles of organisations such as Church or 
state, and distinct pathways to finance these organisations, resulting in various 
social relations of economic dependence. The division of labour co-exists with 
institutional schedules. Examples are working hours, opening hours, deadlines or 
timetables. These pose limits on time-use decisions, and pre-structure daily life.  
The third aspect enquires into the nature of commodities, as already discussed 
by Marx (1993). The crucial aspect that Himmelweit seeks to emphasise is that 
whereas the manufactured good can be physically separated from the worker, 
and therefore its production separated from the conditions of exchange, this 
separation is not possible for services, and in particular not possible for services 
that include an affective interpersonal component, such as care does.  
Himmelweit’s discussion relates back to the definition of social reproduction as 
processes that generate social bonds and communities. Care therein is not 
reducible to work, because next to its functional tasks (‘wiping bottoms’), care is 
also defined by affective relationships. Himmelweit (1995) observes varying degrees 
of outsourcing, substitution, and visibility across different traditional household 
tasks. Less affective activities, such as cleaning, are routinely purchased on the 
market. Tasks such as cooking or washing are replaced ever more often by 
processed foods, takeaway, or washing machines. However, affective activities such 
as child- and elderly care are among the last territories of family relations that resist 
commodification. Here, a recognition of care as work is most contested.  
Given a frequent embeddedness in other activities, care is difficult to adequately 
represent in time-use surveys (see 3.4 for a methodological discussion). Patterns 
how populations on average split their time between household and workplace are 
a long-standing concern of government, because in aggregate, personal behaviours 
create the overall volume of labour power in different spheres. Foucault (2003, p. 
143) dates a conscious governmental concern with population management to the 
end of the 18th century. Substantial research has been done at the juncture 
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between Economics and Demography to explain time-use patterns between paid 
and unpaid work, childcare, and leisure (Becker, 1985; Bittman and Wajcman, 2000; 
Gronau, 1977; Kimmel and Connelly, 2007). In many regards time-use models have 
evolved from initial shortcomings in accounting for domestic labour. But 
Himmelweit’s critique that Economics treat housework indiscriminately as unpaid 
labour pertains not only to a lack of early theoretical differentiation between 
categories. Himmelweit problematised the inseparability of care and carer, and 
addressed the conflicted valuation of work and leisure. In particular the 
simultaneity of domestic activities can cause uncertainty in the categorisation of 
time, as well as the overlapping of categories, for example in paid care work. It is 
important to note that boundary discussions over categories – as I will demonstrate 
in 3.4 and 4.4.1 – are not just a methodological issue, but a political one, aiming at 
social recognition.  
The extension of the concept ‘work’ from paid labour to caring activities is 
potentially dangerous. Hegemonic ideas in the industrial working world shape 
common interpretations of ‘work’. These include efficiency and productivity, 
measured in so many tasks N executed in time T. Accounting practices in paid 
care already adopt these constructions of value (see 5.4). By naming care ‘work’, 
and valuing care as work, something is gained: the legitimacy to demand 
recognition and remuneration, for example as parental benefits or better wages. 
But something could also be lost – a valuation of affective relationships and the 
domestic activities as ends in themselves:  
“… the ability to give value to the personal and relational aspects of much domestic 
activity. By insisting that domestic contributions are valued as ‘work,’ much of such 
caring or self-fulfilling activity is excluded and remains in the background, essential to 
but unrecognized by the economics of work and by a society that operates within it.” 
(Himmelweit, 1995, p. 2) 
Folbre has summarised succinctly how uncertainties over valuations of care enter 
into a bigger time-use picture: 
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“If caring is its own reward, it need not command an economic return. But if caring 
labor receives no economic return at all, will it persist? If the economic costs of 
caring go up, will the supply of it decline?” (Folbre, 1995, p. 74) 
The concern that permeates Feminist Economics is that if care is undervalued, 
and care work underpaid, its supply will either decline, or be enforced. 
Significant aspects of the struggle around care are about divergent opinions how 
well money given for care work represents the practical, cultural valuation of 
care. Crisis tendencies can therefore be understood as a structural mismatch 
between the actual pricing of care versus the hypothetical price required to meet 
demands according to cultural ideals. Misregulation leads to market failure (see 
5.3.2.5). Important to take away from this discussion, however, is that a ‘crisis of 
care’ should not be understood as a supply shortage only. Albeit underpayment 
is a cause of scarcities of care visible today (5.3.2.3), these scarcities cannot be 
understood just as market failure – because care is more than a commodity. 
Rather than reducing the problem of care supply to wage levels and opportunity 
costs, care needs to be viewed as a social relation that has affective, and 
therefore special organisational requirements.  
Contradictions emerge when the time and space for lasting personal relations 
come under pressure through an expansion and acceleration of accumulation-
related activities. It is widely acknowledged that in care the quantity is equally 
important to the quality of provision (5.4.1). In public childcare, it is not only the 
size of groups and opening hours that matter, but also the continuity of relations 
between carer and child, and the pedagogical conception of the daily work. 
Therefore the indicators we use to evaluate care should not be the same as the 
ones commonly used to describe industrial performance, because they need to 
assess very different processes and social relations.  
I suggest the debate over the relation between paid and unpaid work, care, and 
leisure should take place on a less abstract level in order to better understand 
the institutional determinants of different time-use patterns as they holistically 
affect lived reality. The remainder of this chapter will address the key institutions 
that regulate social distribution in the modern welfare state and act as a 
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framework for everyday life. It will do so first by reviewing more general, global 
accounts of welfare state restructuring, and then delve into the Germany-specific 
discussion of policy changes and life-course effects. 
1.3 Welfare State Restructuring 
Welfare State Theory (WST) has its intellectual focus on the mediating function of 
welfare states between economic and social relations on an international and 
national scale. In the last decades, WST has been dominated by research 
problematising the ‘post-industrial trilemma’, which theorises a trade-off between 
employment, income equality, and fiscal balance (Pierson, 2001; Iversen and Wren, 
1998; for a critique Lewis, Peng and Ryner, 2018). This body of knowledge has 
informed the EU’s Lisbon Agenda and third-way policy (Giddens, 1998), and widely 
been used to justify welfare state retrenchment. The central purpose of this section 
is to outline what WST can contribute to explain family-work reconciliation 
problems. To that point I inquire how potential crises of welfare states are 
theorised, and how these theories address the relevance of care work to the 
stability of societies and states. Here it is helpful to distinguish between two 
narratives of crisis, one basing its causal explanation on globalisation and one on 
post-industrialisation.  
Put briefly, globalisation approaches posit global pressure – more precisely global 
competition in free markets – as the ultimate driving force or limiting condition of 
domestic social policy. This narrative in its strong form is reflected in variations of 
structural dependency theories of the state on capital, which assert that the 
capitalist rationale to invest under the best conditions for profit maximisation 
forces states into competition with other states over business confidence in capital 
returns. This “race to the bottom” (Castles, 2007) undermines the sovereign power 
of government vis-à-vis investors and enforces a deregulation of social security. 
Whereas the rhetoric of ‘no alternatives’ to neoliberal restructuring has evidently 
found a certain appeal amongst Western political parties in the devising and 
legitimation of austerity politics and labour market deregulation,  the adequacy of 
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this overall explanation has been challenged on theoretical and empirical grounds 
(Hay, 2004; Schwartz, 2001). It fails to explain empirical variations in statistical 
indicators, as well as policy responses between states, and relies on ex-ante 
functional explanations. Germany, for example, is a highly competitive state with a 
highly positive trade-balance: urgent economic necessity is an insufficient 
explanation for reform. Institutionally sensitive theories of global pressures, 
prominently in the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature, cannot be dismissed as 
easily. They centrally hold that because institutions vary across countries, unitary 
global pressures are refracted differently in domestic institutional settings and have 
divergent local outcomes (Hay, 2004; Garrett, 1998; Korpi, 2006). The dimension of 
critique I want to highlight here is that VoC theories still reduce the primary causes 
of welfare state retrenchment to international capitalist competition (see Pierson, 
1998 below). The globalisation narrative is thus predisposed to understand ‘crisis’ 
as an economic or a fiscal crisis, a crisis of the welfare state vis-à-vis the global 
market. Its strength lies in revealing struggles between nation states and global 
capital, an approach through which it can provide an explanation for austerity and 
sovereign debt, which in turn becomes relevant when discussing domestic 
developments in social policy. It does not, however, address care in any practical 
manner beyond social expenses. 
In order to talk about a crisis of care, the second narrative of welfare state change is 
significantly more helpful. This literature is informed by Bonoli’s definition of new 
social risks, understood as situations in which “individuals experience welfare losses 
[…] that have arisen as a result of the socioeconomic transformations […] that are 
generally subsumed under the heading of postindustrialization” (Bonoli, 2007). The 
postindustrialisation narrative revolves around the twin tenets of demographic 
change and labour market restructuring, the latter referring to deindustrialisation 
and the growth of service industries. These concepts pertain to changes in familial 
and work relations, and hence reveal more clearly how care activities are bound up 
in a specific division of labour, and the political means that support it. The crucial 
difference compared to the globalisation narrative is that in the 
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postindustrialisation narrative pressures on the welfare state are explained to 
originate from within society, rather than the international political economy: 
 
 
“Welfare states indeed face unprecedented budgetary stress, but this is primarily 
related to endogenous processes of social change, as the economic profiles of 
affluent societies have become increasingly ‘post-industrial’ and as their welfare 
states have matured and their populations have grown older. These important shifts 
are related only loosely, if at all, to the changing international economy. To focus on 
globalization is to mistake the essential nature of the problem.” (Pierson, 1998, 
emphasis added) 
While Pierson maintains the perspective expressed in the globalisation narrative 
that welfare states are in a fiscal crisis, he replaces international with endogenous 
pressures. The two central dimensions these pressures take are addressed below: 
labour market restructuring and demographic change. They illuminate how aspects 
of social reproduction interlink with aspects of capitalist accumulation. Hence I 
dispense with the globalisation – postindustrialisation dichotomy below, in favour 
of more nuanced, historicised discussion how global and domestic socio-economic 
phenomena interlink. 
1.3.1 German Labour Market Restructuring 
Germany until the 1990s has consistently been described as a conservative ‘social 
insurance state’ with a strong male-breadwinner-model (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
With full employment and relatively high wages throughout the boom of the post-
war decades, the middle classes of the mid-20th century could afford to live 
modestly on one family wage. Social policy in this ‘Fordist’3 (Jessop, 1992) era was 
primarily set to protect the husband’s income, whereas other members of the 
family derived their welfare indirectly through the husband. The concept of 
decommodification, framed by Esping-Andersen (1990), describes the relative 
                                                     
3 Aglietta (1998) and other regulation school proponents coined the phrase Fordism to describe 
industrial relations after WW2. It is unrelated to the actual practices of Ford before unionisation in 
1941 (Neilson and Rossiter, 2008). 
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independence of the politically organised male industrial worker from the risks of 
the labour market through social insurance. In the mid-20th century, in an 
international policy environment strongly influenced by Keynesian economics, 
social partnership maintained a relatively low stratification of German society.  
As Lewis (1992) points out, Esping-Andersen’s initial conceptualisation of 
decommodification is blind to the situation of women in the male-breadwinner-
model as “welfare-dependent”. It overlooks the contribution women’s unpaid work 
makes to the independence of men to take up full employment or invest free time 
into other forms of public life. It marginalises the necessity of unpaid work to social 
reproduction, as well as the necessity of social reproduction to enable industrial 
production. Furthermore it naturalises the household as a unit of solidarity and 
welfare provision, taking for granted the nuclear family structure, caring 
relationships, and the ability of the breadwinner to generate an income to provide 
for the whole family, either through employment or welfare entitlements.  
The decline of the male-breadwinner-model must be understood not just as a new 
dynamic of family and gender relationships, but also as a necessary response of 
households unable to access a family wage in a different socio-economic and 
political context. 
“The central economic difference to the Fordist epoch families in Germany are 
gradually adjusting to since the late decades of the 20th century is the erosion of the 
family wage, which means in effect for the majority of the population that two wages 
are now necessary to provide an economic base for the family.” (Bertram, 2012a, p. 
616) 
Falling real wages have been widely understood as a reaction to increased 
international pressures for competitiveness. Scholarly debate about how Germany, 
the “sick man of Europe” in the 1990s, became an “economic superstar” in the 
2010s has identified either the dynamics of the Eurozone or falling labour unit costs 
as the causes of current economic “success” (Dustmann et al., 2014). Success is 
here understood as low unemployment, especially during the economic crisis of 
2008. Studies of the Modell Deutschland, associated with the VoC approach, 
characterised Germany through its system of industrial relations, that is: collective 
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bargaining between unions and employer associations on the national, regional and 
sectoral level, but also in work councils involved in codetermination on the firm-
level (Allen, 1990). Upmarket high-technology and quality production evaded 
international competition. This created an environment in which a highly skilled and 
unionised labour force had the institutional means and power to partake 
proportionally in economic growth. The decentralisation of these institutions has 
been seen as the main mechanism through which German collective wage 
bargaining has been liberalised in the last two decades. The increased flexibility of 
decentralised industrial relations has been lauded by some as an advantage in a 
globally changing and challenging economy, because it enabled wage repression in 
times of crisis (Dustmann et al., 2014). Others view these developments more 
critically, pointing to the redistributive consequences of what Baccaro and Benassi 
(2014) call the transition of the German economy from a wage-led to a profit-led 
growth model. The authors identify three trends: “a decline in the wage share; the 
compression of domestic consumption from 1990 on, and the acceleration in 
exports as a percentage of GDP in the same period” (ibid). The consequence is a 
widely-reported polarisation of wealth, to which growing inequalities in wage 
income due to increased and deregulated part-time work contribute considerably 
(Biewen and Juhasz, 2012; Gornig and Goebel, 2016). 
Deregulation since the 1970s has been traced in terms of flexibility (Streeck, 2009) 
and dualisation (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011), the coexistence of a relatively 
protected and a relatively unprotected labour market, and the so-called Hartz 
reforms (2002–3), which allowed for the expansion of agency/temporary work and 
mini-jobs, and restructured unemployment benefits. Flexibility was mainly achieved 
by leaving newcomers to the labour market with fewer protections, while 
established workers were publicly compensated or remained in protected spheres 
of the labour market (Streeck, 2009). These newcomers are disproportionally 
female and young people. Biewen & Luhasz (2012) suggest that 80% of overall rises 
in inequality between 2000 and 2007 can be attributed to wage incomes, 
employment changes, and the tax system. Especially the expansion of part-time 
work had an impact on social inequality. Furthermore, not all sectors and income 
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percentiles have been affected by real wage declines. Export-oriented 
manufacturing industries provide the best wages to their higher ranks, whereas 
domestic industries and lower paid workers are left out of any trickle-down effect 
from export-led growth (see Dustmann et al., 2014 for a detailled analysis). These 
trends in industrial production and regulation cause a polarisation of income in 
German society.  
Labour market segregation, based on gender, migration background, educational 
and class origin, provides the intersectional grid through which this polarisation is 
mediated. Groups concentrated in non-tradable industries and low-skilled services, 
such as women, are disadvantaged by the wage developments in their sectors. The 
German gender pay gap, perhaps the most popular indicator for labour market 
discrimination, has remained stable at about 22% in the last decades. Occupational 
segregation explains part of the West German gender pay gap, and “wage 
penalties” for women have increased over time (Lauer, 2000, p. 22)4. This 
segregation has horizontal dimensions between industries, as well as vertical 
dimensions in occupational hierarchies. Women continue to be disadvantaged in 
both dimensions (Dressel and Wanger, 2008). Part-time work and segregation 
explained 16% of the 22% pay gap in 2014 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017b). Some 
authors have pointed out that policies promoting adult-worker-models can have 
adverse effects on the quality of female employment (Hegewisch and Gornick, 
2011). Occupational gender segregation is particularly high in well-developed 
welfare states, such as Sweden (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). It is furthermore 
important to note that public sector dismantling under austerity policies has a 
disproportionate effect on women, who are crowded in public skilled part-time 
employment (Rubery and Rafferty, 2013). 
Next to segregation and pay gaps, female labour market participation has been a 
key indicator of economic gender relations. The activation of women into the labour 
market has not been a linear development in the latest decades, but rather 
oscillates with the expansion or contraction of the labour market. Female labour 
                                                     
4 The study focusses on West Germany since the mid-1980s. 
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market participation quotas have been rising steadily to 68% in 2006, in accordance 
with EU Lisbon agenda policy targets. This had led occasionally to a false conception 
of linear progress in women’s employment. Visible in Figure 1 are the increase at 
the turn of the century, during the Second World War, and the dip in 1950. Women 
who during the war had occupied all kinds of jobs in all kinds of industries were 
‘sent back to the stove’ by government decree to make room for returning men. 
 
Figure 1 Historical Female Labour Market Participation (Willms-Herget and Stockmann, 1982)5 
It is widely postulated that in breaking up ideas of female and male occupations, the 
World Wars acted as a major source of emancipation, both professionally and 
privately. The hardship of the war also made the idea of marriage as partnership 
legitimate (Frevert, 1989, p. 265). All the more confusing one might find the West 
German return to a male-breadwinner-model in the 1950s–60s. Frevert explains 
this return with respect to the economic shortages and greater need of home 
production in the early post-war era. With the inflows of US capital and general 
economic recovery after 1952, consumerism took hold in West German society. In 
1962, 52% of households owned a fridge, 79% a radio, and 34% a washing machine 
(ibid). Female employment rose when substituting household labour for 
employment became economically sensible to enable desired consumption 
                                                     
5 Historical data series of women’s employment face the difficulty of changing German borders 
(Deutsches Reich to West Germany), and irregular statistical coverage. Willms-Herget & Stockmann 
(1982) have collected data from official statistics (Berufszählung, Mikrozensus) since 1880 to 
reconstruct female labour market participation. 
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patterns. In this historical context sociological and religious critiques of 
consumerism condemned working mothers as selfish for placing consumption and 
lifestyle over the wellbeing of their families (Frevert, 1989, p. 269). The echo of that 
critique is palpable in ‘Rabenmutter’ (see p. 168) debates today. 
Supporting a thesis of female employment as a ‘buffer’ in overall labour market 
dynamics, contemporary IAB data reveals that the overall share of female labour 
volume has declined between 1991 and 2005 and inclined between 2005–2014 
(Dressel and Wanger, 2008; Wanger, 2015), following total trends on the labour 
market. The lower participation of women visible in the gap between the blue and 
red line (Figure 2) can be explained through higher amounts of part-time work for 
women, which tends to be connected to family reasons (Wanger, 2015). It is widely 
accepted that familialised childcare and elderly care under current labour market 
and policy conditions are the major driving force through which gender inequality is 
reproduced. An extension of West German policies to East Germany and substantial 
losses of employment in the East after reunification must be considered as part of 
this dynamic. 
 
Figure 2 Work Volumes, adapted from Wanger (2015) based on the IAB Arbeitszeitrechnung (AZR)6 
                                                     
6 Data on work volumes, by considering the hours worked rather than just employment status, 
provide a much more conclusive overview of labour market developments than participation quotas, 


















































Outside of labour markets, most women are economically dependent on their 
partners, parents, or social benefits. It is in this context that the erosion of the 
male-breadwinner-model has generated new social risks. These include a lack of 
adequate public childcare and support for single parents, as well as insufficient 
social insurance coverage for people with part-time and interrupted working lives. 
Not only do these risks stem from a change in women’s lives relative to the Fordist 
standard – women also experience these risks much more often than men (Bonoli, 
2005).  
To summarise, distinct income developments between export and domestic 
industries, as well as upper and lower income segments of the labour market 
support a broader diagnosis of income polarisation in Germany since 1990. Studies 
suggest that part-time work contributes to inequality. Looking back into history, 
labour market policy towards women has been driven by labour market expansions 
and contractions, very much visible after the world wars. The hypothesis that 
current reforms were passed with the support of employers who anticipate a 
demand for highly skilled female labour, and general shortages in specific 
industries, especially care, is consistent with the historical account (Seeleib-Kaiser 
and Toivonen, 2011). A straightforward and inevitable trend of modernisation that 
entails increasing female employment cannot be assumed in the future. It appears 
central to analyse therefore how far labour market and family policy reforms are 
products of demand and supply, and how far they represent the interests of the 
producers and purchasers of human labour. What this understanding of labour 
market change disregards is the complementariness of systems of production with 
systems of reproduction. In other words, a pure labour market explanation 
deemphasises the domestic division of labour. The likelihood of women working 
part-time because of an ongoing “hegemony of the mother-child linkage” (Jenson, 
2009, p. 472) suggests that the rising inequality reported by Biewen and Luhasz is 
likely deeply gendered. A higher dependency on public employment and social 
welfare of female headed households makes women on average more vulnerable to 
welfare cuts and public sector restructuring. Policies promoting female employment 
within the EU agenda have emancipatory effects, but their success depends on 
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social services that defamilialise domestic work in accessible ways, as well as on 
suitable demand on labour markets. The first condition is not sufficiently met in the 
German context, as I will illustrate below. 
1.3.2 Demographic Change  
The second pillar of the postindustrialisation narrative of welfare state 
development, after labour market restructuring, is demographic change. The 
literature has identified aging and low fertility as problems on a national scale. To 
summarise the current orthodoxy: 
 “Explorations have been made to link decreasing fertility to the historical co-
developments of the destruction of the post-war standard employment and the 
emergence of flexible employment in parallel to the changing role of women and 
family relations. Derived from this link the question emerges to what extent family 
policy reform must be understood as the state intervening in the production of 
children in line with a pronatalist construction of national interest.” (Streeck, 2009) 
“Population aging has raised concerns about the sustainability of public pension 
systems […] the largest OECD countries are unsustainable in the long run because 
they rely almost exclusively on pay-as-you-go schemes. […] Reductions in the 
generosity of future public pensions seem inevitable […] [pronatalist and immigration 
policies] can make significant contributions to the goal of creating fiscal equilibrium 
in public pension systems as part of a comprehensive package of reform.” 
(Bongaarts, 2004, p. 1 & 19ff)  
These narratives tend to focus on macroeconomic considerations, for example the 
sustainability of pension systems. In Germany, the “Generationenvertrag” 
(generations’ contract), a pay-as-you-go system, uses the current contributions of 
the working generation to finance benefits for the elderly. A problem is created 
through a mismatch between this financial mechanism and the logic of 
entitlements. The benefit is calculated on the basis of past wage incomes of the 
recipient. As a result of this logic, many recipients feel entitled to maintain the living 
standards to which they were accustomed. However, with a growing number of 
dependents in the system, the PAYG mechanism becomes increasingly strained. The 
cohort of an exceptionally high birth rate in the 1950–60s, the ‘baby-boomers’, is 
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currently still of working age, but will retire in the coming five to ten years. Hence, a 
dramatic increase in the ratio of dependents on workers can be expected shortly. 
One might find it somewhat ironic that improved living conditions, effected through 
better welfare, are responsible for higher life expectancies, which in turn produce 
the current ‘demographic problem’ which European governments face in the 
maintenance of living standards. In other words, we may see an example where the 
system has grown to its limits endogenously. This endogenous explanation of crisis, 
a crisis of social sustainability of given welfare policies, is the central aspect of the 
post-industrial narrative (Pierson, 2001; Bonoli, 2005). It connects to insights about 
economic and fiscal crisis thematised in the globalisation narrative, but gives a 
deeper understanding how social reproduction and care feature as crucial aspects 
of sustainable societies. Nevertheless, the ‘growth to the limits’ idea is dependent 
on a range of assumptions over stable contributions and entitlements, which do not 
reflect reality. Rather than a full explanation, it might be better regarded as an 
aspect of change worth considering in a more complex picture. 
An alternative angle on demographic change can be found in the sociology on 
gendered life-courses. When comparing the reference years of 1960 and 2000, 
representative for the Fordist and contemporary age, one can identify a series of 
structural changes in “educational-majority” life-courses of Germans (Figure 3). 
First, lives are longer today, and full adulthood comes later. What is meant by full 
adulthood is economic independence from the previous generation, and for some 
the creation of a new generation. ‘Settling down’ after marriage, children, perhaps a 
house and certainly a permanent job feature in ideas of adulthood. As displayed in 
Figure 3, such adulthood began in 1960 around the age of 17, for most people with 
the end of formal education, full employment, and marriage in the early twenties, 
followed by children (BMFSFJ, 2006a, p. 265). This entailed a break in women’s 
participation in paid employment until the age 33 approximately, when children 




Figure 3 Standard Life-Courses, transl. from Gender Equality Report (BMFSFJ, 2011a, p. 44), compiled by Bird 
(2004) 
Compared to this, youths in the year 2000 spent a longer time in basic education. A 
subsequent phase of life called “young adulthood” has emerged, which pushes 
ahead the so-called “rush-hour of life”(Bertram, 2012b; Bittman and Wajcman, 
2000) (Figure 4). Young adulthood is a phase spent in higher education with loose 
personal commitments, whereas the rush-hour of life evolves between paid work 
and family obligations. Parenthood is the key transition event between those two 
phases. Discussing the rush-hour of life, Bujard & Panova (2014) differentiate 
between a rush-hour of life decisions and a rush-hour of family cycles. The former is 
predominantly relevant for professionals, and refers to a span of 5-7 years in which 
key decision about career and family occur at a rather high pace. The latter refers to 
the increased burden of caring for young children simultaneously to securing a 
livelihood. Only the former is ‘new’ as a phenomenon that has emerged since the 
1960. The trigger for the rush-hour of life decisions, situated between ages 25-40, 
and particularly 27-35, is the lengthening of education time. This includes academic 
degrees, but also vocational master qualifications (Meister). Longer education 
periods result in an increasingly problematic coupling of social and biological age, in 
particular for females: the infamous ‘biological clock’, the window of fertility. 
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Increasing health risks for mother and child discourage motherhood past the mid-
thirties, which is just the time when motherhood becomes socially most feasible for 
professionals. 
 
Figure 4 Young Adulthood – Rush-Hour of Life  (adapted from BMFSFJ, 2011a) 
The most under demographic scrutiny are hence not surprisingly female 
professionals, who were long presented as the group least willing to have children. 
This image has been challenged by the publication of recent census data, which 
tentatively suggests that fertility rates for female professionals have stabilised, 
perhaps even increased, whereas the rates for lesser educated women remain on 
the decrease (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017c). It is arguably too early to tell, but 
the fact that parental leave reforms specifically targeted upper stratum women 
might explain this shift. At the same it is still clearly the case that fewer female 
professionals (74%) have children than other females (80%)7. The causes for this 
general discrepancy have increasingly been understood not as choice per se, but as 
the result of an ever-repeated delay of parenthood in the life-course (Bittman and 
Wajcman, 2000; Bertram, 2012a). The combination of educational attainment of 
partners, where it is socially seen as less acceptable for women to marry and 
procreate with a man below their own educational level, is often considered as an 
important initial hurdle (educational homogeny, Diabaté, 2018, p. 82). There are 
also indications that men place more importance on partnership in life, whereas 
women take a more critical stance. The phenomena are likely interrelated, and can 
be explained by women’s anticipations of reconcilability problems in a society that 
in tendency still produces complementary and unequal gender relations (Diabaté, 
                                                     
7 Percentages are given for permanently childless women (age >45) in the year 2016. 
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2018, p. 93). The delay of parenthood to a time when partner and profession ‘finally 
fit’ then becomes a slippery slope into childlessness. 
Another difference between the Fordist age and the last decades lies in the patterns 
of income over the life-course (Bertram, 2012b, p. 12) (Figure 5). Families in 1973, 
at the end of the Fordist period, had a comparable income in early and late 
adulthood, with a dip during the most ‘family-intensive’ middle age. The data for 
2004 shows a general increase in income. However, income in early adulthood is 
significantly lower than in late adulthood. The cause is the spread of academic 
professions which exhibit career structures of increasing wages, opposed to the 
relatively more flat income progression of manufacturing work. The consequence is 
that the starting of a family falls into a time of perceived shortage, relative to the 
abundance of late adulthood. It has been questioned whether this distribution of 
income throughout the life-course is demographically optimal (Bertram, 2012b, p. 
12).  
 
Figure 5 Income over Women’s Life-Course (transl. from Bertram, 2012b, p. 12) 
Applying taxation theory to life-course perspectives, Apps & Rees (2005) support 
these insights about the distribution of time and income over the life-course. It is 
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without doubt that children are the central cause for breaks and reductions in the 
labour market participation of women. Withdrawal from the labour market peaks 
for women at the age of 35–39 (Apps and Rees, 2005, p. 447). To explain why 
women withdraw from the labour market when having children, the authors point 
to the combination of various structural factors:  
 “More specifically, we would argue that factors such as the structure of the tax and 
social security systems, as they impact on working women of child-bearing age, the 
availability of good-quality and affordable child care, and organization of the school 
system, have an important effect on the terms of the trade-off between allocating 
time to the market and to domestic child care.” (Apps and Rees, 2005, p. 442)  
Apps and Rees attribute the relative hardship during the rush-hour of life to two 
kinds of market failure that explain the sharp drop of labour market participation 
and hours worked for young mothers (2005, p. 459). The first market failure is to 
provide affordable childcare. The authors connect this to the taxation of childcare 
as a product, as well as the high taxation of the labour that goes into childcare as a 
main factor of production. This makes labour-intensive childcare expensive, and 
without public intervention so expensive that parents with smaller incomes are 
likely to substitute their own domestic labour. In other words, poor parents stay at 
home and care for children themselves, because the cost of childcare exceeds the 
wage they could earn. A given preference to stay home with children might lead to 
this decision even if the wage is similar to the cost of childcare, or even slightly 
higher. The second market failure is a limited access to credit for couples with pre-
school age children (ibid). Free education for older children eases the monetary 
burden on parents, whereas early-age childcare must be paid for (see 5.3.2.1). This 
connects to the overall assertion, also made by Bertram as discussed above, that 
the distribution of economic means for the family is suboptimal throughout the life-
course.  
To summarise: Educational and economic changes can explain why the starting 
phase of family has moved back in the life-course, to be accommodated by more 
economic and personal stability. The structural creation of that phase of young 
adulthood is responsible for the delay of full adulthood, which, however, is hitting 
45 
 
biological age limits regarding fertility. That the number of intended children is not 
matched by the actual number of children in many families is likely connected to 
this temporal shift, in which the social organisation of life comes into conflict with 
the female biology of reproduction.  
The increased longevity of people impacts life-course patterns further. Whereas 
women in early modernity barely survived to see their youngest children reach 
adulthood, women today in their fifties have on average another three decades 
ahead of them. Newer generations are likely to reach the age of 90, or even 100. 
There is thus now a new phase in the life of mothers, the ‘empty nest’. Motherhood 
has thus stopped being a life-encompassing duty, and become a time-limited 
project. The question emerges how to fill ‘late adulthood’ with new purpose. 
Whereas patterns of childhood and early adulthood have been converging between 
sexes throughout the last centuries (Frevert, 1989), parenthood still marks a 
divergence in which gender sets the sexes apart on different trajectories. It is at this 
junction and age that gender inequality becomes most noticeable and profound. It 
is worth adding that the experience of freedom during young adulthood might be 
formative for future expectations towards independence, gender equality and free 
time, which result in the experience of rather profound life-course breaks for young 
mothers (see 4.3.3). I will apply this perspective in my own analysis following 
section 4.2.1. 
What has not been addressed in this Fordist-contemporary comparison of life-
courses is the impact of concrete policies and other institutional factors. A little 
more historical context on policies and political debate in the upcoming section 
should give the reader a general overview over recent German family policy. A 
detailed discussion of parental leave policies and public childcare can be found in 
chapters 4.3.1 and 5.1 ff respectively. For these two policies I analyse in depth, 
presenting formal policy jointly with the analysis of the everyday enactment has the 
advantage of making it easier for the reader to connect these two perspectives. 
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1.4 German Family Politics: A Brief Orientation 
The German government has taken an active approach to the management of 
family life in the last decade: firstly, in the labour market activation of mothers at an 
increasingly younger age of children, and secondly, in the expansion of childcare 
facilities. Childcare and parental leave reforms between 2004 and 2015 have 
enjoyed a rare popularity, responding to longstanding demands by childcare 
practitioners and parents. They received support from employers that made 
reforms politically viable, supposedly due to political rhetoric emphasising the 
economic benefits of sustainable fertility rates (Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen, 2011). 
The expansion of public childcare by SPD and CDU, particularly the right to childcare 
for under-three year olds in effect since 2013, presents the most obvious case of 
‘paradigmatic’ change away from a conservative model (Fleckenstein, 2011; 
Seeleib-Kaiser, 2010). However, this expansion – while legally active – drags on in 
implementation and many assumptions made on the availability of public childcare 
fall apart in the face of reality. What is clear when looking at the opening hours of 
day-care facilities, usually between 7:00-16:30, is that full-time work for both 
parents remains difficult to coordinate. Furthermore, the expansion process is 
difficult for the municipalities to manage, and demand outpaces supply in urban 
areas with positive migration. This phenomenon has been coined ‘Kita-Mangel’ by 
the press (see 5.1). Somewhat less radical, but of central importance, are changes 
to parental leave: a tendential shortening of leave to one year, and a tendential rise 
of benefits by a shift from flat-rate to income-dependent payments. These two ‘big’ 
reforms, which I will discuss in detail in chapters 4 and 5, coincide with regulatory 
changes pertaining to alimentary payments after divorce and widows’ pensions, all 
of which follow the logic of working women as responsible individually for their 
economic security (adult-worker-model, Daly, 2011b).  
Reforms are supposed to make work-family reconciliation easier and improve 
fertility rates. It may yet be too early to tell whether the implementation of reforms 
has shown signs of success in that second dimension, not in the least because 
childcare expansion is still much underway, but since 2012 the German statistical 
office reports a rising birth-rate. The average fertility rate of mothers with foreign 
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citizenship status of 1.9 children per women in 2015, in comparison to German 
citizenship mother’s fertility rate of  1.4 in the same year (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2016), has been used by nationalist commentators to construct a fear of foreign 
population expansion in Germany, in particular of Turkish and Muslim minorities. 
Expression of it can be found in Thilo Sarazzin’s bestseller “Deutschland schafft sich 
ab” (2010), or the rhetoric of the populist right party AfD. These fears have been 
connected to the sustainability of the welfare state in the face of migration. Turning 
away from this particular form of scapegoating, however, one can see more widely 
legitimate worries of people living in Germany about social and economic change 
affecting families. 
Female labour market activation is not just a form of emancipation and 
modernisation, but often an economic necessity for families. Women, especially 
those returning to the labour market after a family break, are often depicted by 
media and employment agencies as a “Stille Reserve” (silent reserve), a previously 
unused economic resource. This view completely disqualifies unpaid work many 
citizens carry out, in charitable organisations and in the family, from public 
recognition, as Himmelweit lamented (1.2). It denies the time and reproduction 
problems that are likely to be caused by further activation of an already working 
population. It may, however, also point out that women hold a potential that is 
denied expression in current times, and that changes in the current modes of doing 
things – changes in policy – could be emancipatory, as Fraser suggested (1.1). This 
ambiguity of the consequences of activation is subject to substantial political 
debate and ideological cleavages in Germany, which I will discuss in the opposition 
of neo-familial and third-way childcare policies in section 5.3.3.1. The main 
conservative concern is the crowding out of the male-breadwinner-model and 
family time due to policies that incentivise women to maximise their participation in 
the labour market. Opposed to it, the liberal-feminist perspective claims that female 
labour market participation is essential to equal status for parents in society.  
The opposition of two policies, public childcare expansion and care allowance, is 
highly symbolic for these ideological divisions: The care allowance (Betreuungsgeld) 
was a policy alternative to public childcare expansion proposed by the Christian 
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Social Union (CSU), Bavarian sister party of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 
during the coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD), 2005–2009. While the policy 
was never pursued in that legislative period, it was reinforced as part of the 
coalition agreement between CDU, CSU and FDP in 2009 (CDU/CSU and FDP, 2009). 
It was passed in 2012 by the central government and abolished again in 2015, after 
the constitutional court declared that central government had overstepped its 
jurisdiction (public childcare is the responsibility of the Länder). Since then the 
Betreuungsgeld only exists in Bavaria (Landtag Bayern, 2016). The care allowance is 
a 150 € monthly payment to families who raise their small children at home, which 
is paid after parental benefit for up to 22 months. The policy was legitimised as 
facilitating a choice for families to give their young children into public childcare or 
finance a private solution to care (CDU, 2012). It was highly controversial for several 
reasons, often mocked as a “Herdprämie” (stove bonus) that pushed women into a 
‘backward’ housewife role. It was also discussed whether the allowance would 
educationally disadvantage children of poor families, who would choose the money 
to supplement household expenses rather than invest it into their children’s 
wellbeing. The care allowance’s repeal on federal level shows the tentative 
dominance of third-way/liberal-feminist over conservative/neo-familialist ideas in 
the last decade of policy-making. At its heart, the conception of labour market 
participation as the central motor of social integration and reduced welfare 
dependence has been very influential in EU politics (Rubery, 2001). This has led to 
various forms of gender mainstreaming initiatives throughout the EU, which 
affected German politics. It has become almost taken for granted in liberal feminist 
circles that full-time employment is key to gender equality, because full-time 
employment is normalised as a precondition to career advancement. However, 






“The Women’s Movement challenged the feminine mystique – that full-time 
domesticity is the only path to women’s fulfillment – as a false myth. However, 
almost unawares another false myth – the career mystique touting men’s full-time 
paid work and continuous labor market attachment as the norm – came to be 
increasingly accepted by women, even when they couldn’t achieve it. Paid work 
became widely accepted as the path to women’s success and fulfillment as it 
purportedly was to men’s.” (Moen, 2011, p. 84) 
For the historic bourgeois women’s movement in Germany, “emancipation was not 
to be confused with conformity to male standards”, the cold “pathology of the 
Modern” (Frevert, 1989, p. 127). The insight that the universalisation of ‘masculine’ 
career life-courses is problematic goes beyond aesthetics. As established above, 
care work is essential to societies. Viewed through the lens of the life-course 
perspective, Bertram suggests: 
“… rules and regulations concerning the chronological organization of the life-course 
always rest on depictions and ideas from certain historical eras in which the majority 
of these life-courses were likely plausible. But a life-course whose structure 
essentially centers on education, career, and pension necessarily does not recognize 
any time for care, since it developed in parallel to the industrial-society model of the 
family. […] The adherence to Bismarck’s ideas on life being used to organize the life-
course necessarily leads to a situation whereby those who wish to interpret care for 
others as part of their lives in addition to their careers will always be at a structural 
disadvantage compared to those who do not see care as a part of their lives.” 
(Bertram, 2012a, pp. 619–20) 
He further posits that integrating care into modern life-courses is not so much a 
question of gender per se, but one of how to realise the “warm modern ideal” 
(Hochschild, 2003a, p. 213 ff)  of family (Bertram, 2012a, pp. 618–20). To raise 
fertility, Bertram advises, policymakers should take into account the ideas young 
women have about their life-courses and motherhood, and make it more possible 
to realise those simultaneously; the decision to be a mother and to be a worker 
cannot be understood as an either-or (2009, p. 40). This requires a change of 
infrastructure such as full-day schooling and childcare. But it also requires economic 
stability for young families. Longer education periods that delay labour market 
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entry. Often entry-level employment is temporary, and offers insufficient stability to 
start a family, which moves parenthood even further back in life. The link between 
educational degree and labour market opportunities should be loosened, to 
increase mobility for workers to change jobs over the life-course, if industries or 
their personal circumstances change (Bertram, 2009, p. 52). Labour market policy 
needs to consider these issues as part of promoting a more family-friendly society. 
Taxation could be used to redistribute resources towards parents, and incentivise a 
more equal sharing of paid and unpaid work (Apps and Rees, 2005). But 
furthermore care involves intimate personal relations (attachment), which can only 
find expression when family members have time with each other (Vaupel and 
Kistowski, 2008). Time requirements for careers are still modelled on a masculine 
role that does not consider time for care. A reconciliation of care and paid work 
needs to change this expectation of traditional masculine lives: as it pertains to 
career structures, in the division of labour between home and workplace, and 
between sexes (Bertram, 2009, p. 46). To that end, tax splitting is 
counterproductive, and childcare fees should be abandoned to support young 
families economically (2009, p. 52). Bertram lauds the income-dependent parental 
benefit, because it allows parents – the main breadwinners in particular – to take 
time out of work (ibid). 
Critically examining these suggestions in the face of the everyday my participants 
described, I will suggest that the current German set of policies has recommodified 
mothers, but not done enough to create care times for all parents, thereby 
espousing more of an ‘unencumbered adult-worker-model’. 
1.5 Reflections on the Literature 
Several literatures have been addressed above, which from different perspectives 
thematise issues of caregiving: first, conceptions of crisis in relation to social 
reproduction; second, issues of value of work and sustainable pricing; and third, 
welfare state restructuring and gendered life-courses. Changes in social relations, 
between women and men, and between states, markets, and families, were 
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presented as contingent outcomes of global economic deregulation, demographic 
change, and labour market restructuring. Economic growth and profits on a national 
scale justify policies that enhance international competitiveness. These produce in 
the current economic orthodoxy a commitment to austerity and public debt 
servicing, effectively setting fiscal limits for social policy. Wage polarisation effected 
by labour market deregulation has been accepted for the sake of competitiveness. 
In parallel, ageing populations and new risks emerging from atypical family and 
employment forms demand a greater coverage for social risks. These findings 
highlight the interconnectedness of social reproduction and commodity production, 
within states and beyond their borders.  
It has been argued that the sustainability of social reproductive work, centrally care, 
suffers from insufficient recognition in the capitalist global economy. This is 
theorised as a structural incongruity between the desirable amount of care, 
including necessary resources and organisational preconditions, and the given 
mechanisms of resource distribution – the free market, the welfare state, and 
familial or community forms of provisioning. There is a crisis tendency inherent in 
the interconnectedness of social reproduction and commodity production, which is 
founded in the failure to develop a system of exchange that distributes resources 
effectively enough to avoid crises of misallocation. Capitalism regularly produces 
economical, ecological, and social crises. Following Sum & Jessop (2013, p. 186), 
economic imaginaries, such as Keynesianism or neo-liberalism, are successful only 
to the extent that they can offer a “spatio-temporal fix” that displaces or defers the 
effects of capitalism’s inherent contradictions. Where the institutions of the Fordist 
system are eroding, various commentators underline the need for new rationalities, 
private and public, about money and time allocation over the life-course and 
between members of society (Vaupel and Kistowski, 2008; Bertram, 2009). This 
necessitates reflecting the redistribution of time and work, and how identities are 
caught up in this dynamic of shifting divisions of labour. 
Applied to the field of paid and unpaid childcare, contradictions become visible 
in a sense of undervaluation and underpayment of carers. Such a judgment is 
always contingent on localised and historicised perspectives of what is 
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‘sufficient’. In the current context of European welfare states, undervaluation is 
primarily expressed as the opportunity cost of care. Potential carers shy away 
from care in order to pursue more rewarding activities elsewhere. This schema 
applies to the wide conception that women have less children in order to work in 
paid employment. Especially for privileged women with high education and 
attractive employment opportunities, fertility has declined. At the same time 
unpaid domestic work, pertaining to housework more than to childcare, has 
been commodified and displaced from these privileged women to other women, 
often migrants. This returning ‘mistress and maid’ dynamic depends in its 
economic viability on sufficiently large wage differentials: the mistress needs to 
be able to afford the maid. These issues reflect in inquiries about the institutions 
structuring time-use patterns, and conflicts over valuations of these time-uses 
and mechanisms of segregation, reproducing advantaged and disadvantaged 
groups. The immediate concern in the German case is not absolute poverty, but 
equality and emancipation, understood as a closing of the gender pay gap, and 
gendered employment opportunities and hierarchies, within and across 
industries. In addition, however, this conception of gender equality also 
demands a cultural shift towards the recognition of men’s responsibilities in 
social reproduction, by employers, policy makers, academics, women and men 
themselves.  
It was further criticised, however, that an exclusive understanding of care in 
terms of opportunity costs (chronos) detracts attention from the specific 
organisational requirements of care (kairos). These derive from the affective 
character of care relations, such as between parents and children. The 
separation of work and worker as in manufacturing, and therefore the 
replaceability of any worker with another of equivalent skills, is not as easily 
given in care. The quality of care benefits from durable interpersonal 
relationships. This points to the limits of commodification in this field of activity, 
suggesting further that instruments used to assess manufacturing performance 
are partially unsuited to care. An increased use of quality management tools in 
public childcare is one example where success indicators are deeply political and 
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contested. It is for this critique that the methodological approach taken in this 
dissertation will focus specifically on time constructs in human interaction, as 





2 Refracting Time: A Theoretical Framework 
The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the social processes that 
create work-life reconciliation problems, illuminating how everyday practices are 
informed by structures such as policy mechanisms and cultural norms in the labour 
market and in public childcare provision. As outlined above, reconcilability issues 
have been theorised as instantiations of structural crisis tendencies between social 
reproduction and capital accumulation, as the outcomes of welfare state 
restructuring, and as a gendered division of paid and unpaid labour that 
disadvantages women.  
The analysis will contribute insights towards these concerns raised in the literature, 
but it is not immediately oriented to them. Rather, it approaches the topic of 
reconcilability more inductively, and at the same time relocates the empirical scope 
of the inquiry away from processes of policy making towards processes of ‘policy 
taking’ in everyday-life. The site chosen for researching the everyday in this project 
was the city of Cologne in North-Rhine Westphalia, Germany, which I will describe 
in more detail in section 3.3 of the methodology chapter. Research questions 
emerged from the narratives of parents and childcare practitioners in in-depth 
interviews. Engaging with these accounts of local stakeholders directed attention to 
time as a key dimension in the coordination of their daily lives. As I will outline in 
section 4.1, the German discourse has constructed reconcilability predominantly in 
a temporal perspective.  The most central contradictions experienced by parents 
are the temporal norms of childcare and workplaces regarding timing, schedules, 
and sequences: when to apply for childcare, how to reconcile the institutional 
schedules of childcare and work, and how to sequence education, work, and 
childcare in the life-course. I will extract from the data these temporal 
problematisations that stakeholders encountered when dealing with policy, 
institutions, and organisations in their everyday lives in chapters 4 and 5. The 
theoretical framework follows this profound discursive emphasis on time, instead of 
– for example – choosing an approach based around concepts of space. 
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Analysing how participants navigated their environment revealed certain barriers 
and resources, selectivities, and shared experiences and expectations. The following 
theoretical framework refracts the concept ‘time’ into a set of dimensions: a 
dialogical ontology of the social (2.1); and an account of agency based on a 
temporal deferral to subjectivation, suspended dialogically between experience and 
anticipation (2.2). Following a more general theoretical section on hegemony and 
governing (2.3.1), time is further conceptualised as an aspect of social order and the 
division of labour in terms of asynchronicity between spheres (2.3.2). Last, time is 
reflected in terms of alienation (2.3). In that order, I will progress from foundational 
assumptions to conceptualisations of the social that evolve around the individual 
subject, to overcome the shortfalls of individual explanations by bringing in the 
collective character of social relations. 
I will introduce Bakhtin’s and Voloshinov’s dialogical conception of language, which 
lays the philosophical foundation to my subsequent methodological focus on 
experience and expectations in everyday life. Sum & Jessop’s work on Cultural 
Political Economy (2013) is another central source, which itself engages Foucault’s 
work on governing and Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Both inspired Institutional 
Ethnography, the sociological methodology developed by Dorothy E. Smith (2005), 
which provides central theoretical, but also crucial methodological tools, that 
enable a repositioning of the debate on social reproduction, the welfare state, and 
the division of labour into a discussion of everyday life and work. Furthermore her 
work picks up on the semiotic concerns of other theories discussed here by 
highlighting the growing importance of texts in the governance and execution of 
work (e.g. new public management). Refocussing the attention of policy analysis to 
the dynamics of everyday life also helps to prompt a critical reflection of the 
language of change employed in much welfare state theory: Hall’s definition of a 
“paradigm shift” as a target change in policy is limiting where everyday life is 
characterised by ongoing contestation rather than hegemonic stability. At worst, 
seeking to understand change in a punctuated equilibrium between paradigms 
depoliticises struggle, especially outside of the formal political arena. Paying 
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attention to struggle outside of formal political processes also reflects the 
longstanding feminist concern that the personal is political. 
2.1 Interpreting the Social 
Foucault suggests that theory should begin with an evaluation of “conceptual 
needs” (1982, p. 209). A theory cannot be articulated without concepts, but likewise 
concepts tend to presuppose an ‘objectification’ (predefinition) of the research 
object that precedes any analytical work. In his lectures at the Collège de France, 
Foucault explains his historical method in terms of the questions to ask:  
“… instead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting 
with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices, I 
would like to start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals 
through the grid of these practices.” (Foucault, 2010, p. 3) 
Foucault illustrates this method by asking “How can you write history if you do not 
accept a priori the existence of things?”, and answers by example: “Let’s suppose 
that madness does not exist. If we suppose that it does not exist, then what can 
history make of these different events and practices which are apparently organized 
around something that is supposed to be madness?” (2008, p. 3) I interpret this 
approach as a thought experiment that puts something ideational – an idea, such as 
‘reconcilability’ (4.1) or ‘childcare deficit’ (5.1) – in question to show subsequently 
that its discursive existence is necessary to explain a historical trajectory, to make 
sense of an ensemble of practices that realise the idea in real time and space. 
Simultaneously, I perceive Foucault’s tactic as an attempt to minimise biases 
originating in a theory-driven reification of concepts/objects. Understanding 
language as a ‘semiotic grid’ used to divide a seamless reality into meaningful 
chunks entails on the one hand a sceptical element that denies the possibility of 
knowable absolute truth, and on the other hand a normatively critical element that 
inquires how language might be used to prescribe a ‘grid’ of reality as part of 
hegemonic projects. In my own work I am particularly interested in this prescriptive 
function, and how language is used to coordinate social relations around childcare. 
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The conventionality between concept and object, sign and referent, is a defining 
element in constructivist epistemology and critical semiotic/cultural theories that 
has extensive consequences for subsequent theorisations, the choice of methods 
and criteria for data selection. Finding the ‘right’ words to express fieldwork 
experiences, and how to handle translation, are issues in practice. I will address 
these consequences as two philosophical foundations of my work: critical realism 
and dialogical constructivism. 
2.1.1 Critical Realism 
Critical Realism has been developed along various lines, such as in the work of 
Archer, Bhaskar, or Sayer (Archer et al., 1998). Shared ground amongst critical 
realists exists in the assumption of a realist ontology and relativist epistemology. 
This study will follow the interpretation given in Sum’s & Jessop’s Cultural Political 
Economy (2013). The authors develop their approach on the most fundamental 
assumption that the world in real time is too complex for human beings to make 
sense of its totality. This assumption supports a pluralistic science that studies the 
world from many different empirical and theoretical entry points. Critical realists 
distinguish between intransitive and transitive moments of scientific knowledge 
production: 
“The intransitive moment refers to the external world as the object of observation 
and, in many cases, intervention; the transitive moment refers to the practices of 
science and scientific communities as a set (or sets) of observers and, perhaps, 
interveners.” (Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 6) 
Knowledge is the fallible product that emerges between the transitive and 
intransitive moment. Therefore, critical realists perceive of science as an ongoing 
process, in which recursive reflection on both, the research object and the research 
practice, develop a spiral dynamic, a process and method called “retroduction” 
(Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 9). The research questions formulated above and the 
theoretical framework presented below are outcomes of such a circular process 
between fieldwork experiences and academic reflection.  
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The key ontological assumption of complexity demands processes of simplification 
to help actors “go on in the world” (Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 3 f). Sum & Jessop 
make a distinction between two sources of simplification: semiosis and 
structuration. Semiosis leads to the ongoing production of various construals8 by 
different actors or groups. These construals, sometimes pertaining to smaller and 
sometimes to broader issues, compete to become constructive. Constructions are 
those construals which achieve a degree of acceptance (sedimentation, see 2.2.1) 
that makes them structural, i.e. durably consequential in shaping human life. In 
their strongest form, constructions become hegemonic: taken for granted or 
‘naturalised’ (Eagleton, 2007, p. 112). It is important to note that due to their 
consequentiality, constructions unlike construals are viewed as ‘real’9. Semiosis 
enters the approach in two forms, as sense-making and meaning-making (Sum and 
Jessop, 2013, p. 4 f). Sense-making refers to the process of apprehension of the 
human being towards their environment; it is a referential process in which context 
has important implications. Meaning-making denotes the production of linguistic 
meaning, communication and signification. The triad that emerges (in Saussurean 
terminology) between the symbol (signifier), the concept (signified), and the object 
(referent), is a necessary aspect of a Critical Realist perspective on semiosis10, which 
can be found in variations of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1995; Jäger and 
Jäger, 2007), Begriffsgeschichte (Koselleck, 1982), Linguistic Ethnography, and 
Interactional Sociolinguistics (Blommaert and Rampton, 2011). I will explore some 
implications of this ontological turn to semiosis on the conception of ‘the social’ in 
the following section on Dialogical Constructivism. Taking for real the existence of 
constructions is part of what makes a realist ontology compatible with dialogical 
constructivism. What in turn makes a relativist epistemology compatible is the 
assumption that semiosis is a human technology to reduce complexity, and perhaps 
                                                     
8 Construal: “the way a person understands the world or a particular situation” (Cambridge 
Dictionary, no date) 
9 Also see the Thomas Theorem: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences.“ (Thomas and Thomas, 1928, pp. 571–2) 
10 These are distinct from approaches that understand meaning exclusively in the interrelation 
between signs, excluding references to objective reality, like the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). For a Critical Realist critique, see Sum & Jessop (2013, pp. 129–34) 
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also to cope with an inherent meaninglessness of the world and human existence 
(Bourdieu, 2000, p. 239). 
As a second mode of reducing complexity structuration limits the number of 
possible social relations; it enforces selection among a limited number of 
alternatives (Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 4). I suggest it also promotes predictability by 
limiting not only present, but also future relations. Compossibility, another key 
concept of Sum & Jessop, describes the compatibility and benign evolution of 
multiple relations between parts of a whole. As an example for compossible 
relations, Jessop cites the varieties of capitalism that coexisted within the European 
Union before the European Monetary Union (EMU) (Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 4–
5). The EMU removed flexibilities between the member states, and according to 
Jessop made the EMU less able to reproduce a peaceful coexistence of member 
states within the European Union (ibid).  Compossibility exists contingently in 
“specific time-space envelopes” (Jessop, 2005). I will address the spatiotemporal 
aspect of structuration in the upcoming section on Coordinating the Social, but I will 
call compossibility ‘reconcilability’ instead.  
It is important to note that semiosis and structuration are not a binary. They do not 
correspond to the discursive-material binary. The latter is flawed, not in the least 
because discourse is material, such as in speaking bodies or texts, and ‘material’ 
aspects of life – such as the economy – are discursively organised between humans. 
Semiosis and structuration are two modes of simplification that can overlap, 
enhance each other, or possibly come into conflict. In the next section I will 
elaborate on semiosis and how meaningful interaction produces the social. 
2.1.2 Dialogical Constructivism  
The relegation of absolute truth to contingent meaning-making can be traced 
historically in the philosophy of positivist science, from Hume’s problem of 
induction, Popper’s falsification, and Kuhn’s paradigms (Rosenberg, 2005). But in 
discourse-sensitive constructivist approaches, contingent meaning-making becomes 
qualitatively much more important than the mere acknowledgement of positivist 
limitations. Here, society is understood as the dynamic product of meaningful 
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reality-constitutive interactional processes. In theories following this ontological 
turn to discourse, the social emerges in interaction, and this interaction is 
coordinated through past interactions and future anticipations of further 
interactions. This makes for a profound attack on empiricist/positivist 
methodologies in social sciences:  
 “The failure of the empiricist approach is its inability to incorporate an adequate 
account of the social actor's subjective understanding of the situation. By focusing on 
the observable dimensions of a social phenomenon, empiricists observe the social 
world from a different angle from that of their subjects. The empiricists’ models, in 
short, tend to be constructed around the researcher’s own implicit assumptions and 
value judgements about reality. They thus drift away from the social context by 
tacitly substituting their own view of the relevant aspects of the situation for the 
social actors’ understanding of the social realities.” (Fischer, 2003, p. 51)  
Rejecting that meaning is posited in objects, constructivist approaches need to 
explain how processes of semiosis take place and produce a variation of possible 
construals towards any event or object, but also how any ‘fixed’ language can be 
sustained. Contingency here refers to the initial ambiguity of sense-making, which 
can generate many construals and reactions in response to a phenomenon. Of 
these many possible construals, one is selected11 in the course of action, giving 
‘closure’, determining the phenomenon as some kind of thing (an event, an object, 
a process) (Parsons, 2010, p. 88). Contingency is a fundamental assumption of 
discourse theory, which describes the “conditions of possibility” of objects and 
identities (Howarth, 2004, p. 324), their precedents and context in a wider field of 
historical development that allow an object or identity to emerge. In that sense 
contingency replaces historical or material determinism by describing a 
phenomenon as overdetermined. In human interaction, contingency arises in the 
openness in which “utterances [do not] entail descriptive closure and cognitive 
consistency”, but are instead “intersubjectively understood” and result in “further 
actions” (Wetherell, 1998, p. 401). These points require elaboration:  
                                                     
11 Selection is a key concept in the Structural-Relational Approach (SRA), in which change is 
understood as sequences of variation-selection-retention. (Jessop, 2005) 
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 First, there is the question of sense-making and meaning-making, of 
discerning a thing as a thing;  
 Second, there is mention of an openness of utterances in human interaction 
that needs to be explicated;  
 Third, there is the question of ‘going on’ in the social world. 
Relevant to the first point, Lähteenmäki (2004) suggests that theories of literal 
meaning are part of an objectivist paradigm. 
“the notion of literal meaning is intimately connected with the idea that, first, reality 
has a pregiven fixed structure, second, there is some ultimate way of making correct 
mental representations of the structure of reality, and third, there is a fixed 
correspondence between the objects of reality and the linguistic expressions which 
are used to refer either to the objects of reality or to their mental representations” 
(Lähteenmäki, 2004, p. 97) 
While, as a realist, I agree that reality has a historically given structure, I also agree 
that a ‘correct’ representation is impossible. The search for context-free, literal 
meanings of signs presupposes a fixing between sign and referent that is 
theoretically and empirically not convincing: No one characteristic is ever shared by 
all instantiations of one specific sign (ibid). Consequently, analysts need to make a 
decision, privileging some characteristics over others as the core meaning of a sign, 
which undermines a disinterested definition12. Foucault’s (2010, p. 3) strategy to 
“pass these universals through the grid of […] practices” reflects this concern. 
Standpoint and ethnographic approaches (Harding, 2004b; Blommaert and 
Rampton, 2011) follow a similar logic. Dorothy Smith situates her starting point of 
research in everyday experience with an emphasis on language (see 2.2.2). 
Similarly, Lähteenmäki suggests an entry point into theorising meaning which starts 
with the spoken utterance in the actual social context. This approach to language is 
also attributed to the works of the Bakhtin Circle in 1920s St. Petersburg, an 
ensemble of scholars with various backgrounds and interests. Their commonalities 
and continuities are visible in: 
                                                     
12 For an elaborated account, see Lähteenmäki (2004) pp. 94–5. 
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“the hostility to Saussurean linguistics; the insistence on the interactive nature of 
individual consciousnesses in a social world where language was a shared medium; 
the correlation of the stasis of meaning with authoritarian forces within language and 
change with popular resistance to that authority, and the continuity between forms 
of social consciousness and the significance of literary form.” (Bostad et al., 2004) 
This approach has come to be recognised as ‘dialogism’ albeit Bakhtin himself never 
used that term (Ongstad, 2004, p. 75). The following passage will address the 
theoretical basis of dialogism: the openness and interactive origin of meaning, 
addressing the second point identified above. Bakhtin developed a theory of culture 
that is based on the idea of dialogue and meaning as socially emergent, 
evolutionary and non-teleological, in which “moving beyond what is given” is the 
central dynamic (Bostad et al., 2004, p. 2). This process of moving forward 
presupposes creative acts, espousing emergent properties, “properties that cannot 
be predicted from their constituent parts and antecedent conditions”, to use 
Lähteenmäki’s (2004, p. 100) definition. This contingent view implies uncertainty as 
a foundational source of human anxiety, which corresponds well with Sum & 
Jessop’s concern of reducing complexity, or as I have mentioned regarding 
structuration, increasing predictability. Bakhtin captures this emerging nature of 
language in the term heteroglossia (Bakhtin, 1981), understood as the outcome of a 
centrifugal tendency in the development of language, which is based in the 
decentral use and adaptation of language in everyday contexts. Opposed to this is a 
centripetal tendency in language development, in which the potential of 
understanding each other over distances and across contexts favours a more 
centralised standard language. Efforts of standardising language are associated with 
nation-building, the spread of dictionaries, standardised language teaching in 
schools, and similar projects that contain an ideological centralising momentum13.  
As an underlying aspect of these political dimensions of discourse, a bit more should 
be said about how variation of language is limited. This also dispels the spectre of 
‘anything goes’ relativism. Theories of interactional meaning-making posit a 
mediating function of signs between human beings, and between human and 
                                                     
13 Also see Gramsci 
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environment14. Voloshinov understood signs as symbolic tools, “reflect[ing] the 
functional dynamics of the social matrix that created them and deeply affect[ing] 
their creators in return” (Bostad et al., 2004, p. 7). This social anchoring of meaning 
limits meaning potentials, but there is also a temporal aspect to limitations: 
Meaning emerges in concrete moments that make it possible to draw the 
connection between sign and referent synchronically. But meaning equally 
transcends the actual time-space of that concrete moment (utterance, event), 
because dialogical meaning-making is shaped by the rules of antecedent use of 
signs, and their directedness to future outcomes.  
“… a theme must base itself in some kind of fixity of meaning; otherwise it loses its 
connection with what came before and what comes after – i.e., it altogether loses its 
significance.” (Voloshinov, 1973) 
 Dialogical theories see an unending chain of utterances and responses, leading 
back infinitely into the past and stretching into the future by anticipation. A present 
utterance includes a sedimented ‘trace’ which emerged in previous uses of a sign 
and anticipations in the sign’s use (Lachmann, 2004, p. 47). This ‘future toward-
ness’ is captured in the notion of responsiveness, which characterises dialogical talk 
(Ongstad, 2004). Following Mead, and in line with this idea of responsiveness, 
Dorothy Smith views language as a way to organise and store (memorise) sensory 
experience and coordinate social interaction. 
“Language, according to Mead, comes into being only as there is a conventional vocal 
gesture that activates in speaker and hearer the same response or assembly of 
responses. A vocal gesture or word activates responses stored from people’s 
experience; experience is thus organized socially.” (Smith, 2005, p. 80, italics added) 
Shared meanings/responses are here seen as critical for dialogue to continue, that 
is, to act cooperatively. But not all talk (action) is dialogical (cooperative). Dialogue 
may be subverted, for instance in the style of carnival, when responses are withheld 
or made inappropriately, disrupting or breaking the chain of utterances (Lachmann, 
2004, p. 50 ff). The ability to interact cooperatively, as I will conclude later with 
                                                     
14 This restates Sum & Jessop’s distinction between meaning-making and sense-making. 
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regard to reconcilability, depends on enabling conditions such as synchronised 
social schedules, which facilitate social inclusion into collective rhythms.  
Pertinent to the third point identified above – the ‘going on’ in the social world – 
centripetal and centrifugal forces act on the relative instability-stability of meaning. 
This conception of discourse can be used to address political questions about the 
role of ideas, language, and hegemony. Mastering the (provisional) rules of 
communication within a community and across many contexts enables the actor to 
“go on in the same way” (Lähteenmäki, 2004, p. 102), to reproduce the 
culture/society. This mastering is a process of lifelong learning, where individuals in 
the community are corrected by their peers towards appropriate (linguistic) 
behaviour. Different life-courses result in individually varying cultural-linguistic 
capabilities, which depend on the social environment and individual 
development/aging (also see 2.2.4, Bourdieu on capital).  
Discourse and linguistic analysts contribute the methodological tools to study the 
social construction in empirical interactional data. Synthetic efforts between 
Conversation Analysis (CA), post-structuralism and ethnomethodology have 
resulted in a wider interest in how to expand the empirical capabilities of CA to 
analysing the relation between institutions and long-term social processes with 
short-term interaction (Schegloff, 1997; Wetherell, 1998). Whereas these methods 
are often too focussed on micro-discourse analysis to be immediately useful to 
social analyses as conducted here, I utilise simplified CA symbols for transcription 
(p. 8). I further paid attention to pronoun changes and the construction of 
legitimacy (p. 140). Interactional sociolinguists and linguistic ethnographers have 
studied the enactment of identity in interaction, pointing to the multiplicity of 
identities a person can enact and the strategic positioning of such enactments 
(Blommaert and Rampton, 2011). These findings are useful to sensitise the social 
researcher more practically to the situatedness of discursive production, as 
mentioned above and further discussed in the methodology section on 
generalisability and interview data (3.1, 3.2). But dialogical constructivism has also 
influenced methodologies that are less focussed on micro-discourse, and more 
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interested in wider social coordination, such as Institutional Ethnography (Smith, 
2005), which informs this dissertation and which I will elaborate on below. 
To summarise, dialogical understandings of constructivism posit human interaction 
as the basic source of the production of meaning and culture. Semiosis is creative, 
but limited by social conventions, power relations, and extra-semiotic factors. 
Meaning carries a past legacy and future intent, that skilled speakers and hearers 
are aware of, and based on which they anticipate and create further responses. 
Thereby, meaning traverses time and space in an evolutionary, contingent, non-
teleological way, being transformed event after event. Both centripetal and 
centrifugal forces work on the relative stability and standardisation of meaning. I 
will return to dialogism and the temporality in the discussion of kairos (2.2.3) and 
anticipation (2.2.4). 
2.2 Shaping the Social 
Moving on from the ontological and epistemological foundations, the next 
theoretical dimension to be addressed is structure-agency, and bound up in this 
dynamic, social change.  As established above, language and semiosis are seen as 
technologies of social coordination, a perspective not only part of more recent 
‘discursive turns’ in social science, but also fundamental to Marxist theories of 
ideology (Eagleton, 2007). This takes us, as a first step, into the terrain of 
subjectivity and agency as concepts pertaining to the individual. 
Paul Smith (1988, p. 6) suggests that the poststructuralist critiques of the humanist 
individual created a theoretical impasse in Western philosophy. Whereas the 
negative, fragmented conception of the poststructural subject has become widely 
accepted, agency still tends to be thought of in terms of the humanist individual, 
understood as a “unified and coherent bearer of consciousness” and “intending and 
knowing manipulator of the object” (Smith, 1988, pp. xxx, xxviii). This leaves 
unresolved how to understand the “point of interaction between ideological 
pressures and subjective existence” (ibid, p.xxx). Paul Smith makes the central 
assertion that the difficulty to theorise the subject lies in the tradition of Western 
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philosophy itself, from Descartes to Sartre, which has repeatedly removed the 
subject from its actual living conditions into an abstract position: 
“current conceptions of the “subject” have tended to produce a purely theoretical 
“subject,” removed almost entirely from the political and ethical realities in which 
human agents actually live […] a different concept of the “subject” must be […] 
discovered.” (Smith, 1988, p. xxix) 
Subjectivity is an important category to interrogate in my research for two reasons: 
first, because I have grounded my starting point in participants’ narrated 
experiences, i.e. in their ‘subjective’ accounts. Hence it is important to clarify how 
their subjectivities help to understand the bigger picture of social reproduction and 
change in Cologne, Germany. Secondly, I raise the issue of subjectivity in terms of 
consciousness and self-esteem due to the guilty consciences carers reported to me. 
I will address this second aspect in terms of conflicting norms, rather than 
hegemony, in the current phase of transition between male-breadwinner and adult-
worker-models (see 4.5). The following sections will discuss important sources on 
subjectivity, and integrate those into the dialogical framework introduced above. 
Starting with a critique of the work of Butler, and her conception of temporal 
indeterminacy (2.2.1), the argument moves to insights how ‘experience’ can be 
conceptualised as a mediating concept between subjectivity and agency (2.2.2). 
Returning to issues of timing and change, it interrogates agency in terms of ‘kairos’ 
(2.2.3). Finally, I integrate various insights about temporality in relation to agency 
together in a discussion of Bourdieu’s understanding of anticipation (2.2.4).   
2.2.1 The Subject in Question 
The problem of subjectivity that Smith outlines can be re-examined as a need to 
theorise subjectivity in a theoretical framework that evades the problematic aspects 
of at least three common approaches to social science: the methodological 
individualist and voluntarist aspects of rational choice theory, the essentialism of 
some standpoint theory and psychoanalysis, and the ‘linguistic determinism’ of 
poststructuralist scholarship. The latter, built on the work of Foucault, Derrida, or 
Althusser, tends to conceive of “subjectification as subjection”, theorising the 
subject as a discursive product of a “dialectic between freedom and constraint” 
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(McNay, 2003, p. 140). Excessive emphasis placed on discursive construction can 
encourage a quasi-determinism of the “always passive” (ibid) subject, interpellated 
by social norms (Althusser, 2001). I want to discuss in some detail here a critique 
McNay (1999, 2003, 2004) offers on the conceptual limits of Butler’s 
poststructuralist theory of power and identity. Butler’s contribution to feminist 
scholarship is seminal, and cannot be discussed here in its entirety. The dimension 
picked out for its particular relevance is her treatment of performativity as a 
temporalised subjectification, and therein her focus on language. 
McNay lauds Butler for having brought feminism past the essentialist debate15 by 
historicising the symbolic through the concept of performativity. Butler understands 
identity as the effect of repetitions of acts that, through their ritualisation, can be 
attributed to relatively stable and recognisable categories (e.g. gender). This 
assumes a sedimentation of language around ritualised practices. Identity formation 
is constrained by external forces16 – subjection – leading in turn to an 
internalisation of social norms that enables the subject to draw on powers inherent 
in the subject position. This emerging agency of the subject is temporally delayed 
from the moment of subjection, constituting two distinct temporal modalities in 
which power affects the subject (Butler, 1997, p. 14). This conception expands from 
Foucault’s second volume of The History of Sexuality (1985), which raised the issue 
of morality and the conduct of the self, but left these ideas underdeveloped. McNay 
(1999, pp. 177–8) suggests that Butler builds on the strength of Foucault’s account, 
drawing attention to the historical specificity and variability of social norms. But she 
also perpetuates the weaknesses of Foucault’s account, chiefly a very abstract 
notion of subjectivity that oscillates between the poles of submission and 
autonomy. 
                                                     
15 Essentialist theory assumes an essence, or core of a person, exist independently from behaviour: 
she is a woman and that is why she acts feminine. This understanding, dominant historically, has 
been challenged by second-wave feminism. Poststructuralists oppose this separation of the self and 
practice as a naturalization of power relations. They reconceptualised identity as performative, 
interactional, or enacted: the human being acts in a feminine way which constitutes ‘her’ as a 
woman. 
16 Including punitive measures, verbal harassment, etc., in response to ‘wrong’ behaviour 
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Butler grounds the “social temporality” (1988, p. 520) in the separation of language 
and conduct, assuming a central role of language in subjection. She reworks Austin’s 
speech act theory, emphasising delayed effects of speech acts, which integrates a 
dialogical understanding of language into her theory of temporality (McNay, 1999, 
p. 178 ff). The intention and context in the moment of utterance (speaking) cannot 
be sustained to the moment of reception (listening/response). This deferral enables 
symbolic indeterminacy. In consequence it becomes viable to theorise resistance as 
resignification, mediated by the context and intentionality of reception. Butler 
attributes these resignifying acts predominantly to marginal groups, who, finding 
their own desires frustrated by mainstream culture, resort to subversive tactics17. 
Thereby Butler expands the ways in which analyses of power can integrate the 
symbolic as a dimension of struggle. However, McNay identifies some important 
limitations: 
 “The idea of the performative provides a compelling account of the open 
temporality of structure that permits the emergence of autonomous action, but it 
does not really consider how this symbolic indeterminacy relates to other social 
structures and how it may catalyse or hinder change. [This results in a 
predominantly] negative model of action as the displacement of constraining social 
norms.” (McNay, 1999, p. 176) 
Positing resignification as a radical emancipatory act discontinues the symbolic-
social separation that is foundational to Butler’s anterior theory-building, and 
expands from the theory of symbolic indeterminacy a generalised concept of 
agency. According to her critics, Butler not only takes this generalisation too far, she 
also misses the need to theorise how different sources of power and agency, 
grounded for instance in the economy, interact with resignification. McNay suggests 
that Butler provides a theory of the possibility of resistance, rather than a 
substantive concept of agency: in the performative, “Agency is conceived of, in one-
sided terms, as the indeterminacy of symbolic structures rather than as social 
practice. Agency is a quality of structures rather than subjects.” (2003, p. 143). This 
                                                     
17 The resignification by LGBT activists of the word ‘queer’ from a negative to a positive identification 
is an example. 
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leads to feminist theories using  “a rather unqualified notion of temporal 
indeterminacy [of meaning systems] to explain agency in place of a more 
differentiated account of the temporality of action” (McNay, 2003, p. 140 ff, italics 
added). Furthermore, Butler’s account emphasises the past in the role of subject 
formation (sedimentation, ritual) at the expense of the future, and a notion of 
anticipation (McNay, 2003). An important insight of poststructuralist accounts of 
the subject nevertheless reminds us that ‘freedom’ from subjection is – if at all – 
only achievable as exclusion from society, as the relinquishing of all power that 
comes from having a place in society, as being ‘someone’. This negative freedom 
appears rather undesirable and cannot be the target of emancipatory movements. 
Emancipation, in positive terms, needs to be about the distribution of means and 
recognition within society, about inclusion, and about a balancing of power in 
individual and collective relations. 
2.2.2 Agency and Experience 
McNay (2003, p. 141) suggests that a “valorization of experience” can partially 
overcome the limitations in Butler’s work through an emphasis on anticipation, and 
the social experience of time. In the following paragraphs I will address the concept 
of experience in the work of Edward P. Thompson, Joan Scott, and Dorothy Smith, 
tracing how experience can act as a mediating concept between subjectivity, 
agency, and structural social relations.  
On the question how experience relates to agency, Thompson (1966) suggests that 
objective social relations give rise to similar experiences amongst the people 
affected by them. These relations can be indirect. For example, he suggests, 
workers are in a direct relation to their employer, but workers themselves as a class 
do not intrinsically relate to each other. Institutions of the working class, such as 
unions or newspapers, come into being only through a process of class formation 
that begins in shared economic conditions, which give rise to shared experiences, 
which in turn enable a mobilisation around an emerging, shared subjectivity. His 
account is mainly targeted against structural Marxist accounts, which treat class as 
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a given economic category without inquiring into how class situations can lead to 
class consciousness and collective action.  
Thompson’s work is not without its critics and Wood (1982) reviews some of the 
charges raised against him: his conception of experience appears to some as 
voluntaristic, his insistence on the cultural process of class formation as ignorant of 
the economic determinants of class. In part the conflict appears to revolve around 
the interpretation of ‘class’, and whether as a concept class should exceed ‘the 
relations of production’ (Wood, 1982, p. 50). Thompson challenges accounts that 
equate capitalism with technological industrialisation, pointing out a mobilisation 
around exploitative social relations that predates industry, and is variegated across 
different social groups at the lower end of the stratum (ibid, p. 57). Thereby he 
demands an empirical effort to go beyond theoretical ideas about class and to 
examine the concrete historical social relations. To study experience entails “to 
explore what these ‘structures’ do to people’s lives, how they do it, and what 
people do about it” (Wood, 1982, p. 62). The latter refers to the political practices 
that can eventually emerge from shared experiences.  
This focus on political practice and experience is shared by standpoint feminists, 
and has been a central line of critique against them, for example by Scott (1991). 
Whereas she recognises his contributions to conceptualising agency, Scott criticises 
both Thompson and feminists following his ideas, charging them with an 
“essentializing” of class or gender as an overarching and dominant determinant of 
consciousness (1991, p. 787). Her claim has important implications of the limits of 
generalisability and unity of group identities, such as widely discussed in the 
critiques of standpoint feminism’s alleged totalisation of the term ‘woman’ 
(Crenshaw, 1989). While this does not negate that social relations bring forth 
identities, it must be clear that individuals identify with several categories, and that 
each intersectional combination of dimensions (class, gender, race, etc.) in different 
spaces and times takes on its own political dynamic. This in tendency undermines a 
feminist political union of women from different backgrounds, simply because the 
social relations they find themselves in vary and contain exploitative relations 
between women, such as between the ‘mistress and the maid’ (Young, 2001). 
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Scott furthermore points out that historical processes of subjectivity formation are 
discursively mediated. The epistemological issue that Scott provides a statement to 
is whether language and experience can be separated, or if experience needs to be 
treated as inherently discursive. She clearly advocates that all experience is 
discursive, and that because discourse is collective, experience is collective (Scott, 
1991, p. 793). Hereby Scott diverges from Thompson’s explanation that shared 
experience is grounded in shared objective social relations. The problem, as 
suggested already by McNay above, is that Scott’s concept of agency becomes very 
thin. This is because she posits discourse as the source of subjection, and 
subjectivity as causal for action. While Scott views the coexistence of various 
discourses, and the friction between them, as a source for change, she does not 
offer an account by which ability agents can select one discourse over the other. 
There is no point of traction outside of discourse that generates change. Agency 
offers no conceptual substance past an acknowledgement of enactment of 
subjectivity. Contextually, it is important to note that Scott’s paper is addressed as a 
critique to historians’ practice of taking their own and their sources’ experience at 
face value. Given the necessarily narrative accounts of experience that history deals 
with (as all research), it should be considered that whereas one may – as I do – 
disagree with her equation of experience with discourse in general, the 
consequences she draws are nevertheless relevant for the linguistic nature of 
experiential data. It is worth acknowledging how these insights point to limitations, 
but also strengths in research methods such as Foucault’s genealogy that seek to 
historicise experience and discover the power relations that make up the 
(discursive) politics of identity and group consciousness.  Therein, “experience is […] 
that which we want to explain” (Scott, 1991, p. 797). 
Dorothy Smith has attacked feminist poststructuralism, such as that of Scott and 





“Feminist postmodernism/poststructuralism has, of course, repudiated experience as 
a ground to speak from since its constitutive conventions deny the possibility of 
speech that is more than a movement within or an expression of a discursive logic, 
and of the existence of a subject outside or beyond discourse.” (Smith, 2009, p. 2, 
italics added) 
Poststructuralists, in the extreme, assume that subjectivity is a product of 
discourses entirely – hence reported experience has no critical potential, it just 
replicates the discourse. Smith, alongside other standpoint feminists, is sharply 
opposed. She views such poststructuralist accounts of the subject as part of the 
“relations of ruling”, textually-mediated, translocal modes of social organisation 
that move “knowledge, judgment, and will” away from local producers to central 
organisations (Smith, 1996, p. 175). These create an “out-of-body experience”, 
metaphorically speaking, that positions subjects outside of their bodily situatedness 
into a translocal, virtual reality, such as for instance scientific discourse, or the 
market economy18 (Smith, 2009). Excluding local bodily experience as a source of 
critique leaves poststructuralism defenceless to address these organisational forms 
of objectivation and local disempowerment. This dissertation, in fact, uses Smith’s 
approach to do exactly that for childcare in Cologne. 
By valorising experience as social and individual, that is socially produced and 
individually lived through, Dorothy Smith comes closer to bridging the gap that Paul 
Smith identified between ‘ideological pressures’ and the ‘existing subject’. As noted 
above, standpoint feminist approaches grounded in experience have been criticised 
for privileging (women’s) experience as an authentic source of knowledge, ignoring 
that all experience itself emerges from discourse, as poststructuralist or 
postmodernist theory assumes. As such they have been charged with essentialism 
and relativism19. Smith responds to this critique by stating that whereas standpoint 
feminism uses experience as an entry point for analysis, it does not treat individual 
accounts as sufficient or ideal data. Instead it searches for the commonalities in 
experience that can be explained by a shared social situation, and “studies up” 
                                                     
18 The conditions of existence in market societies shift away from interpersonal dependence to 
organisational ‘abstract’ dependence (Marx, 1973, p. 101) 
19 See Harding (2004a) for an overview  
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(Harding, 2004a, p. 30) into the institutions and discourses that shape these 
situations, and thereby create shared experience20. This also distinguishes 
standpoint approaches from locally-bounded ethnographic research, which does 
not necessarily explore the translocal and trans-contextual dimensions of analysis 
(ibid). Experience and everyday use of language may further be redeemed as an 
object of analysis because of their political relevance. Rejecting, for example, the 
literal meaning of ‘woman’ as anything that could truthfully and universally describe 
feminine or female human experience, does not disqualify that the sign ‘woman’ 
functioned as a unifying node of discussion and action for the white, middle-class 
Western women’s movement. This worked – within limits – according to Dorothy E. 
Smith, because the issues female activists discussed centred on the sexed body they 
shared: 
“In exploring our experiences we talked with, wrote to and for, women, beginning 
with what we shared as women, our sexed bodies. Here was and is the site of 
women’s oppression, whether through violence, rape, lack of control over our 
choices to have children, and, through our connectedness to our children through 
childbirth and suckling, the drudge of housework. To declare this is not to formulate 
essentialism or biological determinism. Women’s experience of oppression, whatever 
its form and focus, was grounded in male control, use, domination of our bodies. No 
transcendence for us. We were irremediably (as it seemed) defined by our bodies’ 
relevance for and uses to men.” (Smith, 2009, p. 8) 
The relevance of this experience cannot be found in the revelation of universals, but 
in its historical consequentiality as consciousness-raising in the formation of 
political activism, as Gramsci (1999) already established in his work on organic 
intellectuals. The link established here is not between discourse and subject, but 
between discourse and agent. Discourse is not a realm separate to the social or 
material world, but functions as a mechanism of interpersonal communication and 
coordination within it.  
Institutional Ethnography (IE) is a feminist sociology pioneered by Dorothy E. Smith. 
The analytical target of IE is “explication rather than theory building; the analysis is 
                                                     
20 See methodology chapter on generalisability (3.1) 
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meant to be ‘usable’ in the way that a map can be used to find one’s way” (DeVault, 
2006, p. 294). Smith’s intention to write a sociology “for people” that connects to 
lived experience, however, does not promote a sociology that exclusively builds on 
phenomenological experience (2005, p. 1). It takes people’s local experience as an 
entry point from which research must go further to understand the social 
mechanisms which created the experience to begin with. Although this research 
project primarily relies on interviews and does not include participant observation, 
it cannot be considered an ethnographic study. It t is however inspired by IE’s 
underlying logic. 
 “‘Standpoint as the design of a subject position in institutional ethnography creates 
a point of entry into discovering the social that does not subordinate the knowing 
subject to objectified forms of knowledge of society or political economy. It is a 
method of inquiry that works from the actualities of people’s everyday lives and 
experience to discover the social as it extends beyond experience. […] The 
institutional ethnographer works from the social in people’s experience to discover 
its presence and organization in their lives and to explicate or map that organization 
beyond the local of the everyday.” (Smith, 2005, pp. 10–1) 
Experience becomes framed here as a concept to mediate between subject 
positions and social structures, including a dimension of agency or ‘making of a 
subject position’. In that sense Smith continues Thompson’s grounding of 
experience in social relations, while acknowledging Scott’s qualification that 
experience is an effect of subjectivity. Smith shares with Thompson, building on 
Marx, the fundamental idea that individual social activities are grounded in material 
conditions, and that history and society are the forms of cooperation that these 
activities take. It is therefore that these social relations should be the object of 
inquiry (Smith, 2004, 2005, p. 57). In order to do so adequately, concepts need to 
correspond to the historically specific social relations, rather than a parsimonious, 
ahistorical canon of sociology. Only then can the retroductive (critical realist), 
dialogic methodology unfold.  
In order to take account of the acts of individuals without falling into voluntarism or 
material determinism, IE theorises the social in “how people’s activities or practices 
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are coordinated” (Smith, 2005, p. 59). In this pursuit, IE problematises the 
reproduction of dominant culture. This includes the production of legitimacy and 
authority, and how actors can draw on their subject positions in order to channel 
this authority in local contexts. Different pasts, presents, and anticipated futures, 
unique to each individual, allow for differences in interpretation and response. But 
differences between groups are also coordinated more systematically: through 
symbolic interaction as explored by Mead or in conversation analysis; in the 
relations of commodity production, as analysed by Marx; or through textually-
mediated processes, as Weber discussed in his work on bureaucracy. But the 
dynamics of (re-)distribution and recognition are always interlinked in the real 
world (Young, 1997), language is the medium “par excellence” for social 
coordination (Smith, 2005, p. 76). 
Drawing on Luria’s work on child and language development, Smith suggests that 
language creates attention to similarities, functioning as a verbal generalisation 
system21 (Smith, 2005, p. 83 ff). This allows children to learn to equate the word 
‘stick’ with all sticks (assimilating all the different things that can be subsumed 
under the term ‘stick’), or rarefy the meaning of an object to its most important 
characteristic (the table is for ‘eating at’, other properties or potential uses, such as 
‘standing on’, are excluded). Hence, meaning and corresponding ‘appropriate’ 
behaviour is prescribed in everyday language learning and use. This includes 
identity terms, and behaviours that become associated with it, such as gender or 
class, which children internalise and imitate from a very early age. An example for 
authority is the expertise of ECEC practitioners in child development assessment 
(see 5.4.2). 
In summary, it should be highlighted again that Dorothy Smith, not unlike Paul 
Smith, assumes an agent who exceeds subjectivity. This is supported by a theorising 
of a multiplicity of subject positions each agent traverses, a position partially shared 
by poststructural theory. However, standpoint theorists see further opportunities 
for the ‘excess’ of agency over subjectivity. They posit a human capability to make 
                                                     
21 Compatible with Sum & Jessop’s conception of semiosis as a simplification system. 
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sense out of the environment (such as the relations of production) that exceeds 
discourse in the sense that sense-making is a generative mechanism for meaning-
making, a creative process that mediates between substantive reality and language. 
The advantage of such an ontological assumption is that it is more capable of 
explaining how language and new subject positions are made in the first place. It is 
thus better positioned to explain change. This is relevant since my study is situated 
in a period of transition between gender models in which new subject positions 
(adult-worker) have gained a dominant, but not hegemonic position. In the analysis 
of interviews, the above perspective helps me to situate interview data as 
enactment of subjectivities. Therein, the recounted struggle between subject 
positions (e.g. gender identities) is a key feature of reconcilability problems. But 
recounted strategies also point to agential potentials or barriers that arise for 
certain actors at certain junctions. I analyse such ‘key events’, e.g. births, 
promotions, and parental leave taking, in chapter 4. 
2.2.3 Agency and Kairos: The Right Time for Change 
Towards a theory of timing relevant to these ‘key events’, I would like to introduce 
a conceptualisation of agency supplied by Herndl & Licona (2007). The authors seek 
to shape a notion of agency that, analogous to Foucauldian power (p. 88), targets 
the how-questions of social change. The problem posed by the authors is how to 
conceive of rhetorical agency, defined as something that effects change, within 
constraints of authoritative discourse. This perspective interrogates how the 
centripetal and centrifugal forces of language identified by Bakhtin work on subjects 
in specific contexts. Significantly, it delimits the concept of agency to a situation of 
change, rather than a general capacity to act. 
Agency, for Herndl & Licona, is thought to exist “at the intersection of a network of 
semiotic, material, and, yes, intentional elements and relational practices”, as a 
social location and opportunity that agents traverse, rather than a quality to be 
possessed (2007, p. 137). It is a “coming together of subjectivity and the potential 
for action” (Hedge 1998, in Herndl and Licona, 2007, p. 138). This conjunctural 
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understanding is not unique. What Herndl & Licona add to this is the temporality of 
agency expressed in the concept kairos. 
Chronos and kairos, as introduced above, connote two distinct ideas: chronos refers 
to the quantitative character of time, its divisible, measurable durations and 
irreversible, continuous flow; kairos refers to a qualitative aspect: the timing of a 
discrete event in history, the “when” in an order of events (Smith, 1969). It is 
translated as the ‘right time’, an opportunity given by the constellation of events. 
Kairos thus refers to a critical or turning-point in history, a situation of crisis, the 
fork in the road (ibid). Instead of conceptualising agency as the general capability to 
act, Herndl & Licona limit the concept to this specific – kairotic – moment. Agency is 
understood as “social subjects realizing the possibilities for action presented by the 
conjuncture of a network of social relations” (2007, p. 135)22. Implicit therein is the 
assumption “that postmodern subjects […] exist before or outside the agentive or 
authoritative performances, outside the shifting social location of agency and 
authority” (Herndl and Licona, 2007, p. 13, italics added). Whereas subjects pre-
exist, it is “the social phenomenon of agency [that] brings the agent into being” 
(Herndl and Licona, 2007, p. 140), giving primacy to the conjuncture rather than the 
actor. This reattributes the conditions for change to a spatiotemporal match 
between circumstances and subjectivity. Following Paul Smith, Herndl & Licona 
suggest that the human agent exceeds the subject. This ‘excess’, however, cannot 
be located within the individual, but becomes temporarily available to the subject 
due to the enabling circumstances of kairos.  
Their approach makes progress in going beyond a simple agency-
structure/freedom-constraint binary: it locates agency in the enactment of 
transformations in critical events, whose possibility is given by the conjuncture of 
enabling conditions. This reconfiguration of the agency concept has the advantage 
of separating the notion of agency from the notion of the individual. Another 
advantage is that kairotic moments can easily accommodate a multitude of actors 
working together or against each other. An example would be the interaction 
                                                     
22 Herndl & Licona draw on Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus, and how changing social conditions 
create differential potentials for action. 
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between fathers and their bosses in leave-taking negotiations, and how these 
events shape lives and understandings of acceptable masculinities (4.3.3.3). Instead 
of pitching individuals against structures, then, agency points to a time-space of 
contingency in which structures can be transformed through subjective intent. I 
suggest that this aspect of conjuncture highlighted by Herndl & Licona is crucial in 
understanding how temporality enters into the agency-structure debate. However, 
theorising empowering elements in conjunctures appears more of a theory of 
structures, or indeed, a theory of the possibility of agency, as McNay (2003) has 
already pointed out as a weakness of poststructuralism. The critique regarding the 
abstractness of theories of agency, and the lack of embedding in actual lives and 
events, has been partially countered here through the notion of kairos, placing the 
situated event/conjuncture into the centre of analysis, as I will do in chapter 4. The 
concept however, deprived of empirical application, remains uncomfortably 
abstract. For a holistic account, more needs to be said about how agents seize 
kairotic moments. I will do so by connecting experience and kairos with Bourdieu’s 
theory of habitus. 
2.2.4 Agency as Anticipation 
Both McNay and Herndl & Licona point to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to make 
sense of subject formation. Bordieu & Wacquant’s definition captures in many ways 
what has previously been discussed as experience, oriented to the past. The 
definition by McNay, respectively, adds a future-oriented dimension. Together 
these combine to enable a fully dialogical framework. 
“… habitus consists of a set of historical relations ‘deposited within individual bodies 
in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation, and 
action.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) 
“Habitus, or the construction of the body within cultural norms, is understood not 
simply in unidirectional terms of the body’s retention of exogeneously imposed 
norms, but also in terms of the anticipatory dimension of protention, or the living 
through of those norms.” (McNay, 2003, p. 143) 
Bourdieu’s habitus is described as a “strategy-generating principle enabling agents 
to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 22). It is 
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creative and adaptive, but within the limits of structure (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992). This non-determinism has been theorised from two entry points: firstly, in 
Bourdieu’s treatment of individuality, which he perceives as a social trajectory in 
which “the habitus could be considered as a subjective but not individual system of 
internalized structures” that is the product of a different chronology of experiences 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 86). Early experiences, Bourdieu suggests, are most important, 
building the foundations against which all later experiences are understood. 23 
Consequently, individual styles are structural variations of a group habitus that 
emerge from different sequences of events between individual lives – individual 
paths of integration into a common social positions (such as class). 
Secondly, to theorise structural limitations, one needs to examine more closely 
what has previously been called constraint, authority or structure. Structures are 
not only – or necessarily – constraining. Whereas, for example, authority selects 
some discourses over others, and hence excludes, it also empowers the selected. 
Structures are thus in part a product of their own reproductive functions, which 
explains conservative biases. But they are also porous to transformative action that 
is generated within and outside of them. Following Bourdieu’s theory, structure 
does not cover humankind in a total manner, but exists as specific fields. 
“A field consists of a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored 
in certain forms of power (or capital) […] each field prescribes its particular values 
and possesses its own regulative principles.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) 
Understood this way, field is potentially synonymous with institution or discipline. 
The metaphor of battlefield has the advantage of ambiguity: it is the status quo of 
history, an objective configuration of resources (capital) in space, a landscape of 
hierarchical positions (the higher and lower ground). Yet at the same time it is the 
space of struggle, where the future is decided (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).  
A central aspect to Bourdieu’s work is the assertion that social and cognitive 
structures are generatively linked, which is why an analysis of culture (or discourse) 
is effectively a political analysis, revealing relations of symbolic power (Bourdieu 
                                                     
23 This perspective also informs discourses emphasising the importance of ECEC. 
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and Wacquant, 1992). This idea restates in a different context previous perspectives 
that meaning emerges in the interaction between human and environment (sense-
making). Symbolic power enters into the anticipations of social agents, their 
subjective expectations of future possibilities. In Bourdieu’s (1977, p. 77) words: 
“… practical evaluation of the likelihood of the success of a given action in a given 
situation brings into play a whole body of wisdom, sayings, commonplaces, ethical 
precepts (‘that’s not for the likes of us’) and, at a deeper level, the unconscious 
principles of the ethos which, being the product of a learning process dominated by a 
determinate type of objective regularities, determines ‘reasonable’ and 
‘unreasonable’ conduct for every agent subjected to those regularities.”  
The tendency for the subject to anticipate a future based on past experience can 
explain stability tendencies. A challenge to explain social change emerges practically 
and epistemologically: the categories in use in everyday life are generated by the 
social relations underlying them. Methodologically, this necessitates a “double 
reading” in scientific practice that addresses both objective-material and semiotic 
levels of social relations (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 11), which I see mirrored 
in Sum & Jessop’s approach, as well as in Smith’s “studying up”. As suggested by 
McNay (2003, p. 141), in this effort “an interpretative analysis of experience must 
always be resituated within the overarching problematic of power relations”, in 
which a “hermeneutic interpretation of time is crucial in revealing the role played 
by anticipation within practice and agency”. 
Bourdieu integrates a theory of experience with a dialogical theory of agency, 
pointing to the centrality of anticipation as something grounded in the past and 
shaping present action directed at the future. To emphasise again a key point 
Herndl & Licona take from Bourdieu: Separating the theory of subject formation 
from the theory of agency makes it possible to consider the historical trajectory of 
an individual and the history of subject formation (collective categories, such as 
class, gender) separately from the structural conjuncture (kairotic moment) in one 
specific moment. This is not meant to suggest that the history subject and individual 
capability to affect kairotic moments (events) are separable – rather the opposite – 
but it emphasises a degree of (temporal) independence between the historical 
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subject and the present agent, pointing towards the innovative and reflective 
capabilities of the subject to adapt to a present event or anticipated opportunity. 
Authority and other forms of constraint, then, can be considered as resources or 
barriers to this adaptation process. In the case study below, for example, the 
availability of public childcare will be discussed as an enabling condition for 
mothers’ labour market participation. 
In continuation of the discussion on Bourdieu’s work on the habitus, I would like to 
introduce more of his work on uncertainty, the experience of time, and the 
connection between time and power. Bourdieu (1990, pp. 98–99) suggests that the 
introduction of uncertainty into sociological theory is crucial, because it dispels any 
simple notion of the rational actor or structural behaviour. Taking seriously the 
uncertainty encountered in daily life necessitates theorising how actors respond to 
uncertainty, and how uncertainty undermines any rational action, if rationality is 
understood as an informed comparison of alternative outcomes and the selection 
of the best. Bourdieu proposes that actors faced with uncertainty undertake 
activities to reduce this uncertainty, in order to make the world “liveable”, 
practically “foreseeable” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 215). This resonates with Sum & 
Jessop’s idea of complexity reduction as a necessity to ‘go on’ in social life. More 
importantly, to “reintroduce uncertainty is to reintroduce time” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 
99). The irreversibility of time not only introduces risk, time as social experience 
also raises attention to the plurality of social times and power that resides in the 
control over such social temporalities.  
The experience of time is grounded in the matching between subjective 
expectations and objective opportunities. Time becomes perceptible in experiences 
of impatience, regret, nostalgia, boredom, or stress, when expectations and 
realities clash (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 208). This theorisation derives from Bourdieu’s 
work on the relation between the habitus and field, in which he posits that the 
internalisation of past experiences produces dispositions that are adjusted to the 
social opportunity structure. Thereby he suggests that the opportunities given 
through capital endowment shape individual consciousness and motivations, the 
“investment” in the social game (ibid, p.213).  
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“Thus, the experience of time is engendered in the relationship between habitus and 
the social world, between the dispositions to be and to do and the regularities of a 
natural and social cosmos (a field). It arises, more precisely, in the relationship 
between the practical expectations or hopes which are constitutive of an illusio as 
investment in a social game, and the tendencies immanent to this game, the 
probabilities of fulfilment that they offer to these expectations.” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 
208) 
Investment presupposes ‘things to do’, a social role or life’s purpose, that integrates 
the individual into the social temporal order with all its regularities. For the 
individual, this allows an anticipation of the future, a forthcoming of the present in 
the form of future obligations or opportunities. This enables a strategic orientation 
to this future, an ability to ‘make’ time, to “temporalize oneself” (ibid, pp. 207–13). 
The diversity of ways to temporalise oneself, bounded by unequal capital 
endowments, creates a plurality of social times. Bourdieu suggests that 
powerlessness prevents investments in the social game, producing detachment, 
where the “link between present and future is broken” (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 221–2). 
In his description of the Algerian subproletariat he refers to fantastic expectations 
and perceptions of life as a gamble, which he attributes to a fatalism bred from 
powerlessness. Respectively, the time of the executive, keenly invested and 
experienced as a permanent hurry, becomes a “fundamental dimension of the 
social value of that person” (ibid, p. 226).  
Bourdieu emphasises that timing is a type of power in itself. He locates this power 
in the ability to make somebody else wait, to wait oneself, or to speed up the pace 
of an interaction. Deferring an act, or acting to surprise others, requires control over 
timing. Its effect lies in the capability to make oneself unpredictable, exposing 
others to the anxiety of not being able to anticipate the course of future interaction 
(Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 227–8). This secures the initiative for the person in control and 
puts others at a strategic disadvantage. Bourdieu also indicates how power over 
distribution is temporal. Timing determines distributive practices as stable or 
arbitrary, setting the pace of economic relations. Following this insight, 
flexibilisation must be seen not only as a technology to efficiency maximisation, but 
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centrally as a disempowerment of those who are exposed to temporal insecurity, 
those or are, in Bourdieu’s words, “condemned to live in a time oriented by others, 
an alienated time” (ibid, p. 237, emphasis added). With regard to Europe in the 21st 
century, Bourdieu (2000) remarks that trends towards flexibilisation and 
precariatisation lead to increased, more widespread risks for a mismatch between 
objective opportunities and subjective expectations, especially for the younger 
generations. Socially determined criteria, such as stable employment and property, 
help to make sense of a “signposted universe” of inclusions and exclusions, which 
regulate the predictability of social trajectories (ibid, p. 225). This holds on the 
individual level for the expectable life-course, and on the collective level for the 
orientation of political projects. I will return to this as the key finding I perceive in 
the current dynamic of professional parents, who experience time conflicts as part 
of gendered identity conflicts in a period of flexibilisation of family models and 
labour market temporalities. 
A profound consequence of uncertainty about the future is uncertainty about 
identity (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 237). Bourdieu understands identity in terms of an 
ability to make sense of oneself and one’s life. And whereas he observes a relative 
autonomy of the symbolic, and perceives therein a subversive potential not unlike 
the symbolic indeterminacy identified by Butler, Bourdieu reminds us that any 
breaking of the social rules is perceived and judged by society (ibid). That judgment 
can mark subversive acts as either transgression or liberation, the latter which is 
thereby legitimated. This legitimation of the individual subversive act, however, 
requires that the norms underlying social judgment are already weakened. Most 
profoundly, the social world can bestow unto the individual “that which they most 
totally lack: a justification for existing”, a “right to feel justified in existing as he or 
she exists” (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 237, 239 , italics in original). This social importance 
– purpose, raison d’être, identity – is therefore utterly dependent on the 
recognition that underlies social inclusion. A contemporary example where this 
recognition is withdrawn in the role of the housewife.  
Bourdieu further asserts that the symbolic effects of (social, cultural, economic) 
capital exceed the direct impact of these capitals on the social hierarchy by 
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constructing a symbolic hierarchy of worthiness, legitimacy, and significance that 
reinforce social structures. I will discuss this in terms of occupational hierarchies 
and gender segregation. These hierarchies, and the institutional arrangements in 
which they are realised, in turn connect to specific lived temporalities, simply put, 
schedules befitting certain positions. Here, disposable time, available in the right 
quantity and quality, can be observed as a conduit or barrier to inclusion. In the 
case study below, parents’ time will be analysed to tease out these quantities of 
time, over the schedule of the working week, and its qualities, with regard to the 
experience of ‘free time’, degrees of exhaustion, as well as the effects of being able 
to sell different kinds of skilled labour time (chapter 4).  
What I want to draw attention to with this paragraph is how embedded temporality 
is across different perspectives on society, from economic logistics to matters of 
identity and legitimacy, and as a consequence how useful a temporal perspective 
can be to bring together these different perspectives in order to see their 
interdependence. The central insight that I take from Bourdieu is the theory of 
anticipation as a link between past and future, as well as between subjective sense-
making and objective contextual conditions. Anticipation and investment can 
explain tendencies to social stability in a non-deterministic way. Crucially, 
Bourdieu’s approach brings out the importance of power over time as an ability to 
provide or withhold predictability, cooperation, and resources. The next section will 
engage this issue of temporality and power through a discussion of theories of 
government and social coordination, a very short reflection on the history of 
modernity in terms of separate ‘spheres’, and a concluding section on the value of 
time in terms of alienation and eudaimonia. 
2.3 Coordinating the Social 
Previously in this study, time has been conceptualised as the ‘right time’ of agency, 
kairos, or opportunity. Time has further been discussed as dialogism, history, and 
anticipation. These understandings of social time incorporate temporal 
prescriptions as aspects of social norms: 
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“Time’s ordering character for social life does not arise from the passage of time or 
the temporal duration of social systems, but from its normative effect on the 
structure and coordination of behaviour.” (Bergmann, 1992, p. 99) 
When we ask therefore, as Sum & Jessop (2013) do, how societies manage 
complexity, and the uncertainty that perpetually arises from complexity, we need to 
direct our attention to the mechanisms by which predictability is enhanced: to 
forms of standardisation that rarefy social relations and subjectivities into 
comprehensible, limited spaces of interaction. This rarefication enforces a necessity 
to select, it provides selectable alternatives, imbued with tendencies and 
rationalities that encourage or discourage certain actions. Jessop summarises this in 
the concept of structural selectivity: 
“… the concept of structural selectivity highlights the tendency for specific structures 
and structural configurations to selectively reinforce specific forms of action, tactics, 
or strategies and to discourage others.” (Jessop, 2005, p. 49) 
Structural selectivity resonates with Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of objective 
opportunity structures and adapted habiti, sharing a view on “regulated liberties” 
(McNay, 2003, p. 144) in the interplay of agential and structuring.  
With regard to selectivities, Jessop already emphasised the importance of 
spatiotemporality: 
 “Thus the spatio-temporal selectivity of an organisation, institution, institutional 
ensemble, or structural configuration involves the diverse modalities in and through 
which spatial and temporal horizons of action in different fields are produced, spatial 
and temporal rhythms are created, and some practices and strategies are privileged 
and others made more difficult to realize according to how they ‘match’ the temporal 
and spatial patterns inscribed in the relevant structures.” (Jessop, 2005, p. 51) 
The central theoretical proposition put forth here is that social relations have their 
own rhythm. Applied to the case, this means that – simplified – childcare practices 
are informed by the social temporal norms of the ‘private sphere’, whereas work 
practices are informed by the norms of the ‘public sphere’ (2.3.2). Glucksmann 
(1998), amongst others, has demonstrated that this binary understanding of the 
private and public sphere is historically contingent. Neither all work relations, nor all 
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care relations, can be grasped through this binary. If taken verbatim, the simplified 
model obscures the variety of social relations in work and care that are part of daily 
life. At the same time, it cannot be denied that ‘work’ and ‘care’ function as 
semantic nodes in distinct clusters of association. A linking of work-public 
workplace-male-paid-formal and care-private home-female-unpaid-informal does 
not do justice to the actualities of work and care, but it carries forth cultural 
patterns of thought that act as a ‘norm-to-understand-against’. This becomes visible 
in participants’ articulations of their own daily lives. A small example can be found 
in my interview with Johanna, a childcare manager and mother:  
Johanna: “dad has the [the fulltime job] dad is the mom, so to speak. […] hehe, dad 
has the, my husband also cooks, I can . not really cook . and also, that is maybe a little 
bit of a kind of specialty, where we also actually deviate” (I17, 24:12) 
Without wanting to go too deep into analysis here, this example suggests how 
Johanna constructs her narrative about herself and her family with reference to the 
constructions of what is a ‘mom’, and what is a ‘dad’. Cooking for the family, 
traditionally understood as feminine, is drawn upon as a contrast to her husband’s 
role at home, supporting her argument of reversed roles, and the deviating family. 
This kind of referencing and comparing to an (unspoken) norm is a common feature 
in the interviews I recorded. It shows what I mean by ‘norms-to-understand-
against’: norms that function as collective ideas, but of which everyone is aware 
that they do not represent reality. They are more of standard against which the 
variety of actual experiences can be assessed. Implicit in these norms, very clear in 
this example, are gendered standards of where and how time ought to be spent.  
This function of norms in semiosis is important in analysing narratives, but more 
profoundly it is relevant to conceptualise how experience, anticipation, and identity 
are subjected. Dorothy Smith’s understanding of ‘the relations of ruling’, Herndl & 
Licona’s treatment of authority, and Bakhtin’s reference to centripetal forces all in 
some form explore what Gramsci called hegemony (1999), but also to what 
Foucault called gouverner (1985). I will explore the ideas of hegemony and 
governing in the next subsection, drawing a connection between power and 
knowledge, bridging Foucault’s notion of conduct and morality with Smith’s ideas 
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about social coordination and texts (2.3.1). This will be followed by a discussion of 
social relations and reconcilability, as initiated above, adding more historical and 
theoretical detail. Here I will address the failing complementarity of public and 
private spheres past the Fordist age (2.3.2). Last, I will raise again the connection 
between temporality and norms in the shape of the valorisation of time, the 
experience of alienation and happiness (2.3.3). 
2.3.1 Hegemony, Conduct, and Translocal Coordination 
 
“The basic premise of the theory of hegemony is one with which few would disagree: 
that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas […] The concept of hegemony 
[…] means political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is 
secured by the diffusion and popularization of the worldview of the ruling class.” 
(Bates, 1975, pp. 351–52) 
Fundamental to both hegemony and gouverner is the question of ruling, and the 
relation between force and consent, and inherent therein, subjection. I have 
discussed subjectification above, pointing out the advantage of conceptually 
separating the internalisation of subject positions (subjection) in the past and 
enactment of subjectivity (agency) in the present. This distinction theorises the 
space for an emerging future, one not wholly determined by or foreseeable from 
the past, and hence a potential for human action leading to (intended) social 
change. Nevertheless, I have highlighted through a discussion of Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus and anticipation how the opportunities of the present are shaped by the 
past. In more depth than before, I am now going to discuss such limitations and 
directions to possible change through the concepts of hegemony and gouverner: 
“In the Gramscian tradition, hegemony refers to the capacity of ruling social forces to 
impose their own material interests in such a way that they are acknowledged by 
other social forces, in particular subaltern ones, as legitimate and representative of 
the general interest of society.” (Brand and Sekler, 2009, p. 55) 
Gramsci’s work marks a cultural turn from 19th to 20th century Marxism, centred 
on his twin concepts of ideology and hegemony (Bates, 1975, p. 353). Ideology is 
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produced by an organic intellectual, and her ‘philosophy’ that contains all language, 
common sense, popular religion, and folklore that make up her cultural 
environment, as well as her critical reflection upon society, and knowledge 
imparted through its institutions, such as schools (Gramsci, 1999, p. 626). 
Decisively, every human being is – at least in potentia – an intellectual. Gramsci 
further theorises the creation of new ideologies by intellectuals as leaders of mass 
movements, and ideologies as tools in attempts to create new political collectives, 
achieve and maintain hegemony over society (1999, p. 658). This account, 
addressing the gap between ideological pressures and the existing subject that Paul 
Smith problematised, mirrors concerns addressed by the Bakhtin Circle about the 
connection between consciousness, culture, and authority. According to Gramsci, 
social consciousness can be moulded by civil institutions, such as schools, journals, 
or parties, to allow for consensual modes of ruling. With the conceptual separation 
of civil society from political institutions of the state, such as police and courts, 
Gramsci locates consensual (hegemonic) and coercive (dominant) forms of 
government in different sets of institutions (Bates, 1975).  Neo-Gramscian scholars, 
such as Jessop, have rejected the conceptual separation between civil and political 
society, and the separation between consent and coercion on an 
institutional/organisational level. This indicates a theoretical distinction between 
Marxist, neo-Gramscian and Foucauldian theories, insofar that some Marxists, 
including Gramsci, treat the state as a substantial locus of power over society.  
Foucault meanwhile studied “the historical constitution of different state forms in 
and through changing practices of government without assuming that the state has 
a universal or general essence” which Jessop identifies as “crucial […] for an anti-
essentialist, non-teleological, ex post-functionalist explanation of capitalist 
development and state formation” (Jessop, 2007, pp. 37–8). This perception of the 
state derives from Foucault’s underlying conceptualisation of power, and inherent 
in this the issue of subjectivity and morality. According to Foucault, power is not 
something to be possessed; rather, it is “an action upon an action” (Foucault, 1982, 
p. 220), a practice enacted in a relationship which delineates the space for possible 
actions between agents. Power is enacted (Foucault, 1978, pp. 92–102). It is 
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productive as cause and effect of social practises or ‘technologies’ (Foucault, 2009, 
p. 2). By this definition, Foucault distances his concept of power from any 
hierarchical apparatus of sovereignty that implies an essence of power possessed by 
any institutional body or actor, specifically the state. Power cannot be equated 
with, but rather produces durable structured fields of interaction. These situated 
patterns are anchored in specific organisations, operational knowledges, and 
targets. Foucault’s concept ‘gouverner’ is often translated as government, albeit the 
term ‘governance’ might be more appropriate: 
 “Government refers to more or less systematized, regulated and reflected modes of 
power [technologies] that go beyond the spontaneous exercise of power over others, 
following a specific form of reasoning [rationality] which defines the telos of action or 
the adequate means to achieve it.” (Lemke, 2002, p. 53) 
Between Foucault’s work on subjectivity in the History of Sexuality and the lectures 
on government at the Collège de France, Lemke (2002) identifies a link in the 
discussions between the “technologies of the self” and the “technologies of 
domination”. This link becomes visible in the way Foucault unravels the historical 
meaning of the term ‘gouverner’ (to govern) – how it denoted not just the practices 
of the formal state to which it is attached today (government), but also the ruling 
over and enacting of good practices in administration and commerce, the family, 
and on the self (good governance). This understanding of government was coined 
by Foucauldian scholars as the “conduct of conduct” (Lemke, 2002).  
Given Foucault’s anti-essentialist, historicised understanding of state formation as 
well as his dispersed view of power in the micro relations of society, he is faced with 
the problem of explaining how government functions as a translocal mechanism. 
This is where the link between technologies of domination and technologies of the 
self becomes crucial. I will explore this link in the context of a governmentality that 
Foucault called biopolitics. It is relevant to this study empirically, because it pertains 
to the governing of populations, i.e. social reproduction, as well as to forms of 
governing that I will continue to discuss in terms of new public management and 
assessment (5.4).  
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Biopolitics refers to an increased concern with the interiority of the state in terms of 
population management and control emerging in the 18th-century and 
characteristic of 20th-century Europe (Foucault, 2002, 2008). It is linked to a 
conception of the state as a territorial unit in competition with others, not in terms 
of territorial expansion, but rather in an international regime of competitive 
advantage through efficient government. Foucault connects biopolitics to a 
technique of government that treats humans not as individuals, but a multiplicity, 
which is affected by social risks emerging from urban industrial society, such as 
public hygiene, health, and birth control (ibid). This governing rationality is 
implemented through systems of totalisation and individualisation. These go hand 
in hand with two forms of knowledge about people: “one, globalizing and 
quantitative, concerning the population” which emerges through the introduction 
of statistical data-gathering and use by state authorities. The second form of 
knowledge, “analytical, concerning the individual” (Foucault, 1982, p. 215), is linked 
to a ‘pastoral power’, which refers historically to the power of the priest to 
influence the conduct of people through the means of confession and the provision 
of salvation. In a modern context, salvation-in-the-next life has been replaced with 
welfare-in-this-life. Through a transfer from civil organisations, such as the Church, 
friendly societies, or unions, the welfare state takes over these functions of 
government. Confession has moved from the domain of the priest to that of the 
doctor, psychologist, human resource manager, or teacher as ‘assessment’. These 
knowledge systems engage in a technique of subjection: 
“This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the 
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, 
imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to 
recognize in him. In is a form of power which makes individuals subjects […]: subject 
to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a 
conscience or self-knowledge” (Foucault, 1982, p. 212). 
Creating a system of knowledge that ‘conducts conduct’, Foucault suggest, firstly 
means to create some form of moral code (Foucault, 1985, p. 25). But secondly, 
morality also designates the actual human behaviour in response to a moral code. 
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Thirdly, there is also an issue how one “ought to ‘conduct oneself’ – that is, the 
manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject” (ibid). The latter is 
important, because it addresses the alternatives that are left open by the 
interpretation of the moral code. The selection of alternatives is connected to the 
“modes of subjection […] the way in which the individual establishes his relation to 
the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice” (Foucault, 1985, p. 
27) in a long-term construction of the ethical self. This self feels “responsible”, 
which compels questions about not only the roles of identities, but also the 
importance of “self-esteem” in the shaping of social power relations (Lemke, 2002, 
p. 59). The contemporary literature contesting ‘accountability’ in new public 
management (Tsui and Cheung, 2004; Burton and van den Broek, 2009; Griffith and 
Smith, 2014) draws on this issue of the moral subject in the context of welfare 
reform, interrogating the role of front-line social workers. This draws attention to 
morality in terms of enactment and representation, as I will briefly discuss for 
childcare managers below (5.4.3). 
Limitations in Foucault’s work are apparent in his focus on the history of systems of 
thought, made explicit for instance in his studies of the “art of government” rather 
than the “ways in which governors really governed” (Foucault, 2010, p. 2). This 
focus leaves unexamined the mechanisms through which the ideas Foucault traces 
become effective in real life, and how they act on subjects. It excludes an empirical 
enquiry into the negotiation of discourses in ongoing human interaction.  
“Post-structuralist theorizing of discourse, including Michel Foucault’s, presuppose, 
but leave unanalyzed, the socially organized practices and relations that objectify, 
including but not reducible to those visible in discourse itself.” (Smith, 2009, p. 5)  
In order to problematise the relation between discourse and enactment, rule 
formulations and behaviour, needs to be examined separately. By this I simply 
mean that the verbalisation or formalisation of social rules, such as for example in 
written law, are distinct from the daily enactment (Ball, Maguire and Braun, 2012) 
of that law: first, as separate entities; and following from that, because there is no 
guarantee of compliance or uniformity of response to the rule formulation. To 
examine how social rules are reproduced in everyday life, the mechanisms need to 
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be uncovered by which this reproduction takes place as something that limits other 
possible action. As suggested by Foucault above, this extends further into how 
individuals take up moral codes and apply them to themselves. 
The key contribution Dorothy Smith throughout her complete work makes to the 
theorisation of this relation between rule formulations and rule following is the 
insight that modern forms of governing usually involve textual mechanisms of 
coordination: 
“The relations of ruling form a complex field of coordinated activities. They are 
activities in and in relation to texts, and texts coordinate them as relations. Text-
mediated relations are the forms in which power is generated and held in 
contemporary societies. The materiality of the text and its indefinite replicability 
creates a peculiar ground in which it can seem that language, thought, culture, 
formal organization, have their own being, outside lived time and the actualities of 
people’s living – other than as the latter become objects of action or investigation 
from within the textual.” (Smith, 2009, p. 5) 
This form of coordination creates a link between the local particular and more 
general organisations of ruling, which it is possible to investigate empirically. Smith 
(2009) refers back to Foucault work on power/knowledge, highlighting the use of 
text in the domain of mass media and bureaucracy as a site for capitalist and state 
coordination. These forms of social innovation become possible historically with the 
invention of movable type24. Examples of textual coordination are electoral 
processes, the news coverage and circulation of written legislation, and more 
broadly the dissemination of values and problematisations from politically 
organised groups towards the reader. Another form of textual coordination 
highlighted by IE scholars is management based on the use of forms and other 
predesigned texts to guide work processes. The spread of IT systems for the 
purposes of enterprise resource planning and the technical possibilities of 
monitoring performance through these are an important contemporary example of 
                                                     
24 It is not the invention of printing per se, but the acceleration and simplification of the printing 
process using metal movable type, invented by Gutenberg around 1450 CE, that makes large-scale 
use of texts possible. 
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disciplinary technologies25. A lot of IE work has been carried out with a focus on 
front-line workers in health (Rankin, 2003; McGibbon, Peter and Gallop, 2010), 
education (Nichols and Griffith, 2009), and childcare (Weigt, 2006; McNeil, 2008), 
often by former professionals themselves. Much of this work has criticised the 
effects of accountability discourses and new public management (Griffith and 
Smith, 2014). I will apply these frameworks in particular in section 5.4. 
Smith’s (2009, p. 9 ff) critique of Foucault centres on his analytic standpoint outside 
of the stories he tells about power/knowledge, outside the subject matter of such 
situations. Foucault’s method operates top-down in the sense that is starts from the 
general, and exemplifies the situated. These examples therefore remain spurious 
accounts of a hypothesised power/knowledge. Smith, without developing her work 
to that purpose, inverts some of Foucault’s method, starting with recurring patterns 
of local experience, and seeking the concrete organisations that create the general 
power/knowledge functional within this relation between organisation and local 
experience. Thereby her method goes beyond a local-general (micro-macro) 
dichotomy, linking up a network of historical localities which are influencing each 
other translocally: 
“… while the relations of ruling connect across local sites of people’s living, they are 
produced and reproduced as a local historical organization of the work of particular 
people in particular local settings.” (Smith, 2009, p. 11) 
From this theoretical premises the methodology of IE develops, recording local 
experiences as an entry point, and expanding along social relations to the next 
hierarchical level of governance, to understand how it influenced the local 
experience. The focus on conduct and governance as techniques of social 
coordination makes it possible to address not only government as an arena, but 
coordination through all the relations that make up society. In this framework, it 
                                                     
25 These systems automatise and regulate work flows between different employees through the use 
of forms, integrating and collecting data across business processes in order to measure performance 
in real time and through specific indicators. There is an important overlap between the 
implementation of such software and the involvement of consultants in companies. Data collected 
from business processes can thereby be used to identify spaces for saving resources and becomes 
key in restructuring processes. 
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becomes possible to link different scales of formal government (international, 
national, federal, local) with everyday life by explicating translocal processes of 
ruling. Tracing relations conducted through policy outside of the formal state, 
private institutions such as companies, associations, and the family become visibly 
linked into a larger map that shows the relations of ruling within society. This 
relational research includes the texts and knowledge that travel in these social 
relations, as well as the forms of power that organise relational strategies, the 
mechanisms of enforcement and their consequences.  
Having established an account of the ‘how’ of social coordination in general, and a 
research strategy to match it, I will turn in the following section to the relevant 
case: work-family reconcilability. 
2.3.2 Reconcilability and Spheres: A Matter of Time 
Before commencing with the final part of the theoretical discussion, I would like to 
remind the reader of the empirical theme: reconcilability (see 4.1); the necessity of 
bringing together practices of work and family in such a way that they are 
temporally compatible (synchronised). To the extent to which these practices form 
stable sets, enacted in temporal and spatial separation, it is possible to speak of 
distinct spheres (Glucksmann, 1998). This language of spheres has been applied to 
differentiate between the public and private, denoting a moral and practical 
distinction between gendered lives. The idea of a historical gendered duality of 
spheres has been challenged empirically. The degree of separateness depends on 
the concrete sociohistorical context, and cannot be assumed as a general condition 
(Glucksmann, 1998). Furthermore, the binary of private and public in liberal thought 
has been said to mystify the subordination of women, confined to the private 
sphere; the universal individual citizen as the subject of liberal theory is modelled 
on male lives, and obscures the patriarchal character of private relations in 
capitalist society (Pateman, 1989). Pateman goes as far as to suggest that “the 
dichotomy between the private and the public is central to almost two centuries of 
feminist writing and struggle; it is, ultimately, what the feminist movement is 
about” (1989, p. 118).  
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A historically situated approach needs to identify a sphere by the exclusiveness of 
practices allocated to specific spaces, times, and people. The test for reconcilability 
is to ask: Does this arrangement allow individuals to travel between ‘spheres’ and 
take up multiple subject positions? Are the respective temporalities and spaces 
traversable? Or: Does this arrangement demand individuals to be in two places at 
one time, say, at the day-care centre to pick up their child and at work in a 
meeting? Speaking about spheres in such a way, not unlike how Bourdieu speaks 
about fields, enables an inquiry into the temporal structures of societies. 
The separation of spheres clearly appears in the 19th century bourgeois male-
breadwinner-model (Frevert, 1989). Therein, private and public sphere could be 
reconciled by gendered specialisation. It also mark a class distinctions, because for 
the working class housewifery was never an economic option (Canning, 1992). 
Working mothers needed to do both, the paid and family work (double burden). 
This became more difficult with the separation of workplace and home, pointing to 
spatial changes in the social organisation of industrial production that continue to 
shape contemporary society. In the 19th century historical setting, we can also 
locate the emergence of a new institutions: the kindergarten (5.1.1), and maternity 
leave, the precursor of parental leave (4.3.1). The theoretical challenge here has 
been succinctly put down by Harvey: 
“The objectivity of time and space is given in each case by the material practices of 
social reproduction, and to the degree that these latter vary geographically and 
historically, so we find that social time and social space are differentially constructed. 
[…] The material practices from which our concepts of space and time flow are as 
varied as the range of individual and collective experiences. The challenge is to put 
some overall interpretive frame around them that will bridge the gap between 
cultural change and the dynamics of political economy.” (Harvey, 1990, p. 211) 
Harvey’s central point is that the conceptualisation of time and space arises from 
social practices. Time and space are therefore both socially constructed and 
objective – ‘objective’ however only within their own cultural frame of reference 
and enactment. As practices change, so need the concepts of time and space. 
Bergmann (1992) conceptualises these different analytic perspectives on time as 
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time reckoning, the semiosis of time, and synchronisation26, a matching of social 
schedules which is improved in capitalist development by a trend to efficiently 
organise complex sets of practices with the help of clock-time. Zerubavel (1976) 
expands conceptions of time in scheduling: duration, sequence, timing, tempo, and 
linearity/cyclicality. In the scheduling process – the negotiation of timetables – the 
amount of self-control versus environmental constraint pose a central criterion to 
assess power relations. This historical insight can also be found in Polanyi’s work on 
primary accumulation and Foucault’s conceptualisation of discipline and the 
“critique of political anatomy” (Foucault, 1977; Polanyi, 2001). Thompson (1967) 
traces historically that increasing precision of time measurement became 
instrumental in exerting control over workers’ time habits. He insists, however, that 
it is not the invention of the clock itself that changed common time-reckoning away 
from natural process towards standardised clock-time, but the need for 
synchronisation of practices that arose much later in the development of industrial 
society. This need only arrived with the implementation of large-scale mechanised 
production and logistics, before which labour patters were irregular (Thompson, 
1967, p. 71).  
With regard to reconcilability and control over time, a differentiation of time-
reckoning between the public and private sphere that Thompson reports is worth 
noting:  
“… despite school times and television times, the rhythms of women’s work in the 
home are not wholly attuned to the measurement of the clock. The mother of young 
children has an imperfect sense of time and attends to other human tides. She has 
not yet altogether moved out of the conventions of ‘pre-industrial’ society.” 
(Thompson, 1967, p. 79) 
Thompson’s observation appears a little patronising, yet indicates something rather 
important: young children do not obey the regularities of society, and caring for 
them, neither can those responsible for their immediate care. I will return to this 
                                                     
26 The sociology of time has developed this concept from Durkheim, whose writings also influenced 




issue in the empirical analysis, but for now stay with the general idea that the 
private and public spheres could have distinct temporalities.  
Investigating the scheduling of different spheres of life, and how actors navigate 
between them, sheds light on which institutional timetables take priority and direct 
individual action, that is which social relations are dominant. For this purpose, I will 
examine Gluckmann’s (2005, 1998) ‘total social organisation of labour’ approach 
(TSOL) and her analysis of female textile and casual workers’ oral history. The TSOL 
focusses on the interconnections in production-distribution-exchange-consumption 
processes, the interconnections between paid and unpaid work, markets and other 
modes of economy, formal and informal sectors. Temporality is here the 
overarching analytic category. A distinction between work and labour is refused. 
Not in the least because categorising what is work, and what is not, is difficult 
theoretically and empirically (see 1.2 and 3.4), the TSOL seeks to articulate divisions 
of labour and their coordination in their historical specificity, rather than to provide 
universal categorisations (Glucksmann, 2005). Especially in the distinction to free 
time, the embeddedness of certain types of work (especially emotional work) is 
emphasised. On weekend outings, for example, the supervision of children, even in 
leisure activities, can be considered work for the supervisor/parent, simultaneously 
to being ‘free time’. My participants grappled with this distinction when asked 
about their weekly time-uses. As I will show in the analysis below, articulating 
examples of complex time-uses can convey more insight than trying to fit them into 
dichotomous abstract categories. 
In her historical work on English working women Glucksmann (1998, p. 252) insists 
that distinct temporalities are constitutive for the separation of spheres, or lack 
thereof: Textile workers experienced the home as a space for autonomy, an 
individualised space, whereas time in the workplace was controlled from above. 
This distinction did not exist for casual workers. First, their paid work and domestic 
work occurred in the same places (for example, doing paid washing and her own 
wash). But furthermore, the hurry to reconcile different tasks within the community 
temporal order did not leave much individual time control. The work dedicated to 
children and husbands put casual workers/housewives into temporal dependence 
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to school timetables and male working hours, their paid work to the schedules of 
the neighbourhood. Their ‘public’ took place in the local community that could not 
be distinguished from the ‘private’ home: 
“If the public sphere for casual women workers comprised the local community and 
other women, rather than formal workplaces and distant world events, then it could 
be argued that for them the public was predominant over the private: they were 
subject to community norms about the right way of doing things; gossip represented 
a means of social control; respectability was conferred by community consensus.” 
(Glucksmann, 1998, p. 253) 
This comparison exemplified how important historical detail is to understand to 
what extent separate spheres, such as the private or public, exist. Not only is the 
dividing line perpetually traversed by working parents; the division also only exists 
for certain organisational forms of paid work. The binaries of women/private, 
men/public are simply too abstract to explain much. This is why a more historicised, 
differentiated conception of spheres is theoretically important. 
Another implication of Glucksmann’s study is that flexible, informal segments of the 
labour market are not a novel ‘postmodern’ phenomenon. Casual work, often 
taking place in the home and of a gendered nature, is a longstanding feature of 
capitalism. In order to systematise work relations, Cox provides a set of categories 
that describe historical and contemporary social relations of production, such as 
“subsistence, household, self-employed, enterprise labour market, or state 
corporatism” (Cox, 1987, p. 32). These “translate the general category of production 
into concepts that express concrete historical forms of the ways in which 
production has been organised” (Cox, 1987, p. 1). The scope of my own work does 
not allow me to look at these systematically, but I explore how relations of 
production yield different working hours and flexibilities. These in turn result in 
unequal access to childcare, which is usually provided to cover standard working 
hours only (5.3.3.3).  
To summarise, in this section I have set out that time is a key dimension from which 
to examine social relations. The extent to which social relations of production and 
reproduction are reconcilable depends on the degree of synchronisation between 
99 
 
‘spheres’ and the mobilities available to traverse between them. Having compatible 
schedules and/or control over one’s time makes reconciliation between different 
social roles possible. Analysing these rhythms not only yields insights about the 
coordination of activities, it also informs us about the power dynamics of time 
control and the values and social norms that guide collective action. In the next and 
last theoretical section, I will reflect key temporal concepts elaborated above in 
their relevance to the valuation of time, and experiences of alienation and 
happiness, i.e. questions of a ‘good-life-balance’. 
2.3.3 The Value of Time: Alienation and Eudaimonia 
Starting from the logic that society evolves around two modes of simplification, 
semiosis and structuration (Sum and Jessop, 2013), it follows that collective norms 
about time-use act as a semiotic basis for the daily coordination of tasks. The 
limited availability of time (chronos) provides an ultimate constraint on what can be 
done. The result is a necessity to select and prioritise certain time-uses, and on a 
collective social scale, a necessity to coordinate individual participation in collective 
action, that is, to facilitate a temporally synchronised division of life and labour.  
Reconcilability is grounded in temporal social order, which takes on historically 
specific forms. These forms, I suggested above, are reproduced through social 
norms that attach to practices not only their ‘time and place for everything’, but 
often also an exchange value (wage) in a monetarised market economy. After all, 
“Time is Money” (Franklin and Hall, 1748, pp. 375–7). Time framed as a resource 
and source of all economic value is foundational to theories of Classical Political 
Economy, centred on the labour theory of value (1904; Ricardo, 1821; Marx, 1971). 
Marxist theories problematise capitalist labour relations in terms of the extractions 
of rents by capital owners at the expense of workers. Conflicts around fair wages in 
social professions can be articulated in such a framework. Meanwhile theories of 
alienation, equally inspired by Marx, go beyond accounts of economic exploitation. 
Going back to the central conclusion already forefronted in the introduction, I posit 
that the multifaceted time problems German professional parents articulate 
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towards work family reconcilability, their ‘crisis of care’, must be understood not as 
resource scarcity, but as alienation in terms of temporal disempowerment (2.2.4).  
Providing an overview on its use in classical sociology, Seeman (1959) distinguishes 
between five dimensions of alienation. These repeatedly resonate with time 
concepts discussed above (in italics):  
1) Powerlessness, expressed from an individual standpoint as the experience of a 
discrepancy between the power and desire of control (over time);  
2) Meaninglessness, a kind of unintelligibility in the everyday and low future 
predictability. This may be accompanied by an ideologically-centralised and 
instrumental doctrine to replace situated reasoning, for instance theorised by 
Mannheim (1940, p. 59) as a growth of “functional rationalities”. A recent 
perspective can be found in Smith’s treatment of the out-of-body experience (p. 
72);  
3) Normlessness, a weakening of discipline to social standards of morality towards 
self-interest. Norms that recognise time as a scarce commodity, such as punctuality, 
or rising early-going to bed timely, feature as part of the modern ideal of the worker 
(Thompson, 1967, p. 94). Thompson explicitly discusses these values and the 
institutions behind them as a means to discipline workers.  
“In all these ways – by the division of labour; the supervision labour; fines; bells and 
clocks; money incentives; preachings and schoolings; the suppression of fairs and 
sports – new labour habits were formed, and a new time-discipline was imposed.” 
(Thompson, 1967, p. 90) 
4) Isolation, as a withdrawal from mainstream culture and society, in the extreme: 
rebellion;  
5) Self-estrangement, which narrowly can be understood as a loss of pride or 
investment in one’s own work, or abstractly, as the loss of a sense of intrinsic 
meaning in an activity (remember Himmelweit’s concern about the intrinsic value of 
caring). It is extremely interesting to note that Seeman (1959, p. 790) further 
abstracts this last notion in terms of anticipation, whereby he posits that a loss of 
intrinsic meaning makes an activity dependent on a future reward. An alienated 
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human thus orients perpetually towards an imagined future. The experience of 
happiness is moved from the concrete (or bodily) to the imaginary.  
Time concepts embedded in these dimensions will be applied in the case analysis 
below: (1) as control over time, in employment or with regard to kindergarten 
opening hours; (2) predictability in terms of work life flexibilisation, or transitions 
between parental and institutional childcare; (3) temporal norms in their moral and 
disciplinary effect, where high expectations to availability can lead to perpetual 
feelings of guilt for ‘having no time’; (4) isolation as a consequence of 
asynchronicity; (5) or indeed, a deferral of wishes into the future – for a baby or a 
family trip – as discussed in terms of ‘inconspicuous consumption’ (chapter 6).  
Given this dissertation’s concern with the ‘good life’, it is further helpful to briefly 
discuss a diametrically related concept to self-estrangement: self-realisation. Ryan 
& Deci (2001) review the literature on happiness, discussing self-
realisation/eudaimonia as a key dimension to wellbeing. The concept eudaimonia 
draws on the Aristotelian tradition, positing natural or objective human needs 
against individual wants (hedonism). Psychologists in this tradition have defined 
self-realisation as “autonomy, personal growth, self-acceptance, life purpose, 
mastery, and positive relatedness” (Ryff and Keyes, 1995). Waterman (1993) 
suggests, as paraphrased succinctly by Ryan & Deci: 
“that eudaimonia occurs when people’s life activities are most congruent or meshing 
with deeply held values and are holistically or fully engaged. Under such 
circumstances people would feel intensely alive and authentic, existing as who they 
really are.” (Ryan and Deci, 2001, p. 146) 
This depiction of eudaimonia resonates with Bourdieu’s understanding of self-
temporalisation, or the idea of ‘time sovereignty’, understood as the ability to 
strategically orient towards the future (to plan) or ‘make time’ for self-realisation. I 
will return to these categories in the conclusion to emphasise, first, a lack of 
synchronisation of work and childcare schedules as foundational to parents’ 
temporal disempowerment, and second, an ongoing conflict over ‘good’ time-uses 
and adequate recognition for care.  
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3 From ‘Work’ to ‘Time’: Methodology 
From the early stages of this project onwards I wanted to examine the experiences 
of carers in the context of their social networks and knowledge circulated therein. 
First, to understand how these experiences are structured by translocal forces, such 
as policy and markets, and by local forces, such as immediate social relations, and 
second, to see how agency arises in these local contexts. As already mentioned 
above, this dynamic between the local and translocal is a cornerstone in the 
approach of Institutional Ethnography (IE):  
“the investigation of empirical linkages among local settings of everyday life, 
organizations, and translocal processes of administration and governance.” (DeVault 
and McCoy, 2006, p. 15) 
Dorothy Smith’s account of the out-of-body experience and relations of ruling 
introduced above lays the theoretical foundations, from which IE scholars have 
developed research strategies, tools, and modes of analysis that work with different 
types of data and research contexts (Smith, 2006). I will begin the methodological 
exposition of IE with some comments on generalisability (3.1), and how translocal 
mechanisms of ruling function as sources of generalisability to the same extent as 
they function as sources of structuration. The recommendations that are especially 
relevant for this project deal with how to use interview data in IE (3.2) (DeVault and 
McCoy, 2006). As noted above, this research project is not an ethnography. Rather 
IE is utilised as a source of inspiration on how to conduct fieldwork and analyse 
interview data in such a way as to be consistent with the theory underlying IE (see 
section 2.2.2 on ‘experience’). Methods are here seen as an integrated part of 
theory, and not as a buffet from which to independently pick and choose. This 
pertains to the cohesion between research questions, levels of abstraction, 
conceptual choices, data gathering, and practical analysis. As a consequence, 
methodology cannot be reduced to technical aspects of data gathering and 
handling.  
Sartori (1970) famously warned of the dangers of emphasising technical methodical 
precision over logos, the need for research to reflect its own logic, concepts, and 
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limitations. This chapter is therefore dedicated to an in-depth explanation of the 
logic behind the ways in which fieldwork and analysis were conducted, and how 
these have in turn shaped conceptual choices and theorisation. Lessons learned 
throughout four years of research were in part conceptual and in part practical, and 
culminated in a change of key concepts from ‘work’ to ‘time’ (3.4).  
An absolutely foundational choice that shaped the whole project was to situate the 
inquiry in the relations between policy and the everyday. The initial research 
problem formulation arose from everyday experience with reconcilability problems. 
As already discussed in the theory chapter, it was further refined through an 
engagement with IE, following Foucault’s logic of ‘conceptual needs’. The order of 
reasoning underlying this project hence works primarily – but not exclusively – from 
the inside out; that is, the order of the argument begins from an empirical starting 
point – or research problem – and is oriented towards arriving at a theoretical 
explanation. In practice, of course, there was repetitive recursion between 
transitive and intransitive moments. Choosing a starting point in the everyday – 
here through stakeholder interviews – confronts the scholar with the challenge of 
needing to think beyond the ‘obvious’, to ‘make the data strange’. Interviews and 
texts, as opposed to participant observation, have the dubious advantage of 
yielding data in which practices are already codified in spoken and written language. 
But analysis rejecting literal theories of meaning needs to problematise these ‘given 
formulations’:  
First, there is the question in how far participants’ accounts can adequately 
represent actual behaviour in everyday life. Section 3.2 will explain in detail how IE 
informs the treatment of interview accounts in this project.  
Secondly, there is also the issue of creating (and consistently applying) a suitable 
meta-language of scientific concepts for the purposes of analysis. This pertains to 
the kinds of technical problems that arise in scholarly practice: Is X a ‘thing’ and 
what do I call it? Is X an instance of Y? Is Y a suitable category to begin with? 
Chapter 2 above presented a final account of useful theory. I will demonstrate a 
central part of the ‘conceptual journey’ to that stage in section 3.4. 
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Thirdly, and profoundly interconnected with the second point, there is a strong 
ethical-political dimension of conceptual choices implied in Butler’s understanding 
of resignification. Any scholarly activity taking the irrevocable political nature of 
concepts seriously cannot claim total academic neutrality. The strategy I use 
throughout this study to mitigate biases is to make conceptual considerations and 
their political implications transparent. I am a thirty-year-old, childless, female 
academic from Cologne. This allows me a ‘native’ or ‘organic intellectual’ insight 
into my case, but it also impacts my research, perhaps most centrally the choice to 
design this study to explain local experience, to empower local actors by providing a 
‘map’ of the social structures that constitute ‘our’ everyday life. My participants are 
parents and workers engaged in and around childcare in Cologne, NRW. I will 
discuss the particularities of my case selection – spatial and personal – in sections  
3.3 and 3.4. 
3.1 Generalisability 
A lot of qualitative and case study research projects refer to Burawoy’s (1998) 
extended case method (ECM) to legitimate their claims to generalisability. IE 
departs from Burawoy’s logic: how so, I will reiterate based on Smith’s own 
comparison (Smith, 2005, pp. 35–7). IE and ECM share certain features, such as a 
general idea to ‘study up’ from local contexts, or using ethnography on the local 
‘micro level’. In my study, the ‘micro’ was accessed through interviews, not a fully-
fledged ethnography. The comparison between IE and ECM is nevertheless helpful 
to convey how the shift to the extralocal or ‘macro’ is made:  
ECM is ethnographic in local practice, and draws on theory for the broader 
explanatory categories that the scope of the empirical study cannot cover.  
“The extended case method applies reflexive science to ethnography in order to 
extract the general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro,’ and to 
connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on 
preexisting theory.” (Burawoy, 1998, p. 5, emphasis added) 
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Burawoy promotes a reflexive science that reconstructs and expands theory based 
on the empirical discovery of anomalies. Therein he seeks to bring into interaction – 
but thereby arguably maintains – a duality of ethnography, understood as recording 
the world from a participant’s standpoint, and science: falsifiable and generalisable 
models.  
“Hermeneutic” approaches associated with the interpretative or linguistic turn 
(Gadamer, Rorty, or Geertz) have denied the possibility of a positive science, 
defined by the “4Rs” of reactivity, reliability, replicability, and representativeness 
(Burawoy, 1998, p. 13). This is because of the uncontrollability of contextual effects 
in data collection, which positive science tries so hard to avoid or compensate for. 
Burawoy’s strategy is not to avoid, but to embrace these effects. This can occur in 
interviews through a better appreciation of the reflexive possibilities that occur 
when a participant is “[extracted from] her from her own space and time and 
[subjected] to the space and time of the interviewer” (Burawoy, 1998, p. 14). 
Interviews should virtually follow the participant to gain information from the 
discursive possibilities of interaction between interviewer and interviewee. Non-
discursive dimensions, meanwhile, require practical interaction (‘doing things 
together’), and cannot be discovered through interviews (ibid, p.15). While these 
latter points about interview strategy are widely accepted by IE proponents, IE has 
no ex-ante commitment to theory or theoretical improvement. More radically than 
ECM, IE searches for situated mechanisms to explain local experiences.  
The break between ECM and IE happens where inquiry goes beyond the local. Both 
Smith and Burawoy emphasise the need to situate individual interactions and 
relations within a field, to use Bourdieu’s term. This field-metaphor indicates a 
historical, situated space of interaction, which is structured by certain social forces 
and processes: 
“These social forces are the effects of other social processes that for the most part lie 
outside the realm of investigation. Viewed as external to the observer these social 
forces can be studied with positive methods that become the handmaidens of 
reflexive science.” (Burawoy, 1998, p. 15, italics added) 
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The important difference between ECM and IE lies in how – theoretically and 
practically – generalisations are legitimated. ECM, where the local ethnography 
needs further explanation, seeks support in theory. There is hence a break between 
the micro-ethnography and the macro-positive science. Thereby ECM can be very 
helpful in synthesising results between studies, or working interdisciplinary/inter-
methodologically. But what it fails to grasp empirically is how ruling takes place, 
how the ‘external’ forces that shape a field come from somewhere. IE, 
problematising just this, rejects the micro-macro dichotomy of social structuration, 
and instead seeks to explicate the relations between localities: the translocal 
relations of ruling, that is, of governance (Smith, 2005, pp. 35–7).  
“… the ethnographic inquiry pushes beyond the local settings of people’s everyday 
experience, and it must do so by finding those extended relations that coordinate 
multiple settings translocally.” (Smith, 2005, p. 49) 
Everyday reproductions of standards are explained through the relations between 
more and less powerful organisations, such as between central and local 
governments, governments and welfare providers, or providers and clients. The 
dispersion of standards (e.g. in policy) and related enforcement mechanisms (e.g. 
audits, quality management) can be observed in the localities of production and 
reception. Their scope of influence determines the scale on which generalisations 
can be made. This brings into empirical focus what Burawoy calls “systemic 
features” of a field (1998, p. 15). 
Following the IE pathway to generalisation has immediate impact upon the 
fieldwork organisation, especially the selection of participants and research sites. 
Rather than observing one place in the greatest detail, institutional ethnographers 
have to travel across a network of translocal social relations. Interview questions 
need to probe into these relations, inquire into a participant’s social network, 
translocally coordinated practices, and sources of information. Texts are a key 
resource in understanding the facilitation of translocal management. I will explain 
how IE perceives interviews in the following section, and then move on to give 
some practical information about participant selection. 
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3.2 Interviews in Institutional Ethnography 
It has been established in the beginning of the theory chapter that this project 
follows a dialogical constructivist ontology, in which communication is the 
foundation of the social. I have pointed to the importance of situated interpretation 
and responsiveness, and in the latter part of the theory chapter I have discussed 
coordination and governance. DeVault & McCoy (2006) have explored what impact 
such an ontology has on the study of institutions and the use of interviews. 
IE is inspired by the idea of creating a map of knowledge, useful for those inhabiting 
the field under study to understand mechanisms that impact their everyday lives 
which exceed personal experience. Given its explorative logic, IE fieldwork is usually 
not fully planned in advance. Most commonly, research follows a sequence of “(a) 
identify an experience, (b) identify some of the institutional processes that are 
shaping that experience, and (c) investigate these processes in order to describe 
analytically how they operate as the grounds of the experience” (DeVault and 
McCoy, 2006, p. 20). The starting point in experience can be autobiographical, or 
found through engaging with participants. Given that I am not a parent or childcare 
practitioner, this study begins with the experiences of participants, albeit my own 
upbringing and life in the same city allow me to draw on my ‘local outsider’ 
perspective on parenthood and the general experience of German culture. I chose 
the experiences of practitioners as an entry point into a network of social relations 
around childcare. I then asked ‘back’ to learn about their relations to the parents, 
and ‘ahead’ to learn about their relations to public administration. To map this 
chain of relations, I interviewed parents, practitioners, childcare managers, and 
local civil servants. Additional information came from NGOs active in this field. The 
set of questions I asked in semi-structured interviews pertained to the work and 
schedules of interviewees, but also explicitly inquired about the relations to other 
groups of actors in this network, and how these relations were coordinated 
(DeVault and McCoy, 2006, pp. 20–32). This includes asking questions about 
hierarchies, legitimation, and conflict.  
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Analysis began simultaneously to the data collection with the search for similarities 
in participant accounts, repetitive patterns in the description of relations to others, 
and the search for mechanisms that generate these patterns. The latter takes the 
researcher beyond the interview, and into the realm of managerial artefacts. In my 
case, this included childcare legislation, IT systems, and forms used in the 
implementation of regulation, and further interviews with managers responsible for 
implementing organisational processes with the aid of these artefacts. The resulting 
body of data in this project is a combination of various texts encountered in the 
field (anything from registration forms to parliamentary documents) and interview 
transcripts. I followed the advice of IE proponents to keep coding simple, indexing 
problems or situations, and paying attention to institutional language and the 
referencing of texts (DeVault and McCoy, 2006, pp. 38–39). 
It is important to note that – as in any study – there are limits to the scope and 
depth of relations that can be investigated. Rather than mapping the totality of a 
field, what IE can do is tease out particular strands of relations to make connections 
visible (DeVault and McCoy, 2006, p. 17). IE uses interviews not to study individual 
subjectivities, but to tap into a social network and learn about which and how 
connections exist in everyday life. This has implications how generalisability is 
conceived of. DeVault & McCoy express this very clearly: 
“When interviews are used in this approach, they are used not to reveal subjective 
states, but to locate and trace the points of connection amongst individuals working 
in different parts of institutional complexes of activity. […] The researcher’s purpose 
in an institutional ethnography is not to generalize about the group of people 
interviewed, but to find and describe social processes that have generalizing effects. 
[…] The general relevance of the inquiry comes, then, not from a claim that local 
settings are similar, but from the capacity of the research to disclose features of 
ruling that operate across many local settings.” (DeVault and McCoy, 2006, p. 18) 
What IE does not propose is to mistake texts and narratives for other practices. 
Under the title Talk is Cheap, Jerolmack & Khan (2014) draw attention to the 
common fallacy to confuse what people say with what they do. Psychology knows 
this problem as “attitude-behaviour consistency” (ABC) or “attitudinal fallacy” (ibid, 
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p. 179). Cultural theories have grappled with the issue in which ways sense-making 
and collective habits of expression shape or are shaped by non-semiotic practices, 
or in how far they can differ. The methodological implications affect how interviews 
are understood. If viewed as “a window into the normative and cognitive frames 
that actors use to explain their actions and anchor their identity”, Jerolmack & Khan 
(2014, p. 189) criticise, this ignores findings that interpretive frames are always 
context-bound, and that meanings of events are interactionally co-constructed. It is 
for this reason that the authors advocate ethnographic methods that can capture 
the “collective act” and depart from individualising accounts of sense-making and 
action (ibid, p. 202). This is consistent with the dialogical constructivism advocated 
in the theory chapter, the rejection of literal meanings, and a performative, situated 
understanding of identities. Living up to this analytic commitment is not easy, but I 
will take care throughout the analysis not to conflate discourse with non-semiotic 
practices.  
At this point one may ask: why only interviews, why not participant observation? 
The answer here, at least, is simple. Ethical participant observation requires time 
and trust, and the researcher to be welcome at the site of research. These 
conditions were not given in my environment, where the privacy of families should 
not be violated, and where professional carers work long hours and thus have little 
time and interest in ‘extracurricular’ research activities. The salience of childcare in 
German media has led to a flood of research requests for childcare managers, who 
have become quite selective in their cooperation. Especially when children are 
affected by the research, managers reported a need to protect the children from 
unwanted scrutiny. It is impossible to observe childcare work without observing 
children. Consent is an issue here. It is therefore for practical reasons – a lack of 
feasible access – that participant observation was not possible. Interviews in homes 
and kindergartens provided the less intrusive ‘second-best’ alternative. 
It is also worth repeating here that IE requires the researcher to go beyond local 
ethnography. Interviews take up significantly less time in one place, which has its 
disadvantages in decreasing the depth and types of available information, but this 
method also enables research in more distinct places and with more people, who 
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are not in immediate contact with one another. This is advantageous in increasing 
the scope of this project to detect similarities that cannot be explained by 
immediate interpersonal local relations and conventions.  
3.3 Cologne, NRW: Research Spaces 
A term yet left underspecified in this dissertation is the ‘local’. As stated above, I 
chose the city of Cologne – Köln in German – in North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW), 
Germany, as my exclusive fieldwork site. NRW is the most populous federal state in 
Germany with 17.9 million inhabitants, of which approximately 28% have a 
migration background (Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2017). NRW 
is therefore more populous than the whole of Eastern Germany. At its core, the 
Rhein-Ruhr area can be considered Europe’s third largest metropolitan area, after 
the London and Paris areas.   
 
Figure 6 NRW Map (Wikimedia Commons, no date) 
Historically one of the most important industrial areas in Europe, it has been subject 
to ongoing deindustrialisation. The Ruhr area has been affected particularly badly, 






done relatively well. With an influx of German and foreign migrants, Cologne is a 
growing city, and has the highest population density in NRW with 2667.6 
inhabitants per square metre, reaching 1,080,394 inhabitants in 2017 (Statistisches 
Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2017). 
In NRW overall, unemployment rates were low at 4.2%. The employment rate of all 
those age 15-64 reached 72% in 2017, with 22% employed in industrial production 
and 77% in services. Unemployment was somewhat higher in Cologne at 8-8.5% 
throughout 2017. 71% of all employees had jobs with social insurance contributions 
(“sozialversicherungspflichtige Beschäftigte”), of which 26% worked part-time (ibid). 
The gross gender pay gap in NRW 2017 was 22%. Large enterprises in industry, 
insurance, and media are located in Cologne. 
Politically, both NRW and Cologne were historically dominated by the social-
democrat SPD. Since 2005, with the election of minister-president J. Rüttgers (CDU), 
NRW has been considered a swing-state. The family policy reforms considered in 
this dissertation thus occurred in a period of changing governments at different 
scales of state: on the national scale, the reforms were prepared by the SPD (family 
minister Rita Süßmuth), but implemented by the CDU in liberal and social-
democratic (grand) coalitions (Merkel-government, family minister Ursula von der 
Leyen). In NRW, the reforms (e.g. KiBiz) were largely executed under the CDU-FDP 
conservative-liberal coalition 2005-2010, which was replaced by a social 
democratic-green coalition 2010-2015 under SPD minister-president Hannelore 
Kraft. Since 2017 NRW has returned to a conservative-liberal government. 
Founded by the Romans in 50 CE, Cologne is shaped by its history as an archdiocese 
under religious control, its early status as a free imperial city in the first German 
Empire, followed by French and Prussian occupation. Cologne has historical linkages 
to the catholic Zentrum party, and later CDU. In the last decades municipal elections 
were dominated by the Volksparteien CDU and SPD, whereas both the liberal FDP 
and the Greens have a strong history in the city. Since 2014 Cologne has an 
independent mayor, supported by a conservative-green coalition. In 2017, 15% of 
Cologne’s inhabitants identified as protestant and 34.3% as catholic, putting the 
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Christian confessions into an overall minority (Schmitz, 2018). At the same time 
49.2% gave no comment on their faith or did not belong to any religious 
community. This percentage includes ca. 11% Muslims, which the city does not 
count explicitly, calculating from 2011 Census data on migration. Culturally, Cologne 
is further known as a “fun” city, famous for its carnival and its vibrant and visible 
LGBTII+ community.  
This brief account may serve as an initial spatial introduction into the case. More 
detailed institutional descriptions regarding childcare will be given together with 
the empirical analysis, notably so in section 5.2 on welfare providers. 
3.4 Participant Selection 
Sampling in IE does not follow common logics of representativeness, but instead 
traces chains of relations and governance encountered in the field (DeVault and 
McCoy, 2006, p. 32). This does not, however, prevent the researcher from selecting 
participants with variation of characteristics in mind. In this study intended 
variation in sampling occurred for two key groups of actors interviewed: childcare 
managers and parents. 
As I will explain in detail below (5.2), the German welfare system is heavily reliant 
on large non-statutory welfare providers (Wohlfahrtsverbände). Those are 
institutional relics of the social cleavages of the 19th century. I will show below that 
these cleavages, especially the religious ones, still matter for slot allocation today 
(5.3.1). I used official lists of all kindergartens in Cologne to phone up managers and 
ask for interviews. The process was painstaking and involved many outright 
rejections. While I found participants from non-statutory providers, I could not 
recruit representatives of the city-run public facilities. Those managers often 
explained to me on the phone that I needed the permission of the district youth 
welfare agency, which the agency itself denied as necessary. My overall impression 
was that recent industrial action of the public childcare practitioners had resulted in 
tensions towards district authorities. In general, the local youth welfare agency was 
not very cooperative, which heavily limited my ability to study their work processes. 
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Four managers eventually agreed to be interviewed, to whom I am very grateful. 
The very limited enthusiasm for my questions is likely due to a tense climate 
resulting from high public pressure on the performance of the local agency that 
simultaneously has to deal with budget cuts and high personnel turnover. Since I 
only worked with one district, it was impossible to guarantee those participants 
effective anonymity. With two of the four participants I agreed to refrain from 
recording the interviews, and let my notes be double-checked after the interview. 
That way they had the full control over which statements they wished to have 
attributed to their person, and which not. Appropriate ethics approval was obtained 
in advance. 
Parents I interviewed varied in the types of family models they lived, their age, 
marital status, ethnicity, and sexuality. My initial aim was to represent diversity as 
best as possible, given the small number of participants, to see which mechanisms 
affected all parents irrespective of their differences. Recruiting took place in various 
districts within the city of Cologne. The childcare facilities I visited were located in 
three central urban areas (Deutz, Ehrenfeld, Lindenthal, Inner City) which can be 
described as “gentrified”, upper - but not excessively high-class. Two are close to 
universities, one is in a ‘hipster’ area. Another one was in Marienburg, which is an 
uptown residential area. One was in Ossendorf, which is a deprived area (“sozialer 
Brennpunkt”). Professional parents came from these up-town and gentrified areas; 
parents on benefits I recruited through an NGO (Frauen gegen Erwerbslosigkeit 
e.V.) came from various poorer areas, often further from the city centre (Porz, 
Ossendorf). 
As announced above, the case study below will focus on professional parents. This 
focus is in part due to the fact that cultural and policy change are particularly 
noticeable and directed at that group. But furthermore the data I could gather on 
professionals was also the ‘best quality’, in terms of breadth and depth of 
reflections. Parent recruitments happened through the childcare managers I had 
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interviewed first, through an online board for queer parents, and personal 
networks27.  
Beyond these two core actor groups, I branched out to a range of different actors I 
encountered throughout my networking and where issues had been left open and I 
was searching to fill a gap in my knowledge of the local childcare landscape. I have 
provided a full list of actors in the appendix (8.1). Only a subset of interviews was 
used for this study in the end. The characteristics of those participants I will 
introduce in more detail throughout the empirical analysis, so that the information 
is given where it is needed.  
3.5 Learning in the Field: From Work to Time 
The ‘problem’ I began to reflect on from the very first days in the field, was to use 
‘work’ as a key concept to structure inquiry. Work as a concept is commonly used in 
IE to draw attention to the multitude of tasks carried out by people in their daily 
lives, and to the “work knowledges” necessary to enact them (Smith, 2005, p. 151). 
Broadly defined, works comprises:  
“anything done by people that takes time and effort, that they mean to do, that is 
done under definite conditions and with whatever means and tools, and that they 
may have to think about” (Smith, 2005, p. 151) 
Behind the widening of the category from ‘paid work only’ (e.g. I52) is a political 
intention within IE, grounded in the Wages for Housework campaign that 
understood capitalism to be sustained by an “underground of unpaid and invisible 
work that people don’t recognize as work nor as a contribution to the economy” 
(Smith, 2005, p. 152). Concepts discussed in 1.2 such as “unpaid work”, “care work”, 
or TSOL have taken up a similar concern (Himmelweit, 1995; Folbre, 1995; Taylor, 
2004; Glucksmann, 1995). The practical problem that arose during fieldwork was 
the inability to differentiate work subcategories clearly and consistently in the 
interaction with parents. This problem was caused – inadvertently – by confronting 
                                                     
27 I strictly avoided working with people I know personally, but occasionally got recommended to a 
friend of a friend, or a friend of another participant. 
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parents with a time-use table that suggested a small set of categories (Table 1). The 
inclusion of the table into the parent interview guide (appendix 8.3) was a 
spontaneous decision without much technical reflection. Unexpectedly, this turned 
out to be of advantage. After a first trial with rather interesting results, I kept the 
table to see if those results would replicate themselves – and indeed – they did.  
In comparison to the GSOEP28 time-use survey (Table 2), I asked for commuting 
times separately from employment to understand how space and transport means 
mattered to participant’s mobility; I grouped sport with leisure; I asked about civil 
engagement to separate unpaid housework from communal work. Given that I 
exclusively used the table for parents of young children, education was not a major 
feature in my target group. Neither was elderly care very common. Next to the 
GSOEP questionnaire-based studies, German time-use diary data (ZVE/TUS) is 
available for the years 1991–2, 2001–02, and 2012–3. As revealed by the latest ZVE 
2012, German women worked 1h more than men and did 2/3 of all unpaid work 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015a). In comparison to the previous study in 2001, the 
overall amount of unpaid work declined. The most notable differences in the total 
amount of work existed between households with or without children: parents 
worked 9.5h more each week than childless adults between ages 18 to 64, a 
difference that is largely explained by 10.5h of additional unpaid housework (incl. 
care) carried out by parents. Mothers on average worked 7h less in paid 
employment, and carried out 15h more of unpaid work, compared to childless 
women. Fathers meanwhile worked 7h paid and 4h unpaid more than childless men 
(ibid).  
Methodological reflections on the reliability of data collection have generally found 
that housework amounts by women are reported higher in survey questionnaires 
than in time diaries (Marini and Shelton, 1993). This effect was particularly 
noticeable for frequent activities, and Mariri & Shelton have suggested that 
questionnaires may perform badly when it comes to accounting for simultaneity.   
                                                     
28 German Socio-Economic Panel 
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Table 1 Time-Use Interview Guide 
Wie viele Stunden verbringen Sie heute mit:  
(How many hours do you spend today on:) 










Transport (Wege, Pendeln) 
(transport, commuting) 
  
Ehrenamtlichem o. Ä. Engagement 











This explanation makes sense when one assumes that all hours in an activity are 
given as an answer, and that housework and childcare are often multitasked. This 
measuring problem should thus pertain predominantly to women’s time-use. 
Furthermore, patterns in divergences suggest that participants respond in gender- 
and class-typical ways (Press and Townsley, 1998). For example, with regard to 
housework women and egalitarian-minded men may overstate their actual hours to 
(subconsciously) present themselves well. In addition, women are likely to have a 
more precise understanding of time-use in the household, because they still clearly 
do the vast majority of it (Press and Townsley, 1998). In the end, the arguably more 
reliable but much more costly time diary method has generally been considered 
superior.  
Schulz and Grunow have demonstrated on German data that method differences 
are clearly significant, and that similar aggregate results across both methods are 
likely a result of academic data processing, in which a focus on averages in 
regression models neutralises variation (Schulz and Grunow, 2012, p. 629). As the 
authors emphasise, the phrasing of questions and categories is a problem in both 
methods, because different interpretations prevent participants and researchers 
from defining and differentiating activities consistently. For that reason, Schulz & 
Grunow ask for more precise and disaggregated categories focussing on selected 
household tasks, ideally in a language that is harmonious to the ways in which 
respondents perceive their everyday life. Having in many ways ‘failed’ exactly in 
those aspects, I believe my research is particularly relevant nevertheless because it 
critically reflects the politics of devising a study design as imagined by Schulz and 
Grunow. I furthermore can provide a selection of tasks which are particularly 
important to measure from an egalitarian perspective, and the theoretical 
framework why these particular tasks are so important. Let me illustrate this in the 
following reflection on my own methodological journey:  
As a first shared insight with Schulz & Grunow, the boundaries of aggregate 
categories were problematic in practice. Participants rejected some of the 
categories offered: more precisely, they frequently demanded a clarification of the 
category childcare, differentiating themselves between care (Pflege) and 
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socialisation (Erziehung). Similar distinctions reappear in childcare practitioner 
discourses, and comprise not only distinct ideas about the tasks belonging in each 
category, but also a different value/recognition/social status of those tasks, where 
education (Bildung) is more highly valued than care. In a similar vein, the category 
housework was the object of heavy contestation between partners. This fit with a 
general patters observed in interviews with both parents present (I24, I25, I28), in 
which the fairness of the division of work between the couples was repeatedly 
commented on (see 4.4.1). Some tasks were better remembered and more readily 
included by participants than others. Subsuming errands, repairs, and gardening 
(GSOEP) under housework resulted in those tasks being forgotten. Housework was 
primarily understood as cleaning, groceries, and washing. Some parents wondered 
if care (Pflege) was part of housework, but not socialisation (Erziehung). Activities 
such as cooking and gardening were occasionally considered, whereas fixing the 
Internet or doing the tax declaration were ignored. Mentioning those activities 
often resulted in gendered responses, which involved men ‘perking up’ and pointing 
out that if those activities counted, their housework share should increase.  
Elif: “housework . that never ends, well hehe, well at some point . housework and 
childcare, that belongs together” (I42, 14:01-15:51) 
The association of women’s share of housework with the repetitive, circular, never-
ending drudgery of cleaning, as opposed to the occasional success of fixing the 
Internet, has been reflected as a crucial distinction to make sense of the harmful 
psychological effects of gendered divisions of housework (Baraitser, 2014; Dixon 
and Wetherell, 2004; Roxburgh, 2004). My own data is in line with above statistical 
results (ZVE) that childcare (care: mothers, socialisation: parents and practitioners) 
and housework (she: cleaning, he: car repairs) remain deeply gendered.  
Quantification practices proved to be a particularly interesting dimension for 
reflection, both methodical and theoretical. Purely quantitative accounts of time-
use have also been described as “time-budget research, in which only the factual 
temporal duration and allocation of particular activities is ascertained” (Bergmann, 
1992, p. 103). The table used during the interviews bears some resemblance to the 
table used in the GSOEP survey (Table 2). The GSOEP table explicitly asks for a 
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‘normal weekday’, whereas the difference between weekdays and weekends was 
something I let my participants problematise by themselves. Where the GSOEP 
asked for hours per day, I asked for either hours per week OR hours per day – 
whichever participants found easier. Their choice helped to assess in how far the 
‘standard working week’ as a temporal institution is still in place for the particular 
participant. Most chose hours per week, but some – more women than men – 
chose hours per day, notably those not engaged in paid employment. The 
verbalised reasoning process how to fill out the table showed that whereas paid 
work was often more easily known as a weekly amount, housework and commuting 
was thought of initially in the hours the singular activity took, and then added up 
over the frequency of the week. The less structured the week was through paid 
work or external appointments, the more participants relied on such ‘task-
estimates’, while a few outright refused to quantify. The quantification of time-uses 
in hours was easy for most participants for the categories of paid work and 
commuting. This can be explained by those times being consciously 
experienced/measured in everyday life. The regularity of these activities tended to 
make answers easy, albeit overlaps between paid work and commuting (telework 
on the train) and overtime sometimes resulted in extra commentary that positioned 
given estimates as averages. These averages were nevertheless conveyed with 
certainty. The same cannot be said for activities in the home. Here the sense of 
accuracy conveyed in the interviews tends towards ‘guesstimates’.  
(I28, 43:20-43:40) 
Following the impression I have from the overall data, this could likely be due to the 
fact that housework comprises a series of recurring tasks – but recurring at different 
intervals, some of which are scheduled (cleaning the bathroom once a week), 
whereas others are event-triggered (baking a birthday cake, fixing the Internet). As 
a consequence housework is visible as many tasks, few of which are ever 
consciously quantified. In contrast, paid work is often formally accounted for on a 
daily basis, for example through punch clocks. There the overarching category of 
Ralf: Transport. Commuting. That are 5 hours per week for me. 
Christina: That you can say this so easily! … For me every day is different, for you 
every day is the same, that is is difficulty. 
120 
 
paid work is accounted for in the everyday, irrespective of which particular tasks are 
comprised under it. The visibility of hours in paid work given in my data cannot 
simply be generalised however. A self-employed mother I interviewed took longer 
to calculate her weekly average working time (I22). Trends towards target-oriented 
pay undermine the visibility of paid work hours. This disempowers employees in 
conflicts over excessive workloads. The important insight here is not a dichotomy 
between accounted paid work and unaccounted unpaid work, but the fact that 
accounting and the resulting visibility of time-uses matters. 
Inconsistencies which activities were included make it clear how important the 
disaggregation of categories is, in survey design or time diary coding. Equally the 
discussion above revealed the political importance of time-use visibility. Symbolic 
interactionists have emphasised the power deriving from being able to define an 
understanding of a situation (Hall, 1972); analogously, Nowotny (1994) points to the 
power deriving from controlling understandings of time (also see van den Scott, 
2014). This concern is expressed in the German concepts of Taktgeber (pace giver) 
and Taktnehmer (pace taker) (Heitkötter and Schneider, 2004). (In)visibility is a key 
factor in reproducing or challenging dominant understandings of ‘objective’ time, 
such as “clock time”, “world time”, “work time”, or “standardised time” (Thompson, 
1967; Hassan, 2005; Negrey, 2012; Zerubavel, 1982). Alternative temporalities, such 
as individual time reckoning or family routines might be better understood as 
subjected, rather than subjective.  
Simultaneity in activities provided another quantification problem, insofar as that 
parents tried to improve the quality of their time-use guesstimates by adding up to 
24 hours a day. The most frequent simultaneities existed for parents working from 
home or during their commutes, and for parents in the home combining childcare 
with other activities. The last point was particularly important for single mothers, 
who constantly had to organise their lives in the omnipresence of their children. A 
similar category problem existed for a father who reported an overlap between free 
time and paid work, when in his ‘consulting days’ he spent evenings out with 
colleagues or customers. 
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What these struggles over conceptualisations and category boundaries reveal on 
the data gathering and basic analytic level is that work is a deeply problematic 
concept for analysis, because it is so normatively charged and at the same time 
contested. Whereas analysing the meaning of work as an object of research has 
been highly relevant, using work as an analytic category inevitably seems to come 
with a lot of implicit political baggage, in which further subcategories (as used in 
Table 1) can highlight, but certainly not do away with the politics of what counts, 
and what does not (compare resignification, 2.2.1). Any effort in time research to 
make categories consistent should never ignore the political implications and 
analytic downsides of building a method and database that does not consider the 
interpretation processes themselves which underlie any time estimate. As I have 
learned throughout my own methodological journey, for those who seek to study 
the contestation of temporal understandings (time politics), categories that compel 
further interpretation are an asset, not a problem.  
Shifting my attention to time instead of work mid-study provided tremendous 
intellectual growth and new inspiration to discuss gender inequality. The effect is, 
however, that the data I originally co-produced with my participants was structured 
as an Institutional Ethnography inquiring about work. As such, it did not 
systematically orient questions to time-uses, nor design interviews with the 
methodological insights available from time studies. As a result, participants did 
frequently refer to time, but largely on their own motivation, and in their own 
terms. The methodological challenge in the transition from work to time then was 
‘to talk about heat without a thermometer’, to play on Sartori’s metaphor, that is, 
to talk about time without relying on conventional time-use data.  
“… I do not wish to encourage in the least the overconscious thinker, the man [sic] 
who refuses to discuss heat unless he is given a thermometer. My sympathy goes, 
instead, to the ‘conscious thinker,’ the man [sic] who realizes the limitations of not 
having a thermometer and still manages to say a great deal simply by saying hot and 
cold, warmer and cooler.” (Sartori, 1970, p. 1033) 
In reflection of the tendency for clock-time to obscure other temporalities, already 
problematised by Thompson (1967), I believe that the absence of standard 
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quantitative time data in this project, which appeared at first glance as a handicap, 
proved in the end to be extremely useful in forcing and inspiring me to think time 
beyond clock-time. A contribution of this study situated at the junction between 
methods and concepts emerged in the integration of temporal accounts in 
Institutional Ethnography, enhancing ‘work’ through a more multifaceted analysis 
of temporal experience. This theoretical perspective made particularly visible the 
recurring conflict emerging from a gendered experience of time, which is 
particularly clear in Anna’s case:  
Anna: “That [a balanced division of housework] would be very nice. This is also the 
main reason for the separation. It’s going - catastrophe from the beginning, […] 
eventually I talked about this with a friend, and she: simply write it down. Write 
down how many hours, then you get a feeling for it yourself . what somehow . is 
equally valuable. And I: really, and she: yes, of course. Ok, and I wrote. And that was 
very interesting, because . on days where I thought oh, today it was nicely in 
balance . it was not so. I had nevertheless . don’t know . however many hours, and he 
almost half. And there I thought: see, and you feel it somehow different too. And 
eventually I took my records to my husband – partner, whatever – here. Hehe, black 
on white. He blew up: you do such things? That is completely crooked . and so on. So 
he did not . react well. It would have been nice, if there had been: really? Oh dear . 
that we naturally have to change. He naturally did not do that. And it is an issue till 
today. I have to fight for every free minute . […] there is not really an awareness for . 
em, that this is in imbalance, and that this will be balanced somehow […] there is 
nothing, and this is also a reason why I . do not want to continue this kind of 
relationship.” (I22, 17:52-19:20, 26:37-27:30)  
Her example reveals how important methods of accounting for time spent and the 
visibility of time budgets is in the shaping of consciousnesses, the construction of 
fairness and legitimacy in the (domestic) division of work, and the emergence of 
political agency in ‘personal’ experience. The analysis I propose in consequence is 
not a reiteration of time budget research, but rather an inquiry into the 
construction of categories for time-use themselves, as they are used in the 
everyday. The target is to understand how social valuations of different time-uses 
affect the experience of people, their identification, their satisfaction with 
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themselves, and their ideas about fairness and legitimacy in the relations to others. 





4 Clocks out of Step: Working Parents and Time Management 
In an interview, family minister Manuela Schwesig said it is a pity that in Germany 
‘we’ still think that it is never the right time for a child (BMFSFJ, 2015). This 
statement falls into a broader concern about a ‘family-hostile’ society 
(‘familienfeindlich’, e.g. Knauß, 2013). Opposing this sentiment, the discourse on 
recent family policies revolves around the leitmotiv “Vereinbarkeit von Familie und 
Beruf” (reconcilability of family and profession) (Tiedemann, 2014). To understand 
current family political German debate reconcilability is a ‘conceptual need’. 
Passionate public debate is being led over the question in how far a gender-
egalitarian combination of paid work and family care is feasible or desirable. A 
recent study suggest that 1 in 3 of all mothers and 4 in 10 of all fathers desired an 
egalitarian model, with part-time work ranging roughly between 25–35 hours per 
week, per parent (Bernhardt, Hipp and Allmendinger, 2016). Reality, despite these 
wishes, tends to produce a ‘one-and-half-breadwinner’ model, with fathers working 
full-time and mothers part-time. Simultaneously, many women remain childless, 
which allows them to pursue a profession more easily as “unencumbered workers” 
(Acker, 2009). Political perspectives on demography, voiced from a conservative 
perspective by Birg (1998) or from a left perspective by Streeck (2011), convey that 
female labour market participation and declining birth-rates since the mid-20th 
century correlate, and have a substantial impact on national economic capacities 
and the sustainability of redistribution mechanisms. Framed often as female 
emancipation, critical voices have pointed out that changes in the division of work 
have benefitted employers more than women. Making more labour available 
undermined the social necessity of the family wage associated with the male-
breadwinner-model (Knauß, 2015). Increased demands from employers for 
personal mobility and flexibility, welfare state retrenchment, and a desire for 
consumption incentivise high labour market participation. This in turn crowds out 
time for personal relations, family-style care, and time for oneself. Following 
conservative narratives, the idea of a full-time adult-worker-model is bound to 
cause stress and disappointment for parents “trying to live two or three lives within 
a single one”(Knauß, 2015). Such narratives construct the perhaps uncomfortable 
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‘truth’ that the status quo of socio-cultural norms and policies is unable to resolve a 
growing paradox between production and reproduction, also identified in the left 
feminist literature (Bakker, 2007; Fraser, 2016; Rai, Hoskyns and Thomas, 2014).  
The family minister’s statement above reiterates this conflict on an everyday level, 
expressed in the common sentiment that parenthood is in conflict with other 
aspirations, centrally professional ones. This is particularly the case for female 
professionals, the most likely ‘we’ of the minister’s statement. Problems reported 
do not exclusively address reconcilability, but this particular discourse (4.1) is 
central as a way to make sense of everyday life, particularly for mothers. 
Disseminated on a daily basis in the public media for more than a decade, it conveys 
information produced or promoted by the family ministry, Bertelsmann, the 
Deutsche Jugend Institut (DJI), and other ‘authoritative’ sources. Using parent 
interview data gathered in 2016 I will point out a number of recurring themes how 
reconcilability is constructed relative to the expectations raised and criticised 
though this discourse. I will conclude that the idea of ‘never the right time’ is 
misleading. As I will show in section 4.2, there are hegemonic temporal norms on 
the life-course scale of time for when parenthood should be undertaken. Whereas 
parents who adhere to these norms face a range of challenges, the penalties for 
acting against the norms, purposefully or not, reveals their institutionalisation in 
everyday selectivities.  
The design of the safety net provided by the welfare state does not just perpetuate 
a social order, the temporality produced by social norms and policies also impacts 
social mobility. For carers this implies a risk for downward mobility. Studies of 
workplaces and fatherhood (Bernhardt, Hipp and Allmendinger, 2016; Reimer, 
2015), as well as  my own work, suggest the factors causing downward risk and 
limited mobility are reproduced in the daily social relations between parents, public 
childcare, and crucially not employers in the abstract, but direct superiors and 
colleagues (Hochschild, 2001, p. 31). These relations have been understood in terms 
of work cultures, work-time regimes, and work-place masculinities (e.g. Haas, Allard 
and Hwang, 2002; Williams, 2002). I will conclude that changes in the temporal 
structure of workplaces are key to resolving the production-reproduction paradox in 
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a gender-egalitarian and sustainable manner, but that changes in the ‘private 
sphere’ are just as critical. I will illustrate the rhythms of workplaces in the context 
of parental leave taking (section 4.3) to highlight how parenthood remains primarily 
thought of and enacted as motherhood. Tentative incentives in recent reforms to 
promote fatherhood remain relatively ineffective due to their inability to disrupt 
the self-fulfilling prophecy of mothers as ‘encumbered workers’. The selectivities in 
hiring and promotion decisions (critical events, 2.2.3) that follow this generalised 
assessment of women at a certain age reproduce the economic conditions between 
parents under which parental benefit policy encourages the selection of the lesser 
earner (mother) as primary carer. 
In parallel, the division of domestic labour remains deeply gendered. A foundational 
problem in assessing this distribution is the lack of formal accounting practices. 
Unlike paid work, work in the ‘private sphere’ is rarely made visible by timesheets 
or similar. As a consequence, time reckoning is difficult to quantify into standard 
clock time. This blurriness coexists with a gendered hierarchy of tasks (3.4). 
Amongst couples, there is a discernible need to legitimate divisions of labour, which 
I will examine in terms of “family myths” and “time binds” (Hochschild, 2003b, 
2001), pointing to the distribution of time autonomy between different gender 
roles (4.4). I conclude that the primary carer role is doubly time-bound by the 
schedules of profession and children. This phenomenon is visible in the conflict 
working mothers have with fitting paid work into kindergarten opening times. 
Looking at reconciliation as a dyad between paid work and parental care is 
reductionist, because it brackets third-party childcare, such as by grandparents. 
Looking at wider family relations and voluntary work, I will address the implications 
of recommodification on civil society (section 4.4.2).  
The gist of the argument is that the increasing flexibility of paid work schedules and 
a consequent lack of synchronisation to the ‘private sphere’ create perpetual time 
conflicts for individuals traversing between those spaces. The difficulties 
continuously reported by working mothers are a prime example of this. The original 
empirical contribution of this study is a systematic analysis of everyday 
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temporalities, and the institutional barriers that prevent parents, especially 
mothers, from planning and realising their lives in more satisfying ways.  
4.1 Constructing Reconcilability 
As indicated in the introduction, reconcilability (Vereinbarkeit) has become the 
leitmotif of German family policy in the early 21st century. This section provides a 
basic understanding what this concept connotes, and how it is used to promote what 
academia has called the adult-worker-model (Daly, 2011a; Lewis and Giullari, 2005). 
Before elucidating Vereinbarkeit in its current political context, I would like to 
examine the term on its own. Vereinbarkeit (reconcilability) is a variation of the noun 
Vereinbarung, derived from the Middle High German einbæren (Duden, 2018c), 
associated with the Latin concepts of unitas; cohaerentia; assensus; and reconciliatio 
(Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, 1971). While the most 
common translation is compatibility, the wider meaning of vereinbar includes (Duden, 
2018b author’s translation): 
compatible, appropriate, corresponding, harmonising, combinable, compatible, 
conform, concordant, agreeable, fitting [together] 
The negated term is thus highly appropriate to describe a coordination and 
legitimation problem, as well as a shortfall between expectations and experiences. 
Vereinbarkeit (in the following: reconcilability) in the current political context 
conveys a more precise set of ideas. Illustrative are the titles of the last two national 
family reports issued by the family ministry, which are key sources distributing the 
reconcilability discourse: 
 Families between flexibility and dependability – Perspectives for a life cycle-
related family policy (BMFSFJ, 2006b) 
 Time for the Family: Family Time Policy as an Opportunity for Sustainable 
Family Policy (BMFSFJ, 2011b) 
The binary of flexibility-dependability in the former title is symptomatic of a 
thinking in separate spheres between the working world and the family, which 
attributes distinct – and opposing – core values to each institution: flexibility with 
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the working world, dependability with family. The life-course perspective implied in 
the subtitle can be traced to the influence of an epistemic community including 
experts from the University Duisburg-Essen (IAQ), DJI, and Professor Hans Bertram, 
who was the chairman of the commission producing the report. The second report 
clearly positions time as an object of politics to achieve what is considered by the 
authors a sustainable policy environment.  
The reports are relevant due to their anchoring in the parliamentary process 
(Gerlach, 2014). Commissioned by the federal government every few years since 
1968, an interdisciplinary and independent29 team of experts prepares the reports, 
which are then formally published in the parliamentary prints (Bundesdrucksachen). 
The family ministry is obliged to publish a response. This induces a compulsion for 
political consideration. Family reports are considered important in family policy 
agenda setting (ibid). The extent to which policy reform has occurred in response to 
the currently eight reports varied greatly. In recent history, Gerlach (2014) 
highlights the importance of the 1994 report, which introduced the concept of 
“Humanvermögen” (human resources), framing family not only in ethical, but also 
economic terms. This reframing legitimised growing investments in family policy in 
the 1990s. What this report, however, also problematised is the perception of 
humans as individuals – in labour relations and by the welfare state – , which leads 
to “competitive advantages” for childless people (Deutscher Bundestag, 1994, p. 
22). To ensure stable population numbers institutions ought to be reshaped to 
better accommodate the needs of carers – otherwise the number of childless 
people would be likely to increase in a “child-hostile” society (ibid, p.21). The report 
also pointed out that the West German understanding of “normal work” and 
“normal family” (male-breadwinner-model) has lost its obviousness and legitimacy 
with German reunification and commitments made in the process of European 
integration (ibid, p.20). International comparison between the former GDR (state-
led childcare) and FRG (familialised childcare), as well as the liberal British and 
social-democratic Nordic states have uprooted those certainties. Rankings and 
                                                     
29 Participation takes place on a voluntary and unpaid basis 
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recommendations by OECD and EU impact the discursive construction of German 
insufficiencies (e.g. BMFSFJ, 2016). Frequent international comparisons are also 
made to the Écoles Maternelles and supposed ease of parenthood in France (e.g. 
Schubert, 2008; Rahir, 2006). Central in this wider debate are demands to reassess 
the role the state should take to enable the provision of adequate childcare. 
In the 2006 report, the role of the state towards a better “reconcilability of family 
and work” is defined as “helping to make it possible to achieve life plans which 
include children” (BMFSFJ, 2006b, p. 2). The statement is explicitly framed in terms 
of sustainability; first, in the context of long-term demographic and economic 
trends, and secondly in terms of gender and social cohesion (ibid). Germany is 
represented as a country with a need to “catch up” with the most family-friendly 
countries in Europe. The political solution is seen as a triad of (1) infrastructure 
development that supports families in everyday life; (2) new forms of cash support; 
and (3) time politics (BMFSFJ, 2006b, p. 3).  
The most recent family report underscores the dimension of time as an object of 
policy (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012b, p. 1). Time politics (Zeitpolitik) is defined as 
the strengthening of “time sovereignty” (Zeitsouveränität) to ensure a “freedom of 
choice over lifestyles” (Wahlfreiheit der Lebensführung), which is to be facilitated 
by a demand-based temporal restructuring of public institutions (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2012b, p. 1). This includes the redistribution of time budgets for tasks of 
little recognition between the sexes, a better synchronisation of disposable time, 
and time competences, that is, the abilities of citizens to plan their time in ways that 
let them realise their targets. Responsible actors identified by the report are the 
social partners and employers, public social services, but also the legislator with 
regard to labour law (ibid). The last point indicates the current discursive emphasis 
on reconcilability as a phenomenon that requires solutions in a reshaping of 
workplaces, career models, and understandings of performance that actively take 
into account workers’ social roles outside the labour relation. In that sense one can 
understand the discursive politics by the family ministry as a soft attempt to assign 
more responsibility for reconciliation to employers. The following analysis of 
parents’ accounts of their daily lives is going to bring out these social relations 
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between the family, state, and capitalist economy, looking at the social division of 
work and redistribution of time resources, the synchronisation of various schedules 
and time demands in the temporal coordination of that division of work, and the 
institutions that impact time sovereignty and the ability to plan. 
4.2 Never the Right Time for Children? 
 
Markus: “… it simply . there are, so .  it’s easier for men, but for working women 
there is not the right time, it’s always the wrong . and so we said we chance it, if-if it 
happens then it happens” (I25, 12:29-12:56) 
What did the family minister mean when she said, as cited at the beginning of this 
chapter, that in Germany ‘we’ still think that it is never the right time for a child 
(BMFSFJ, 2015)? A recent survey suggests that more than 50% of all participants 
thought that money, independence, and career were reasons that prevented 
parenthood (BAT, 2016).  
Following the logic of Institutional Ethnography, I start analysis with participants’ 
recollections of their journeys into parenthood. During the interviews I asked 
parents when children had been born, when the wish for a child had first appeared, 
and how participants had gone on from there. I also asked if there had been 
something specific about the timing, to what extent parenthood had been planned. 
I will first discuss responses by professional couples, the group I focus on (4.2.1); 
secondly I will turn to the narratives of single and migrant mothers to delineate the 
hegemonic ‘standard life-course’ from the outside (4.2.2). Looking at ‘the others’ 
serves to underline the range of cultural underpinnings, mechanisms, and material 
preconditions for the norm and the scope of the ‘we’ in the family minister’s 
statement.  
4.2.1 The Right Time for Motherhood? 
The literature on life-courses and demography has clearly identified a trend towards 
later parenthood, relative to the mid-20th century, especially for professionals. A 
phase of life called “young adulthood” has emerged, which pushes ahead the “rush-
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hour of life” (Figure 7) (Bertram, 2012b; Bittman and Wajcman, 2000). Young 
adulthood is a phase spent in education, often at university, with loose personal 
commitments, whereas the rush-hour of life evolves between paid work and family 
obligations. Becoming a parent is the key transition event between those two 
phases. Discussing the rush-hour of life, Bujard & Panova (2014) differentiate 
between a rush-hour of life decisions and a rush-hour of family cycles. The former is 
predominantly relevant for professionals, and refers to a span of 5–7 years in which 
key decisions about career and family occur at a rapid pace. The latter refers to the 
burden of caring for young children simultaneously to securing a livelihood. Only 
the former is ‘new’ as a phenomenon that has emerged since the 1960. The cause 
for the rush-hour of life decisions, situated between ages 27–35, is higher 
education. Longer education periods result in an increasingly problematic coupling 
of social and biological age, in particular for females: the infamous ‘biological clock’. 
Increasing health risks for mother and child discourage motherhood past the mid-
thirties, which is just the time when motherhood becomes socially most feasible for 
professionals. 
 
Figure 7 Young Adulthood - Rush-Hour of Life  (adapted from BMFSFJ, 2011a) 
The most under demographic scrutiny are hence not surprisingly female 
professionals, who were long presented as the group least willing to have children. 
This image has been challenged by recent census data, which tentatively suggests 
that fertility rates for female professionals have stabilised, perhaps even increased, 
whereas rates for lesser educated women remain on the decrease (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2017c). It is arguably too early to tell, but the fact that parental leave 
reforms specifically targeted professional women might explain this shift. At the 
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same it is still clearly the case that fewer female professionals (74%) have children 
than other females (80%). The causes for this discrepancy have increasingly been 
understood not as choice per se, but as the result of an ever-repeated delay of 
parenthood in the life-course (Bittman and Wajcman, 2000; Bertram, 2012a). The 
combination of educational attainment of partners, where it is socially seen as less 
acceptable for women to marry and procreate with a man below their own 
educational level, are often considered as an important initial hurdle (educational 
homogamy, Diabaté, 2018, p. 82). There are also indications that men place more 
importance on partnership in life, whereas women take a more critical stance. The 
phenomena are likely interrelated, and can be explained by women’s anticipations 
of reconcilability problems in a society that continues to produce unequal gender 
relations (Diabaté, 2018, p. 93). The delay of parenthood to a time when partner 
and profession ‘finally fit’ then becomes a slippery slope into childlessness.  
 
Figure 8 Professional Life-Course 
Sibille, a human resources manager and recent mother, explains her own timing 
rationality in a way that matches the professional variant of the ‘educational 
majority’ life-course discussed above (391.3.2): Figure 8 illustrates the for the one-
child-variation.  
Sibille Especially the timing when children was definitely a huge topic. Because uh . 
this is always the issue, in that moment one definitely drops out of 
professional life . the question is a bit: where does one want to take the 
career until then, because effectively one already knows that afterwards it’s 
over, at least for a few years . until one maybe comes back to the point, 
where one says, the children are big enough now, one can work fulltime 
again, and then the employer says: ok, now maybe there is also hope for the 
next step . yes 
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Nina And uh . what concretely was for you . was now the decisive point for you to 
say: I am at this point? . and now? 
Sibille Yes, effectively yes . that was the case, that I thought . well, I first did a 
bachelor, then worked two years, then I also did a master. Said, good, now I 
would like to work for another few years, until I reach that certain, well, 
financial and content-related point . and uh . we moved one more time from 
Frankfurt to Cologne . that was connected for me with a change of employer . 
where I said, you cannot start somewhere new, and then somehow say after 
the probation period you are pregnant. Because you somehow have to have 
worked for 2-3 years somewhere, so that they – in quotation marks – like to 
take you back, because I think one always depends a little on it that the 
employer can.. appreciate one’s achievements . so that they will then make 
concessions (entgegenkommen) for you, when it comes to having an 
interesting part-time job, or even to be promoted (gefördert) again 
eventually. And uh . hence that is always already in my head, that I said, you 
have to somehow work at least 2, 2.5 years somewhere, before it is time, yes. 
(I48, 43:24-45:35)  
Sibille’s account accentuates the important role temporal expectations play in the 
decisions of prospective mothers. The professional standard life-course has a series 
of semi-set stages. Schooling that permits entry into the university system usually 
ends at 18-19 years of age, which marks the beginning of the phase of young 
adulthood. Adding up the time required for tertiary education (three years for a 
standard bachelor’s degree, two years for a master’s degree, and some extra time 
for the occasional shift of subject area, stays abroad, student jobs or internships) 25 
becomes a likely age for labour market entry. If two to three years of work 
experience with an employer are necessary to present oneself favourably enough to 
expect a friendly welcome back after parental leave, the earliest ‘sensible’ age for 
parenthood has risen to 27. Taking into account that initial jobs are often 
temporary, and switching employers is likely, it follows that parenthood is ever 
more often delayed into the mid-thirties. Accounts such as Sibille’s raise key issues 
about timing, which I will address throughout the remainder of section 4.2: 
i. Is the right time – the kairos – for motherhood predominantly determined 
by the mother’s circumstances of employment? 




4.2.2 The Wrong Time for Motherhood? 
Reversing the question of the ‘right time’ sheds additional light. Is there a wrong 
time for motherhood? To that end, I want to illustrate the life of Michelle, who 
became unexpectedly pregnant, and the perspectives of Lamia and Amira, who 
recently migrated to Germany from Arabic countries with very different life-course 
expectations and norms. Both accounts help to see that while there may not be a 
perfect time for motherhood, there are certainly better and worse timings for it in 
the temporal structure of German society. 
Michelle: “but I also thought now this is not a catastrophe, I was 24 and not 14” (I44, 
9:52-10:07) 
The effects unplanned motherhood at the age of 24 had on Michelle’s life is telling 
for the question in how far the standard life-course above is socially privileging. The 
single mother on unemployment benefits described her financial situation as 
follows (I44, 24:12-24:43): “well it is plus minus zero, I’d say . well . no possibility to 
put anything on the side”, enough to pay the bills and cook. Michelle apprenticed as 
a fitness coach, but unable to find a job she started a second apprenticeship in 
speech therapy. She financed the vocational school fees by working “three jobs”, 
but had to quit when she got pregnant. Her inability to save and debts from her 
apprenticeship worried her: 
Michelle: “I feel that I simply have worked a lot in my life already somehow, and 
somehow have nothing on my bank account . that is frustrating somehow also 
because . one has the feeling that others . well, go the straight way and then 
somehow . no idea, have a lot of money early on already . that is a little more . 
difficult for us” (I44, 35:07-35:49) 
What Michelle called ‘the straight way’ is the standard life-course identified above, 
where education precedes employment, and children are planned once one’s 
position with an employer is moderately secure. Michelle further distinguished 
between ‘professions’ and ‘jobs’ (I44, 51:17 - 53:41), i.e. standard or atypical 
employment. Becoming pregnant disrupted Michelle’s recounted plan to quickly 
complete her education, work, and start saving money (I44, 2:39-2:55). In her 
current situation she said she would be happy to have a job at all, and that she 
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hoped with her daughter in kindergarten, she might be able to work in retail. She 
would also like to finish her apprenticeship, but could not possibly do this full-time 
or in the evening, when training is offered, because of the limited kindergarten 
opening hours.  
Several participants, who recently migrated to Germany, had had a child shortly 
after their arrival. They reported that following the “Arabic” cultural norm of having 
a child as soon as possible after marriage made it difficult for them to learn German, 
find an apprenticeship or job, and thus be able to work. Amira and Lamia (I45, 
9:08,2 - 9:50,9) told me that upon their arrival in Germany they were unaware of 
the importance in German culture to adhere to the sequence: education, paid work, 
parenthood.  
Amira: “but nobody said . because my culture . come, quickly children, understands 
very different […] Arabic culture is catastrophe . right [Lamia: hehe] . if woman eh . 
does not marry say: when do you marry? If marries: when comes first child? Comes 
first, when comes second?” (I45, 9:52-12:37) 
Now the time demands of school hours, working times, and simply the ability to 
dedicate time to learning German without children interrupting slowed them down 
in realising their goals to participate more in public life, especially in paid 
employment. Gendered norms were described as more traditional in these families, 
but women still wanted to work once their children were older.  
Local NGOs supporting unemployed mothers posited the inability to complete 
education and inflexibility of working hours as the main barriers for parents to 
participate in the labour market or increase their chances at better employment 
through education (I37, I40). What can be deducted from these examples is that 
deviations from the standard life-course described above, most notably in the 
timing of parenthood, have a profound effect on the risk of social exclusion. This is 
owed to the temporal inflexibility of the education system and the labour market. 
But it also becomes palpable in disruptions of friendships and other social networks 




4.2.3 Chancing or Planning? ‘When’ and ‘How many?’ 
A curious observation in interviews with professional couples was accounts of 
chancing rather than planning parenthood. Given reliable birth control and legal 
abortion, most pregnancies these days occur and are carried through intentionally. 
But even for prospective parents, planning under benign conditions and with the 
help of modern technology, the micro timing of conception ultimately remains a 
matter of chance and uncertainty. This uncertainty carries into the ‘critical’ first 12 
weeks, in which miscarriages are still likely enough so that couples tend to keep 
pregnancies a secret. 
Let us return to the questions posed above: 
 Is the right time – the kairos – for motherhood predominantly determined 
by the mother’s circumstances of employment? 
 And how many children can one fit into the rush-hour of life? 
Imke (I24) connects her ability to build a private life with a worsening of her 
employment situation: being laid off as priestess when the Protestant Church 
reduced staff. She switched to operative PR jobs, then teaching. The depreciation of 
her professional role coincides with a reduction of working hours and professional 
commitment. In the vacuum of additional free time, private life emerges, which 
quickly leads to motherhood.  
Imke: “no, as priestess I had thought that maybe does not even arise as a question, 
because I was so involved in the parish, I thought: okay, private life . not a must . my 
job is so much fun, such a calling, such a profession . well, such an important 
profession for me, which fills out my entire life . I would not have expected it. And 
basically I owe it to the outplacement, the being laid off, and  these . low . operative 
jobs, that I […] had much more private life . and then I met him online, and then 
everything went really fast. And this was the turning-point in my life.” (I24, 11:24- 
12:06) 
For Imke and Thomas, an ‘exogenous shock’ in her life was responsible for the 
unexpected journey into parenthood. And suddenly the period between wanting 
and having children became very short: 
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Thomas: “we got to know each other in January 2010, and L was born end of October 
2010, so that is . I will say hehe [Nina & Imke: hehe] . she was a little too early, okay, 
but … it also was not an accident, it happened in full consciousness [Imke: yes . it was 
our mutual wish]” (I24, 13:05 - 13:58) 
Both Imke and Thomas give the impression of very ordinary, quite ‘bürgerlich’ 
people, settled in the Protestant milieu of their affluent neighbourhood. They 
would never turn heads on the street. He is a manager in bank restructuring, she 
went from Protestant priesthood, to marketing jobs, to being a religion teacher at 
school. Yet when they became pregnant, Thomas confessed during the interview – 
to Imke’s surprise –that his friends asked him if their daughter had been “an 
accident”.  
Having children unintentionally is seen as morally deficient. This also becomes 
visible in my carefully hedged questions about Michelle’s pregnancy, and if she had 
contemplated abortion: 
Nina may I ask if the child was an accident? 
 
Michelle she was not an accident, but it was not planned. 
 
Nina ok, so a uh . a surprise, which then . [was embraced? 
 
Michelle [it was then simply a given condition . hehe yes 
 
(I44, 3:56-4:11) 
Nina was it from the beginning fundamentally clear to you that you want to 
keep her? 
 
Michelle yes. I could never imagine that . I can understand that women think about 
such a thing, especially in such a shock situation, when it is not planned, 
when it is also clear that one will be alone with the child, but uh . I could 
never forgive myself, like 10 years later to think, what would have been 
with the child . because there always come different life circumstances 
again, settled circumstances with a regular income, and I think at the latest 
then, right, or when there is a new partner, then one thinks back to the 
time, what if and how the child would have looked, so . I could never have 
had the heart to. 
(I44, 7:53-8:33) 
 
What struck me about the second interview sequence is that the term ‘abortion’ 
never falls. I already noticed this during the interview, reflecting on my own caution 
to offend or hurt Michelle. Given that she was a very open conversation partner, 
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who shared a lot of personal memories, she had generally given me no extra reason 
to tread carefully. Yet I did. What makes the evasion of terms (marked grey) even 
more interesting is that Michelle brings up abortion at a later point during the 
interview (I44, 10:15-11:26), when she describes how she was working a lot during 
her second apprenticeship to cover school fees. Being very busy and losing weight 
in that time, she legitimates, stopped her from noticing she was pregnant. Only in 
this second second sequence she implies that it was legally-medically too late to 
terminate the pregnancy. The question of abortion never posed itself to her in a 
practical sense, and her construction of pregnancy as “simply being a given 
condition” makes a lot more sense. But Michelle evaded that part of the story 
before. Instead she offered a self-presentation in moral-emotional terms, which can 
be an equally honest construction of what happened – but it is one which allows 
Michelle to presents herself as a moral agent, a decision-maker, and her daughter 
consequently as an intended child: not an accident.  
What separates Thomas’ ‘easy-going confession’ from Michelle’s evasion? Is it the 
simple fact that for Imke and Thomas, the unusually early conception of their 
daughter had no consequences on their life that separate them from the norm?  
They were two parents. They had finished their degrees. They had enough money 
and professional status. They became parents in their late thirties/early forties: 
late-ish, but ultimately in time? 
She was alone, unemployed and left without finishing her second apprenticeship, 
poor, and 24 – by far the youngest in the baby swimming class, and blaming that for 
the difficulty in connecting to the other mothers who were ten years older. She was 
also the only mother among her friends, who did not understand that it was hard 
for her to stay in touch.  
I suggest “24, and not 14” was still too young for motherhood in terms of social age. 
Michelle had not reached the life-course point which Sibille deemed ‘safe’ for 
motherhood. The importance of life-course timing is further substantiated by 
Lamia’s and Amira’s experiences. I conclude therefore, in response to the first 
question raised above, that there are economic (employment) as well as personal 
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dimensions of social age that matter in generating the stability and support needed 
to fend off the downwards social risks of parenthood, especially motherhood. 
Adhering to a life-course sequence of ‘education, paid work, parenthood’ is crucial, 
because these activities often cannot be synchronised well and build on each other 
as ‘enabling preconditions’. Looking at another couple’s narrative sheds some more 
light on the gendered dynamics around the ‘right time’: 
For Elena and Markus (I25), an external shock like Imke’s layoff did not exist. 
Instead, the couple used a narrative of “chancing” parenthood, delegating the 
timing to “fate”. Markus is a CEO of an international telecommunications company, 
a job he acquired after several years as a marketing consultant. He studied 
marketing with the army, which meant he had to commit to 12 years in the officer’s 
career path. The decision to become a consultant was explained as a quick start into 
a civil career after leaving the army as a relatively old candidate on the labour 
market. Elena studied law and became a legal consultant in a firm that helps 
German companies internationalise in the Middle East. While they had been a 
couple for many years, their busy jobs and regular travel to the Middle East had 
taken up the central part of their lives. Living in different cities even during their 
time in Germany also meant that they did not cohabitate until relatively late into 
their relationship, preferring to “let things drift”.  
Nina: When did the first wish for children emerge? 
Elena: Well, for me not at all hehe [Nina: hehe] [Markus: well, uh…] – maybe you 
may answer first, you were the driving force after all 
Markus: Yes, wish for a chi- well, as I said, the wish to have children always existed in 
principle, but there was no concrete planning. Such as now, next year. We 
tackle it, but rather at some point we simply chanced it . [Elena: hmhm] and 
then it happened eventually . it simply . there are, so .  it’s easier for men, but 
for working women there is not the right time, it’s always the wrong . and so 
we said we chance it (es billigend in kauf genommen), if-if it happens then it 
happens 
Elena: Exactly, that is well said, because . I always knew exactly, I am also – as 
already said my family is very important to me – but I am not that much of a 
(davy-type of person), uh, and I always knew that I never will be inclined to . 
being pregnant, never have a desire for a birth, never be inclined to 
breastfeed, and the whole baby stuff and whatever, but equally, or . we both 
knew we wanted children, and consequently be played Russian roulette. […] 
we try it now, if it works then fate has decided, if it does not work, fate has 
decided too. Then it is also okay. Hehe, and thereby the wish for a child so to 
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say happened en passant, hehe […] yes, I also was not inclined to get married 
. in that regard I believe I am somewhat of a degenerated (entartet) woman, 
because I find uh-weddings and this whole stuff and fuss, I never found that 
seductive . but I knew that is the man with whom I am going to stay together, 
and in this point he is quite conservative-ish (konservati:iv)[ 
Markus: [-exactly, and then we said now comes the child, now we put things on solid 
legs 
Elena: Then he conspired with my mother hehe [Nina: hehe] if you want to be 
precise, and the two of them then harried me – well in the friendly way – and 
told me now I would have to think about the child hehe, and then we were 
married – quick and dirty – at the registry office. But in retrospect I find that 
quite good, because it saved me so to say from the whole white uh doves-
romance wedding addresses – big dress and 500 people, I was saved from 
that, therefore I quite like it hehe 
(I25, 12:14-15:11) 
It is important to remember that their interview narrative might not represent their 
thoughts at the time they actually became pregnant. There are nevertheless a few 
aspects in how they reconstruct their past that I find telling in the present: Elena 
identifies Markus as the driving force in a joint decision process. She thereby opens 
this interview passage by assigning special agency to him (“you”). His answer is held 
in neutral or shared pronouns (“we”). She voices assent to his narrative. Her 
subsequent account alternates between pronouns, setting off her own (I/negative) 
attitude to motherhood against the (we/positive) shared wish for a child. I 
understand the interaction and pronoun choices in this passage as a co-construction 
of togetherness-difference, that is, a negotiation how a shared life event is 
experienced differently, and should be presented towards an outsider as an 
instance of harmony or conflict: The ‘we’ presents a shared decision, expressing 
solidarity between partners towards me. But Elena’s use of I also suggests tensions 
between Elena’s and Markus’ individual experiences of parenthood. In that line of 
thinking, delegating the responsibility to chance/fate might be a way for the couple 
to avoid blame, or express their powerlessness to find a mutual ‘right time’. The 
desire to have children, possibly present to distinct degrees and with diverging 
temporal preferences between partners, is confronted with an expectation and 
experience of unequal costs. Elena expresses quite firmly the identity conflict she 
identifies between “wife/mother” (wedding dresses, baby stuff) and “lawyer”, the 
role in which she identifies herself most often during the interview. Going beyond 
141 
 
this particular excerpt, it becomes quite obvious that she attributes the higher 
recognition to her role as a professional. As becomes quite clear throughout the 
interview, this gender inequality is an illegitimate element that occupies both 
partners (also see “family myth”, 4.4.1). But the way it is expressed differs: Elena 
thematises issues in loud outrage, whereas Markus tends towards quiet 
acknowledgements. Is the absence of Markus’ “I” a matter of guilty conscience 
here? I cannot tell. The key point to take away is that “there is not the right time” 
for motherhood for professional women in career paths modelled on 
unencumbered (male) lives, and that this causes planning and legitimacy issues in 
professional’s personal relationships. 
What must be clear about Markus and Elena’s account is that ‘chancing’ 
parenthood is a matter of narrative presentation, not of action. Their reasoning 
process suggests a high degree of intentionality and planning. The couple was in a 
financially secure position, with a long-term partner they felt they could trust, and 
broader family support. In that sense they diverge quite clearly from the accounts 
of Michelle, or even Imke and Thomas, above. Another aspect that sets them apart 
is the presence of a second child. Whereas so far the focus has remained on the first 
child, this last part of this section will address the second questions posed above: 
how the rush-hour of life affects the number of children per family.  
Markus and Elena have recently bought a house in one of the most exclusive 
neighbourhoods in town. It is not a villa, or very ostentatious, going by my 
impression of sitting in their open-plan kitchen during the interview, but it is quite 
nice and has enough room for all family members, as well as a garden. It is also 
located down the street from Elena’s mother, which is extremely convenient for 
outsourcing childcare to the grandmother. At first glance one might assume that the 
real estate purchase demands for both of them to work. But at another point in the 
interview, Elena suggests that Markus’ income would be enough to get them by, 
referring to her income as the ‘play money’ (Spielgeld). This suggests, next to a 
gendered and unequal economic dynamic, that money is not the absolutely decisive 
criterion to abstain from further children. Christina and Ralf (I28) are in a similar 
position economically, but live in a stronger male-breadwinner-model. They want to 
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have four children (but only had two at the time of the interview). Imke and Thomas 
(I24) only have one child, but Imke still took a third year of unpaid parental leave. 
For professional, upper-middle class couples, money itself is clearly not the decisive 
criterion.  
Nina: Did you always already want family? 
Markus: Yes. 
Elena: We only argued how many children [Markus: hehe] . he:e wanted at least 
four and I hehe was satisfied with two […] 
Markus: I believe that eh children are somehow . eventually very very purpose-giving 
(sinnstiftend) in life, if one is . especially professionally . going on for years, 
everything becomes a little more relative. Of course . I have made a great 
project, the great successes, but of course nobody cares about that in 100 
years. Yes, or if I buy myself a Porsche now, great, but in 100 years nobody 
cares about that either. And children are . […] I always found it beautiful that 
children, uh, well to pass on values, to . yes, that was always important, and 
there I think the more the better . that is the multiplier effect on the one 
hand, and on the other . if things get rough it is family that counts . and the 
more support one has, the better. We – I, we both only have one sibling, but I 
would not have minded having had more, that is … now simply if one wants 
to live in the city, like in Cologne, and wants property, then . one usually 
needs two incomes and therefore it also [Elena: yes] . independent from that 
you don’t want to do that (having more children) anymore, it is also currently 
economically impossible . [Elena: yes, and also-] well, it would be possible, 
but then we would have to really restrict ourselves (krass einschränken). 
Nina: to have more children, or? 
Markus: Exactly, really restrict ourselves, for one, and on the other hand does my wife 
need her work. 
Elena: Yes, that difficulty comes on top with three children . with two it is now in my 
industry – I indulge myself with the illusion that maybe I will be able to switch 
some day, into a somewhat less clocked (getacktet) working environment, 
but I believe with three children . well I only know very few, they exist, 
absolutely no question, but I only know very few exceptions where also the 
women have a relatively satisfying working environment and more than two 
children. That is really rare. [Nina: mhm] . well I know currently from my 
company for example some women already go into assistance at the time of 
marriage, that is from consultant to assistant, yes? Because they know 
exactly that as consultant they don’t stand a chance anymore (keine schnitte 
machen) if they have children. And this price I have paid as well, definitely so  
(I25, 8:41-11:30) 
Elena’s desire to work marks the decisive limit for the number of children the 
couple has. She adheres to the norm of having two children at most, which she 
explains is the maximum number she encounters in her peer group of professional 
women. Two children are also the ideal conveyed in the media trope of the ‘normal’ 
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nuclear family, and the dominant model of family realised in Germany – for the last 
15 years only 12% of all German parents have had three or more children (Engstler 
and Menning, 2003). In the historic trend, the number of children per household 
has been declining steadily into the 1980s, and stagnates since. Each child reduces 
the likelihood for mothers to work, thus increasing the financial burdens on 
households, most notably through the mother’s income loss (Rupp and Bierschock, 
2005). Households with many children rely more heavily on welfare transfers, and 
are disproportionately common in very low and very high income strata (ibid).  
More relevantly for parents’ sense-making, the normality of one to two children per 
family is mirrored by the otherness of families with many children. As Vascovics 
(2002, p. 74) asserts, those families might be looked at oddly, or be considered 
“irresponsible”, “antisocial”, or “uncontrolled”. Families with many children thus 
face a legitimation pressure from their social environment (ibid). The breaking point 
between two and three children is for instance marked in governmental categories, 
as well as in the self-description of the Verband kinderreicher Familien 
Deutschland e.V. (KRFD), which promotes the interests of “3+” families (KRFD, no 
date). That the wish for more than two children amounts to ‘deviant’ behaviour is 
also visible in Christina’s answer to my question how many children the couple 
wants: 
Christina: “hehehe [Ralf: hehehe] four! hehe to be completely honest hehe …” (I28, 
19:24 - 19:31) 
Her phrasing and the laughter imply a confession. If one can ‘confess’ the wish for 
four children, then it must be possible to consider it ‘deviant’. This interpretation, 
the personal frustration, and everyday experience of straying from the norm, comes 
out repeatedly throughout their interview (I28). The pressures all parents face tend 
to be more pronounced for single parents, but also for families with many children. 
In each case, the ratio between children and carers is higher, which reduces time 
available for paid work. Welfare transfers do not close that gap.  
To summarise briefly, the barrier for parents to have more than two children is 
constituted in normative discourse. Problematic therein is that professional life-
144 
 
courses have shortened the ‘right time’ for parenthood into the rush-hour of life, 
limited by the need for education and professional security on the one hand, and 
biological age (for women) on the other. For professional women, ‘male’ career 
trajectories arguably leave no ‘right time’ at all. Expectations towards the temporal 
trade-off between paid work and care, and the costs of choosing family that are 
largely carried by women, feature as the central decision criterion between 
partners. The conditions shaping this decision, and parents – especially mothers – 
as decision-makers, are the gate-keepers to higher fertility. This observation in turn 
legitimates my methodological choice to focus on experiences and expectations. 
4.3 Working Parenthood and Parental Leave 
This chapter will address the early phase of parenthood after birth, which is 
structurally specific as a period of increased social protection for at least one 
parent. This phase is constituted through parental leave policies. I will begin with an 
outline of parental leave legislation in Germany, focussing on the reform of 2007. 
The central aspect of the reform was a switch from a flat-rate parental benefit to an 
income-related benefit. The reform also promotes a shorter leave and, for the first 
time in German history, introduced two months of dedicated “daddy” leave. Policy 
incentives and cultural tendencies to include fathers more in childcare, however, 
are limited by flexible work schedules, notably project work, whereas gendered 
labour market segregation arising from early adulthood decisions onward 
reproduces the tendency for mothers to become primary carers. As I will 
demonstrate below, the incentives for shared parenting are too weak to counteract 
the male-breadwinner logic deeply imbued in German work culture at this point in 
time. 
4.3.1 Parental Leave Legislation 1878-2015 
Parental leave is not a new type of policy. The first basic form of maternity benefit 
and leave for industrial workers in Germany was introduced in 1878 under 
Chancellor Bismarck, in the form of a three-week employment ban for mothers 
immediately after birth, together with other restrictions on women’s working time 
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(the 16h day, lunch breaks) that were meant to ensure they could fulfil their duties 
to the family (Deutscher Reichstag, 1900, §137). Throughout the late 19th and early 
20th century, the so-called Mutterschutz was gradually lengthened to six weeks on 
either side of the birth and spread to other sectors. Protection against dismissal 
during the period of leave was added as part of a larger reform under the Nazi 
government, which also raised the benefit to normal wage level (Großdeutscher 
Reichstag, 1942)30. Dismissal protection has subsequently remained an element of 
all further legislation in this area. After the separation of East and West Germany, 
policies developed with quite different paces and ideologies.  
Unlike the West, East Germany made social equality a state target, investing heavily 
in the 1950s-60s to promote higher education for disadvantaged groups, including 
women. State targets to full female employment, however, clashed with targets for 
two to three children per family. To promote more births, in the 1970s additional 
policies were introduced, most importantly the ‘Babyjahr’ (baby year) and extra 
leave when children were sick, on top of child benefits, housing privileges, and 
public childcare (Geissler, 1991, p. 182). This, in combination with a right to work, 
kept female labour market participation high and rising up to 91% before 
reunification in 1989, and ensured that women had a pension above poverty level 
(Nickel, 1990). But as in other countries, women in the GDR faced discrimination in 
the labour market due to their likelier absences from work. This pertained to access 
to leading positions as much as to industrial segregation along traditional gendered 
lines. The problem of the ‘double-burden’ was thus addressed by the state, like in 
Scandinavian and other Soviet countries, but ultimately not resolved. This shortfall, 
at the end of the day, must be attributed to the failure to equally involve fathers in 
childcare. 
In comparison to the socialist model, family policy in the West German welfare 
state maintained a clear male-breadwinner-model. After the stress of the war, 
family in the West became the refuge of an otherwise collapsed society, “society’s 
                                                     
30 Policies supporting mothers introduced at the time must not only be seen as pro-natalist, but also 
in the context of the war, and the large number of widows and independently living women. 
Necessity here explains the divergence between Nazi ideology and policy on women. (see Frevert, 
1989, p. 207) 
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last bastion” (Schelsky 1955, as translated by Frevert, 1989, p. 265). The post-war 
period restored the traditional family norm and patriarchy. The legal framework for 
maternal leave, implemented in 1952, emphasised occupational bans and 
restrictions around birth (Deutscher Bundestag, 1952). Working women at the time 
were routinely dismissed upon marriage, and the ratio of married working women 
dropped from a third in 1939 to 26.4% in 1950 (Frevert, 1989, p. 267). This trend 
slowly reversed itself with the influx of American capital, economic recovery, and 
growing consumerism. By 1980, 48.3% of married women were employed, more 
than half of which in white-collar jobs (ibid, p.270). The socio-economic shift 
towards greater female employment, together with the second-wave women’s 
movement, generated the political pressure on the government to address gender. 
The first major qualitative shift in leave policy design was affected through the 
reforms of 1979 under a Social-Democratic/Liberal coalition government, which for 
the first time posited a right to time off, rather than a ban on employment 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1979). The reform, which allowed six months of 
Mutterschaftsurlaub (maternity vacation) was framed in biological-medical terms: 
“The involution of the organs may usually be completed within six to eight weeks. 
The whole regeneration of the maternal organism however takes up considerably 
more time. In particular the vegetative nervous system and the hormonal changes in 
connection with the pregnancy and delivery require significantly more time than 
eight weeks to reach the state before pregnancy. With the […] Mutterschaftsurlaub it 
is made possible for an employed mother […] to commit herself to her child just like a 
housewife. She is relieved of the double-burden of her duties as employee and 
mother at least for the particularly important first phase of life of her child.”  
(Zmarzlik, 1979, p. 174) 
Eligibility was restricted to mothers previously in employment, thus excluding self-
employed women (Malzahn, 1985). These gaps in coverage were mostly closed with 
the introduction of the Erziehungsurlaub in 1986 by the Christian Democrats 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1985). A key novelty was parental leave for fathers, effected 
by the gender-neutral phrasing of the law. This, however, only applied to married 
spouses, as custody otherwise remained exclusively with the unmarried mother 
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(BGB §1705, outdated). Through the limitation of working time to 20h, the reform 
promoted full breaks or part-time work for mothers. As Malzahn commented at the 
time: “gender equality, partnership, and freedom of choice as key concepts of 
family policy under closer scrutiny of the [policy proposal] prove to be empty shells” 
(Malzahn, 1985, p. 192, author’s translation). The policy rewarded only families who 
had the luxury of affording a parent on full or partial leave from paid employment, 
while enabling conditions for further welfare state retrenchment (ibid). Until 1993 
parental leave was gradually lengthened from six months to three years. This trend 
ended with the Social-Democratic/Green governments (1998-2005).  
West German policy promoted a more intense sequentialisation of the standard 
life-course (1.3.2), in which motherhood and paid work were reconciled through a 
break from paid work in the particularly care-intensive early years of children. While 
this sequentialisation reduces stress in the family-cycle rush-hour of life, the 
downside is a slump in family income (Figure 5, p. 43). The opportunity cost of 
motherhood was therefore particularly high for professional mothers, whereas 
poorer families struggled to make due on the benefit. Declining fertility since the 
1970s suggests that policy was insufficient to organise social reproduction in a 
demographically sustainable manner. 
Renewed reform came into effect in 2007, when the previous flat-rate benefit of 
300€ over a duration of 24 months was replaced by the Elterngeld31 (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2006). Paid for 12 months, the Elterngeld is calculated at 67% of the 
previous year’s income of the parent on leave, bracketed between 300€ and 1800€. 
Parents have the right to be on leave (Elternzeit) for the first three years after birth. 
In the first promulgation, the third unpaid year of leave could be delayed between 
the child’s ages 3-8, with the employer’s permission (§15(2)). Parental leave can 
furthermore be taken in part-time up to 30h per week (§15(4)), and entails a right 
to part-time work down to 15h. A right to return to one’s previous employer in the 
same or an equivalent job exists32. Particularly controversial at the time of reform 
                                                     
31 Elterngeld (parent money) is the benefit, Elternzeit (parent time) the leave right. The terms are 
often conflated in everyday use. 
32 Valid for enterprises regularly employing more than 15 people and employment contracts that 
existed for longer than 6 months. 
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was the extension to 14 months of paid leave between partners, if ‘the other 
parent’ took at least two months of leave (daddy months). The Elterngeld Plus was 
introduced in 2013 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015, current promulgation), allowing a 
‘stretching’ from 12 to 24 months of leave at half benefit (14 to 28 with daddy 
months). Since 2015 two years of parental leave can be taken in-between ages 3-8, 
with the employer’s permission. One year is in practice often taken when children 
transfer from kindergarten to school. 
What earlier leave policies established is a life-course model of (relatively speaking) 
sequential phases of work and motherhood, rather than a simultaneity of roles. 
Since 2006, Elterngeld promotes part-time work for mothers as early after birth as 
possible. ‘Partnership Boni’ in the 2015 amendment promote more part-time hours 
for mothers (>25) and less part-time hours for fathers (<30). This mechanism is 
created by setting brackets (25-30h per week) for both partners’ employment 
within which the bonus is paid.  
Is this trend to a more simultaneous parenthood where observers located a 
‘paradigm shift’ towards an adult-worker-model (Fleckenstein, 2011; Seeleib-Kaiser, 
2010)? From a formal policy perspective, it appears that policy in the West took a 
‘reactionary turn’ after the Second World War, whereas the East sought to 
introduce an adult-worker-model from the beginning. The limitations encountered 
there, and the eventual introduction of the baby year, suggest that a fully 
simultaneous model of work and parenthood was not feasible for demographic 
reasons. In the West, the attempt was not even made until the 2000s. The first 
qualification about the diagnosis of a ‘paradigm shift’ is therefore that it draws on a 
predominantly West-German story. While the decade after reunification expanded 
the Western institutions to the former GDR, to the visible detriment of women, the 
Eastern dual-breadwinner roots appear to be blossoming again under the current 
policy regime. The Western-centric paradigm model may hence underestimate the 
‘international’ influence of reunification, policy-learning and path-dependency from 
the GDR. For example, the 12 months of Elternzeit look suspiciously like the baby 
year. The ‘new’ expansion of public childcare for children aged one to three equally 
resembles the GDR crèche system. 
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Secondly, it seems somewhat arbitrary to emphasise the Elterngeld reform 2007 as 
the only important reform. The 1979 reform, for instance, with its introduction of a 
right to leave rather than an employment ban, seems equally ‘radical’. The historic 
perspective also reveals the layering of policy elements as a longer process. The 
‘new’ elements of the 2007 reform are income-related benefits, dedicated daddy 
months, and a turning-point from sequentialisation to greater simultaneity of 
worker and parent roles. Faced with the continuity of dismissal protection, a right to 
time off, and a gender-neutral phrasing, the verdict of a ‘paradigm shift’ seems 
somewhat biased in highlighting the changed elements. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the paradigm narrative can be challenged from the 
perspective of implementation and enactment. As I will show below, the regulatory 
incentives of the ‘new’ family policies quickly come into conflict with other (older) 
social selectivities when observed in daily life. In the ‘messiness’ of the everyday, 
there are delays in the expansion of public childcare due to resource shortages 
(addressed in chapter 5) (Geis, 2018). West-German urban areas are particularly 
affected (Rinkl, 2015a). The problems in expanding public childcare to meet 
demand slows down the progression of the adult-worker-model. As a consequence, 
ideas formalised in Berlin or Düsseldorf (NRW) often cannot be realised in homes, 
and parents end up in more ‘traditional’ family models than they expected. Such 
gaps, between different paces and directions of change, between expectations and 
experiences, and between different locations and different people, are something 
in the dynamic of political change the concept paradigm (Hall, 1993; Blyth, 2002) is 
simply too abstract to capture.  
With regard to policy implementation and local enactment, my empirical starting 
point, it is clear that citizens and front-line workers do not just implement policy in 
a mechanistic sense. Realising policy in the everyday is not just a matter of 
compliance or willingness, but of communicating ideas, interpreting ideas, and 
enacting them in a particular local context (Ball, Maguire and Braun, 2012). The next 




4.3.2 Protagonist Enterprises: Sense-Making of Working Parents 
Given the openly pro-natalist discourse about demography and skills shortages, the 
shift in policy towards a simultaneous model of working parenthood appears 
predominantly economically motivated. This explains the protagonist role of 
employer associations (Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen, 2011). As Beblo and Boll (2014) 
simulate, the opportunity cost of a child for a medium-skilled woman between age 
30 and 45 can be reduced by more than 2/3 if she works 20h per week for three 
years, instead of pausing work completely for one year and then working part-time 
the other two years. Put differently, her productivity for the German economy is 
enhanced by more than a third if she keeps working while having a baby. Parents, 
obviously, are not necessarily concerned with demographic or macroeconomic 
developments in decisions how to take leave, thus the interconnected questions 
remain:  
i. Which ideas inform parents’ and enterprises’ strategies around parental 
leave? 
ii. How are these tied up in structural selectivities, and specifically, temporal 
ones?  
4.3.2.1 Selective Policy and Breadwinner Models 
It comes to no-one’s surprise 
that money matters in parents’ 
sense-making how leave should 
be taken. In conversation with 
human capital managers at two 
large locally headquartered 
companies (I48, I52), it became 
clear that the take-up of 
parental leave was gendered, 
but differently so across 
educational and income strata. 
Sibille (I48), working for an 
Figure 9 Segregation and Parental Leave 
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automobile company, differentiated between higher and lower stratum employees 
(Figure 9): the former she described as managers with leadership responsibility, 
specialists such as engineers, and generally “those where one says they have 
studied” (I48, 16:27 - 17:05).  The lower stratum included workers in the 
production, as well as clerks and assistants in the back-office. For both groups, there 
was clear gender segregation: Production and engineering were masculine domains, 
as well as upper management. Back-office areas, such as human resources, legal 
department, and finance, were mixed or feminine areas, particularly in the lower-
end jobs.  
The higher a mother’s income, Sibille said from experience, the higher the likelihood 
of a return to work after 12 months at most. Those mothers were more likely to 
stay in touch with the company throughout their leave, in order to prepare the best 
return possible. The reason given for early returns were in part economical: 
Sibille: “for most of them it pays off […] a well-earning woman usually also has a 
rather well-earning man at home, because . it is rarely the case . most often both 
have studied, and both have a rather good job, and then it does not pay off with the 
tax, because both already have the highest tax band, and if you split it over two 
years, one does not have a large advantage. For someone who earns less, it pays off 
to spread it over two years.” (I48, 17:08-17:41) 
The tax Sibille mentions refers to a joint taxation option for married couples, much 
discussed in the feminist literature (Dingeldey, 2001; Apps and Rees, 2004). 
Germany is one of the few European countries today that maintains this 
cornerstone of the male-breadwinner-model (Daly, 2011a). Joint taxation allows 
married couples with sufficiently diverging wage income to each be taxed on half of 
their joint income. Due to the progressivity of the income tax, this reduces the total 
amount the couple pays together. Thereby joint taxation incentivises unequal 
labour market participation, but: to what degree depends on ancillary calculations. 
In the context of educational homogamy – and effectively a certain degree of 
income homogamy – joint taxation does not pay off for many professional couples. 
For them, the income loss effected through the gap between their wage and the 
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67% Elterngeld is more relevant than the tax savings possible through joint taxation, 
especially when leave is extended to two years at only 33% benefit (Elterngeld Plus).  
Summarising the literature on redistribution and Elterngeld in Germany (e.g. Auth, 
Leiber and Leitner, 2011; Gerlach, Schneider and Juncke, 2009; Martinek, 2010; 
Wrohlich et al., 2012), it seems uncontroversial that family policy in the last decade 
has predominantly strengthened the one-and-half breadwinner-model. 
Recommodification has resulted in an expansion of (female) cheap labour supply 
and atypical employment. An adult-worker-model has only been promoted for 
affluent couples who can afford paid care beyond state provision. In total, Nowak 
characterises German family policy as an elite-focussed population policy (Nowak, 
2010, p. 132) that is strongly selective according to income stratum. In its 
redistributive consequence, Elterngeld is part of a social policy regime that enables 
an economic dualisation of the society (e.g. Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). This 
dualisation does not ‘just’ affect the labour market, but gradually establishes 
(reaffirms?) two separate classes: the affluent, professional parents with a choice of 
family model, subject to personal values and with a tendency to a more egalitarian 
gender order – and the poor, atypically-employed parents, who are under pressure 
to maximise their income and thus tend to be ushered into a one-and-half-
breadwinner-model, subsidised by parental benefits and joint taxation. Where work 
environments are less attractive, and tax incentives make baby-breaks possible, it is 
not surprising that many mothers remain in economically-dependent, domestic 
roles. The same retreat into the home is ruled out, by convention, for men in the 
lower strata. Where men take up domestic roles there, this is commonly associated 
with the stigma of un- or underemployment, rather than choice.  
Nowak (2010) further makes some interesting points from a Gramscian perspective: 
Whereas the adult-worker-model gained in ideological relevance, most parents do 
not have access to or cannot afford sufficient childcare services to both engage in 
full employment. Nowak identifies the unattractiveness of the male-breadwinner-
model for the majority of women as the driving force behind broader assent to 
liberal-feminist discourses that promote the adult-worker-model. This liberal 
feminism, Nowak suggests, has been co-opted by the state throughout a “passive 
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revolution”. This provides the adult-worker ideology a hegemonic status, also due 
to a lack of left-feminist alternatives in public discourse. Demands from the left, in 
particular the 30h working week, found no space in political discussion. The last 
point, about the working week, is noteworthy. While I agree with Nowak that in 
2018, as in 2010, there are few serious demands for a universal reregulation of 
working time, a number of small demands and complaints are visible enough that 
the topic appears to be present, if only as something that ‘blinks beneath the 
surface’.  
Sibille (I48) reported that in the last year, for the first time, four fathers in higher 
positions had retreated from their non-tariff contracts into tariff-covered contracts, 
because that way overtime had to be compensated. Sibille suggested that whereas 
a 35h week in the tariff was a 35h week, a 40h week outside often meant a 45-50h 
week (I48, 28:35-20:05). These men accepted lower incomes in return for the ability 
to exchange overtime into free time, rather than extra money. They gave the same 
reason: that is was impossible for them to reconcile family time with hours in paid 
employment. From the company’s perspective, this was understood as a serious 
problem. 
Sibille: “It cannot be that the people who are good willingly give up their good jobs, 
because they cannot get things organised otherwise.” (I48, 27:16-28:31) 
Here, too, Sibille made a clear stratum distinction: the demands for more time were 
a “luxury” of the affluent employees, who articulated their dissatisfaction to the 
employer. Her company was now experimenting with a series of new measures, 
including job sharing in leadership positions. This was not a direct result of 
complaints, but occurred in the context of wanting to promote good workers 
internally and being unable to fill positions in full-time. “Necessity” thus gave rise to 
new solutions. Unlike their affluent professional counterparts, workers employed in 
low-level jobs did not demand more time or flexibility. Very few men took parental 
leave at all, and never longer than two months.  
I concur with Nowak that the liberal-feminist discourse, found in female career 
initiatives, job fairs, or women’s business clubs, is influential for and beyond its 
154 
 
‘viable’ group. In a completely different context, when she was discussing her paid 
childcare work (KTP) during her own parental leave, Christina (I28) said something 
deeply revealing about the perception of women in male-breadwinner families 
today: 
Christina: “is does not really save us moneywise, but . but this feeling one 
contributes something financial […] one is not just the one here, who . yes, is 
financed by [one’s husband] hehe, there I would feel funny too […] that is a stupid 
reason, but uh . the appearance to others […] I feel a little bit well . under pressure, 
that one simply uh . that it is funny for many, that one leaves one’s child at home the 
first three years and is there for the child, and not working. That is now absolutely 
not modern. And not mainstream. And this way at least I can say: yes, I am kind of 
half-working. Yes, exactly. That is for me the social pressure.” (I28, 31:55-33:21) 
Statements such as this show how dominant the adult-worker ideology has 
become. But among economically privileged families, parents decide between 
possible family models. And unlike in Hochschild’s America (2001), it appears that in 
Germany, 2016, working parents do not extend their hours, but start to seek 
solutions to reduce time in paid work. This at least is the case for the privileged 
professional strata who perceive for themselves an economic opportunity to choose 
‘time’ instead of ‘money’. This group is particularly interesting, because its 
members have more negotiating power in the labour market than others to realise 
their own desires, and crucially: these desires do not follow a liberal-feminist or 
third-way, nor a conservative hegemony – these desires are most often caught in 
the contradictions and tensions between multiple ways of sense-making found in 
these ideologies – which ultimately suggests that the current German professional 
condition of parenthood is characterised by an absence of hegemony. That does not 
stop the institutional arrangement from producing a one-and-half-breadwinner-
model: it just fails to fully legitimate it. 
As I will elaborate below, not only the variety of family models lived, but also the 
guilty consciences reported – in particular by working mothers – belie that the ideal 
of the adult-worker-model is the unchallenged ‘new common sense’. The 
legitimation problem arises from two sources: first, by ideological challenge; and 
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secondly, through inabilities to realise the adult-worker ideal in the everyday (to 
align expectations and experiences). Emotions of frustration, anger, and guilt 
parents routinely report suggest that the adult-worker-model as promoted in 
Germany today is not hegemonic – because of its inability to pacify these emotions 
and generate a harmonious experience of reconcilability. As I argue throughout this 
chapter, this inability substantively derives from a lack of synchronicity between 
institutions. 
4.3.2.2 Career Models: the Vicious Cycle of Gendered Expectations 
Above I have repeatedly mentioned expectations of gendered consequences of 
parenthood as a disincentive for women to engage in motherhood. Sibille (I48) 
conveyed the relevance of gendered expectations through the logic of hiring and 
promotion decisions to substantiate my general point: 
Sibille: “[Promotion opportunities are] with certainty a huge topic, because uh . for 
men, it is not a topic, because one assumes those don’t drop out especially often, 
and the fewest work in part-time . there it is I believe almost an advantage, if one 
says this is a nice family father, that means he is also somehow empathetic and has 
also some social competences, which may even be seen as a credit to him as a 
manager.” (I48, 18:36-20:30) 
Sibille further shared that she knew few women in managerial positions above the 
level of a team leader, because this was where travel requirements and 
expectations towards overtime and flexibility made reconciliation very difficult. 
Female superiors she had encountered had remained childless. 
Sibille: “I would say, from experience, that women make career later, because with 
them one waits […] if she still has had no children by the end of her thirties, the 
likelihood is relatively high that she won’t have any anymore, and then one can give 
her such a post with relative certainty . well then the risk is not so present anymore, 
that she drops out” (I48, 18:36-20:30) 
While direct questions about family plans are banned in Germany, line managers 
conducting job interviews routinely took a coffee break or similar to ask about 
moving plans or personal life to gather the information indirectly. Otherwise gender 
and age were used as an approximation. This attitude, she said, was held by the 
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middle management – the people who had the responsibility to coordinate work 
and schedules in the company’s daily life. Where applicants were assessed as 
equally qualified on all other dimensions, Sibille suggested, young men were hired – 
because they were never suspected of demanding leave or part-time work with the 
onset of fatherhood. Only one male employee, she said, had ever asked for seven 
months of leave – 50% of what the couple is entitled too.  
Sibille: “and that was the first time, that actually a bit of discussion and murmuring 
went through the company . and one pondered how this can be, and how one can 
keep such a job empty for a person that long . because seven months is such an 
eternity . because for men previously no one had ever thought about this, and it was 
so unlikely, that a man would even do this . that was . that was really the first one” 
(I48, 14:01-15:12) 
At the human resources department, they encouraged more equal treatment in 
hiring and promotion decisions, willing to try new solutions like double 
appointments and rethink “which work could actually be done in part-time” (I48). A 
new female CEO, who was childless herself, but engaged in women’s equality, was 
pushing the issue in the company.  
As per the 2007 reforms, parents need to notify their employer seven weeks before 
the start of leave, and since 2015 employers do not need to generally consent to 
leave requests between ages 3-8 anymore, albeit they have a veto right in certain 
circumstances. This relatively short notice period makes it theoretically difficult for 
superiors and human resources managers to replace parents going on leave. As 
Sibille suggested, however, prospective parents often inform their employer much 
more early (about 6 months in advance). Furthermore, the replacement problem 
only arose for longer leave periods. Especially fathers’ short leaves could be easily 
covered by provisions made for holidays and sickness replacement, according to 
Sibille. Given the obligation to let parents return to their old or an equivalent job, 
employers further relied on temporary replacements or left positions vacant. How 
difficult an employee was to replace depended on internal possibilities to shuffle 
work, and the type of skills (I48). Engineers, for example, were almost impossible to 
find on temporary contracts, which meant Sibille’s company had to hire them 
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permanently and shuffle work again once the parent on leave returned, so that 
both employees were sensibly occupied. Such reorganisation and hiring measures 
are difficult or impossible for small enterprises (I53, I54). 
Reorganisation usually results in conflicts among superiors, parents, and their 
colleagues over the distribution of workloads. In this personal dynamic, feelings of 
guilt or fear of repercussions were common among participants. On top, new 
parents often found it hard to assess how much leave they needed to cope well 
with parenthood in advance. The personal circumstances of the parents, notably 
family support by grandparents, and also the variable needs of children create 
heterogeneous private time requirements and flexibilities. With regard to the 
length of longer leaves, usually 12 months for mothers, insecurity to employment 
re-entry times are worsened by insecurities over when public childcare slots are 
available. Whereas parents apply for a slot usually around the time of the birth, 
responses from kindergartens can arrive very late. In urban areas, such as in 
Cologne, a scarcity of slots can result in rejections despite a formal right to public 
childcare (5.3.1). 
The gendered length of standard leaves (she 12, he 2 months), including the effects 
of expectations built on that norm, substantially shapes the gendered experience of 
leave and the broader gendered inequalities in paid work. These structural 
selectivities are tied up locally in this self-fulfilling prophecy or vicious circle of 
gendered ‘encumberedness’, perpetuating gendered expectations and gender 
enactment. This results in an ongoing collective judgment of women in their thirties 
as risky employees, which spreads discrimination in the workplace even to childless 
women. Uncertainties about when a parent may return, or when public childcare 
will be available, exacerbate the conflicts between employers, employees, 
managers, and co-workers. 
4.3.2.3 The Family-Friendly Enterprise 
As indicated in the introductory section on reconcilability (4.1), an important 
dimension of the reconcilability discourse of the Family Ministry is directed at 
enterprises and emphasises their role in reshaping working culture towards more 
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family-friendly practices. Enterprises need to reflect on family-friendliness due to 
skills shortages, in MINT but also in managerial professions. Especially the loss of 
qualified women to family time was constructed as a ‘loss’ (Figure 9, p.150) over 
which Sibille’s enterprise was engaged to rethink its business culture and 
organisation to speed up mothers’ returns:  
Sibille: “We cannot wait for families to organise [childcare] themselves.” (I48, 26:07-
27:07)  
Various family ministers have personally taken part in conferences and round tables 
to promote the topic (e.g. Provinzial Rheinland, 2017). Large initiatives that 
generate and promote ideas how businesses can support reconcilability include the 
business network Erfolgsfaktor Familie, founded by the Family Ministry and DIHK in 
2006, and comprising more than 6000 members; or the Wirtschaftstag Familie, on 
which awards for family-friendliness are given to particularly engaged enterprises. 
The award is a joint venture between umbrella organisations of the German 
economy: BDA, DIHK, ZDH, and DGB (BMFSFJ, 2018; BMFSFJ / DIHK, no date). The 
purpose statement on the network’s website constructs enterprises’ interest in 
family-friendly working cultures though human resource arguments: 
 “Simpler recruiting of skilled workers 
 lower fluctuation and therefore lower associated costs 
 lower costs through parental leave (substitution; reintegration) 
 better work climate, higher motivation and commitment of employees 
 less absences (reduced number of staff ill, shorter parental leave) 
 increased productivity” 
(‘darum geht es’, BMFSFJ / DIHK, no date, author’s translation) 
This discourse disseminated by the network’s website connects productivity and 
efficiency gains with skills shortages. Employee demands are described with a focus 
on the ability to plan working time and reliable schedules, a rather noteworthy fact 
from a time-theoretical perspective. The website authors further emphasise that 
family-friendliness and flexibility complement rather than contradict each other. 
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Working time models are an important topic in the discussion how flexibility can 
benefit families and enterprises. Next to the usual time models (part-time, flexitime 
with or without core times, home office, job-sharing) a relatively new model is the 
“Lebensarbeitszeit”, which functions as a long-term time account in which 
employees can ‘save’ and ‘spend’ time. In other words, they can expand and reduce 
hours in rhythm with their life-course needs. While interesting as a model capable 
of reducing stress in the rush-hour of life, the downside of such models on the 
enterprise-level is the necessity to remain with one employer for a very long 
duration. The time ‘saved’ cannot be moved along to the next employer. In times of 
greater job insecurity, this model’s applicability appears rather limited, unless such 
time accounts were institutionalised on a scale large enough (national, or even 
international) to treat time like a universal currency. 
Job-sharing meanwhile is difficult to organise in the context of Präsenzkultur (also 
see 4.3.4): a preference for workers to be on site during business hours. The 
prevalence of Präsenzkultur in Germany becomes visible in the European Working 
Conditions Survey (EWCS, 2016), under the item: “Is it difficult to take an hour or 
two off to take care of a personal or family matter during working hours?”. Next to 
several Eastern European countries, Germany does particularly badly on this 
indicator, even though Germany has fairly benign labour conditions in most other 




Figure 10 Präsenzkultur, taken from EWCS 2016 
To give an example: two mothers have a Kindergarten slot (say, between 7:30-
16:30). They can both therefore work the ‘morning shift’ on the job they want to 
share. Their employer, however, wants all regular hours of the working day covered 
(9:00-17:30 at least). Hence the mothers have to share the ‘afternoon shifts’ as well, 
for which they need to organise extra childcare. The afternoons are usually the 
difficult time to organise. I will explain the policy constraints on kindergarten 
opening hours in section 5.3.2. This small example illustrates that the Erfolgsfaktor-
Familie network’s claim of a complementarity between flexible working times and 
family friendliness is not theoretically impossible, but practically very conditional on 
a range of factors that are not addressed by the network’s ideological message. This 
divergence between ideology and reality is picked up on by parents when asked 
after family-friendly measures in their workplaces.  
Ralf: “well enterprises . I mean every enterprise presents itself (schimpft sich) as 
family-friendly, and every enterprise today is certified somewhere that it is family-
friendly and so on, but at the latest when they let themselves be certified it gets 
dangerous. Hehe, right, so there is not a lot of support. Well there is the wage and 
that’s it.” (I28, 33:26-34:08) 
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Participants either were not covered by measures other than working-time models, 
or found them difficult or impossible to access. Working-time models themselves, 
interestingly, with the exception of parental leave, were not considered family-
friendly measures in the interviews. I believe the right to part-time was simply taken 
for granted for mothers, and therefore not discussed. This indicates that the 
meaning of ‘family-friendly measure’ is understood by employees more in terms of 
parent-specific offers, and less in terms of universal offers, like flexitime or part-
time.  
Larger enterprises these days tend to have some specific offers for parents, which 
are not part of a working time model. These comprise for example parent-offices, 
when parents spontaneously need to bring a child with them, or emergency 
services when the child’s regular carer is suddenly unavailable or the child sick. As 
Thomas suggested, awareness and use of such offers is low in his company. A 
parent-office existed, but it was “one for […] 9000 employees” (I24, 25:55-27:19). 
While he had once considered using that office, he described it as a “last solution”. 
His superior, herself childless, had not been aware such offices existed, and 
apparently struggled with the idea when he mentioned it to her. 
The most prominent and sought-after solution for reconcilability in workplaces is 
the company kindergarten (Betriebskita). Childcare facilities on work sites were 
common in the GDR, but virtually non-existent in West Germany. In NRW, the only 
differences between a Betriebskita and a regular kindergarten are (1) that the 
opening times are adjusted to the company’s need; (2) that the company has a say 
in how slots are allocated, most often exclusively to employees; (3) and that the 
company pays around 9% of the operational costs, as well as part of the initial 
investments. The Betriebskita is then usually run by an established external provider 
and subsidised by the government like any other public kindergarten. Respectively, 
governmental regulations need to be upheld and the company cannot make any 
profit from childcare. A Betriebskita is thus a non-profit entity that enterprises 
maintain for employer attractiveness and the general reasons for family-friendliness 
already stated above. 
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The current reality is that while Betriebskitas become very popular, high regulation 
(health & safety, etc.) makes them difficult to set up. Furthermore, the model is 
only functional if the employed parent takes care of the childcare commutes. For 
example, Markus’ company has a Betriebskita, but only in the town he works in, 
Düsseldorf (I25, 27:56-28:24). Given that Elena had reduced to part-time to 
coordinate her work within kindergarten opening hours, and the children were 
already enrolled in a kindergarten, the task fell to her in Cologne. This decision in 
the couple’s division of work preceded Markus’ job change to the current company. 
Markus commutes to Düsseldorf by train for one hour approximately, which would 
be difficult to do with two small children. Also, once acclimatised in a kindergarten, 
it is not advisable to move children around. Under the given circumstances, the 
couple cannot benefit from the Betriebskita. 
The underlying tendency is that large enterprises have Betriebskitas in their 
headquarters, particularly where their most expensive staff is located, and less so in 
smaller branches, also because the predictable number of children there is too 
small to warrant the investment. An alternative to Betriebskitas are ‘contingent 
slots’ (Kontigenzplätze). Those are slots a company can reserve against a fee in a 
public childcare facility, for whose allocation company employees get preferential 
treatment. This opportunity also works for medium-sized enterprises and branches 
and has the advantage of less fixed costs and investments in set-up.  
The great advantage from a parent perspective is the high potential of Betriebskitas 
to resolve the synchronisation problem underlying reconcilability. Distances and 
opening hours in principle cease to be a problem, when childcare and paid work 
happen in the same place and same rhythm. The possible downside is that only one 
parent is effectively capable of bringing the children into the childcare facility, 
unless the family home is very close to the workplace. Frequent job changes would 
lead to children having to switch kindergartens very often, or the synchronisation 
advantage would be lost. This is unadvisable from a pedagogic perspective. What 
such initiatives presuppose is an orientation of enterprises to a standard of 
‘encumbered’ rather than ‘unencumbered’ workers. In the current and likely future 
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context of skills scarcities, this degree of social engagement by enterprises is 
thinkable. 
4.3.3 Taking Parental Leave: Gendered Experiences 
The standard of the ‘unencumbered’ life-course to enable a full-time career model 
of work for the male middle-classes has long been established in the literature (e.g. 
Hochschild, 2003b, p. xiii).  What this model entails is the junction of different time 
scales: the life-course, and the days, weeks, and months of the ‘everyday’ of 
professional life in which workers compete for recognition and advancement. 
Women, since the onset of the industrial revolution, have struggled with the 
double-burden. Their responsibility for the everyday of the ‘private sphere’ has left 
them unable to compete on equal ground with men in the everyday of ‘the public’, 
resulting in long-term dependencies and inequalities visible on the life-course scale 
(2.3.2). The following sections are dedicated to untangling some of the junctions 
between those time scales. These junctions can be found in critical events, like 
hiring and promotion, as discussed above. Sticking with the topic of parental leave, 
the next critical string of events I want to discuss are: asking for leave, the 
experience of ‘dropping out’, and the return to work. 
In What a Difference a Day Makes (1998), Glucksmann describes the different styles 
of recollection in the oral history of working women (see 2.3.2). Therein, she 
identifies a distinction in how life phases are referenced temporally, between 
industrial textile workers who orient to world history, and casual workers, who 
orient to personal life events, such as marriage and the birth of children. 
Glucksmann explains that for the latter, these events had a much more life-
changing effect, placing them outside of the formal labour market and into the 
neighbourhood community of female life, whereas the women who maintained 
their work in the mills experienced adult life in greater continuity. I was reminded of 
this when analysing the narratives of parents about the consequences of birth, and 
how the event had a much more life-changing effect on mothers than on fathers. 
This becomes visible in the emotional conflict addressed by mothers, whereas 
fathers’ accounts were much more factual. Fathers remaining in full-time work 
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discussed change in terms of coming home earlier from work, or in the form of 
switching full-time jobs to reduce working hours to something closer to the 40h 
week. But becoming a father did not disrupt their work life in any radical ways. The 
opposite is the case for mothers, and the next section is dedicated to examining 
their recollections of these changes. For purposes that will become obvious, I have 
separated mothers in career-track professions, and what I call ‘non-career’ 
professions. 
The simple point I wish to make throughout the subsequent analysis is that parents 
include income calculations in the present, and income expectations in their future, 
into their negotiations about who takes parental leave. As already mentioned in the 
previous sections, this demonstrates empirically that gendered expectations and 
experiences in the workplace act as causes for leave-taking decisions that further 
cement inequalities between partners – even those who profess egalitarian 
attitudes. It also shows that economic rationalities are not ‘universal’, but 
embedded in personal histories that explain individual constructions of what is 
important. 
4.3.3.1 Non-Career Mothers 
Among my female upper-middle class participants, Christina exemplifies most 
clearly what I am here calling the ‘non-career’ path. She is a primary school teacher 
on a civil service tenure track (Beamtin). The latter status guarantees her 
employment for life. As she put it: 
Christina: “I have of course the luxury that others don’t have, I have tenure, right, the 
job is simply kept free for me […] well I can, if I want to, care for the child for three 
years, well, and then . the job is passed on again” (I28, 5:44-8:00) 
The only drawback, professionally, that she anticipated from having two and 
planning four children was that she would need to redo her extra qualification in 
psychomotoricity, which she had dropped out of during her first pregnancy (I28, 
23:56-24:20). Teachers in Germany usually do not fundamentally advance from 
their jobs. While pay grades change with experience, the only obvious promotion is 
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to the role of principal, which was described by participants as undesirable, because 
it just meant ‘a little more pay for a lot more work’.  
Unlike Christina, Imke had ended up teaching religion due to her layoff as a 
priestess. I already discussed above how she experienced the change in work 
intensity as the decisive aspect that enabled a private life. With regard to parental 
leave, Imke suggested that teaching also made it easier for her to remain home with 
the child, because it had never been her intended profession in the first place (I24, 
48:10-48:23). The lack of advancement opportunities based on performance, 
together with a relatively lower commitment to the job for Imke, worked in both 
mothers’ cases together with the higher wages of their respective husbands. The 
consequences of dropping out of their regular professions, however, left a worse 
than anticipated impression on both mothers, for somewhat different reasons. 
For Christina, the conflict emerged between her own ideal of a more traditional, 
domestic role, and the lack of recognition she experienced for that choice. Her case 
makes the structural dominance of the one-and-half-breadwinner-model quite 
visible from the ‘conservative’ end. For Imke, who held a much more egalitarian and 
profession-oriented attitude, the inability to realise her ideal illustrates the 
structural dominance of the one-and-half-breadwinner-model from the ‘egalitarian’ 
end. Among their expectations (Christina)/ experiences (Imke) of returning to work 
two dimensions stand out: timing and direct superior’s attitudes. 
Christina: “Well my child was born in summer, and that way I could nicely finish the 
school year, and so on, school-technically that was great . yes, how it happens . right, 
but well I have a very supportive principal, who keeps the job free for me, to which 
she is legally obliged, and . but I notice that she does not do that unwillingly, but 
happily . uh, and well she surprisingly also has, even though this is not the 
mainstream, a similar attitude like me, she thinks it’s good, yes, that I spend such a 
long first time with the children and don’t drop off the child after one year already . 
so she supports me in that.”(I28, 30:53-32:07) 
Whereas Christina has her superior’s support and lucky synchronisation between 
the school year and the birth of her child (see 5.3.3), this is not the case for Imke. 
Her child was born in October, and while she would have preferred to take two 
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years of leave, she returned early to the start of term in August. According to Imke, 
her employer could not have guaranteed her re-entry during term time (I24, 16:49-
17:24). Further conflict arose, because the school wanted her available for all hours 
of the day. Whereas part-time work was possible for a reduced number of hours, 
those hours could be anytime during the week between 8:00 a.m. and mid-
afternoon. Including commuting times, this availability was not possible within 
public childcare opening hours. The leave break had a further clear disadvantage: 
Imke could not return to her previous school, where she had been comfortable, and 
which had only been 15min away from their home. The couple had purposefully 
moved to that area in Thomas’ parental leave time to optimise commuting for her, 
while Thomas accepted the longer commute (ca. 1.5 h) to work in the next city. That 
way, Imke was supposed to be able to reconcile work and childcare. With the forced 
change of school after the break, Imke’s commute rose significantly (I24, 22:51-
24:34). Furthermore, she experienced conflict with the principal there (I24, 9:19-
10:25). 
In summary, it becomes clear that even in ‘non-career’ professions, such as school 
teaching, employees are expected to be present and available to a temporal extent 
effectively not covered by public childcare. Even for those with guaranteed return 
rights into a very similar position, shifts in the work environments after ‘dropping 
out’ presented a loss, in Imke’s case an unanticipated one, because she did not 
know she would have to switch schools when she took leave. In the spatiotemporal 
arrangements between home and work places, even these relatively small changes 
lead to substantial problems – which reveals the diminished mobility of parents in 
active carer roles. Where employment is structured by fixed schedules, such as in 
schools or universities, but also for shift work, a lack of synchronisation with public 
childcare is deeply problematic (5.3). Mismatches between such schedules make up 
a substantial gap in the ECEC system, which parents have to bridge somehow – 
most often through familialised care: mothers, or grandmothers (4.4.2.1). 
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4.3.3.2 Career Track Mothers 
For the majority of mothers, dropping out of the labour market for 12 months of 
parental leave is the norm. Returns afterwards commonly happen in part-time. Only 
one of my participants did not take parental leave, and this is not surprising, 
because Anna is a self-employed freelancer. Whereas parental benefits in theory 
also cover this group, risking the future of one’s business can effectively prevent 
self-employed parents from making full use of the policy. In many ways the paragon 
of the ‘active individual worker’ promoted by the third way (Giddens, 1998), Anna 
reaches her limits trying to mother and work: 
Anna: “professional restrictions . well that was . was linked to . afterwards (the birth) 
I was actually in completely exceptional circumstances, but I also did not know that 
yet. […] after three months I was already recording the first audiobook, and did that . 
yes, pedagogically, because I – well, don’t fuss, this will go on, hmhm . and then at 
some point there was overkill after half a year, I had . a nervous breakdown every 
day, and nobody could make sense of what was happening, and only then all of this 
was processed . so to say, and uh, that means the infertility treatment and the birth, 
what happened . afterwards . was, for the profession so to say not beneficial. Which 
means I had to cancel a lot . uh . shooting days and radio, well . I did try to do a few 
things . uh, yes . and then came the decision at some point that I also don’t want to 
shoot anymore, and only want to concentrate on the radio, because I also 
recognised: that is far too much, I just can’t – this simply does not work.” (I22, 0:08-
2:31)  
Anna explains the gradual process of realising in these early months that she was 
unable to reconcile motherhood and work with her own mental health. This needs 
to be put into context with her equally freelancing husband, and problems in the 
marriage. Financial insecurity was a key issue for Anna; a second issue was a lack of 
close-by supporters she could trust: 
Anna: “I would have wished, in the beginning . I would not actually have needed this 
from 9 to 5 o’clock . that the child is gone, but rather somebody . who cooks, does 
the housework, who uh . buys clothes for the child. Who so to say helps a lot with all 
the organisational things, and uh . would also go to the playground and say: you now 
take a bath . you . now do something for yourself, read a book . uh . where on . feels, 
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they can really take responsibility . that was my main wish. And this environment . 
that could have been my parents, my sisters, uh […] the family really . but then I 
would have had to drop out of the job for a while, which I would do . now in 
retrospect I would do that . would say, for two years I’m out of here – and uh . 
afterwards I come back . and that has something to do with money. If one . or with 
the freelancing ” (I22, 4:52-6:50) 
But Anna’s mother and sisters are in a different federal state, too far away to help 
much in the everyday. Anna’s mother was a housewife, who raised four children 
while the father earned the money. Anna’s grandmother was deeply involved with 
the Protestant Church, caring for others in the parish on top of her own children, 
while her husband drank away the money (I22, 11:08-14:10). The same role model 
in two generations: doing everything for the husband, for the children, “this is 
fulfilment”. But as Anna’s mother begins to recount as an old woman, high family 
obligation came with the certainty she would be provided for.  Respectively, Anna 
describes her father as a man living in dichotomy: on the one hand, his daughters’ 
education is vitally important; on the other hand, “women belong in the family with 
the children, men go to work” (ibid). Both her older sisters and she live a different 
model. 
Anna: “but I have . noticed . in the first years what inner conflicts there are, with 
those very images . what all hits one, and how difficult it is, well it was extremely 
difficult for me: what kind of mother am I? am I a Rabenmutter33, oh my god, I go to 
work – but I have to earn money, hehe, all the time really . it was . was really 
difficult” (I22, 11:08-14:10) 
When I asked Anna if she had ever experienced similar role conflicts in her 
professional life, she said “absolutely not”.  
These passages are brimming with clues about gender: Something that particularly 
struck me was Anna’s wish for someone to take responsibility to organise the 
household. I am reminded of Hochschild’s comment in the preface of The Second 
                                                     
33 Derisive media trope of a working mother, defined as “loveless, hard-hearted mother, who 




Shift (2nd Ed.): “As I repeatedly heard career women in this study say, ‘What I really 
need is a wife.’” (Hochschild, 2003b, p. xii). A wife: someone who organises the 
household and takes responsibility, so that somebody (a husband, or Anna herself) 
can lean back and relax – at least once in a while?  
The source of Anna’s problem, as she constructs it, is her initial decision to keep 
working while becoming a mother, which results in an “overkill” of obligations. The 
reason for that decision is primarily money. Two things in Anna’s context are key to 
understand why money is so important to her: first, her mother and grandmother 
were dependent economically on their husbands, and thus felt unable to separate 
even under conflict:  
Anna: “*then separate from dad* so my older sisters, and my mother said very 
clearly: yes but I . I can’t work anything, how should I do this?” (I22, 22:55-26:29) 
*mock yelling* 
Deterred by their experience, Anna has insisted on earning her own income. 
Secondly, she and her husband have separate finances. She wanted it that way in 
the initial period of their relationship, which hurt his feelings (and maybe his sense 
of masculinity?). When she would have preferred shared finances after the birth, he 
denied her wish. Due to (from her perspective) lacking involvement in housework 
and monetary support, they were divorcing at the time of the interview. The 
contrary needs and wants Anna perceives throughout their relationship reveal the 
conflict between different ideas of family, especially as an economic relation. 
Anna’s example reveals both ideological and functional conflicts (possible 
organisation of work, money as a hard constraint) in the joint coping with everyday 
parental and marital life. But this case, as one in which parental leave policies do 
not really take hold, also exemplifies how a lack of effective family policies 
contributes to family crises and personal breakdowns. Perhaps most importantly, it 
indicates the limits of the feasibility of an adult-worker-model based on the 
temporal standard of ‘unencumbered’ workers. 
A different example of a mother seeking to maintain a career is given by Elena, who 
is Anna’s opposite in the sense that she had a lot of support, private and public. 
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Elena took parental leave for both of her daughters and kept her job as a legal 
consultant with reduced hours. What enabled her to do so is a combination of 
parental leave, part-time work and public childcare, together with telework and a 
reliable grandmother living down the street.  
Elena: “after the second child I started working part-time […]now I work 30h, in 
reality maybe more like 40h, so full-time after all, but uh – fulltime, so I’m a lawyer, 
in our industry, that is in consulting, fulltime is more like 60 to 70h, and not 40. 
Respectively I am for security reasons hehe still on an 30h, so that I can’t be asked for 
60 to 70. That, uh, that’s just project work (Projektgeschäft). That means . sometimes 
I have insanely much to do, predominantly I have insanely much to do, since we all 
have increasingly less staff for ever more tasks. Bu:ut, uh, sometimes there are 
stretches where there is less to do, and uh, I have a – that is the thing that gives me 
somewhat of a benefit now with the children – uh, early on I have already designed 
my whole office in principle, my whole activity was designed so that I can work from 
any and everywhere, and – because I was travelling a lot on the job. And today I can 
just log in again in the evening, I have all my client data electronically available, that 
helps a lot.” (I25, 3:25-4:32) 
For both of her daughters, she signed up for two years of parental leave, but 
effectively only took one year each time (I25, 26:58-27:44). She recounts having a 
bad consciousness in the meeting with her boss in which they negotiated her return 
from the first baby break, because she was “already pregnant again” (I25, 25:17-
26:46). Elena said her boss was “a cool type”, who had two children himself and “a 
good sport about it”. In return for the renewed inconvenience, however, he asked 
her to return in full-time for the five months up to the second birth, in which Elena’s 
mother “thankfully” stepped in to care for the first child. While that arrangement 
“worked well” on the short term, Elena says it was too exhausting as a long-term 
solution. After her second daughter, Elena returned in part-time, as described 
above. But part-time work led to the limit of her advancement in her company, the 
famous glass ceiling (Acker, 2009). 
In terms of a ‘path-breaking’ life-course event, Elena describes the experience of 
becoming a mother for the first time and parental leave as such: 
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Elena: “even though I was not even that young then, but . I was the first who had a 
child, and I rather suffered from that in the beginning, because my lifestyle changed 
so drastically: before always about and on the job, and everything else then … 
partner, also a serious partner, but he could easily occupy himself, also living in a 
different city. All my female friends pretty much did it the same way, to be honest. 
Then I was – at one blow – very down to earth […] uh, and for a while I really had the 
feeling that at one blow I don’t have any friends anymore and no hobbies anymore . 
and pretty much only care for the baby . and uh, yes, I think one should also say it 
that way, the first – one and a half years, after one and a half years our second 
daughter also arrived slowly, we also moved quite a few times . well, that was a 
pretty tough time . which I don’t need again . [Markus: hmhm] . since a year it works 
well, hehe, we have a relatively furnished house, and the girls are big enough, that is 
beautiful . the first years, then I was so  - well, I felt alone” (I25, 15:47-17:20)  
The primary feeling mothers recalled in effect of a sudden disruption of their lives 
was loneliness. This affected Elena, Anna, Imke, and Christina as well, if to varying 
degrees. The stark difference is that fathers who took at most two daddy months of 
leave did not report such experiences. They talked about children being exhausting, 
and family conflict, and having not enough time for children or themselves – but 
they did not ever report the kind of rupture that mothers routinely experienced, nor 
the frustration and isolation of staying home. Overall, what Anna’s and Elena’s 
accounts exemplify is the strain an active work life takes on active carers. Their 
situation indicates the limits of simultaneous roles under the current policy regime, 
the nuclear family, and workplace culture: in other words, the unhealthiness of an 
‘unencumbered’ adult-worker norm. But crucially their experience of loneliness also 
points to the sense of exclusion women experience when ‘confined to the private’ 






4.3.3.3 Career and Fatherhood 
As a third and last dimension of experiencing leave, I will now turn to father’s 
narratives: 
Thomas: “ … and eh, for me, I’ll put it that way, that was also at my old employer, 
despite the understanding of my boss, I think if I’d turned up with part-time . that 
would not have worked . that certainly had been quite conservative, even if already, 
don’t know, ten years ago a department head, well directly below board-level, had 
taken parental leave already, but at the time that was already revolutionary . and 
when I turned up with the topic – ok, that was pretty short-term had we thought this 
out, well two months of parental leave . that then led to that eh at 7:00 in the 
morning I was permitted to meet my boss for breakfast . well that was a… hehe 
[Imke: how so?] he was somewhat . no, [my boss] was a bit baffled and there was a 
‘need to talk’ – don’t you remember? [Imke: nah, I don’t know this] there I went with 
him in the morning, into his, when he came from Munich in the morning met in the 
morning in his hotel, for breakfast [Imke: to discuss this?] yes, and then it was after 
this it was ok, there we spoke it through how it can function, to be out for two 
months, and went through the projects, and then he later saw, ok, that works. It also 
worked with the whole environment, I had told those, and it was, there were another 
two people who worked (liefen) . it was not a question, that this would function. But 
for starters he needed to digest this. That-that did not quite fit into his image. But he 
then got it . that went well (es lief) – that was then also respected. I was even 
properly disconnected from the employer, from the network. So, the blackberry was 
gone . well it was there, but my email account was switched away . so that was a 
clean process – once it was assimilated by him. That went quite quickly, that is we 
knew each other long and well enough . I believe for other people that would not 
have worked (wär das nicht gelaufen).” (I24, 17:52-20:06) 
The passage above illustrates in one narrative the key dimensions of fathers’ 
reasoning and experiences I encountered in all interviews, and that match the 






 An expectation of part-time work as impossible in one’s position 
 Anxieties towards superiors regarding one’s wish to take leave 
 A need to organise paternal leave within company schedules (e.g. projects) 
o Non-conforming fathers as singular cases or ‘exotic’  
o Certain adjustments in working habits and weekly schedules 
(○ quotes below) 
Thomas recounts the event described above as an instance of planning and 
legitimation, an interaction that brings about a confrontation and adjustment of 
expectations about the future. I inquired further (I25, 20:18 - 21:42), asking after 
the argument he presented to his superior. Thomas replied it was based on 
demonstrating that the externally-visible performance of the enterprise would not 
be impacted. He said he had purposefully avoided a legal argument based on his 
right to parental leave, aiming to avoid a “formal conflict” with his superior. 
Compared with other interviews, the need to legitimise leave with respect to 
workloads, notably project schedules, appears a common feature amongst male 
professionals. The pattern of referencing to rare male colleagues who acted as 
pioneers in taking leave, and were considered ‘exotic’, also reappears. In total this 
suggests that active fatherhood runs into conflict with working cultures that uphold 
the unencumbered worker norm, demanding the availability of the worker 
according to the flow of business (just-in-time management, Präsenzkultur, etc.) 
(Reimer, 2015).  
Ralf: “when I applied [for a different position] internally . I have said that well I would 
like – I apply here, but I still want to take two months of parental leave, and uh my 
department head [female] tells me something about the best family-political decision 
ever, would be annoying for her, but one hand to accept all this and so forth, so at 
least there were no negative consequences, even though in that situation there could 
have been consequences” (I28, 26:26-27:43) 
The discretion and power of direct superiors to shape the cost of leave taking, in 
terms of respect and standing in the workplace, appears crucial. Further indications 
of the importance of these actors and the ideas they act on is given by the amount 
of attention family ministers have given the business community to advertise more 
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family-friendly business culture (4.3.2.3). An interesting feature is the discursive 
positioning of workers towards employer interests, e.g. in the reported approval by 
Ralf’s department head, but more directly in the following statement: 
Ralf: “from the perspective of an employer never truly great uh . of course I know 
that […] well then with the second, in the situation with our second daughter . yes, 
that I likely felt that I could not afford it professionally, well to take parental leave 
exactly then, somehow . well, because we were very understaffed then, yes” (I28, 
26:26-27:43) 
I asked Ralf whether that thought had come from him, or if somebody had pressed 
him, and he was quite insistent, for “fairness’ sake” (27:49-28:23) that the thought 
had come more from him rather than the environment. Based on dialogical theory, I 
suggest this distinction in responsibility is nonsense. I rather think that Ralf 
(responsively, see p. 63) enacted a cultural norm that is part of his work 
environment. This norm – not to take leave when colleagues are under pressure – 
inherently favours employer interests, while placing responsibility on prospective 
leave-takers, who are asked to act in solidarity with colleagues and direct superiors. 
The interpersonal desire for harmony among co-workers is thus channelled to 
produce outcomes (here: no leave) that both Ralf and his department head have 
mixed feelings about. They both end up enacting employer interests. In other 
words, their consciousness as employees trumped their consciousness as fathers. 
Mothers tended to have reversed priorities. 
Beyond taking leave, the more long-term changes to fathers’ routines are visible in 
their working time and scheduling. While none among my participants formally 
reduced to part-time employment, fathers were concerned with reducing overtime 
and being home in the evenings to play with children and take them to bed. Work 
missed in that period was done during the later evening or on weekends, remotely. 
For Thomas, Markus, and Ralf – all three professional fathers I interviewed – making 
this basic presence in the home possible required a change of employer/position.  
Thomas (I24, 7:19-9:02) was confronted with a new boss, whose reputation 
preceded him as a superior who came out of investment banking, and demanded 
long hours (up to 10 p.m.) as a form of exerting dominance. Thomas described him 
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as a man whose wife lived in a different city, and who flew there on weekends, 
which left him with nothing to do in the evenings of the week. In anticipation of 
such a worsening of his working times, which “crossed the red line”, Thomas 
switched employers. While his new job offered less pay and prestige, at home the 
“blackberry remained off”, and nobody expected him to be available in the 
evenings.  
Ralf (I28, 16:03-19:06) made a similar experience with his superior, a childless 
woman he described as “a crazy” who worked 70h a week, a “sad person” with no 
private life, who sent emails on Christmas night. Her work intensity “radiated” to 
the department, which in Ralf’s perception was “permanently understaffed”. In 
consequence, he reported, he worked 55h on a regular basis. Flexibility is his 
workplace meant “one is allowed to arrive before nine and leave after six”, and 
while time management was placed into the responsibility of the worker, the 
workload always made sure that one had more than 40h on the clock. This was 
currently compelling him to switch employers, so that he could spend more time 
with his children and wife. 
Markus (I25, 17:51-19:35), in the first years of fatherhood still employed in 
consulting, spent a lot of time abroad. Having worked for his employer for a while, 
his standing had improved sufficiently that he “could fly home more often” and 
“telephone bills did not matter anymore”. His attempt to take two months of 
parental leave was interrupted by a change in the project schedule, for which he 
returned after one month, and got his full pay back in compensation. But after 
missing the birth of his second daughter because his plane was delayed, Markus 
switched jobs as well. At the time of the interview, he was the (German) CEO of a 
Middle-Eastern telecommunications company. His employees, who predominantly 
had Turkish roots, generally put “family first” anyhow, and had no problem with 
him flying home earlier when needed: “the children always come first”. Apart from 




Markus: “because I’m the boss, at the end of the day probably nobody says anything 
anyhow, but it is truly accepted, and therefore . I currently have only the constraints I 
put on myself, that I say I want to be home for dinner, even if I keep working 
afterwards and such things . but that is . I’ll say okay, so there is one of my other 
bosses who doesn’t think that so cool, but I don’t care.” (I25, 17:51-19:35) 
Markus has the temporal autonomy and power towards his employers to manage 
the degree of reconciliation he desires. As a superior himself, he supported working 
parents, and had a positive attitude to their performance. In his experience, parents 
simply had no time to waste time at work. Their consequent efficiency benefitted 
the company. 
What this section overall reveals is that whereas fathers commonly made smaller 
adjustments to their schedules, or switched employers for the sake of 
reconcilability, they remained in full-time employment and oriented to the needs of 
the workplace. In parallel to Jenson’s (2009) “hegemony of the mother-child 
linkage”, the ‘father-profession linkage’ remains generally intact, with some 
concessions relative to a father’s time autonomy. 
4.3.4 Strategies and Selectivities: a Summary 
Which insights have been revealed in the last sections, and how do these insights fit 
into the overall argument put forth in this dissertation? 
As elaborated in the early chapters, a key issue for governments and societies is 
how to organise social reproduction under evolving socio-economic conditions. 
Perhaps more so than agricultural societies, industrial societies require a formally 
protected space and time for reproduction; this motivated governmental 
intervention and the creation of social rights (Polanyi, 2001; Thompson, 1966; 
Marshall, 1950). German policy has gradually shifted to accommodate the needs of 
working mothers, not just since 2007, but since 1878. Parental leave and benefits, 
at least in the limited sense of Mutterschutz, are a very old pillar of Bismarck’s 
German welfare state, often less acknowledged than the social insurances. 
Throughout the history of the GDR and FRD two distinct institutional paths 
developed, both of which have an impact on today’s policy regime and discourse.  
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Solutions to the reproduction issue, viewed on the life-course scale, can be 
sequential (baby breaks) or simultaneous (part-time work), whereby sequential 
solutions allow a more specialised division of work, that is, a greater separation of 
spheres. Whereas the 1950s-1970s were characterised in West Germany by 
expanded sequential solutions, the last decades has enabled a mix of sequential and 
simultaneous solutions, which in tendency produce a one-and-half-breadwinner-
model.  
Two interrelated questions were posed above:  
i. Which ideas inform parents’ and enterprises’ strategies around parental 
leave? 
ii. How are these tied up in structural selectivities, and specifically, temporal 
ones?  
First, the strategies of parents and enterprises towards leave taking appear to 
culminate in a vicious circle of expectations and experiences of gender inequality. 
Leave policies are selectively promoting fast returns for female professionals, while 
maintaining more traditional gender relations for the rest. This policy outcome was 
explained by the economic rationalities of income maximisation parents applied in 
their own decision making. However, it was also established that whereas money 
mattered, privileged parents, and notably fathers, were also moving to limit their 
working time in favour of family time.  For enterprises, concessions towards 
increased ‘family-friendliness’ are informed by human resources arguments, 
notably skills shortages, and the consequent wish to retain highly skilled female 
workers. Family-friendly measures ought to be understood primarily as an outcome 
of negotiations between employers and privileged workers: direct negotiations, as 
well as negotiations channelled through the social partners, political parties, and 
parliamentary processes. Skills shortages provide the conjunctural enabling 
condition for professionals. 
Secondly, there has been growing support for the adult-worker ideology in the last 
decades. In 1975, Pross already discussed the idea that being “only a housewife” 
was “problematic” for many women who felt left “standing in their husbands’ 
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shadow” (Pross 1975, in Frevert, 1989, p. 273). He posits a desire to realise oneself 
as an individual, a search for a “meaning of life” beyond the servicing of husbands 
and children, as the key motivation for middle-class women in the 1970s to seek 
employment. Nowak’s (2010) account of the undesirability of the male-
breadwinner-model reaffirms this general claim. My interviews show that parental 
leave was experienced negatively as a lifestyle rupture by mothers to a greater 
extent as by fathers. Longer periods at home first led to feelings of loneliness and 
dependence, then to professional disadvantages and stress. Discrepancies between 
traditional norms of motherhood and working motherhood, notably for Anna, 
furthermore led to feelings of guilt and anxiety. Accordingly, I have judged the 
adult-worker-model to be dominant, rather than hegemonic, because its legitimacy 
is perpetually in question, both in terms of alternatives, and in terms of viability. 
The harmonious idea of reconcilability, as promoted in public media, does not 
represent the experience of the everyday of parenthood. 
Thirdly, gendered labour market segregation was clearly identified as the root of 
inequalities arising from formally gender-neutral policies. But segregation is a 
concept that requires unpacking; perhaps it is even the wrong – or an insufficient – 
term. Career models based on the (male) unencumbered worker reinforce unequal 
labour market statuses throughout the life-course. As Frevert has pointed out, part-
time work, once seen as a solution for women to reconcile care with the economic 
and psychological needs to participate in the public sphere, is increasingly seen as a 
problem (Frevert, 1989, pp. 271–2). This problem must be located in the quality of 
part-time work as it is prevalent in Germany, which takes us back into the 
discussion of social insurance eligibilities, wage inequality, low recognition and 
intellectual stimulation. More subtly, it becomes visible that ‘feminine’ occupations 
are sometimes more reconcilable, such as back-office work, but also inferior in 
status and pay, and offer less ‘career’ opportunities (e.g. teaching). There is clearly a 
very persistent belief that specialist or leadership work cannot be done in part-time. 
This belief is only very slowly being challenged by dual leadership models and 
similar ‘experiments’. What this suggests is a disciplinary mechanism in the idea 
that privileged work is given only to those to devote the most flexibility and time to 
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their profession (Präsenzkultur). This logic of showing commitment immediately 
disadvantages ‘encumbered’ workers. The concept of encumberedness implies a 
separation of what is considered valuable work, and what is not. Care is constructed 
as a ‘burden’, rather than a normal and valuable – even desirable – part of life (see 
Himmelweit in 1.2). Generalised assumptions about women at a certain age spread 
discrimination in hiring and promotion decisions to childless women. 
Fourthly, Präsenzkultur and restricted public childcare opening times lead to a 
rigidity of schedules, both in ‘public’ and ‘private’, which worsens the potential for 
reconciliation. Those schedules are frequently unsynchronised.  
Elena: “what I find crass, and I have for example a number of friends who very 
consciously say we do not want children, yes, because we have built so much, we 
don’t want to sacrifice that. […] it is really still easier . in many regards in Germany to 
be a woman . I don’t want children consciously, that is more accepted than a woman 
who wants children, but . I also want a job. I want a qualified profession. Then one 
has the Rabenmutter thing on the one side . and also in the kindergarten, as I said 
they are all nice and kind, but still they schedule the Christmas event for 14:30 in the 
middle of the week . I can’t go then.” (I25, 1:23:35-1:24:39) 
Anecdotes such as Elena’s exemplify that the adult-worker variant currently 
‘idealised’ by professional women in Germany is not very compatible with 
parenthood. This more radically commodified variant of the adult-worker-model is 
unviable for sustainable social reproduction, because it effectively copied the male-
breadwinner life-course onto professional women34, while ignoring the old 
complementarity of roles. If one accepts gender equality as a key target, the 
obvious conclusion to this line of argument must be that the ‘unencumbered adult-
worker’ norm needs to be exchanged for a more sustainable, genderless norm of 
the adult worker-carer. This points to the gap in German political left-feminist 
discourse that Nowak laments: the shortening of the working week. I will continue 
this discussion in the conclusion (chapter 6). 
                                                     
34 This conclusion is restricted to professional women, not all women! See 4.3.2 
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4.4 Temporalities of the ‘Private Sphere’ 
As indicated previously, looking at the temporal structures of the ‘public sphere’ is 
reductionist. To understand reconcilability problems, we must equally heed the 
structures of the ‘private’. The following subsection focuses on the household and 
nuclear family (4.4.1). I will return to the private in the wider sense – social 
networks and civil society – in the subsequent section (4.4.2), before moving to 
public childcare provision in chapter 5. 
An empirical problem that affects time research in the private is the lack of habitual 
accounting for time-uses, as elaborated in the methodology section (3.4). Most 
contributions that talk about private life and time try to measure the distribution of 
different tasks between household members. Important themes in this literature 
are the allocation and quality of free time and the gendered division of housework 
and care (Apps and Rees, 2005; Bittman and Wajcman, 2000; Craig and Brown, 
2016; Gershuny and Sullivan, 2003; Mattingly and Sayer, 2006). The problem with 
studying free time or housework in the aggregate is that each category can include 
activities of rather varied nature. More importantly from a feminist perspective, 
these activities have different social status. The lack of accounting for private time – 
lack of visibility – is worsened by aggregate considerations, because they hide the 
hierarchical differences of who does what specifically at home (see methodology, 
3.4).  
The contemporary division of domestic work is not only characterised by persistent 
gender and hierarchy differences, but furthermore by a widespread experience of 
time scarcity. The growing prevalence of adult-worker or single-parent families, as 
well as the intensification of paid work, contribute as “objective explanations” to a 
trend of feeling rushed; respectively, ideas about good parenting and the high social 
status associated with being busy on the job and in “action-packed lives” combine 
into “subjective explanations” (Mattingly and Sayer, 2006, p. 205,  original 
emphasis). Mattingly & Sayer problematise the “seeming paradox between 
increases in free time and concurrent increases in subjective feelings of time 
pressure” (ibid, p.206). Whereas free time has increased in historical comparison 
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between the 1970s and 1990s, this trend does not continue in the 2000s. 
Furthermore, statistics around the world suggest that women work 30min to 1h 
more each day than men (Sayer, 2005). Mattingly & Sayer’s findings indicate that 
more free time reduces fathers’ perceptions of feeling rushed, but not mothers’. 
The gap between childless women/men vis-à-vis mothers indicates a “family 
penalty” where mothers’ habits to perpetually tend to household and children 
change the quality of free time (ibid, p.217). The urgency of small but frequent daily 
demands on mothers result in multitasking, which has been associated with 
psychological distress and higher reported time pressure (Craig and Brown, 2016). 
Some disagreement exists in how far increased hours in paid work make this 
experience of feeling rushed worse, or to what extent multitasking in the home is 
equally stressful across all forms and intensities of mothers’ employment (Craig and 
Brown, 2016, p. 238; Sullivan and Gershuny, 2013). Work might even be 
experienced as relaxation relative to the stress of the home. In her early work, 
Hochschild (2001) inferred that mothers purposefully extended hours in paid 
employment for that reason. Hochschild’s more recent work, however, suggests a 
greater concern with protecting family “downtime” by outsourcing domestic tasks 
(Hochschild, 2012; van den Scott, 2014, p. 481). From a Bourdieuian perspective, 
one might consider that children’s demands on mothers, and mothers feeling 
responsible to respond to children very quickly (being ‘on call’), lead to a temporal 
disempowerment of mothers. In line with that idea, my own data suggests that 
multitasking creates an experience of fragmented time, which is not only annoying, 
but also prohibits activities that require a certain amount of ongoing concentration 
from being executed. This limits mothers’ participation opportunities in education 
and paid work, as well as a range of hobbies and social activities. 
4.4.1 The Domestic Division of Work 
As discussed previously (3.4), a clear separation between categories such as 
housework, childcare, and free time, is only of limited help when trying to make 
sense of domestic rhythms. For one the boundaries between categories can be 
fleeting, but more often it is because the frequency of switching between tasks is so 
high that tasks are experienced as simultaneous. In such cases we speak of 
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multitasking. As mentioned above, multitasking has become associated with stress. 
Together with the general low recognition of house and care work, the reality of 
multitasking housework and care potentially combines into a particularly 
dissatisfying experience. In reflection of the data I collected, I arrive at the 
conclusion that all professional participants felt that housework, and to some 
extent childcare, were inferior tasks to paid work. The bottom rung of the activity 
ladder is without doubt occupied by cleaning.  
Imke described housework as “horrible” (I24, 33:34-34:26). Albeit the couple lived 
in a male-breadwinner-model at the time of the interview, Thomas put down 7h of 
housework, which comprised his duties of shopping for groceries, washing, and 
cooking. Imke put down 15h. The central burden she perceived was the cleaning.  
Imke: “if anything was possible, then I would first […] search for a cleaning aid for 
me . there . because otherwise . well, in the long run this is impossible . now it works, 
because I have time, but […] next to . even half a job I can’t imagine it anymore. […] 
but I think in principle, I find that . I always have an unpleasant feeling to have people 
clean for me . that is so, there I just have such a bad feeling. Well, therefore I was 
also not that happy with [having a cleaner previously], because somehow one must 
manage this oneself, but . I still notice how much time it robs me off, and how many 
nerves“(I24, 40:35-41:40) 
As strategies for coping with too much housework, Sullivan & Gershuny (2013) have 
examined multitasking (as outlined above) and outsourcing. The latter has also been 
discussed in terms of care migration and the dynamic between The ‘Mistress’ and 
the ‘Maid’ in the Globalized Economy (Young, 2001). Imke expresses a common 
awareness and occasional unease amongst German female professionals that their 
lifestyles rely on the ‘dirty work’ of less privileged women. The least desirable 
activities are outsourced first, whereas more respected or person-bound activities 
are multitasked by parents, predominantly mothers. The widespread derision for 
cleaning reflects the hierarchy of activities in the broader social division of work, 
and furthermore the social status of those enacting these activities on a daily basis.  
Unfortunately, a lot of time-use research does not consider housework on a 
disaggregated basis, which makes it difficult to assess in how far certain groups can 
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‘cherry pick’ among activities in the home (Grunow and Baur, 2014, p. 511). 
Especially men’s sharing in domestic tasks needs to be considered in relation to the 
status of specific activities. The literature on “doing gender” has long established 
that frequently egalitarian ideologies remain a surface phenomenon, whereas the 
distribution of domestic labour remains notably unequal for heterosexual couples 
(Bianchi et al., 2012; Goldberg, 2013; Grunow and Baur, 2014; Hochschild, 2003b). 
This is demonstrably the case in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015b).  
Domestic divisions of work need to be rationalised in some way to cover up 
divergences between ideals and reality. As Hochschild describes in vivid detail in 
The Second Shift (2003b), families create their own ‘myths’ to legitimate those 
divergences. Such legitimations appeared in all couple interviews I conducted, and I 
will show a few telling examples here, all of which are responses to my question 
whether the couple has a fixed division of work at home. 
Imke no, not at all 
Thomas mh-mh (negation) 
Imke came in interaction 
Thomas exactly, exactly . simply who-who is better at something 
Imke Hm-hm (assent) . true 
Thomas Simply comparative advantage hehe 
Imke Hehe yes, and complementary, [so- 
Thomas [No, well . that is . a technical term 
Imke Aaah 
Thomas Yes, so who is more efficient (leistungsfähiger) is who can (verb 
missing) this aspect- 
Imke Yes, exactly, is who goes into that niche  
Thomas Yes, if I would start now to clean and you would start to cook 
Imke oh god! 
Thomas I don’t believe that either . would be good 
Imke No, that would not be fun 
Thomas Then we would have paired . I’ll say southern hygiene with uh . 
English food . hehe* 
Imke Hehe . terrible! Ok hehe 
(I24, 39:45-40:26)* disparaging stereotypes 
Discussing their division of work, at some point the narrative of comparative 
advantage enters the discourse. There is no previous mention of anything similar in 
the interview. Thomas works in banking, perhaps the term comparative advantage 
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(see Shaikh, 2005 for a summary and critique) is used there to legitimate or explain 
an ideal division of international labour. Here, the idea of advantages through 
specialisation is applied to the household, from an academic perspective hardly a 
new approach (e.g. Becker, 1985). The rationale of sexed specialisation underpins 
the male-breadwinner-model. And somehow, the narrative of ‘who does it best’ 
seems fair to both Thomas and Imke, at least in that moment. It offers a more 
appealing explanation than to say the couple enacts a traditional gender relation, 
with the concession that Thomas does the washing, cooking, and part of the larger 
groceries (Imke does the smaller shopping nearby and prepares the afternoon 
snacks for their child). Yet it is undeniable that Imke does all the hated cleaning, and 
that “needs to change” (I24). Soon, she says, because she is reorienting to go back 
to work. Not to the school, but to return as a priestess, or write a PhD in theology. 
There are several options under consideration that promise a better future for her, 
in which Thomas might even take over the ‘second shift’ of care and housework to 
even out their “life balance sheet” (I24). That hope, it appears to me, helps to cope 
with the gap between Imke’s egalitarian ideals and the couple’s reality. 
A similar dynamic was reported by Markus and Elena (I25, 43:15-44:25): between 
them, tasks are allocated according to skills. She cooks because she “can do it 
better”, he compensates by doing the dishes and taking out the trash. He irons and 
folds the laundry. Markus further has to fix the internet, says Elena, because she 
“does not have a clue about technology”. It is clearly “his job” to “wrestle” with IT 
companies. It is also his job to carry the water, because “she hates that like the 
plague”35. Markus says the housework, done “on the side”, is distributed roughly 
equally, “pari-pari”. She agrees. The allocation is done “direct-democratically”, 
which means that “everyone does what they can” do best.  
I am slightly amused how the terms comparative advantage (Thomas) and direct 
democracy (Elena) are used to denote the same logic of specialisation. The link 
between signifier and signified does appear a tad arbitrary here, but as long as the 
                                                     
35 In Germany sparkling water, beer, soft drinks and the like are bought in large boxes full of 
returnable bottles. Those are heavy, and classically buying drinks is therefore men’s work. It is often 
done on the weekend with the car from special shops, which look like gas stations and have a similar 
masculine atmosphere as DIY stores. 
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signs serve to legitimate the status quo, that hardly seems to matter. The analogy 
between a symbol for a good system of distribution or decision-making and the 
couple’s division of domestic work is the analytically relevant finding here. My data 
does not allow me to make inferences over the veracity of any of these narratives 
with respect to ‘observable’ time-uses. But what is interesting is that the couples 
that ascribed to an egalitarian ideal reported a division of domestic work explained 
through the principle of specialisation. This poses a contrast to Ralf and Christina, 
who intended a more traditional gender relation. In their case, too, Christina 
emphasised Ralf’s help in the household – unlike her husband, who asserted that 
the costs of dealing with household and children were largely carried by his wife. He 
legitimated this fact with reference to the importance his job had taken. Unlike the 
other fathers, Ralf readily admitted to doing less in the home, to putting more effort 
into his work. The imbalance, even for him, is still an admission – but it is one that 
can be made in front of his wife. It does not appear to endanger the emotional 
climate between the couple. In fact, Christina’s complaint directs itself to a society 
and environment hostile to full-time mothers, to a lack of support for her more 
traditional ideal.  
Another interesting discovery was made with regard to the rationalities discussed 
by Arabic women, in the absence of their husbands: Amira and Lamia suggested 
that Arabic husbands helped at home, but the majority of the work was left to the 
wife, unlike in their imagination of German families. They also suggested that for 
Arabic men there was a cultural barrier to visibly engage in household tasks, notable 
in Lamia’s suggestion that many husbands helped their wives, but not when guests 
were around. More research on how men from more gender-conservative migrant 
backgrounds negotiate increasingly dominant egalitarian partnership norms would 
be fascinating to conduct, but may require deeper trust relations with these 
communities than I could establish. 
What these accounts reinforce is the dominant ideological status of the egalitarian 
ideal promoted by the reconcilability discourse (also 4.3.2.1). But most accounts 
simultaneously convey how unrealistic that ideal is in the face of reality, and that 
other ideals, conservative-Christian or Arabic, co-exist and remain significant for 
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individuals and couples. Contestation happens thus in the friction between different 
gender ideologies, but also between the dominant ideology and the frequent 
disappointments it creates in the face of reality. These findings underline why I 
think the adult-worker ideology is dominant, but not completely hegemonic in 
Germany: it simply cannot present itself as a viable reality for the masses. Instead, 
even privileged parents experience irreconcilability, feel rushed, and discriminated 
against. Most clearly, they complain about time scarcities. These also become 
visible in a perceived lack of free time. 
As elaborated above, gendered realities produce gendered consciousnesses, 
traceable in gendered forms of time reckoning (Press and Townsley, 1998). This is 
likely to affect ‘as what’ categories and time-uses are perceived in the first place. 
How free time is thought of differently, and how that matters between spouses, can 
be exemplified by Elena’s contestation of Markus’ idea of free time, voiced in the 
context of filling out the time-use table, item “free time”, which I was prompted to 
elaborate: 
Markus Free time . what does free time mean? Free time without children? 
Nina Time to one-self . also free time with children . so everything that is fun, 
simply put – which could also be different things, but everything that one 
experiences as . free time oneself, as freely shaped time, which one need 
not, which one can . which one enjoys. 
 … 
Elena Well free time, where I have the need-uh or the feeling that I am doing 
something for myself, or something, would be Friday mornings, where I’m 
off [work] . when I am off (frei haben), but - 
Markus Yes, but in the evening when the children are in bed we always have another 
two hours of free time [yes, in which we write random emails, bank 
transfers for our offline family members] yes, but that is still an hour from 
Monday to Thursday, and Fridays. 
Elena 
[Markus] 
Then there stand eight hours free time, I don’t really have eight hours of 
free time! That is ridiculous. I don’t really have eight hours of free time – 
[four?] eight hours – yes but four hours from Monday to Thursday, one 
each, and the Friday morning are another four hours. I don’t have 8 hours 
free time, that would be a complete day that I have to myself, that is 
nonsense [well, but…] no! . no, so . for me, if I sit here in the evening, then 
uh we fold the laundry, we tidy up or something, that is not my impression 
of free time. If we say anything that is fun [Nina: hmhm] . [Markus: hm, well 
okay then…] . it’s not an imposition, but .[then let us say during the week for 
you five hours, if you have the Friday morning . one hour in total . and what 
do we have on the weekends?] . eh, well this here . care work and free time, 
that uh flows into each other seamlessly for us I believe, because for 
187 
 
example on the weekends, since we have a rather strictly regulated day due 
to our dual employment, we try on the weekends and also on Friday 
afternoons, we try to [organise] the daily routine according to the wishes 
and ideas of the children, or respectively what we all want to do together as 
a family . if we want to go to the zoo, or if the ‘Mäuschen’ [‘little mice’, their 
daughters] . E for example sometimes just likes to be home . then she wants 
to run around in her pyjamas all day . and in the beginning we were a little 
surprised (befremdet), but meanwhile I rather like it hehe [hehe] so we run 
around in our pyjamas all day [hehe] . and uh . that is certainly also 
education work, because inbetween there are a lot of conflicts to resolve, 
but it’s free time. 
Markus Yes, that means Saturday to Sunday each six hours 
Elena Yes, the weekend is free time so to say 
 
Markus So, 12, then it is for me . 13 . and for you . so, we said four . 
 
Elena Yes, the same as for you, or do I have a longer weekend? 
 
Markus Uh, your Friday morning . four hours 
 
Elena But Friday mornings I don’t do what I want, I mean I work hard to go to one 
hour of yoga each week … [Markus: okay, you get one hour] . cheapskate! 
Hehe, now I understand what you meant when you said this will be 
contested amongst family members* [Nina: hehe] hehe – tse! – men! 
(I25, 39:52-43:15) * I made that hint when introducing the table 
First it should be said that negotiations about time-use, such as displayed above, 
are relatively usual in the interviews I conducted. Disagreements among partners, 
as well as joint considerations which amount of time seemed appropriate, and what 
should be counted, what not, were absolutely common place in response to Table 1 
(p. 116). Among these accounts the passage above is an illustrative ‘strong’ case. 
What determines the amount of free time for each partner – the number that is 
eventually written into the table printed on my interview guide – is the product of a 
negotiation process that draws on several sources: his beliefs, her beliefs, my 
commentary about the category “free time”, and the interaction throughout the 
exchange. The bargaining dynamic (Markus’ offer of four, then one, rather than 
eight hours) is underlined by Elena’s argumentation. An interesting aspect of their 
negotiation is that apparently, with the exception of Friday mornings, they always 
have free time together. Does this suggests that they have no individual free time? 
While that is possible, Markus’ use of the pronoun ‘we’ seems once more a rhetoric 
strategy (compare 4.2.3). Talking in the ‘we’ automatically suggests that one 
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partner is not ‘slacking off’ while the other is still doing housework. Yet Markus’ 
‘we’ and perception of the evenings as free time is challenged by Elena’s ‘I’. The 
divergence in perceptions could be explained by the fact that Markus does not 
perceive housework as an important interruption of his evening relaxation. For him, 
the absence of paid work and the absence of the children might be sufficient 
indicators for free time (M: “free time without children?”). For Elena, the absence 
of children marks a clear quality dimension of free time, which she expresses in the 
distinction between “doing something for myself” (Friday morning) and the 
simultaneity of education and free time (weekends). To the extent that Friday 
mornings are considered ‘pure’ free time, the absence of her husband might also be 
worth considering. The more intense emotional work and multitasking mothers 
tend to do in the family, towards children and husbands, has been considered in the 
literature as the lasting impact of deeply internalised ideas about femininity 
(Radcliffe and Cassell, 2014). The result is less ‘pure’ free time for mothers.  
What is striking about the passage, irrespectively of how much work either partner 
does effectively, is the moral need to have similar amounts of free time, even if that 
means bending previous statements. What this passage does not give is a reliable 
time-use account; instead it constructs the ‘family myth’ of equal free time, despite 
different ideas what even counts as free time, and how much of it is really had.  
What I found particularly interesting were efforts to present oneself favourably to 
legitimate, but also to contest, the mismatch between ideal, experiences, and 
expectations. Noticeable examples of such strategies, not previously discussed, are 
Imke’s repeated self-presentation as a priestess, her ‘true’ vocation – despite the 
fact that she has not been enacting that role for several years. Another example is 
Elena’s response to the following interview question: 
Nina Which priorities do you have in time distribution? What comes first in 
the everyday? 
Elena By necessity the job. 
Markus As said before, what comes first is the eh . the frame for the job is set 
by the children, I mean you bring them in the morning, collect them, 
therefore they are determining . and- 
Elena Yes, you are right . no, you are right . really . true, and if I had to decide 
between job and children, I would chose my children. […] he is right, 
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that was my old me answering ‘job’ . my new me says, there he is right, 
children. Of course . sure, and if the kindergarten calls, eh . one of the 
girls has earaches and cries and needs to be picked up, taken to the 
doctor, clearly . I drop everything and drive, that is true. 
Markus For me, by necessity the job. 
Elena (sighs ironically-compassionate) one by necessity has to win the bread 
after all 
(I25, 46:23-47:15) 
Markus hits on something very important here, which is not just Elena’s ‘true’ 
priorities relative to her earlier self-presentation, but the temporal binding effect 
the childcare commitment has on her daily schedules. I have illustrated this ‘time 
bind’ in Figure 11. The diagram depicts in somewhat simplified form their average 
week-day. The feature I want to draw attention to is the fact that Elena takes and 
picks up the children from kindergarten (Kita). This binds her leftover time to these 
two events, in effect curtailing her time in paid work. As mentioned above, she has 
reduced to part-time, which has stopped her career progression. Markus, even 
though he does engage in housework and childcare, is not in the same way bound 
to specific times. And this nuance matters an awful lot, because it preserves his 
time autonomy at her expense. 
 
Figure 11 Childcare Time Bind in Daily Schedule 
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Regular emergencies, such as sick children, add to this basic dynamic. The recurring 
finding is the ongoing mother-child linkage, which is active in key moments that 
bind mothers to the child and to the home, and thus reduce their time autonomy in 
other spaces. The husband who takes over these particular ‘time-binding’ private 
duties on a regular basis is still exotic. The ongoing temporal division of gendered 
spheres, that is, the lack of synchronisation between the working and the children’s 
world, makes it harder to traverse between those spheres. 
A central theme that discussions about different time budgets (paid work, leisure, 
care, housework…) usually mention, but fail to address systematically, are the 
temporal structures – of the day, the week – in which activities can take place. This 
structural embedding is important to understand the limitations of different 
availabilities and synchronisation problems between activities or spheres: this is the 
case for fixed institutional schedules, such as opening hours or school schedules, 
but it is also important with regard to less formalised cultural rhythms, such as 
mealtimes or bedtimes. With regard to methodological improvements for 
statistical-representative research, activities such as taking the children to 
kindergarten should be key information for time-use statistics to pick up. In general, 
all activities that are ‘time-bound’ should be considered as crucial to assess the 
temporal inclusion of different social identities/groups. By inclusion I mean either 
autonomy to engage flexibly, or alternatively a lack of synchronisation problems in 
an improved collective temporal grid. To understand where the biggest 
synchronisation problems are, time statistics should therefore not only record 
durations, but also timings and temporal dependencies between institutions or 
spheres, to make representative analyses of the German collective temporal 
rhythms and “temporal stratification” possible (van den Scott, 2014).  
4.4.2 Extended Familialism and Civil Society 
The last section focussed on the nuclear family. The remaining part of this chapter 
will widen the scope of consideration where and by whom childcare takes place. 
The African proverb teaches us that “it takes a village to raise a child”, referring to 
the importance of community structures in providing a safe and educational 
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environment for growing up (Goldberg, 2016). In the contemporary German welfare 
state, the village has been replaced by a mix of public education and care, clubs and 
associations (Vereine), religious communities, paid services, and personal networks 
of relatives and friends. Looking at this multitude of social relations from a welfare 
theoretical perspective, the relative weights of different actors, and shifts between 
those weights, matter to diagnose movements such as ‘defamilialisation’ or 
‘recommodification’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999).  
Below, I will examine family in the wider sense, that is, the role of private networks 
(especially grandparents), and the challenge of spatial distances to dependability 
(4.4.2.1). Secondly, I will address civil society and voluntary work (4.4.2.2).  
4.4.2.1 Private Networks 
 
Elena: “we have here in Cologne I believe, because my mother also lives here and uh, 
Markus’ parents also live here, we have the maximal home field advantage, because 
both grandparent couples engage themselves much in the care of the children, and 
help a lot.” (I25, 4:48-5:32) 
What became clear comparing participants and their ability to manage daily lives 
was the important role of grandparents. For Michelle, the unemployed single 
mother of one daughter, her mother’s support took an interpersonal and financial 
role (I44). For Ralf’s father, tending to the grandson made it possible to live out an 
active carer role that had been unthinkable in his younger years: 
Christina: “Ralf’s parents in the parallel street, those are already 76 but still relatively 
fit . and my father in law, he, he is very good with children. Would have preferred 
back then already to become a childcare practitioner rather than any profession men 
did. Today that would not have been a problem, but in his generation everyone 
would have looked at him strange. And now he can live that out.” (I28, 32:25-33:19) 
Of course, Christina adds, this does not work for many parents, because 
grandparents are often too old, frail, or far away to help. Anna (I22) struggles with 
the fact that her parents live in southern Germany, a several hours’ drive away. 
Since her separation from her husband, the relation to the mother-in-law has 
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cooled. Her wish for somebody close-by to take responsibility off her shoulders 
remains unfulfilled (4.3.3.2). Thomas’ parents are too old to keep up with the 
children. Imke’s mother minded her granddaughter while Imke completed 
additional vocational training (I24, 24:53-25:55). Elena and Markus’ dual 
breadwinner model would not have worked, if Elena’s mother did not regularly help 
out:  
Elena: “well at least once a week. And as I said, till January […] [my daughter ] was 
with her during the day […] Markus’ parents live on the other riverside, they are not 
reached as practically as my mother, who lives here down the street . that is well . 
convenient . and if I am now away on business longer, or something happens, then I 
tell the girls they are sleeping at grandma’s, […] (Markus’) parents we see less often, 
but . pretty much also regularly” (I25, 52:43-53:34)  
What this example reveals is that even moderate distances, which could be covered 
in less than one hour by car, may discourage daily interaction when closer solutions 
are possible. All examples of very frequent grandparent support I encountered took 
place inside the same neighbourhood. Proximity therefore seemed to exist in three 
layers: within one neighbourhood, within one town or area, and beyond that. 
Grandparents on that last distance only gave hands-on support during holidays, 
whereas support within one town seemed to depend on various interpersonal 
factors, including the urgency with which help was needed. Some prospective 
parents purposefully move back to their home towns to have access to their 
personal support networks: 
Sibille: “that was definitely a major point. Well I always said that – when uh children 
come, then in such a way that we have at least one family in the vicinity. […] I have 
seen with so many [people] how difficult that is, when one has in principle no 
grandparents or siblings, babysitter, whomever in the vicinity. For us it was always 
the case that the main circle of friends and family was here, and uh . I believe I 
already know to appreciate that, and that will get significantly more when I go back 
to work . simply to know that one has someone, who can jump in. because . since we 
both have a job that demands a certain flexibility, uh, it can happen that – my 
husband is occasionally on business travel, then he is away for two or three days, 
that I simply . need grandparents around the corner, yes” (I48, 45:44-46:37) 
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In this passage, Sibille links her adult-worker family expectation with the need for 
grandparents’ support, specifically for unplanned or flexible care needs that follow 
from her and her husband’s occupations. What I find interesting is that she 
mentions grandparents and siblings as potential babysitters, and then trails off by 
saying “whomever”. She does not consider friends as regular supporters with 
childcare. 
This is an important distinction to make between family and friends, at least among 
professionals: friends are not expected to “jump in” when childcare is needed. 
Parents’ friends fulfil a different role: They act as conversation partners about 
children, as advisors and role models, but they are not regularly asked to babysit. 
Between parents and childless friends, furthermore, there is a danger for rifts 
caused by different lifestyles. Elena and Michelle reported that having children as 
first-movers among their friends led to them feeling isolated, suddenly living in a 
different world than their former peers.  
Considered in terms of dependability (p. 127) it becomes clear that reliable 
childcare support is not commonly given by friends. Friendship usually lacks the 
dimension of obligation, which – differently phrased – entails the sense of 
responsibility for mutual daily care attributed to family. With regard to relatives, 
proximity in daily interactions turned out to be particularly important. Due to the 
mobility many young people have, going to university or working in a different town 
or even country, the necessary proximity for hands-on support cannot be 
considered as given. For those who travelled, it needs to be purposefully re-
established. The findings in this study leave no doubt that familial support networks 
substantially help to ease reconcilability strains, and are particularly important for 
working mothers to delegate childcare in an informal and flexible manner, 
especially in emergencies.  
Narrowing in on grandparents, what became quite obvious was the more likely and 
regular involvement of grandmothers. Ralf’s father in his enthusiasm for children is 
an exception within my sample. The closest link appeared between mothers and 
their mothers. Care-giving along the ‘maternal lineage’ is an important facet of 
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networks in which mutual care can be delegated according to need. But 
prospectively, this form of delegation is likely to run into problems. Grandmothers’ 
availability is today still given by the previous generation’s male-breadwinner-
model, and the generational alignment in terms of age. The more parenthood is 
delayed in the life-course, the likelier it moves into a phase where the grandparent 
generation is too old to give support, or may even need additional care. These 
assumptions depend on life expectancy and health developments in the future. The 
problematic has been discussed in terms of “women in the middle” or the 
“sandwich generation” (Brody, 1981). As Künemund has aptly described the general 
concern from the perspective of elderly care: 
“reducing the welfare state spending on the elderly may aggravate the burden placed 
on the daughters of the baby boom cohorts, as they are less likely to share care 
activities with siblings and as they face competing demands from both younger and 
elderly kin as well as from the labour market” (Künemund, 2006, p. 12, emphasis 
added) 
Künemund suggests that whereas the sandwich generation exists, its proponents 
are usually not particularly burdened with work (Künemund, 2006, p. 20). Whereas 
the author concedes a potential worsening of the situation, he also emphasizes the 
potential of men taking over a greater share of care work. Keck and Saraceno see 
future trends more pessimistically: 
“Whatever the development at the level of preferences and values, in the next two 
decades the expected overall growth of care dependent elderly people, coupled with 
demographic and family changes, will effect negatively the ratio between care givers 
and individuals in need of care in Germany.” (Keck and Saraceno, 2009, pp. 5–6) 
In the comparative policy literature, Germany has been characterised as a regime in 
which elderly care is met by a policy mix of “de-familialization and supported 
familialism”, facilitated by services and cash-transfers, “with another large share left 
to familialism by default” since the eligibility level of disability support is relatively 
high (Saraceno, 2010, p. 37). The positioning of the elder-care phase in the life-
course further suggests for women that the ‘drop out’ from the labour market due 
to childcare is often extended for elderly care. This is likely to cement employers’ 
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experience of women’s reduced availability and flexibility, and thus maintain their 
expectations about future female workers. This brief excursion into debates on 
elderly care demonstrate that grandparents have an ambiguous role in childcare 
arrangements, and in how their presence and proximity impacts the middle-aged 
generation, especially women.  
Before I will turn to voluntary work, I would like to say a few words about paid 
domestic care, such as babysitting or au-pairs. The latter are privilege of the upper 
classes. Albeit I talked to several rather affluent families, none of them seriously 
considered having an au-pair. With the exception of Anna, who relied on babysitters 
more frequently, even this more informal form of paid care was not very widely 
used. Quite often ‘babysitters’ were family members, often siblings or cousins (e.g. 
Markus’ brother; I25, 53:38-53:59). In other cases babysitters were older girls from 
the parents’ environment, such as an intern from the kindergarten (I24) or 
somebody from around the neighbourhood: 
Christina: “I now have two 14 year old girls, who do the baby sitter. Fortunately, they 
don’t take much [money].” (I28b, 6:08-6:41) 
The important thing to take away is that unlike grandparents, babysitters did usually 
not play a major role in childcare. Furthermore, their employment was infrequent, 
short, and very informal. 
Overall, therefore, I conclude that the importance of family remains very high in 
German childcare arrangements, specifically so in emergency situations. The 
possibility of an adult-worker-model depends on whether or not childcare can be 
delegated, which usually means having grandparents close-by rather than having 
private paid carers.  
Whereas public childcare expansion has had a defamilialising effect on mothers, this 
effect is limited by rigid schedules and insufficient provision. I will explain this in 
more detail in chapter 5 on public childcare. Furthermore, the relatively 
spontaneous nature of non-parental familialised childcare (e.g. by grandparents) 
suggests that its importance in resolving reconcilability problems is unlikely to be 
revealed by durations of care work reported in time-use surveys. It is not the 
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amount of time that matters here, but the timing, and the flexibility of care-giving 
by relatives. This highlights the importance of ‘time-binds’ and availability on the 
one hand, and the meaning of familialism beyond the nuclear family on the other. 
4.4.2.2 Civil Society, Parenting Spaces, and Voluntary Work 
On the borderland between private and public childcare, as well as family services, 
lie community institutions: these often have a little bit of public funding, take place 
outside the home, or are organised by volunteers on a non-profit basis. A good 
example is the city of Cologne’s KIWI programme. KIWI, the 
Kinderwillkommensbesuch (children welcome visit), comprises an offer to young 
parents, about 6 weeks after the birth, to be visited at home by a local volunteer. 
The volunteer brings a little gift and a lot of information about local offers for 
families. The primary purpose of the visit is to give parents information on how to 
integrate into local parent networks. Given the experience of loneliness reported by 
mothers, it makes sense how meeting like-minded people in similar life situations 
can be helpful. The KIWI programme is organised by the city youth welfare office, 
but executed by partner NGOs in each district. Relying on volunteers does not only 
make personal visits financially possible, but also avoids a sense of privacy invasion 
by the state. A youth office employee commented that the authorities were aware 
of the conflictual reputation they had with families36, and that the involvement of 
laypeople from the neighbourhoods had been a reflected decision to make KIWI 
more informal (I39). In the earliest phase of parenthood, midwives are also worth 
mentioning. Midwives accompany families around birth and give initial practical 
advice how to handle a new-born. Participants told me that midwives helped to 
form connections between their clients, bringing like-minded mothers together 
(I24, 30:17-30:58). 
Beyond the initial weeks of parenthood, a branch of publicly financed services for 
families is organised under the label Familienbildung (family education). 
Familienbildung takes place in centres, often affiliated to the non-statutory welfare 
                                                     
36 The youth office is known as the people who have the authority to take the children away. 
Especially among parents who perceive themselves as vulnerable to accusations of bad parenting, 
the youth office is thus seen as a threat.  
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providers, which offer classes and meeting groups for parents and children. These 
can be sports or hobby-related things, but centrally revolve around parenting 
advice, either by peers or by professionals. The course Starke Eltern-Starke Kinder® 
developed by the DJI is one of the most wide-spread offers (Tschöpe-Scheffler, 
2004). Anna joined this course to meet up with other parents and ease her own 
anxieties as a mother who had never previously engaged with children. The issues 
raised by parents today do not substantially vary from the issues of classical 
pedagogy, and revolve around the questions of what it means to be a good parent 
(Tschöpe-Scheffler, 2005, p. 252). The course builds on the democratic and 
humanist tradition of pedagogy (Rousseau, Fröbel; also Comenius, Pestalozzi, 
Korczak), and emphasises self-experience and reflection in the process of educating 
children (ibid). Another type of discourse in demand with parents is child 
development: at which age a child should be able to do what (pioneered by Piaget, 
1970). I will return to this theme in the discussion of childcare practitioners’ 
perspectives below (5.4.2). 
A second branch of community building around families, often in practice 
interlinked with Familienbildung, exists in the form of Familienzentren, an initiative 
by the Land NRW. These family centres group various offers towards families 
together, usually at the site of a kindergarten. Next to themed evenings and more 
professional family services, these centres also offer family cafés (Familiencafé). The 
latter format, which also exists independently, takes the style of a coffee shop, 
which is adapted to the needs of parents with small children. The family café 
provides a toddler-safe meeting and chatting environment for parents, as well as 
playing spaces for the children. The advantage of the café over the traditional 
courses in Familienbildung is that the café has an open-door format: it is open 
flexibly, whereas the traditional activities take place according to a regular schedule 
(I22, 10:56-12:58). As Thomas commented on his wife’s positive impression, the 







Thomas: “[another father and I] were there in the evening, and went in there . what 
was it called, not pink-red . into such a café . where supposedly it was clearly a 
parent-child café . there we were looked at as men . who are these guys, who are 
turning up there? [Imke: hehe] well we were really . looked at really strangely, 
because we disrupted this women’s groove . and everything there was done in pink 
[Imke: hehe, exactly. They did cupcakes there] well that was . welcoming, not from 
the people who ran the place, but from the surroundings one noticed: we are 
intruders . those don’t belong here […] also when I was there alone, that . I went 
there a few times with [my daughter] during parental leave, because it was quite nice 
there, but . well, Willkommenskultur . if one [uses] the term . that did not exist back 
then . that was, that wasn’t there. No.” (I24, 1:17:15-1:19:08) 
Thomas proceeds to recount an older friend’s experience of being a father on a 
playground 15 years ago, who felt he was regarded as a rapist by the mothers 
present. Today, Thomas suggests, fathers are normal on a playground, if still a 
minority. This example illustrates rather well how gendered parenting spaces often 
still are, and how young fathers who do engage actively are confronted with places 
clearly dominated by women. But the playground comment also suggests that 
change is clearly underway. A local NGO I was in contact with ran specific father-
child groups to give fathers an opportunity to spend time together. This prevents 
fathers on leave from being lonely with their children, and allows fathers in general 
to engage with children and other men. 
The problem that affects a lot of these local – and often free or low fee – offers is 
the availability of either funds or volunteers, and the degree of professionalism and 
reliability that can be achieved when relying on the latter. Civil society is passing 
through a phase of structural change in which traditional areas of sports, 
conviviality, and emergency management decline, whereas new fields of 
international solidarity, childcare and education are growing. Surveys around civic 
engagement (Simonson, Vogel and Tesch-Römer, 2016) show that engagement is 
rising, from 34% in 1999 to 43.6% in 2014, in particular among the well-educated 
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(52.3%). The authors of the study point out, however, that growth often happened 
in paid positions (Krimmer, 2018, p. 197). Whereas foundations and non-profit 
corporations increased in numbers in the last two decades, the trend for 
associations (Vereine) is negative.  
In order to better understand the connection between civic engagement and 
working time, the North-Rhine Westphalian Labour Ministry has commissioned a 
study from the WSI37 (Klenner, Pfahl and Seifert, 2001). The results are revealing, if 
not surprising. Hierarchies in labour and family relations impact and continue in 
social relations around volunteering. The higher the temporal autonomy, the more 
likely the civic engagement. Women’s ‘second shift’ in the home explains the lower 
percentages and times of female volunteers, particularly in East Germany, where 
the adult-worker-model is more prevalent. In the West, female volunteers are 
usually part-time workers, who engage only if their domestic duties are already 
taken care of. Men between 45-65 and employed in prestigious positions volunteer 
the most. Respectively, single men or men in a childless relationship volunteered 
much less.  
The presence of children in a family increases the likelihood of volunteering 
significantly. This is because a lot of volunteering positions involve childcare or 
children’s free time in sports clubs or similar (Klenner, Pfahl and Seifert, 2001). 
Voluntary work is also a key resource for parent-initiative kindergartens, who 
cannot compensate their labour demand through paid work. Between 1999 and 
2014 the share of people volunteering in ‘school and kindergarten’ activities rose 
from 5.9% to 9.1%38 (Simonson, Vogel and Tesch-Römer, 2016). Results from the 
2016 ZIVIS survey suggest further growth in this area, which was almost non-
existent in the 1950s, began to grow in the 1970s, and has been booming in the last 
decade (Priemer, Krimmer and Labigne, 2017). Gender segregation in voluntary 
work, identical to paid work, means that the majority of volunteers active in these 
fields are women. Prospectively, the noticeable trend in policies towards an adult-
                                                     
37 WSI: Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut, Hans-Böckler Stiftung 
38 Three categories of activities rose in that time by approximately 5%. All others rose less, 
stagnated, or declined. The increase is thus quite noticeable. 
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worker-model is likely to cause labour shortages in these volunteering spaces 
around social reproduction.  
Another key finding in the report is the scheduling of traditional volunteering 
activities around the Fordist working week. Most activities are scheduled on 
evenings and weekends, which prevents workers in flexible or evening/weekend 
hours from participating. Put differently, the schedules of civil society have often 
not yet undergone the process of flexibilisation apparent in paid work. Family cafés, 
mentioned above, are one example of this. The comparison of an amateur sports 
club, in which a certain group trains every Tuesday night, to a gym, where any 
member can come and go as they please between 6:00 a.m. and 22:00 p.m., seven 
days a week, gives another good example. The latter offer is available for pretty 
much everybody, temporally speaking, whereas the former includes only those who 
can reliably have Tuesday evenings off. The vast majority of German leisure 
associations is still organised in the first mode. For a good range of activities 
flexibilisation appears unrealistic in practice, because the small organisations 
supporting them do not have the resources to increase their availability around the 
clock. In consequence, any further flexibilisation of labour hours is likely to affect 
associational life negatively. This centrally affects families, because among all 
citizens they are among the most integrated in this sphere of free time and support 
activities. 
4.5 So what’s the Problem? 
In the beginning of this chapter, I began to reflect how for female professionals it 
never seems to be the ‘right time’ to have children. In the life-course of 
professionals, modelled on the ‘unencumbered’ worker, there is no adequate time 
reserved for active parenthood. Mismatches between expectations towards 
working parents result in overloaded schedules, both in terms of work and in terms 
of decision-making and processing, the so-called rush-hour of life. Parenthood, in 
consequence, is anticipated ambivalently. It is imagined benignly as long-term joy 
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and emotional security (dependability of family); but it is also associated with 
worries about being able to coordinate everyday life.  
The lacking synchronisation between the schedules of the working world and the 
family world (kindergartens, schools, associational life, etc.) has been presented as 
the root of reconcilability problems. Life-course scales and weekly scales of 
temporal norms are interlinked, for example in the ‘rule’ that part-time workers do 
not advance far in their career, or in the time binds on weekly public childcare that 
restrict full-time employment for both parents, and thereby ‘damage’ one career in 
the long run. These links are reproduced in circles of experiences and expectations, 
through which agents signal their own position and make sense of others. Signalling 
high availability and flexibility on the job works as a competitive strategy and 
disciplinary mechanism to incentivise high job commitment for professionals. This 
logic automatically leads to penalties for ‘encumbered’ workers, that is, carers. 
In contemporary Germany, this conflict is further articulated as a transition from 
the ‘old’ male-breadwinner-norm, Fordism, and its societal schedules to the ‘new’ 
ideal of an adult-worker-model. The latter promises eventual gender equality, 
especially in economic terms. In the current phase of transition, however, the 
partial institutionalisation of the adult-worker-model is too piecemeal to coherently 
overrule older institutions, such as working cultures or gender norms. In effect, the 
historical layering of institutions creates an asynchronous and incoherent collage of 
institutional logics. This asynchronicity generates fewer ‘kairotic’ moments in which 
enabling conditions ‘fit together’. In consequence it has a structural disempowering 
impact on stakeholders. 
The practical result for families is a dominant tendency towards a one-and-half-
breadwinner-model (Mahon, 2002). I have argued that widespread experiences of 
guilt, frustration, or disappointment by parents, especially mothers, suggest that 
there is no overarching hegemony to legitimate this status quo. Furthermore, I have 
argued that the promotion of an adult-worker-model on the assumption of 
relatively ‘unencumbered’ workers withdraws time resources from families. The 
expanding public childcare system, as I will demonstrate further in the chapter 
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below, is not ready to balance this recommodification of time. The practical 
outcome, currently, is not defamilialisation, but a stalled and restricted (part-time) 
recommodification of women, a shrinking of leisure time for parents, and renewed 
dependence on wider family to fill the gaps in public childcare provision. Expansions 
of voluntary work around family suggest that civil society, often in the shape of 
parents themselves and grandparents, is compensating for some of this resource 
drain. But the availability of volunteers itself is bound up in the economy of time. 
Where the unencumbered adult-worker-norm progresses, the availability of 
voluntary and domestic labour declines, ceteris paribus. This dynamic is not just a 
matter of total hours available, but furthermore a scheduling problem, a 
predictability problem, which points back to synchronisation issues between 
institutions. The different hours of the day and week are not substitutes for one 
another, because they are differently bound up in institutional and also biological 
schedules. In consequence, time is not a homogeneous resource like money, and 
should not be treated as such, in academia or elsewhere. 
Whereas the status quo in Germany cannot in any sense be described as acute 
crisis, the visible tendencies suggest rather clearly that the ideology of the adult-
worker-model, as it is institutionalising right now, fails to convincingly promote 
itself as a pathway to the ‘good life’. It is ideologically too trapped in ideas about 
unencumbered workers, austerity, and global competitiveness, to value care 
enough to generate a harmonious, sustainable division of work. Seeleib-Kaiser & 
Toivonen’s (2011) account of an alliance between liberal feminists and employers, 
or Nowak’s (2010) account of a passive revolution that co-opted feminist discourses 
into state policy, suggest that there has been an alliance between liberal feminists 
and employers to promote new family policies. This political alliance, historically in 
this moment of skills shortages and austerity, has a limited win-win potential. 
Individual forms of resistance are visible in families ‘stubbornly’ sticking to old 
norms, as well as for parents to consciously choose ‘time over money’, and 
withdraw at least partially from the labour market. In times of skills shortages, 
these occurrences appear sufficient to motivate some regulative and organisational 
change, at least for professionals. But these political acts are not coherently 
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organised, and thus very limited in their capacity to address collective time 
problems of synchronisation.  
The expansion of public childcare, addressed in the next chapter, is meant to 
complement the adult-worker-model by providing the necessary childcare 
resources to relieve families. But at the moment, this infrastructure is not yet set 
up. The risk in the meantime is that the adult-worker-ideal, and the gender equality 
target implicit in it, could lose attractiveness in the political discussion. Pushing for 
female labour market activation before childcare infrastructure is in place risks the 
credibility of the whole political endeavour as a pathway to a ‘good life’, because 
the burden of an incoherent transition is carried by the families: that is, the people 
who were promised better reconcilability. It is impossible to make a clear diagnosis 
in the middle of the process, but there is no guarantee that reform efforts will 
continue to run towards a more sustainable adult-worker-model. A protraction of 
reforms ‘stuck in the middle’, stuck in an asynchronous state, could in and of itself 
become a problem to complete the transition by undermining reform’s own 
legitimacy. As I will argue further in the conclusion, the political alliances and ideas 
that took reforms to this point may not be ideal to carry through the ‘second half’, 






5 Public Childcare 
In this chapter, I will explore the structures of the German public childcare system 
from a variety of perspectives. Next to parental leave, public childcare is the 
important policy shaping reconciliation problems. First, I will introduce a series of 
historical and contemporary discourses that share a common concern about the 
targets and deficits in the provision of public childcare (5.1). With respect to the 
ideational history of public childcare in Germany, I will bring attention to ongoing 
struggles between supervision and education objectives, and the respective design 
of institutions. Drawing on this history, I will illustrate the contemporary debate in 
Germany, which posits as common sense that there is a scarcity of public childcare 
provision, elucidating a second conceptual need: ‘Kita-Mangel’ (Zeit Online, 2017).  
Public childcare deficits are constructed against the background of a particular set 
of policy reforms on federal- and Länder-level that aimed for an expansion of public 
childcare. The expansion process was initiated with the Bundestag’s passing of 
TAG39 in 2004 and KiföG40 in 2008. The latter created a right to public childcare for 
all children aged 1-3 that came into effect in 2013. Further reforms took place on 
the Länder-level, in North Rhine Westphalia (NRW) with the passing of KiBiz 
(Landtag NRW, 2007). The ‘Krippengipfel’ (crèche summit), a conference between 
federal government, Länder, and municipalities in 2007 had set the target to create 
780,000 new slots until 2013, under the assumption that the parents of 35% of all 
U3 children would want a slot. A year later, the KiföG (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008a) 
was passed to bring these agreements underway and facilitate the right to childcare 
for U3. When the right came into effect in 2013, the statistical authorities calculated 
that approximately 597,000 slots had been created (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013). 
This resulted in a capacity of only 29.3% in March 2013. By that time, the demand 
was estimated to be even higher, up to 50% in cities, according to the union 
Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW, 2013). Therefore, approximately 
                                                     
39 Gesetz zum qualitätsorientierten und bedarfsgerechten Ausbau der Tagesbetreuung für Kinder 
(Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz – TAG) (Deutscher Bundestag, 2005) 
40 Gesetz zur Förderung von Kindern unter drei Jahren in Tageseinrichtungen und in 
Kindertagespflege (Kinderförderungsgesetz – KiföG) (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008a) 
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180,000 slots or more were needed in 2013. In 2017, calculations by the Deutsches 
Institut der Wirtschaft suggest that further 293,486 slots were needed, with 
scarcities particularly notable in Bremen and NRW (Zeit Online, 2017). In NRW, the 
study suggests, the “Betreuungslücke” (provision gap) comprised 77,459 slots 
(16.2%) (ibid).  
Departing from this assessment slots scarcities in quantitative terms, I will argue 
throughout this chapter that the problem of public childcare deficits cannot be 
discussed in ‘objective’ terms only; rather, deficits are constructed differently from 
the perspectives of parents, practitioners, and providers. Second, therefore, I will 
map out the key organisational structures and actors in a simple organogram of 
public childcare in NRW (5.2). It will show which Länder- and district-level 
governmental and non-governmental organisations exist. Third, I will move on to 
discuss the shape of the public childcare ‘market’; its selectivities in matching 
children and slots (5.3.1), its substantive and financial economy (5.3.2), and the 
temporal problems that emerge under the current regulation of public childcare 
provision (5.3.3). These sections will focus on connecting formal policy and the 
perspective of parents. Fourthly, I will address policy enactment from the 
perspective of practitioners and providers by looking into the 
governance/management of public childcare (5.4). Here, I will emphasise on the 
textual nature of governing techniques in the context of ‘new public management’. 
In total, I will conclude that short resources in care result in insufficient and 
inflexible public childcare provision which is unable to give parents (mothers) the 
necessary time autonomy to reconcile family with a career, as described in chapter 
4. 
5.1 Constructing Public Childcare Deficits 
In Germany, the media coverage on public childcare expansion has created a 
leitmotiv to denounce the lack of slots to meet growing demand: ‘Kita-Mangel’. 
Kita, abbreviated from the formal ‘Kindertagesstätte’, is the contemporary term for 
Kindergarten. Mangel, on the other hand, translates into as many as 105 English 
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terms (Leo Online Dictionary, no date), which connote a spectrum of meaning 
including: lack, scarcity, deficit, fault, flaw, or defect.  
 How is this public childcare deficit constructed? 
The focus of this study is on the contemporary situation, the ‘beginning’ of which 
can be dated to reforms since 2005, or possibly 1991 if one counts the period after 
reunification as the political context in which the need for reform emerged. 
However, the current construction of issues and purposes of public childcare cannot 
be understood without a deeper awareness of history: this includes institutional 
history as much as the history of ideas about pedagogy and the role of the state in 
childcare; a history of contesting understandings of the purpose of childcare and 
prioritisation of purposes. To situate the contemporary debate, I will begin by 
tracing influential ideas and their moments of confrontation in the history of public 
childcare in Germany. 
5.1.1 Historical Perspectives on Public Childcare and Education 
The purpose of German public childcare has been contested since its establishment 
in the 19th century. Conflict occurred over the prioritisation of children’s supervision 
and family welfare against educational targets. Supervision (Betreuung) became 
relevant in the social context of mass poverty of a dispossessed working-class and 
the separation of workplace and home in the course of the industrial revolution. 
Government sought to combat social problems that arose as part of these 
developments: a surge in child mortality, declining education levels, illness, and 
other harmful conditions that spread in poor urban neighbourhoods (Aden-
Grossmann, 2011, p. 16; Berger, 2016, p. 14). These problems were approached by 
the state as a matter of social hygiene. Public childcare was conceived of as a social 
welfare service to alleviate the neglect of children that resulted from increased 
female employment and the absence of time for a family life (Roux, 2002). Public 
childcare was also utilised to improve school attendance of older siblings by freeing 
them of their duty to mind younger siblings (Berger, 2016, p. 14).  
With regard to the educational purpose of public childcare, controversy persists 
over the contents and practices that should constitute ‘education’ (Bildung). Two 
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historical  interpretations of education are particularly relevant in shaping ongoing 
oppositions: education as a natural right to self-realisation that has its foundation in 
Renaissance and humanist thought; and education as the shaping of others that 
emerged with late Enlightenment thought in connection with the idea of the 
rational individual41 (Roux, 2002). This opposition can be expanded to different 
conceptions of the child: Friedrich Fröbel, humanist and founder of the 
Kindergarten,  “finds all seeds of intelligence as well as moral life are enclosed 
within [the child] and wants to bring those to naturally unfold” (Hagen, cited in 
Aden-Grossmann, 2011, p. 28). This conception, central in contemporary pedagogy, 
depicts the child as inherently good, innocent, and capable. In contrast, the sinful 
child in positive-Christian thought needs to be corrected by a Christian upbringing 
to find salvation. 
These differences have political context and implications. Early influences on 
pedagogical thought can be traced to Rousseau’s Emile (published 1762), which 
posits the creation of the republican citizen as the primary target of education 
(Aden-Grossmann, 2011, p. 15). Rousseau already emphasised the importance of 
play and ‘letting children be children’ (“Kinder Kinder sein lassen”), which inspired 
Fröbel’s work on pedagogy in the first half of the 19th century. Other pioneering 
ideas on childcare, such as non-violence (Gewaltfreiheit) and the importance of free 
play and language acquisition42, can be attributed to French revolutionary thought. 
The ban on Fröbel institutions in 1851 by the Prussian authorities, in reaction to the 
German revolutionary attempts in 1848-9, was justified with reference to Fröbel’s 
denial of the original sin (Berger, 2016, p. 29). According to Prussian decree, only a 
Christian education could enable children to find salvation. Struggles between 
Christian, democratic, socialist, and nationalist thought on children and the purpose 
of education materialised in distinct traditions and institutions in the last 200 years 
                                                     
41 The late enlightenment understanding of education posits a human being who is able to morally 
improve or be improved through reasoning. This understanding derives from developments in 
theological thought that increasingly emphasised reason as an aspect of imago dei, notably Thomas 
Aquinas (Dauphinais, 1999). Christian discourses on imago dei are bound up within the narrative of 
original sin and salvation. 
42 Teaching of a standardised French at the expense of dialects was a key dimension of French nation 
building executed through the education system. This is a prime example of what Bakhtin 
understood as centralising forces on language. 
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of German history that evolve and interact at various points in history. To 
understand the contemporary debate, it would be excessive to recapitulate this 
history in full detail. I would still like to summarise the course of some of the central 
debates and events to provide a general overview of the institutional development 
of the period from the mid-19th to the end of the 20th century. 
In the period after 1848 and during the Second German Empire (1871-1918), two 
kinds of childcare facility developed: Kinderbewahranstalten and Kindergärten. The 
former were Christian institutions, created out of necessity to support working 
mothers rather than any conviction in the merits of early pedagogy. 
Bewahranstalten spread quickly, often founded by women’s initiatives and 
bourgeois Christian charities (Aden-Grossmann, 2011, p. 21). By the end of the 19th 
century, the majority of institutions were under Protestant or Catholic sponsorship. 
Children of different classes were cared for separately; their education was oriented 
to skills perceived as useful to their social status (Berger, 2016, p. 61). Organised in 
strict temporal schedules, the Bewahranstalt’s primary purpose was to install 
discipline (Aden-Grossmann, 2011, p. 20). Accounts of bodily discipline suggest that 
Kinderbewahranstalten were disciplinary institutions par excellence in the 
Foucauldian sense (Berger, 2016, pp. 55–81; Foucault, 1977). Clock-time discipline, 
as Thompson (1967) described for adult workers (2.3.2), is here taught to children. 
The Bewahranstalt was furthermore a patriarchal institution, teaching the “love for 
God, king, and father’s house” (Berger, 2016, p. 64, author’s translation). We can, 
therefore, understand the Bewahranstalt as a Christian-patriarchal institution for 
the working classes with an emphasis on supervision (Betreuung) and an image of 
pedagogy as necessary correction of children’s dispositions by the means of 
discipline.  
The Kindergarten43, as indicated above, is a product of French republican and, in the 
German adaptation, Enlightenment and German Idealist thought (Aden-Grossmann, 
2011, p. 24). Fröbel recognised the importance of basic trust (Urvertrauen), 
breastfeeding, and more generally the emotional attachment between mother and 
                                                     
43 The term Kindergarten derives from Fröbel’s idea that in order to bring children into contact with 
nature, every childcare facility should have a garden. 
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child (ibid, p.25-6) that resurfaces in contemporary understandings of attachment 
theory44 and parenting advice. His second decisive contribution was the recognition 
of free play as a valuable form of autonomous and experiential learning.  Fröbel 
developed material for this purpose, such as building bricks in the shape of cube, 
cylinder, and sphere (Figure 12).  
The first Kindergärten were founded by parent 
initiatives of the wealthy middle classes and liberal-
minded aristocracy (Aden-Grossmann, 2011, p. 35). 
But with a growing working class, economic 
requirements for skilled labour, and workers’ 
political agency after 1948, the Kindergarten 
became seen as a model which should be expanded 
to children of all classes and sexes. This idea was 
supported by socialists and social democrats, 
notably by Karl Liebknecht and August Bebel (ibid).  
 
The opposition between ideas institutionalised in the Kinderbewahranstalt and 
Kindergarten is fundamental for the conflicts about the purpose and quality of 
public childcare that have evolved since. For the sake of brevity, I will pass over the 
development of childcare throughout the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. As 
one may expect, the ideas formulated by democratic forces during the time of the 
Weimar Republic were abandoned under the NSDAP Führung, and replaced with a 
nationalist-authoritarian approach. Concerns about a strong role of the state in 
childcare today are occasionally explained with reference to the Third Reich and 
                                                     
44 Attachment theory was developed in the 1940s by John Bowlby, and refined through various 
methods. Research focusses on the effects of attachment and separation between children and 
parents, especially mothers, and long-term effects on attachment capabilities in adults. Critics have 
pointed out that some of studies were conducted on young monkeys (see Baker, 2010), questioning 
the ethics around animal rights and the transferability of results. With regard to public childcare, 
attachment theory is used to problematise the impact of institutional care and separation from the 
parents on child development. It is further used to develop acclimatisation models to facilitate 
children’s transition between family and institutional care. 
 





GDR, and the ideological indoctrination of children that becomes easier in a 
centralised system of childcare.  
Since the 19th century, the supervision-orientation of  West German public childcare 
has in principle remained unchanged (Roux, 2002). A strong familialist attitude 
prevailed until the 1960s, when criticism about un- or underqualified childcare 
practitioners and a lack of pedagogic quality were raised through the Strukturplan 
des deutschen Bildungswesens in 1970, which suggested that family care impeded 
child development, either through excessive attachment in narrow social relations 
or overburdened parents (Aden-Grossmann, 2011, p. 93). The debates came up in 
response to the Sputnik-shock, which put into question Western abilities to 
compete internationally. Insufficient education was seen as a driver for the 
perceived lack of competitiveness, especially in technological development. Here 
we see the first signs of a social investment logic in family policy discourses. The 
societal importance of ECEC gained political attention in particular through 
discussions about readiness for school (Schulreife). This resulted in the first large 
policy initiative for public childcare expansion aimed at children aged 3-6. Coverage 
increased from 32.8% in 1960 to 78.8% in 1980 (ibid, p.169).  
Reforms included quality discussions and the development of the ‘situation-
oriented approach’ (SOA) by the Deutsches Jugendinstitut München (DJI) (Aden-
Grossmann, 2011, p. 179). This approach is centrally influential today. The SOA 
focusses on the development of children’s core competencies45 to cope with a 
variety of everyday situations. It was legitimated with reference to an ever more 
dynamic world, in which static curricula would be outdated quickly. Education 
aimed at core competencies could be interpreted more flexibly to suit topics as they 
became relevant. This approach increased expectations and professional 
requirements towards practitioners, who were tasked to discern the children’s 
interests; assess which themes are important for the children’s future in the society; 
transpose these interests and themes into concrete projects; and document the 
course of the project together with the children (Aden-Grossmann, 2011, p. 181). 
                                                     
45 These are self-awareness, social competence, issue competence, and learning abilities (Aden-
Grossmann, 2011, p. 180) 
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Furthermore, in the SOA, the image of the capable child is complemented with the 
image of the practitioner as an attachment figure with a reduced hierarchical 
relation. The latter conception clearly shows the influence of the anti-authoritarian 
movements that developed as part of the international social movements around 
1968, which questioned the authoritarian character of the state, including the 
education system. The parent-initiative Kinderläden movement revolutionised 
childcare through the development of a new educational style: laissez-faire. 
Children’s show of emotions, including aggression and sexuality, was not 
discouraged anymore. New perceptions informed by second-wave feminism 
included a rejection of traditional gender roles with regard to work and childcare 
(Aden-Grossmann, 2011, p. 145). From an organisational perspective, Kinderläden 
were the first childcare institutions to calculate fees on the basis of parent income, 
which is legal standard today (Aden-Grossmann, 2011, p. 152). Like parent-initiative 
childcare today, these facilities also improved their financial situation by allocating 
work to parents as mandatory services.  Other novelties included temporal 
flexibility of opening hours and internal temporal structures, which are central 
issues in the current debates.  
Another impulse for change came from the increase of migrant families in several 
waves of ‘guest workers’ during the economic miracle of the 1950-70s. The 
recognition that children with migrant backgrounds are underrepresented in the 
share of children visiting pubic childcare facilities, and disadvantaged in terms of 
educational attainment and social status, has put them into a position of special 
attention (Finetti, 2018). The particularly low scores of children with migrant 
background in PISA studies, according to Becker & Lauterbach (2004), have been a 
central reason for government to become more actively involved in pre-school 
childcare. The recent lowering of public childcare entry ages must therefore be seen 
as a biopolitical attempt to prevent social problems associated with insufficient 
education. Parental care is purposefully being complemented (or even substituted) 
by institutional care. Special programs to enhance language education and test 
language skills in young children must be interpreted in light of the popular idea 
that a lack of German linguistic and cultural abilities in migrant children (and 
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parents) is responsible for their ‘lagging behind’. A similar comparison can be made 
between working class and middle-class children. Debates over opportunity 
structures echo the purpose of education Rousseau sought in the constitution of 
good citizens and civil participation, but they also construct the worker and migrant 
child as inferior and in need of positive discrimination. This idea has been 
institutionalised in so-called Plus-Kitas, which are set up in areas with high numbers 
of social benefit recipients and receive extra funds for language support (Landtag 
NRW, 2007, §16a).  
The renewed focus for political intervention and reform after the publication of the 
PISA studies in 2001 has espoused two targets: to improve childcare quality and to 
expand coverage.  Following a social investment logic, the current reforms are a 
crisis-response to PISA, much in the same way that the 1970’s reforms were a crisis-
response to the Sputnik-shock. Their realisation takes us into the contemporary 
debate. 
5.1.2 The Contemporary Debate (2005-today) 
Contemporary debates on public childcare revolve around the expansion reforms 
TAG (Deutscher Bundestag, 2005) and KiföG (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008a), the 
latter of which implemented the right to public childcare for children aged 1-3 
(U3)46. The TAG and KiföG constituted an expansion and amendment of the 8th book 
of the Code of Social Law (SGB VIII), the central source of child and youth welfare 
regulation in Germany. A series of implementation acts were introduced since 1990 
in all federal states. In NRW, changes affecting childcare provision were mainly 
effected in 1991 through the Kindergartengesetz GTK (Landtag NRW, 1991), 
replaced in 2007 by the Kinderbildungsgesetz KiBiz (Landtag NRW, 2007). Below, I 
will focus on the KiBiz (5.3).  
A right to public childcare for children aged 3-6 (Ü3) already came into effect in 
1996, as a consequence of debates 1992-1995 over the constitutionality of the 
abortion ban, StGB §218 (Deutscher Bundestag, 1992, 1995). Conservatives 
                                                     
46 Common distinction for children in public childcare: U3 (unter drei) means under-three, age group 
1-3; and Ü3 (über drei) means over three, age group 3-6. 
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supported the right as an incentive for mothers to refrain from abortion. 
Simultaneously, a greater commitment to public childcare facilitated a compromise 
during German reunification (Evers, Lewis and Riedel, 2005). In East Germany, 
coverage had already reached about 80% for U3 and 95% for Ü3 in the 1980s, as 
part of the socialist adult-worker-model (Hank, Tillmann and Wagner, 2001). 
Reunification brought about a decline in coverage rates in the East that can be 
attributed to a political will to indiscriminately expand Western institutions, public 
financing problems, and widespread female unemployment after reunification 
(ibid). In West Germany, as noted above, the Ü3 expansion was underway since 
1970: coverage had increased from 32.8% in 1960 to 78.8% in 1980. By 2010 
coverage levels have evened out at approximately 93% (Bock-Famulla, Lange and 
Strunz, 2015; Statistisches Bundesamt, no date).  
A key difference between both expansions is that the Ü3 right to childcare only 
came into effect in the 1990s, when coverage rates were already close to demand. 
Hence the Ü3 expansion had 50 years to develop the necessary infrastructure. The 
timing between formal right and infrastructure expansion is different in the current 
U3 expansion. Here, the right to public childcare precedes infrastructure expansion. 
And this is deeply problematic in terms of expectation management. 
U3 coverage rates in West Germany were minimal for a long time. In 2008, when 
the U3 right to childcare was passed, coverage reached only 17.6% on German 
average, with large differences between West (12.1%) and East (40.9%) 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, no date). The lowest levels were reached in Lower Saxony 
and NRW with a U3 coverage of 9.1% and 9.3% respectively, while the highest levels 
of 52.7% were achieved in Saxony-Anhalt. When the right became active in 2013, 
the national coverage had increased to 29.3%, and NRW had become the laggard 
with 19.9%. Currently, U3 coverage rates have reached 26.3% in NRW (2017).  
In a simple comparison of numbers, the speed of the current U3 expansion is much 
faster than that of the Ü3 expansion. However, one can argue that the relative 
speed between the Ü3 and U3 expansions is not a very significant indicator when it 
comes to assessing public opinion. The point argued here, instead, is that by 
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establishing a formal right to childcare before delivering the infrastructure for this 
policy, the government created a public conception of a slow or lacking U3 
expansion. The simplest hypothesis to explain a public childcare deficit, therefore, is 
that reforms raised public expectations much faster than they could deliver the 
necessary infrastructure. The relevant scale of comparison is not between U3 and 
Ü3 expansions, but between expectations raised now and infrastructure delivered 
now. Only ‘now’ is relevant to current parents. 
Inga: “well when we did not find a childcare slot, I did ask myself how that can be in 
Cologne […] was practically exactly the time (2013) where [the right to public 
childcare] would have applied to [our daughter], and . we had thought great, but in 
reality it became clear to us very fast, no, pff, that has no relevance for us, because . 
because it is not going to help us” (I29, 35:48-37:59) 
Focussing on the city of Cologne, the central site of this study, the local youth 
authorities estimated a demand for 40% U3 coverage, which has been corrected 
upwards to 50-55% in recent years (I2). The planned provision U3 quota for 
2017/18 in Cologne is forecasted by the local authority at 42.6%, including places in 
commercial care centres and home-based publicly financed day-care (KTP). This 
illustrates the substantive gap between U3 demand and supply, which can currently 
be estimated at ca. 7.4-12.4%, or approximately 2400-4000 slots47 for the year 
2017/18. The data underlines that public childcare scarcity is not a subjective 
experience of parents alone, but a fundamental structural problem in urban 
centres. 
The right to U3 childcare must be seen as an ideal and a catalyst, rather than a 
genuine availability of services at the moment. Misunderstandings emerge where 
the formal right to public childcare and the substantive capacity of the public 
childcare system get confused. Such misunderstandings in everyday life result in 
gaps between expectations (plans) and experiences (outcomes). This phenomenon 
was more likely in the time immediately after the reforms. Since then, a greater 
                                                     
47 Assuming 42,6% of coverage in 2017/18 as 13684 places, this suggests 100% of U3 children as 
32122 total in 2017/18, of which 50% and 55% respectively (demand forecast) make a gap of 7.4% 




awareness over the discrepancy has spread. Nevertheless, the uncertainties in this 
ongoing transition period create a problem in the adjustment of interlinking 
practices and expectations. In Bourdieu’s terminology, the correspondence 
between objective chances to have a childcare slot and subjective expectations 
thereto, between field and habitus, is disrupted. Following Bourdieu’s theory (2.2.4) 
suggests that the experience of time in the expansion process as lag or slowness 
(waiting) is a result of this disruption between expectations and daily experience.  
Understanding public childcare deficits as a social construct raises the question of 
how it is constructed: Which concepts are used to describe it? How is it measured 
and communicated? Also: how are the ‘objective’ conditions of childcare generated, 
and why can supply not match demand? I will address the substantive economy of 
public childcare in section 5.3.2.  
Above, I have addressed quantitative measures for childcare policy outcomes: 
coverage rates, the percentage of children in public childcare, and coverage quotas 
(Betreuungsquoten). The number of slots available relative to the number of all 
children in the relevant age group are important as measuring tools in the policy 
implementation process. The quotas function as targets for the district youth 
authorities, who are tasked by the national and federal governments to 
operationalise the public childcare expansion. Their institutional link to municipal 
and federal finances and enforcement systems makes quantitative indicators 
particularly consequential, as I will elaborate below (5.3.2). Examining media 
accounts, however, suggests that the speed, coverage and other quantitative 
indicators to measure the expansion (e.g. Zeit Online, 2017) only tell half of the 
story. In fact, concerns about the quality of public childcare take up just as much 
space in the news coverage. The Kölner Stadtanzeiger, one of the main local 
newspapers in Cologne, depicts quality improvement as the politically neglected 
complement of the quantitative expansion of childcare slots (e.g. Greuel, 2016; 
Gümüs, 2016; Meier and Ringendahl, 2016). News articles such as these popularised 
key results of the Länderreport Frühkindliche Bildungssysteme (Bock-Famulla, Lange 
and Strunz, 2015) that indicated substantial quality heterogeneity in German Kitas.  
216 
 
Contemporary discourse on childcare quality can be roughly split up in three 
streams: the quantity and qualification of staff and related quality of pedagogical 
practice; the condition of facilities, health & safety, and food quality; and – perhaps 
most central in the public debate – the impact on child wellbeing and development 
of family-style care versus different types of institutional care. This last debate, 
which I will revisit in depth in section 5.3.3.1, is informed by psychological 
discourses of child development, which point to the importance of stable 
attachment figures in early life. These raise concerns about separating children from 
parents too early and placing them into an environment with fluctuating carers. 
Whereas it is widely thought important to place children into care with other 
children, the age at which this is considered appropriate has been lowered by policy 
from three to one. This adjustment has not become hegemonic in the wider 
population. Albeit U3 care is taken up increasingly, as implied in the discussion of 
childcare slot shortages above, parents and practitioners are often conflicted about 
the timing of placing children into public care. U3 public childcare is often promoted 
as a ‘good’ measure for families. Government-issued documents (Landtag NRW, 
2007; BMFSFJ, 2011a) indicate clearly that public childcare is intended to improve 
social equality: gender equality for mothers through improved reconcilability 
between family and work, and more equal educational opportunities for children. 
“Breaking the link between social origin and educational success” through public 
childcare is meant to produce better skilled future workers (BDA, 2012). In 
opposition, however, U3 public childcare can also be said to crowd out family time 
by enabling employers to make higher demands on parent employee availability. 
Childcare practitioners, in particular, resist the idea of childcare as a means to the 
reproduction of future workers at the expense of a pedagogy oriented by children’s 
interests. The conflict between these positions is not so much ‘modern-traditional’, 
as pro or against an expansion of public life at the cost of private life, or put 
differently, the expansion of the market society and social investment logics into 
early childhood (Polanyi, 2001; Jenson, 2009).  
That market logics play a role in reforms is clearly visible, yet it would be misleading 
to speak of a privatisation of institutional childcare. I will elaborate this in section 
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5.3.2.5. To situate the reform and understand the organisational landscape in which 
administration and politics takes place, I will now discuss the structure of the 
German welfare sector.  
5.2 Organisational Landscape 
The German welfare system is centrally based on the cooperation between state 
agencies and non-statutory welfare providers. This cooperation between actors is 
central to public childcare provision, and has been discussed as a key feature of 
corporatism (Zimmer, 1999). Their organisation on different spatial levels, usually 
aligned to the federal system, creates a certain hierarchy of organisations. Figure 13 
provides an overview. 
 
Figure 13 Public Childcare Organogram 
One can distinguish different types of childcare provision on various dimensions. 
The categorisation into private and public (far left column) is somewhat too 
abstract. Whereas there is a pure private space for childcare, the family (bottom 
row), there are three gradually different types of public childcare provision (top 
row): direct state provision, non-statutory charitable provision, and ‘private’ for-
218 
 
profit public childcare. The latter is distinct by not being government funded at all, 
and therefore not having to comply with regulation to the same extent. For-profit 
Kitas do not adhere to the democratically determined pricing system that all other 
public childcare institutions are subject to. In other words, for-profit Kitas are 
significantly more expensive, and tend to offer a more ‘exclusive product’, which 
often implies more staff, more flexible opening times, and more offers to the child.  
Elena: “…that were I believe 1500€ per child, and for the second child there would 
have been a 10% discount ... and then that are, eh, 2700€ for childcare, which one 
must have to spare in a month. I mean, this would have included left-handed48 
organic food and baby yoga. That is the next question, does one need that? But the 
flexible opening hours, the concept they had, that I would have liked. But ehm, well 
that we cannot afford” (I25, 49:29 - 51:23) 
In the remaining analysis, I will not discuss for-profit Kitas, because they remain 
marginal at less than 3% of all Kitas (Bock-Famulla, Strunz and Löhle, 2017). My 
sample does not cover au-pairs; it does include parents’ perspectives on 
babysitters, as briefly discussed above (4.4.2.1). The focus of analysis will be on the 
two tiers of public childcare providers (state, charitable) that are publicly funded 
and thus fall under the closer regulation of the state.  
Two parameters are important to 
understand how childcare is 
organised and financed. First, the 
location of a Kita within a federal 
state and a district matter to 
understand which regulation applies 
to it in the first place. Second, the 
provider type (Träger) of a Kita 
determines how a Kita is financed: by 
whom, to what percentage, and in 
connection with which requirements. 
                                                     
48 Left-handed, or laevorotatory, lactic acid refers to a dietary trend. 
 Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO)  
Worker’s Welfare Association  
 Deutsche Caritasverband (Caritas)  
German Catholic Welfare Association 
 Deutsche Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband 
(Der PARITÄTISCHE or DPW)  
German ‘Equal’ Welfare Association,  
an umbrella association itself 
 Deutsche Rote Kreuz (DRK)  
German Red Cross 
 Diakonie Deutschland (Diakonie) 
Protestant Welfare Association Germany 
 Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in 
Deutschland (ZWST) 
Welfare Office for Jews in Germany 
Figure 14 Non-Statutory Welfare Providers 
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Non-statutory Kitas are frequently affiliated to one of the six large welfare 
associations (Figure 14).  
The weight of providers varies regionally (Bock-Famulla, Lange and Strunz, 2015, p. 
34)49: the state runs the absolute majority of Kitas in the federal state Brandenburg 
(52.4%), whereas it only supplies 0.9% in the city-state Hamburg. Between these 
extremes, the share of state provision varies greatly, and averages nationally at 
33.1%. The non-statutory providers’ presence varies between regions along 
historically-constituted socio-geographical patterns. For example, Catholic providers 
are scarce in East Germany (2.3%), which is historically Protestant or socialist-
atheist. In West-Germany, 21.6% of all Kitas are Catholic; especially in the southern 
federal states (e.g. Bavaria 30.9%), but also in NRW (27.1%). Protestant providers 
are strongest in the North, in particular in Schleswig-Holstein (31.7%).  
Non-statutory welfare providers were already an indispensable pillar of German 
welfare in the Second German Empire (1871-1918), and the state depended on 
their financial power and volunteer labour (Aden-Grossmann, 2011, p. 43). The 
roots of these organisations lie in the social divisions that constituted German 
society in the 19th century. After World War Two, until the 1960s, the welfare 
associations were re-established in West Germany under the principle of ‘hard’ 
subsidiarity (Zimmer, 1999). This was done through exclusive privileges (political 
participation, financial support) that created a protected market for their activities. 
The growth of new public movements and self-help groups in the 1970s led to a 
crisis of legitimacy of the corporatist arrangement in the 1980s, in response to 
which privileges were gradually revoked (ibid). At that time the DPW opened up to 
accept grassroots organisations as members, thus becoming the fastest-growing 
association. In the childcare context, the DPW today acts as an umbrella 
organisation for parent-initiative and smaller independent Kitas. Approximately a 
third of all parent-initiatives are affiliated to the DPW (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2017d). In the 1990s subsidiarity was deinstitutionalised, when government support 
was restructured from lump-sum funding or statutory grants  towards 
                                                     
49 Latest compilation of data that crosses providers with federal states. National averages in 2017 are 
almost the same. 
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predetermined rates for cost reimbursement (Zimmer, 1999, p. 44). More actors 
became eligible for support.  
The welfare system has been undergoing an “incremental marketisation” (Bode and 
Brandsen, 2014). Organisations became more “business-like” and competitive 
under imperatives of ‘new public management’ (see 5.4). As a result of more 
targeted government funding, core business activities are provided as a service to 
the government, and underlie respective standards and accounting responsibilities. 
Additional services in line with associations’ traditional ideological roots have 
become increasingly provided by volunteers. Advocates of a diverse civil society 
have criticised that more centralised standards in service provision lead to a certain 
“homogenisation” (Bode and Brandsen, 2014, p. 1060) of services and providers. 
However, findings in my study that reveal the ongoing importance of ideological 
roots, irrespective of standards. These roots continue to inform selectivities 
between parents and local providers (see 5.3.1). 
Overall, the shift away from hard subsidiarity has weakened the economic position 
of the welfare associations. Their political influence as agenda setters and local 
partners, however, is still very important on local and translocal levels of 
government. In Cologne, for example, childcare reform implementation in the 2000-
10s was negotiated in the “AK80”, a taskforce which comprised representatives 
from the major welfare associations and the city youth authorities (I34). This mode 
of governance corresponds to the ‘softer’ principle of subsidiarity codified in federal 
law (SGB VIII), which states that statutory and non-statutory providers should “work 
together in partnership” and that statutory providers should only become active 
where non-statutory provision cannot be arranged (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012a, 
§4 1-2). The important facet to emphasise is the determining local role of 




Figure 15 German and UK Childcare Modes of Governance (taken from Evers, Lewis and Riedel, 2005, p. 205) 
Evers, Lewis, & Riedel (2005) suggest that the high level of decentralised decision-
making in the German system is responsible for a slower expansion of childcare 
slots than in the UK. Their critique falls in line with broader concerns about the 
static or conservative tendency in the corporatist system. On the other hand, the 
authors propose that change, once agreed upon, is more lasting and sustainable 
than in a more spontaneous market-driven system.  
“The German model is one in which it is much more difficult to achieve a rapid policy 
change. But the system is one in which change that is achieved is likely to be lasting 
and to reflect local preferences in respect of the nature of provision.” (Evers, Lewis 
and Riedel, 2005, p. 206) 
Furthermore, the authors argue that since the right to childcare for Ü3 the central 
government has incrementally increased its influence. They contextualise this shift 
in the central government target to increase female labour market participation, 
which supersedes local preferences to how children should be raised.  
Lastly, writing before major reforms in the late 2000s, Evers et al. did not anticipate 
a right to childcare for U3. But the Parliament agreed the policy in 2008. A decade 
later the hurdles regarding the U3 expansion are not so much ‘parliamentary’, but 
rather embedded in the interplay between regulation and real economic factors, 
most notably skills shortages (see 5.3.2). It is important to note that whereas 
market logics increasingly affect public childcare organisation and funding (see 
5.3.2, 5.4), this partial marketisation has not replaced corporatist governance 
between state and non-statutory providers.  
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In the next section, I will illustrate the North-Rhine Westphalian case in more detail.  
Throughout this research project, I followed the methodological sequence of 
Institutional Ethnography: starting with parents’ shared experiences, and then 
drawing out the mechanisms which generate these experiences. To make this 
rather complex field more accessible to the reader, however, I will present the 
results in a different order: first the mechanisms effected through institutional 
selectivities around slot allocation (5.3.1); second, formal regulation and 
substantive economic conditions that act as preconditions (5.3.2); and then the 
temporal experiences of participants that emerge from these preconditions (5.3.3).  
5.3 Public Childcare in NRW: The KiBiz Case 
Public childcare is provided in two basic organisational forms: Kindertagesstätten 
(Kitas) and Kindertagespflege (KTP). The former is simply the formal term for a 
Kindergarten or Krippe (crèche) – a public place where children ages 1-6 are taken 
by their parents during the day and minded by trained professionals in larger 
groups. KTP, meanwhile, is a format of childcare where children are brought to 
another person’s home during the day. KTP comes from Sweden (“Dagmammas”), 
and was first introduced in Germany through a pilot project by the family ministry in 
1974-79 (Schumann, 2013). Initially organised privately, KTP has become publicly 
institutionalised, notably through the TAG reform in 2005, which formally 
recognised KTP as a form of public childcare equal to Kitas. KTP is seen as a more 
family-like style of care than Kita. A KTP carer today has undergone training and is 
subsidised by the state; however, their training of 160h is substantially less 
extensive that the 5 year apprenticeship educators (ErzieherInnen50) in Kitas 
complete. In consequence, many parents do not view KTP as an equal service to 
Kita.  
The institutionalisation of KTP needs to be historically contextualised in the German 
reunification, which increased demand for public childcare through a cultural spill 
                                                     
50 ErzieherIn is a protected occupational term, connected to an apprenticeship, which in the 
following I will translate as educator. I will use the term practitioner to include other qualified staff, 
such as university graduates with pedagogic degrees. 
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over of the socialist adult-worker-model. As mentioned before, the right to 
childcare for Ü3 had been passed as part of the reunification process. Given a 
growing realisation that Kitas were unable to expand fast enough to meet demand, 
KTP provided a solution (I50). The reforms of the mid-2000s further expanded 
public childcare provision, especially for U3. This shift in policy, driven by a female 
labour market activation agenda, has espoused a right to public childcare for any 
child past its 1st birthday. The problem – where expectations and reality clash – is 
the scarcity of public childcare slots available: The right is better understood as a 
catalyst for change, not a de-facto guarantee for public services.  
Furthermore, the inclusion of younger age groups into Kitas has raised a public 
debate over the requirements and quality of ECEC. Therein different provider 
ideologies, state targets, and pedagogical perspectives meet everyday parental 
experiences of irreconcilability. A key issue is the quantity of time U3 children 
should spend in public care, in terms of child development and happiness, and in 
conflict to the temporal demands employers make on parents, especially mothers. 
This debate translates into struggles around opening-times and flexible service 
uptake. Put differently, the traditional rhythms of the Kita’s daily schedule, 
respective to the availability of mothers during the day (their work schedule), and 
the predictability of these schedules, are weakening, diversifying, and not fitting 
together with pedagogic perspectives on good childcare. 
The political struggle over which fraction – fathers, mothers, their employers, public 
childcare practitioners, or children – should give to the other side’s temporal 
interests is shaped by a scarcity of resources for care: this is clearest in the skills 
shortage of childcare professionals, but also in adequate public spaces for childcare 
(buildings, land), financial resources in Kita setup and operation, and managerial 
overhead (see 5.3.2). These scarcities are in large part caused by a longstanding 
political disinterest in promoting childcare as an attractive work environment, 
paired with an underfinancing that results from austerity budgets and new public 
management strategies (see 5.4).  
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In order to understand this overall dynamic, it is easier to start with and focus on 
the quantitatively more important pillar of public childcare, the Kita. In the 
following subsections I will explain the three most important conflicts arising in the 
social relations around Kitas, which are the slot allocation (5.3.1), the financing and 
real economy of care provision (5.3.2), and the temporal balance between parental 
and institutional care (5.3.3). Together, these three dimensions form a layered 
conflict around supply and demand. The temporal dimension is obviously not 
practically separate, but is particularly important in the experience of parents. 
Emphasising conflicted temporal experience and asynchronous social structures, as 
addressed in chapter 4 and further so below, this study reaffirms why social policy 
research needs to address time (Heitkötter and Schneider, 2004; Bertram, 2009).  
5.3.1 Slot Allocation: Providers, Selections, and Diversity 
The corporatist decentralised system discussed above has created a variety of 
childcare providers on the ground-level which collectively are unable to meet 
demand for public childcare. Given this situation, parents employ a series of 
strategies to increase the chance of getting a public childcare slot (Kitaplatz). 
Respectively, Kitas are tasked with the selection of children. Cologne presents an 
uncommon case, in that city-provided slots are allocated centrally by the youth 
welfare agency (Jugendamt) rather than the individual Kitas, as is usually the case. 
But since non-statutory Kitas are not included in this central allocation platform, it 
has to date (status 2017) been necessary for parents to apply for childcare in 
various places. Demands to centralise application processes through an online 
platform are currently being set up by the city (little-bird project). It must be noted, 
however, than while unifying the application process for parents at first glance, the 
upcoming platform will not affect the decision-making behind the screen.  
Decisions over placements in Cologne are made by the youth welfare agency for 
city-run facilities, and by the local managers of all other facilities. The city employs a 
first come – first serve system, run online, in which parents can select one preferred 
Kita (I2). The online application sends an email to the council worker’s collective 
account. The applicants are then allocated to the waiting list of their preferred Kita 
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manually. If a placement in this Kita is not possible, the council worker in charge will 
try to find alternatives within the vicinity of the child’s residence. The maximal 
acceptable distance between Kita and residence has been legally determined at 
5km, after court appeals by parents challenged placements decisions 
(Verwaltungsgericht Köln, 2013). Council workers enact this task with aid of Google 
Maps, trying to find a Kita within a 5km radius of the child’s residence, including 
public transport or walking opportunities that keep commuting time within 30min 
(I2). The city Kita application process is digitalised through the online portal for 
parents to input children’s details (such as date of birth, address, date from which 
childcare is sought), but the placement process itself is not automated. It is carried 
out by 19 council workers in full-time positions. The only formal exception to the 
first come – first serve rule is the immediate placement of younger siblings into the 
same Kita as older siblings, as long as vacancies in that Kita exist. According to the 
youth welfare agency, this centralised placement process aids them in realising the 
placement quotas set by the city government under the right to childcare, which 
legally obliges all municipalities to provide U3 childcare according to demand since 
2013 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008a).  
Overall, due to the simplest criteria of timing and location, the city’s placement 
system could be described as relatively fair, treating all applicants as effectively 
equal. A lack of awareness that application timing is important, however, can affect 
for instance recent migrants’ inclusion into the system, since they often cannot 
apply at the ‘right time’. Council workers have recognised problems with 
communicating how the application system works (I2). In effect this means that all 
parents ‘in the know’ go online as fast as possible after the birth of their child to 
apply. Unaware ‘late-comers’ run a substantial risk of leaving empty-handed. 
Anna Yes, well . I had this list, all then, and phoned it down . uh, went there . city, 
Church, also in other districts of course, so across cologne, also private facilities, 
parent initiatives . trawled through everything . and there was simply no slot. 
The people were friendly: uh yes . maybe in a year, or something . but we 
actually need something now, immediately. 
Nina Were you aware in advance that this is such a problem? 
Anna Nah! . well uh . I know uh at the application uh . at one Kita, there was a 
pregnant woman with me. We were still joking somehow how . and she: yes, I 
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didn’t yet want to either . but my husband said I should, and so forth. Well yes, 
there I have to say I approached this matter somewhat naively 
(I22, 35:57-37:53) 
Non-statutory Kitas select children locally and according to their own rules. They are 
not covered by the central city application system – although this is supposed to 
change, as mentioned above. Currently parents need to fill in application forms at 
each non-statutory Kita they consider (status 2017). From the perspective of Kitas, 
parents/children are selected based on a relatively small set of variables, some of 
which have more weight depending on provider background. Generally, the 
attendance of older siblings has a very strong impact on the chance of another child 
to attend the same Kita. One manager of a small Kita I interviewed was only taking 
younger siblings that year (I17). Other common factors are the proximity of Kita and 
residence (same district), parent status (single parent/couple), many children in the 
family, disabled children, and other factors that create a situation for parents that 
can be understood as ‘hardship’. Often these criteria are assessed in a point system, 
which result in a ranking of children. The highest ranked children receive the 
available slots. The date of application, which is essential for the city-run Kitas, is 
usually less important for the non-statutory Kitas, as long as it precedes the in-
house selection process. The timing of this varies from Kita to Kita, and can occur up 
to a year in advance. 
In confessional Kitas, membership to the respective religion, and engagement in the 
local parish/faith centre make a crucial factor. Religious provision is mostly relevant 
for the Christian confessions. In Germany, 33% of all Kitas and children educated 
therein are nominally Christian – the same percentage as statutory providers 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017d). In NRW, Caritas and Diakonie have a joint market 
share of 43.4% (Bock-Famulla, Lange and Strunz, 2015). In Cologne, my own 
calculations51 suggest a percentage of approximately 23% for Christian Kitas in 
2016-17. Given this substantial share, the selection procedures of the confessional 
Kitas have a significant impact on the overall selectivities that determine which 
families have effective access to public childcare. 
                                                     
51 based on municipal statistics and planned expansions by the Jugendhilfeausschuss Köln 2015 
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Imke: “…well day-care centre, sure. But especially a Protestant kindergarten was 
important to me as a priestess… she is being guided towards the faith, through the 
services-children’s Church services. Sundays in the parish, or there are biblical 
readings sometimes. I like how the people are there, the team itself, yes, there one 
notices they have a Protestant consciousness, and yes, treat the children in a special 
way. So that was very clearly what we absolutely wanted” (I24, 1:03:49-1:04:38) 
Activities described by Imke, like children’s services, are common in confessional 
Kitas. Religion hence matters in the day-to-day of education, and not just abstractly 
in the affiliation of childcare facilities. Parents of different cultural persuasions 
select or deselect confessional Kitas, based on their own preferences how their 
children should be educated. But furthermore, they anticipate the selection criteria 
which the Kitas themselves employ, given the overall scarcity of slots:  
Inga (lesbian): “we applied everywhere, well . yes, if it fit at all with the opening 
hours . so, uh, and the naturally . we are . both not in the Church, that is without 
confession . and then some were already eliminated . well not . officially, but they 
told us the work with a point system, and so on . there it was clear that we won’t be 
accommodated.” (I29, 24:45-25:13) 
Johanna (Kita manager): “We have a ranking . eh childcare facility, because we are 
Protestant, parishioners are favoured, there are 2 points, no, there are 3 points for 
one lives in the parish catchment area, there are 2 points for being Protestant – that 
one member of the family, father, mother, child, or custodian, … well that one of the 
three is Protestant, for that there are 2 – actually there are 2 points for each 
Christian affiliation, then there are em, points for em other social aspects, eh single 
parent, or any hardships […] If there is a draw between many ehm, then it is looked 
again with more differentiation em, then one takes, I say it now that maliciously, but 
I always say it so maliciously, then one takes not the mixed-confession families but 
the pure-bred [reinrassisch] Protestant families . yes, even though these have the 
same point status, but – or – there one looks again a bit closer – is the family 
engaged in the parish, but that is, yes that is the only . there, I find that actually 
always quite transparent and presentable … and therefore we have . actually 
therefore we never have muslim children, because there are always enough 
Protestant children being reproduced” (I17, 1:12:53-1:15:19) 
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Several parents who were non-religious, homosexual, or otherwise did not perceive 
themselves in the target-group of Churches had dismissed confessional Kitas 
immediately from their search patterns. In two cases within my study, a Christian 
institution admitted non-religious children. Whereas this is not entirely unusual, as 
statistics show, both parents were very surprised to receive the slot. Anna (I22) said 
in the interview that she had asked an educator why she had received the slot, and 
was informed that the Kita management sought to present diversity. Given her 
husband’s and son’s Turkish surname, Anna thought her family had been selected 
as the ‘least other’ family to fulfil that idea of diversity. Her husband grew up in 
Germany; both of them are employed in media and middle-class. Irrespective of the 
possible accuracy of her statement from the perspective of the Kita, her 
construction nevertheless exemplifies an intersectional, hierarchical thinking 
present in German culture, and how ideas therein can be drawn upon to reflect 
selectivities relevant in childcare provision. An interviewee in a position to be widely 
aware of selection procedures, who prefers to remain anonymous, expressed this 
idea quite starkly, when he cynically commented on local provider discretion in how 
children were selected: “they are keeping their Kita clean” (Die halten sich ihre Kita 
sauber!). 
The matching processes between families and Kitas is the obvious context in which 
selectivities become visible. In Cologne, due to the centralised city system, it 
becomes particularly visible how different providers have the power to shape 
selection – but that parents themselves also employ a set of ideas about education 
and cultural identity that makes selection a mutual process.  
In direct comparison, the centralised city system is at first glance more likely to 
produce fair and transparent placement outcomes than the decentralised, local 
systems. For the former, only timing and residence matter. The stratification of 
urban space, perhaps irrevocably, perpetuates inequality between rich and poor 
neighbourhoods. Compared to the point systems of other providers, however, the 
central allocation is nevertheless less discriminatory. This can have positive effects 
on equal access, such as in the non-importance of religious affiliation. However, it 
can also have negative impacts for people who receive preferential treatment due 
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to hardship. Hence, the two systems have divergent client groups who benefit from 
the selection mechanisms.  
As I will discuss next, financial regulation and economic conflicts between 
stakeholders reinforce the institutional ensembles in which selectivities become 
entrenched (5.3.2). Beyond the application process, there are structural 
configurations that add less noticeable selective mechanisms. Temporal structures 
and mismatches between them are one kind of such ‘subtle’ mechanisms (5.3.3). 
5.3.2 Financial Regulation and the Political Economy of Childcare 
Municipalities and federal states, who finance the largest part of all public childcare, 
in NRW between 88% and 96% of operating costs53, have to comply with austerity 
debt limits. The consolidation of households limits the space for investments, 
notably wage increases. Following the KiBiz reform (Landtag NRW, 2007), each Kita 
provider – despite being a non-profit organisation – is required to raise a certain 
percentage of their operating costs (Trägeranteil). This share has to be raised 
through donations or other lines of business in which profit-making is permitted. 
The level of contributions depends on the institutional affiliation of the welfare 
provider (Landtag NRW, 2007; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015a), as shown in Table 3, 
column ‘provider’.  
Table 3 Kita Operating Cost Distribution 
 
                                                     
52 The category “other” refers to non-profit actors such as welfare associations (AWO, DRK) 
considered by the government as `poor welfare providers`, a status the Catholic and Protestant 
welfare bodies have been lobbying to attain. Their campaigns have resulted in Kita closures since the 
Land and municipalities considered themselves unable to cover these additional costs under 
austerity households. 
53 Excluding parent contributions, which vary between municipalities. See 5.3.2.1. 
Affiliation Provider Jugendamt 




Municipality 21% 79% 30,0% 24,8% 
Church 12% 88% 36,5% 43,4% 
Parent 
Initiative 
4% 96% 38,5% 
28,9% 
Other52 9% 91% 36,0% 
For-profit 100% - - 2,9% 
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The rest of the operating cost is covered by the municipal youth welfare agency 
(Jugendamt), which in turn receives a federal subsidy. There are additional national 
and federal funds for investments to expand coverage, for example new buildings 
and renovation to accommodate U3 needs. 
For-profit Kitas do not receive state funding. This has caused a certain amount of 
concern under which circumstances Betriebskitas (4.3.2.3) should be subsidized. At 
the time of the interviews, the SPD-Green NRW government favoured the 
cooperation of private companies with non-profit welfare providers. In such cases 
the private company pays the welfare provider’s cost share and the welfare 
provider runs the Kita non-profit. This helps welfare providers expand their supply 
without having to raise additional funds themselves, and companies to ensure care 
for their employees. At the same time, childcare remains non-profit. The current 
CDU-FDP coalition government may support a different agenda, since the liberal 
FDP has long criticised Betriebskitas as overregulated and insufficiently attractive 
for enterprises. The early reform proposals for the KiFög, formulated by the CDU, 
suggested an equal treatment of non-profit and for-profit providers. Despite a neo-
liberal influence palpable in how childcare has become marketised, the left political 
spectrum (notably SPD) and influential organisations like Bertelsmann have not 
supported a full privatisation, and averted respective reforms (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2008b, p. 19254; GEW, 2008). Arguments in this debate, which peaked 
around the passing of KiFög in 2008, ranged from the economical perspective that 
information asymmetry between parents and providers does not sufficiently ensure 
a functioning market, to the standpoint that for-profit childcare results in social 
polarisation, worse education for poor children, and that consequently childcare 
“does not belong on the stock exchange” (Diana Golze (Die Linke), Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2008b).  
The major current issue and reason for reform demands by providers in NRW is the 
perpetual underfinancing of childcare. Whereas the previous policy (GTK, 1992-
2007) covered the de-facto costs of a Kita within certain limits, the KiBiz (2008-
ongoing) introduced a per-child lump sum funding (Kindpauschale), which basically 
calculates the hours of care booked per child (25, 35, or 45 hours per week). This 
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policy has effectively introduced a market logic to the sector without privatising it, 
because the guarantee of public refinancing has been exchanged for a refinancing 
conditional on service provision. In theory, Kitas now need to compete for parents 
to place their child there. In practice, the current slot scarcity has created a 
producer-led market in which parents compete for Kita slots. Nevertheless, 
childcare managers were called upon to introduce market thinking to their 
employees, and understand childcare as a service provided to parents (I34). The 
lump-sum funding incurs problems for Kitas, because time for administration, team 
communication, preparation, and documentation were not adequately considered 
(see 5.4). The simultaneous expansion of opening hours (during lunch, afternoons) 
made it necessary to place these ancillary tasks within the opening hours of the 
Kita. This means that some educators take care of all children, while others carry 
out these additional tasks – the time for which is not recognised in the accounting 
formulae (I51).  
Whereas these time-recognition issues create discontents among practitioners, the 
more immediate problem from a managerial perspective is the underfinancing of 
wage costs. The legislator assumed an annual 1.5% rise of wages and provided an 
automatic mechanisms to increase budgets accordingly. But recent tariff 
agreements with practitioners after several rounds of strike have resulted in an 
average of 2.5% annual rises between 2014 and 2017. This leaves a gap in wage 
financing of about 1% per annum. According to Volland-Dörmann (I34), chief 
executive of the AWO Köln, the Kindpauschale is particularly damaging for small 
facilities. Larger providers can legally redistribute funds between their small and 
large Kitas in one municipality to buffer financial shortages, but small providers are 
unlikely to be able to keep pay-rolls up or remain within tariff agreements. Whereas 
the Land has provided one-off remedies, the money is meant to arrive at a time 
Volland-Dörmann judged “too late” to keep these Kitas “alive” (I34). Recurring one-
off financial rescue packages do not resolve the underlying financing problem. Since 
the onset of my study KiBiz is meant to be reformed further to resolve this problem. 
Several rescue packages were passed by the previous SPD-Green government. The 
recently elected CDU-FDP government has just recently made another 
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announcement that a new policy proposal will be submitted in January 2019; initial 
press releases however do not convey the impression that key issue of the 
Kindpauschale will be resolved (Voogt, 2018). 
Barriers to public childcare expansion borne out of financing conflicts between 
stakeholders coexist with real resource scarcities, notably in the form of land and 
labour54. Whereas conflicts take place in the formal political arena between 
organised interest groups, the givenness of real economic factors and the imperfect 
pricing of these factors create a dynamic that goes beyond intentional politics. 
Whereas recounting party and provider politics in the last decade in depth is 
beyond the scope and aim of this study, I will show in section 5.3.2.2 how local 
provider politics, on the example of the Catholic Church, impact slot expansion.  
Below, I will first discuss parent contributions as the share of finance not yet 
mentioned (5.3.2.1), followed by the section about provider politics in regard to 
finance (5.3.2.2). Then I will move to the substantive economy of care, and the 
central issue of skills shortages (5.3.2.3). In this context I will also discuss KTP 
(5.3.2.4). The overall status quo, I will conclude, must be understood as a form of 
market failure, where austerity regulation on prices inhibits politically-intended 
growth.  
5.3.2.1 Parent Contributions 
The third pillar of childcare finance, beyond state subventions and provider shares 
discussed above, is parent contributions. These are set by the municipal 
government, and can vary substantially. In Cologne, the height of parent 
contributions depends on the age of the child (under 2 / 2-3 / above 3), and the 
income bracket of the parents (Figure 16). A family on unemployment benefits, and 
a yearly income below 12,271€, is therefore likely to receive free childcare, and pay 
50€ for meals55 in a public Kita. A family with an annual income above 100,000€ 
                                                     
54 consider Fraser’s treatment of Polanyi (1.1) 




respectively would pay 638.48€ for a child under two (491.14€ for 2-3 year old, 
369.16€ for Ü3), plus meals.  
 
Figure 16 Public Childcare Cost in Cologne 2016 (Amt für Kinder Jugend und Familie Stadt Köln, 2016) 
Whereas the progressive cost of childcare is alleviating social inequality, the current 
pricing nevertheless disadvantages lower- and middle-class families, because richer 
parents can afford private forms of childcare (for-profit Kitas, nannies, au-pairs, 
etc.) to avoid uncertainty and waiting in the public system (I2). To curb 
differentiation in the publicly-funded system and avoid exclusions of disadvantaged 
children, the Land NRW has published a recommendation for Kitas to make all 
additional services incurring extra costs for parents voluntary (LVR-
Landesjugendamt, 2010). In accordance with these frames set by higher-level 
legislation, the city council in Cologne decided that providers may charge extra costs 
for meals only (Rat der Stadt Köln, 2012). According to a council worker in charge 
(I2), the prohibition on levying mandatory extra charges from parents has incurred 
financing problems for many non-statutory providers. They are limited to the same 
parent contributions as city-run Kitas. The levying of additional ‘charges’ can 
nevertheless take place more informally by asking parents to contribute to 
fundraisers, become a member of a provider organisation, or to volunteer. The 
ability of parents to contribute to such informal measures was present in rich 
districts (I17, I33). In conversation with parents, I asked whether they thought the 
Kita fees they paid were appropriate. Most parents were willing to pay, so long as 
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they were content with the service of the Kita. They generally found the fee 
appropriate to their earnings. On the other hand, as Markus (I25, 55:47-55:53) 
suggested, school and university education in Germany is free. In that comparison, 
the parent contributions to Kitas can be contested. Why pay for ECEC, in the rush-
hour of life when money is particularly scarce for young families (1.3.2)?  
Volunteering instead of fees is particularly common in parent-initiative Kitas: 
Julian: “the board consists out of parents, there are different fields of responsibility 
which parents take charge of . those are really important things, like human 
resources, finance . and then we have , we introduced this some time ten years ago . 
that we allocate different parent volunteering positions. Uh, that includes positions 
like groceries for example, we have parents who clean the aquarium, we have 
parents responsible for IT . uh, which is arranged contractually – parents have I think 
38h a year uh . mandatory time so to say, which they have to ‘serve’ […] if for 
example somebody needs to paint the gymnasium, we ask the parents” (I33, 12:20-
13:54) 
The problem with regard to reconcilability is that, as discussed in section 4.4.2.2, 
parents need to have disposable time in order to fulfil these duties. Julian tends to 
avoid asking single parents for help. Parents on parental leave were the most likely 
to support the Kita. Whereas the expansion of public childcare has a defamilialising 
effect, in principle, financial and human resource restrictions make it necessary for 
parents to invest both money and time into Kitas. Whereas the former appears 
fairly unproblematic and legitimate, the latter relies on parents who have spare 
time. Voluntary work as a necessity for (some, especially parent-initiative) Kitas to 
function implies that families remain important agents in reproducing ‘public’ care. 
The promotion of parental (maternal) employment, especially full-time 
employment, entails risking that these kind of temporal resources become scarcer, 
and consequently the pressure on parents higher. Hence policies that favour an 
‘unencumbered’ adult-worker-model need to direct more resources into public 
childcare, so that parental involvement becomes less necessary in the daily tasks of 
maintaining a Kita. This is not in conflict with policy targets voiced in the 2000s to 
support parent participation in public childcare (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008b), if 
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one separates the democratic involvement of parents in Kita coordination from the 
maintenance and organisational work they do. If labour supply in Kitas should rely 
less on parent volunteering, the obvious consequence is that more professional 
staff is required, not just in pedagogical activities, but also in administration, IT, 
facility maintenance, and similar areas. Some of these processes could be 
centralised on provider, municipal, or federal levels and provided as a service pool, 
so that even small providers or independent Kitas can efficiently draw on these 
shared resources. The current model of Kita catering is a good example, where the 
provision of meals has become cheaper due to outsourcing. Minimum quality 
standards, which are a huge issue with regard to catering (Gümüs, I35), would need 
to be complemented with funding levels sufficient to cover costs appropriately.  
5.3.2.2 Expansion Targets and Church Politics  
In NRW, struggle between municipal governments, federal government, and non-
statutory welfare providers over the financing of childcare has involved several 
rounds of Kita closures by confessional providers. This slows down the expansion 
process and indicates that Church politics are at least partially opposed to the 
reform process. In part closures can be explained by dwindling numbers of Church-
goers and Church tax revenues, a declining demand for religious education and the 
possibility to recruit and retain Church membership via early indoctrination.  
The issue raised in the following has nothing to do with the legitimacy of religious 
institutions catering to their own target group; it is rather a question of equal access 
to services funded through public tax revenues. Furthermore, the following example 
tells an interesting story about expectations and strategy. 
As noted above, 88% of a confessional Kita’s expenses are met by the state. 27.1% 
of all Kitas in NRW are Catholic; in Cologne approximately 16% (Bock-Famulla, Lange 
and Strunz, 2015; Stadt Köln: Dezernat für Bildung, 2015). In an interview, the 
archdiocese’s person in charge of childcare, Bosbach,  said that 13 years ago it was 
not predictable that demand for childcare, especially U3, would surge as it did 
(Bosbach, 2017). Background to this statement is a project entitled “Zukunft heute”, 
in which the Church reacted to declining numbers of Catholics with saving 
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measures. In the course of the project, the archdiocese assured parents that each 
Catholic child would have a childcare slot. This commitment, according to Bosbach, 
cannot be held up under current circumstances, that is, much higher demand for 
childcare than expected. Next to necessary investment to accommodate the 
different spatial needs of U3, a massive problem for any expansion is skills scarcity. 
“The market [for childcare practitioners] is basically empty” Bosbach said, and staff 
in Kitas were working at their limits. According to Frerk (personal correspondence) 
the Catholic Church’s mission to combine childcare with religious education usually 
demands staff to be Catholic, especially for managerial positions. This complicates 
the labour market supply shortage.  
Looking back to the original formulation of “Zukunft heute” (Presseamt des 
Erzbistums Köln, 2004), the initial diagnosis of declining numbers of Catholics is 
explained through lower birth-rates. The effect is estimated to be a 25% loss of 
members in 25 years, accompanied by a 40% loss in revenues (ibid), which need to 
be rebalanced in a new household (Schwaderlapp, 2006). Resulting budget cuts 
affected childcare facilities. Albeit the Church suggests that only 3 out of 4 children 
in its care are Catholic, nevertheless the declining number of baptised children 
serves as the key reason to reduce service provision from ca. 2500 groups to 1600 
groups (Presseamt des Erzbistums Köln, 2004), which was in 2006 corrected to 1691 
groups. Of the 809 groups to be reduced, in 2006 304 were taken over by other 
providers, and 197 had received extra funding, which left 308 to be closed down by 
2008 (Schwaderlapp, 2006). 
How were these changes perceived on the local level? I interviewed a childcare 
manager both from a Catholic Kita that ‘survived’ the cuts, as well as from a Kita 
that was sold to another provider. Both managers reproduced the narrative of 
financial reasons in combination with fewer Catholic children.  
Silke: “…and then came the Church reform, that groups would be handed away, and 
in fact the number of baptised were taken as the basis in the parishes, and 
afterwards it was then calculated how many groups in the parish were allowed to be 
Catholic.” (I19, 24:48-29:07) 
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Whereas statistical information on the city level is historically not available, shares 
of slots, sorted by providers, in Cologne, 2016 were: 43% city-run; 23% confessional, 
and 34% in various forms of non-profit organisation. Of the confessional ones, 16% 
were Catholic, 6% Protestant, and two facilities Jewish (less than 1%)56. For 
comparison, NRW had a Catholic share of 25.7% and a Protestant share of 15.7% of 
facilities (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015a). In conjunction with the ranking system to 
allocate slots described above (p. 217), it stands to reason that in Cologne, 23% of 
all childcare places are allocated with favour to Christian children. 
The argumentation of balanced households has roused critique, given that the 
archdiocese of Cologne is the richest in Germany, possibly one of the richest 
worldwide. It is also a large actor in real estate and financial markets (Kohlenberg 
and Müller, 2014). Irrespective of these moral questions, the proclaimed need for 
balanced budgets as argument for retrenchment appears rather familiar in Welfare 
State studies and International Political Economy. This pattern of argumentation 
includes a tendency for the state to support financially ailing institutions, such as 
banks after the financial crisis. A similar pattern can be discerned for childcare: The 
provider share of funding for confessional Kitas in NRW has declined since 1990 
from initially 36% to 20% (GTK §18a 1991), and 12% in 2008 (KiBiz §20). The state 
has increasingly taken over financial responsibility, after persistent lobbying. An 
interviewee described it as “blackmail”, in which the Churches threatened the Land 
government to close down even more Kitas if provider cost shares were not 
lowered further. The timing of Churches’ decision to withdraw gradually from 
childcare, such as in Cologne, certainly puts local and Länder governments under 
pressure to make concessions, so that expansion targets set by the federal 
government can be reached. 
It must be considered that the financial basis – how much a Kita may cost – has 
been significantly altered with the introduction of KiBiz in 2008. The reform explains 
in large part the current financial shortages and limits to expansion, since many 
providers cannot raise the necessary funds to maintain or expand coverage (I34). It 
                                                     




does not, however, explain the Catholic Church’s decision to restructure, since this 
decision predates the KiBiz reform. These are more convincingly explained through 
the Church’s priority to cater to Catholic children and disinvest its abundant 
resources from general public childcare. Provider lobbies’ central concern is a 
reformulation of KiBiz towards a different accounting system, so that work done in 
Kitas can be compensated better to meet actual costs, especially regarding wages 
(I34). This demand is fair, if providers produce a common good – but I argue that 
the purposes that seem to inform the Church’s strategy cannot be considered as 
such if they violate non-discrimination and largely restrict services to members. I 
therefore suggest that state funding for non-statutory childcare providers should 
entail transparency requirements over slot allocation criteria and reporting 
requirements over all families who applied, and all who were selected. These 
processes could be fully digitalised in a central application system. At the very least, 
transparency would foster a public debate over which criteria (e.g. hardship) can 
legitimately lead to positive discrimination, and which should not. Furthermore, 
transparency would help to make the matching between Kitas and parents more 
effective by raising more reliable expectations beyond stereotypical ideas that 
currently inform parents’ selectivities. 
5.3.2.3 Skills Shortage and Industrial Relations 
Policy experts and managers perceive expansion limits most acutely in the inability 
to find qualified staff (Buhse, 2014). They attribute this to a lack of job 
attractiveness. Whereas in booming professions, such as IT, rising wages have 
resulted in higher numbers of students, wages in childcare professions remain low. 
Historically conceived of as ‘women’s work’, needing to yield only an early career or 
secondary wage, childcare tariffs today remain at a relatively low level. With 
starting salaries of approximately 2110€ up to 2900€57 for more experienced 
                                                     
57 The WSI study (Stoll et al.) is based on 716 submission to the online portal lohnspiegel.de, 
supervised by the WSI, Hans Böckler Stiftung. Whereas not representative, results are considered as 
good orientation points (WSI, 2014). New queries on lohnspiegel.de suggest minor improvements 
between 2014 and 2018, but no groundbreaking shifts. 
239 
 
colleagues, the financial incentive to choose a childcare profession is negligible 
(Stoll et al., 2014). Childcare managers (Kitaleitungen) earn only slightly more with 
3075€ on average (ibid, p. 6). In response to the publication of the 2013 coverage 
statistics, Norbert Hocke, spokesperson of the GEW, suggested that longstanding 
neglect from politicians and employers to revalue childcare professions resulted in a 
lack of young professionals (GEW, 2013). Expansion targets could not be met by 
refusing to appreciate the responsibility of childcare work and remunerate it 
accordingly.  
The number of employed childcare practitioners in Germany has increased by 67% 
in the last decade. In 2017, approximately 692 thousand individuals were employed 
in public childcare, of which approximately 2/7 worked full-time (38.5h+); the rest 
worked part-time, 2/7 less than 21h (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017d). The majority 
of employees in childcare qualified as educators (ErzieherInnen). The numbers of 
people beginning the apprenticeship in childcare grew until 2014, but is since 
stagnating at approximately 35,000 per year nationwide, of which about a quarter 
to a third do not finish the program (Beher et al., 2017). The last decade has 
furthermore seen the development of new university courses in ECEC, contributing 
to a growth of professional staff. Next to pedagogy, these courses also impart 
management knowledge and aim to qualify ECEC managers. About 20% of courses 
are run by Christian universities; the vast majority is public. It is important to note 
that (nominally) higher qualified graduates are employed on the same conditions 
and wages as their apprenticed colleagues.  
Forecasts that consider demographic trends and continued needs to facilitate the 
U3 expansion predict skills shortages in ECEC until approximately 2024 (Beher et al., 
2017, p. 182). The prediction is based on training statistics, the assumptions that 
demand for U3 slots will not exceed 45% of children, and a fertility rate of 1.5%. 
This demand estimate depicts the status quo, but given the cultural shift of the last 
decade, there is a considerable likelihood that demand will rise further. The fertility 
rate, the authors mention, also has an upward risk, if very recent growth trends 
perpetuate themselves. Crucially, the model does not include improvements of the 
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staff-child ratio. It follows that even in a best case scenario, skills shortages can be 
expected to be a problem beyond the next decade.  
The head of the public childcare division of the youth welfare agency in Cologne, 
Karsten Beetz (I1), said that forecasts about present and future demands for skilled 
workers routinely underestimated the number of required apprentices due to the 
wrong assumptions how many graduates remained within the occupation. The 
training capacities of occupational schools were insufficiently calculated. School 
fees for social professions have long been criticised as a disincentive to pursue a 
social career. Beetz further argued that to keep the profession attractive and 
employees happy, managers needed to facilitate a climate of “modern leadership”, 
which emphasised participation and recognition for hard work. Beetz also pointed 
out a need to consider alternative forms of occupation for older employees, who 
encountered their bodily limits in the daily work with small children. Statistics show 
that employee numbers above age 55 decline sharply (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2017d). In 2017 half of all practitioners retired early, and whereas this share is 
expected to decline, approximately 10% of staff are predicted to retire early for 
health reasons; another 25% for other reasons (Beher et al., 2017, p. 178). 
95% of all employees in childcare are female. This ratio is the highest in Germany 
even among care professions (Beher et al., 2017, p. 145). In 2017 the share of male 
childcare practitioners increased to 5.2%, compared to 3.6% five years earlier 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017a). The lack of male interest is often considered in 
terms of the low pay and a feminine professional image. While discussing his 
attitude to recent strikes and his own professional choices, Julian, student in early 
childhood pedagogy and educator in a parent initiative, said the following: 
Julian: “given that I am a student and can work here I earn . ok. […] uh, I am also of 
the opinion I would like to have a child, for example, and I find it hard to accept that I 
possibly earn too little. Because one hears this a lot, uh, . I grew up with little myself, 
and I was really fine, I am also fine now. Therefore uh . I find this thought […] that is 
so common place now, that one says, precondition for a child is a . secure financial 
situation . well, I think this should not be a precondition for a child. Then one does 
not have to wonder why there are so few children in Germany. […] 
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I don’t believe that 90% of all men decide against this, just because they . get too 
little money for this . [Nina: but instead?] . that is the question . well I believe, what 
could be, is this . my father for example is somebody, who is very masculine 
(männlich) . he for example would never accept if somebody is homosexual.  If I said 
to him I’m gay, he would not like that at all. He has this particular image of a man . 
uh . and I believe if you let children grow up with such a message, then you don’t 
have to be surprised if they felt feminine in such a role […] that has something to do 
with education […] I don’t believe that this is just about money.”(I33, 1:01:18-1:04:39 
+ 1:17:33-1:19:17) 
Alexa: “few men enter the profession […] who can feed a family from that wage? No 
normal person would- well, that does not work. You can’t become an educator, if you 
plan to found your own family. In general – educators love children. They probably 
want to have their own as well – therefore, uh, the conditions simply don’t fit to 
what . that one decides to become an educator.” (I18, 39:06-42:08) 
Gender clearly matters for professional choices. Yet at the same time, the fact 
persists that with approximately 2,100€ a month one will find it hard to raise a 
family, particularly in the cities. Wages for childcare practitioners vary with work 
experience, size of enterprise, location, sex, temporal employment, and collective 
bargaining coverage. A recent survey (Stoll et al., 2014) suggest that West Germans 
received 8% higher wages on average that East Germans; female workers, making 
up 79% of all respondents to the survey, received 7% less on average. Temporary 
employees received approximately 13% less than their permanently employed 
colleagues (ibid, p.12). 75% of all employees were paid on the basis of collective 
labour agreements (TVöD, TV-L), with an average wage 9% above their colleagues. 
Whether or not a childcare practitioner is paid according to civil service labour 
agreements depends on the provider type of the childcare facility, which can be the 
state, large welfare organisations, or small independent providers. State employees 
are paid based on the collective labour agreements for civil servants, TVöD for 
employees of Bund and municipalities, and TV-L for employees of the Länder. Non-
statutory providers are free to choose if they want to adhere to the TVöD. Large 
welfare providers, such as the Churches, AWO, and German Red Cross, have their 
own tariff agreements. Smaller providers may opt out.  
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One effect of this fragmentation of providers and labour agreements is that 
different provider types have different collective bargaining rounds and industrial 
action schedules. The fact that strikes are organised by provider/tariff affiliation 
means that only ever a part of all facilities close down at any given moment, and 
that 43,4% of Kitas cannot strike legally under Church law. This undermines the 
ability of industry-wide collective action. In spring 2015, public employees went on 
strike after bargaining rounds had come to a deadlock on April 21st (Zeit Online, 
2015). Between May 8th and June 8th all public Kitas closed down, causing the most 
prominent strike of childcare workers since 2009. 
Thomas Well tha was . mixed also, those who I encounterd [at the parent meeting], 
between those who were sympathetic about the strike and the motives, and 
the others . because just on that evening, or just before came the 
announcement, there is now a tariff agreement – hence the mood was 
already more . relaxed, but I know of many who hab been extremely annoyed, 
and they also really had problems . 3 – 4 weeks without childcare [Imke: 
horrible!] . and one had to take leave . 
Imke That affects livelihoods . [Thomas: yes, exactly] but on the other hand the 
wages are far too low. That is also no-go, well . that cannot remain this way 
either. 
(I24, 1:40:20-1:42:36) 
There is a wide consensus that ECEC is underpaid, and a certain amount of solidarity 
exists between parents and practitioners during strike times. The domino effect of 
striking childcare workers on parents’ ability to work has brought this matter into 
wide public awareness. Some participants considered strike results as frustrating 
because they see a unique opportunity in the childcare expansion policy that gives 
workers more power due to the current skills-shortage. At the same time, many 
practitioners voiced moral concerns over strikes: some were not allowed to strike as 
Church employees, but refused to provide emergency slots for children from Kitas 
on strike; others provided them arguing for a need to ‘put the children first’ (I19). 
Some complained that the opportunity was not used enough and others felt that 
strikes should be reduced because the children suffered from it (I15, 47:38-51:34) 
and parents ran into employment-related problems. Some said that pedagogic staff 
was by nature ‘harmony-seeking’ people and that therefore their willingness to 
strike did not ever reach the full impact and potential that they could have if they 
were more prepared to fight (I18, 39:06-42:08). These aspects highlight the specific 
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ethical character of ECEC work that is conveyed in practitioner discourses, including 
the awareness of families’ dependence on practitioners. The latter acts as a moral 
barrier to engage more fully in industrial action. 
5.3.2.4 Kindertagespflege 
The second mode of public childcare provision, as introduced above, is 
Kindertagespflege (KTP). In its introductory period in Germany, 1974–79, KTP was 
supported by the family ministry in a pilot project. The project was heavily 
monitored by developmental psychologists and paediatricians, because famous 
members of these groups opposed KTP fundamentally. This was due to the – in 
West Germany absolutely hegemonic – idea that children below age three should 
be cared for by the mother; otherwise their health and development was at risk. 
Findings in that period, however, suggested that children cared for in KTP 
developed better than children in their homes (Schumann, 2013). In fact, the 
dissatisfaction of ‘unwilling’ housewives expressed in the 1970s over the lack of 
appropriate public childcare appeared to have a detrimental effect on mother-child 
relations. Consequently, the women’s movement at the time was a strong 
proponent for KTP (ibid).  
Delevoplemental psychologists today, according to Losch-Engler (I50)58, while still 
tending to favour a conservative model of family care, recommended KTP over Kita 
as a protected space for small children to learn to interact with others (Schumann, 
2013). Prompted to describe the difference between KTP and Kita, Losch-Engler 
suggested that whereas Kitas often were heavily structured, overcrowded, and 
served catering food, KTP – “when done right” – retained a warm and welcoming 
familiar atmosphere, home cooking, and a closer bond between carer and child 
(I50). Municipalities today are tasked to provide both KTP and Kita, due to a 
“Wunsch- und Wahlrecht” (right to choose) for parents (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2012a, §5 with §23-24). In practice, this choice is often limited by slot scarcities that 
compel parents to accept the offer they receive.  
                                                     
58 Head of the Landesverband Kindertagespflege NRW 
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From an economic perspective, KTP has been promoted as a cheaper alternative to 
Kitas, and a solution to reduce factor scarcities, since care is offered in carers’ 
homes and KTP carers can be trained faster than educators. Before the passing of 
TAG in 2005, KTP received no public subsidies, apart from a lump sum for operating 
costs of 245€ per week, which could be deducted from gross earnings of carers, so 
that generally they remained below a taxable income59. This system was 
accompanied by expectations that “women did this on the side” (Losch-Engler, I50). 
After 2005, not only did KTP receive public subsidies – it also became taxable, and 
carers had to pay social insurance contributions, unless their income remained 
below 450€. In that case they could remain in the family health insurance. In the 
last decades KTP has moved from a side job of mothers towards becoming a long-
term occupation. As a consequence, carers demand working conditions that enable 
a financially independent existence. Currently this is not given. As freelancers, 
carers are not eligible to receive minimum wages (currently 8.50€/h). Average 
hourly compensation in NRW has increased to 4.69€ per child, per hour, plus a tax-
free lump-sum for material expenses of 300€ (MFKJKS, 2016, p. 44). Furthermore, 
municipalities have to reimburse 100% accident insurance, and 50% of pension, 
care, and health insurance contributions (ibid). The wage is set by the municipality, 
and substantial differences exist. Since 2013, NRW has banned carers from charging 
additional fees to ensure equal access for all parents. 
KTP is limited to a maximum of five children per carer60.  Recommendations for U3 
by pedagogues and the EU posit an ideal staff-child ratio of 1:3. Whereas the KTP 
associations (Bundesverband & Landesverbände Kindertagespflege) in principle 
support low ratios as a family-like environment, this limit poses problems for the 
financial situation of carers. Five children cared for in full-time translates financially 
into a status which is recognised by social insurances and the tax office as an 
avocational/part-time (nebenberufliche) occupation (I50). In consequence, carers 
                                                     
59 At wages of about 2,50 € per hour, per child. Overall income thus depended on the number of 
children cared for, which in most cases remained below the taxable threshold. KTP was exempted 
from social insurance. (I50) 
60 Excluding any number of own children. The number each individual carer has permission to take is 
locally settled by a Fachberater (supervisor) and depends on the competences and living 
circumstances of the carer. 
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do not pay full contributions to social insurance – and in return receive less 
benefits. Sick-pay for instance is excluded. Pensions accrued are insufficient to ward 
off old-age poverty. This lowers the cost of KTP to the detriment of not 
transforming it into the vocation it needs to be to ensure carer’s economic 
wellbeing. The roots of the male-breadwinner-model, which initially provided the 
context in which KTP emerged, are becoming a poverty risk for carers under a 
stronger adult-worker logic.  
Not recognised as a formal profession, KTP requires ‘only’ a qualification. This can 
be attained in courses comprising 160h of material, ranging from pedagogy to 
business plans. Whereas training for KTP was initially locally organised, the DJI 
developed a curriculum from the 1990s onward, which has become the major 
training module accepted today (I50). While this development must be seen as a 
professionalisation for KTP, respective to the educator apprenticeship or new ECEC 
university degrees, a growth of KTP entails a deskilling and decline of employment 
conditions in public childcare in total. KTP associations organise against these 
tendencies to professionalise KTP education through more extensive qualification, 
better social insurance for carers, and public subventions for both (I50). But in the 
eye of the public, in particular parents, KTP is not associated with the education and 
development of children, but only with supervision in a ‘warm’ family environment. 
In consequence, KTP cannot be seen as equal to Kitas – neither for carers, nor for 
the state, nor for parents – or children, indeed, irrespective of a formally equal 
status.  
This conflict materialises in cities such as Cologne, when under slot scarcity parents 
are confronted with an offer for KTP, which may not be entirely suited to their 
needs (passgenaue Vermittlung). If they decline the offer, the municipality has still 
fulfilled its obligations under the right to public childcare. A second offer need not 
be made. Alternately, a child might be taken out of a KTP arrangement after only a 
short time, because a Kita slot becomes available. This might occur against the 
convictions of developmental psychologists and the KTP carer that care relations 
should be long-term (I50). KTP then becomes the ‘little sister’ or buffer for parents 
who prefer a Kita, but cannot receive a slot there immediately.  
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5.3.2.5 Market Failure: A Summary 
Constraints on Kita funding and wages are given through the lump-sum financing of 
Kitas implemented with KiBiz in 2008. A similar system of publicly determined prices 
exists for KTP. Childcare is not a ‘free market’, but provided under strict price 
controls. Wage growth rates anticipated in public budgeting, however, remained 
below actual wage increases educators have pressed for in industrial action over 
the last years. This has led to chronic underfinance. A lack of attractiveness of the 
occupation, rooted in its history as ‘women’s work’, makes childcare wages 
problematic with the decline of the male-breadwinner-model. The inconsistencies 
that emerge between different gender models and the temporal patterns of ECEC 
professions are not sufficiently being addressed by policy-makers. The slot scarcities 
that emerge in West-German cities are perpetuated by financial and skill shortages. 
At the same time, confessional providers have been withdrawing funds from 
childcare, and parents have been partially banned from making extra payments. 
This overall dynamic undermines public and private impulses for sufficient supply 
growth. In consequence, the current regulation must be seen to induce market 
failure, and is in need of fundamental overhaul. 
An interesting observation about these concerns is that the main economic 
dimensions in conflict are human time and skills, the availability and shaping of 
spaces61, and finance – in other words, Polanyi’s fictitious commodities: labour, 
land, and money, which Fraser drew upon in her feminist critique of political 
economy. Without intending to apply this framework of analysis in any rigorous 
manner, the pattern is nevertheless worth commenting on. Having established a set 
of ‘preconditions’ in the German ECEC political economy as stated above (5.3.1, last 
paragraph), I will now return to the theme of time problems in line with the first 
research question (see introduction). 
                                                     
61 This point has not been addressed in detail, but urban land is scarce. Prices of land and rents have 
been increasing steadily. Carsten Beetz, head of the responsible agency, has pointed out that 
inabilities to find suitable construction sites in urban areas hinders Kita expansion (I1). Federal funds 




5.3.3 Timings, Ideologies, and Synchronisation 
I already discussed above that parents are likely to apply to all and any Kita in their 
area of residence they deem acceptable (5.3.1). Ideas informing when parents apply 
for Kita slots come from different angles. I mentioned the ‘first-come, first-serve’ 
logic of city-run Kita applications. In this chapter I will expand the theme of 
temporal selectivities: First, I will discuss diverging views on age-appropriate care. 
The timing for the transition between parental and public care is affected by beliefs 
held about the appropriate age of children to leave the home and be cared for in a 
larger group (5.3.3.1). Secondly, parental leave restricts the window of time in 
which parental childcare can be delivered without major economic backlashes. Here 
I will delve deeper into the uncertainties of transitions between familial and 
institutional care (5.3.3.2). Thirdly, the regulation of public childcare provision itself 
generates specific temporal opportunity structures, which I will discuss in section 
5.3.3.3. 
5.3.3.1 Neo-Familialism in a Third Way World 
A central ideological division exists between parents who hold more traditional 
beliefs that children should be cared for in a family environment until the age of 
three, and parents who think a separation around the age of one is acceptable. This 
division has been traced in the context of OECD policy recommendations by Mahon 
(2004), who distinguishes between neo-familialist and third-way ideologies as 
alternative responses to the “farewell to maternalism”, the latter implying a retreat 
of the state to support full-time motherhood (Orloff, 2006). By neo-familialist 
Mahon (2004) describes a policy regime which emphasises “women’s right to 
choose between a temporary housewife–mother role and labour force 
participation, with the balance tipped in favour of the former”. Maternal care is 
posited as best for U3 children, which correlates with a policy emphasis on long (2–
4 years) parental leave and little support for other forms of childcare.  
“Women are encouraged to return to work, but rarely to their former job, and 
usually on a part-time basis, when the child enters public pre-school. This model does 
little for gender equality and, its typically low rate of reimbursement means that it 
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operates primarily as an incentive for working-class, not professional, women to 
withdraw from the labour market.” (Mahon, 2004, p. 176) 
The third-way (e.g. Giddens, 1998), conversely, emphasises gender sameness and a 
general adult-worker-model, ignoring the gender differences that arise from 
different roles outside the labour market. Policy promotes short leaves and non-
parental care to minimise human capital losses (in the interest of employer and 
worker). 
“Consistent with the ‘new public management’ theory on which third way, like neo-
liberal, thinking draws […], the state is not to play the role of provider. Rather, in the 
name of efficiency and equity, the public role should be limited to supporting the 
choices of consumer-citizens through demand-side subsidies, improving the flow of 
information, and/or regulation. States work thus work in ‘partnership’ with the 
private (commercial and non-profit) sector, usually at the local level.” (Mahon, 2004, 
pp. 176–7) 
Whereas third-way proponents, unlike neo-liberals, see a role for the state to 
engage in social investment, notably education, the solution of market-based 
services permits the formation of a secondary labour market. Women’s 
disproportional representation in the latter points to an acceptance of a one-and-
half-breadwinner-model (ibid). 
In Germany, childcare managers reported that in the last ten years beliefs have 
partially shifted from a neo-familialist towards a third-way understanding among 
professional parents. 
Alexa: “the age limit downwards is always being . expanded further. We really take in 
children from 4 months, yes, and those are getting ever more. One simply notices 
that the . in the beginning it was still the case that parents, very often mothers, and 
couples came in here, and registered their children, and wanted to bring those here 
with one year. Always with the feeling of having a bad conscience, because the 
grandparents, so their parents, always said: how can you hand over your child so 
early? This is getting less and less, because it . has already become normal, I’ll say, 
that children go to the Kindergarten so early.” (I18, 11:31-13:36) 
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In the last decade, the number of U3 children in public childcare has increased by 
ca. 150%, from 253,894 children in 2006 to 645,077 children in 2017 (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2017d). In comparison the number of Ü3 children has remained 
relatively stable (2,333,839 to 2,354,261). Another incline is noticeable in the 
number of school children who are taken care of in Kitas, which can be explained by 
the expansion of after-school supervision for that age group.  
Simultaneously there is a trend towards an expansion of hours in day-care. Notable 
is also a decline in ‘part-time’ childcare hours, or morning and afternoon care with 
lunchbreaks for children at home; respectively a tendency towards ‘full-time’ care is 
clearly visible (Figure 17)62.  
What my data contributes to this rather clear statistical picture is the insight that 
this quantitative trend goes hand in hand with a cultural shift. Unlike the linearity 
that the statistics may suggest, however, the daily mediation of the cultural turn is 
much more complex and contested. Whereas the third-way model of childcare 
gradually appears to become the “new normal”, it is particularly women who 
second-guess the changes to their roles implied in this shift. Or, perhaps better put, 
the institutional shift is causing frictions in how women see their own identities. 
Men appear less affected, even though their roles are changing too – or aren’t 
                                                     
62 Both diagrams show the average time of children in public care, and amount of children in each 
bracket. The statistical categories changed in 2012 in line with regulatory changes. Whereas 
Betreuungsumfang was calculated in h/per day, Betreuungszeiten are weekly. They align with 
booking time brackets, which are defined on a weekly basis in new policies such as KiBiz. 
Figure 17 Public Childcare Daily/Weekly Durations 
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they? Above I have argued that adjustments to fathers’ lives progress in relatively 
smaller steps, and that the main burden of the ‘second shift’ remains 
predominantly with mothers. The following quotes from Kita managers shed some 
light on contemporary sentiments: 
Julian: “well generally the . the concept of family is changing, the role of fathers is 
changing . […] I have many fathers who are on parental leave, which is really unusual 
for me . until today” (I33, 39:15-40:39) 
Alexa: “overwhelmingly mothers, I also say. I say this is a main problem of women, of 
mothers. […] I notice this very often in conversations, uh, well really that, mothers 
also talk about this . I have seen many mothers, who got ill, truly ill, had burnout, 
because they simply always had this . very often mothers in social professions, who 
are teachers, or educators, well ill, coming from social professions, but also others, 
uh, who always have this conflict, well, to care for others, but their own children, and 
their own partners, always remain-one always has the feeling they fall by the 
wayside . and if one wants to allocate it healthily, one has the feeling the job falls – 
well, you don’t do 100% anymore. I know it, because I know it from personal 
experience, you are always in a conflict, yes, definitely” (I18, 10:15-11:14) 
The mentioning of women in social professions is particularly interesting as a local 
example of a mistress-maid dynamic (Young, 2001), where the care work one 
women can outsource becomes another woman’s work. The professionalisation of 
childcare and education, which is brought forward by the shift to third-way policies, 
promotes a greater outsourcing of carework. Examples as the one above compel 
the question in how far the working conditions of professional carers need 
improvement (as already suggested in 5.3.2.3).  
A key issue I want to highlight here is that the third-way model might very well be 
becoming the norm of how childcare is done – but not for everyone, and even for 
its professional target group not without struggle. For parents, and in particular 
mothers, the transition from familial to institutional care is wrought with 
uncertainties: on moral, economic, and organisational grounds. The moral struggle 
often takes the shape of bad consciences for ‘Rabenmütter’ (see p.168), which 
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underlines the neo-familialist moral framework that coexists next to the third-way 
logic incrementally introduced by labour market and family policies. 
The following narrative by Ralf and Christina serves as a very telling example of how 
the third-way logic is contested by parents with more conservative leanings. After 
several remarks about not being ‘mainstream’, I asked the couple whether they 
perceived themselves as pressured to correspond to some kind of mainstream: 
Ralf: “it is simply objectively set through the societal framework . [for example in the 
functionality of parental benefits] that is calculated based on the last . net income of 
the last 12 months . and when you have a child, and then stay home for 2 years, then 
have your second child, then you get 300€ parental benefit. And well when you go to 
work after one year, and then have a second child, you get pff . up to 1800€ parental 
benefit. There are now already some very clear political frameworks which well . 
force a certain direction. […] last year the kindergarten where [our older son] is . 
called and said to us, Mrs X, Mr X, if you put your child with one year into the 
kindergarten, then you get a slot from me in my kindergarten. With two years this 
gets very difficult . and with three years you will definitely not get a childcare slot 
anymore. I can’t help it, these are the frameworks in which I move . and uh . another 
Kita manager (Leitung) told us for example very clearly: if I accept a child above three 
years into my kindergarten, I need to pay back 340,000€ subsidies. I don’t have that 
money.” (I28, 33:37-35:06) 
Christina: “yes, those are the objective ones . and the subjective coercions (Zwänge) 
or so . yes, well when I was in this Geburtshaus with [my son] . with him in his first 
year, I was the only one with one other I believe who also . wanted to care for her 
child longer than one year . uh . one does feel a little bit like an outsider . yes uh, odd, 
that nobody here has the wish to somehow . well . it was . one then has to show a 
certain strength: well I do it differently, and I don’t know, if I had been 10 years 
younger, I may not have had it, this strength” (I28, 35:58-36:51) 
Christina goes on to describe the encouraging encounters she had with various 
authority figures on childcare, such as educators, managers, and paediatricians. She 
encountered these people as a mother, but also when qualifying as a KTP carer. 
Being inspired by Emmi Pickler’s pedagogy, she emphasised that attachment needs 
to come before education: 
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Christina: “I see it as a KTP carer (Tagesmutter), I get that live: screaming child, uh, I 
can’t teach it anything or support it, right, it first needs the calm (Ruhe), the feeling 
of security (Geborgenheit), then . it opens up and can receive stimulation 
(Anregung)” (I28, 40:30-41:37) 
She furthermore contested the common sense, often mentioned by supporters of 
the third-way, that mothers in France had a better life with early institutional 
childcare.  
Christina: “this Zeit article, which opened my eyes so much … well France, everything 
running well there . if one looks behind the stage, right, what the psychiatrists there . 
how many burnout mothers there are, who quickly nurse their child in the morning, 
pump milk, and then somehow the child into the Kita and uh . I can’t recount it all 
now, but there stood uh . also, that the children are not really faring well. I don’t 
know who did the study – unicef or so? […] that was another insight (Aha-Erlebnis) 
[…] well one is supposedly not supposed to spread that article, also because this is 
not the mainstream…” (I28, 41:42-43:02) 
The examples above illustrate everyday uptakes of family discourses, situated in 
certain streams of pedagogy and the news coverage on family. A review of 
pedagogic perspectives is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Neither can the 
news coverage in Germany of the last 10 years be analysed systematically. But a 
brief glance nevertheless reveals that a struggle between neo-familialist and third-
way perspectives on family life is fought in public media. Therein the international 
comparison of childcare system to Scandinavia and especially France is very 
common. Whereas the French model is being repeatedly hyped as a role model for 
German developments towards a third-way, there is an ongoing contestation that 
emphasises the problem of the French model from a neo-familialist perspective 
(Rahir, 2006; Schubert, 2008). Summarising the argument, pro-French 
commentators emphasise the benefits of state-run childcare in France and the 35h 
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week, and posit the strong role of the family 
in Germany as a “Mutterkult” that drains 
women of their time for themselves, forcing 
them to sacrifice their own interests for the 
sake of their children, husbands, and 
employers (e.g. Groll and Joeres, 2015). 
Given my own findings with regards to 
mothers’ experience of time, that critique of 
the German model seems warranted. Neo-
familialists, in return, seek to criticise the 
French model. Schubert (2008), for instance, 
begins his article with the following 
statement: “Differently as broadly assumed has France not found the perfect 
response to the reconcilability of profession and family” (author’s translation). 
French women were still carrying out the bulk of care and housework, while their 
husbands furthered their own careers. The author cites Mercedes Erra, General 
Director of a large corporation: “the women […] always feel guilty, because they 
think they don’t care enough for their children and household. This results in a lack 
of self-confidence” (ibid, author’s translation). The public debate that developed 
around the 2000s family reforms was aptly captured in the Spiegel cover story 
“Glaubenskrieg ums Kind” (religious war over the child, Figure 18), which brings the 
issue to the point: 
Der Spiegel: “Consensus however lies in a far distance, when it comes to how far 
Mom is allowed to distance herself from the cradle. And even more so: how long. 
Does she have to mollycoddle her little one 24/7? Is it enough, when she devotes the 
after-work hours to him?” (Brandt, von Bredow and Theile, 2008, emphasis added) 
These cumulative examples demonstrate first and foremost one thing: that there is 
– to this very day – no public consensus about the legitimacy and desirability of the 
policy transition from a neo-familialist to a third-way model of childcare for 
professionals in Germany. The ongoing struggle of the last decade has not stabilised 
in a new third-way equilibrium. Mindful of Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony 
Figure 18 Spiegel Cover 2008 
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(2.3.1) as the “continuous formation and overcoming of unstable equilibriums”  (PN 
7: 1584, cited in Brand and Sekler, 2009, p. 55), it might not be useful to offer a 
general answer of yes or no to the question of whether or not there has been a 
hegemonic shift in German family policy. Such a before-after model would take us 
straight back to the punctuated-equilibrium thinking I have criticised in Hall (1993) 
and Blyth (2002). What I want to highlight once more, however, is that third-way 
policies have been understood as dominant (coercive), and that those following 
them in practice frequently experienced feelings of guilt (compare 4.5). The media 
represents reconcilability as struggle. I believe it is helpful to speak of an attempt by 
governing forces to create a third-way hegemony – but an attempt that is 
challenged not only by doubts about moral legitimacy, but furthermore by the 
governments inability to grow infrastructure fast enough to deliver substantively on 
its own ideological promises. This second aspect I discussed above (5.3.2) as a form 
of market failure generated by regulation issues and resource shortages. 
The timing of children’s’ transition from parental to state care is at the core of 
public debate and policy reform in the last decade, and can adequately be 
considered the most represented. But crucially it is not the only temporal issue that 
creates conflict in the restructuring of daily childcare relations. 
5.3.3.2 Transitions from Family to Institutional Care 
While many parents are aware of the urgency with which the city Kita application 
should be done (right after birth), another timing issue is less transparent, even 
though it is crucial in determining access to public childcare. Kitas follow the 
Kitajahr (Kita-year), which is linked to the school year that starts in August. The Kita-
year is the temporal grid for a range of managerial considerations, including 
reporting deadlines and operational planning. It is simultaneously the accounting 
year for which the Kita plans a budget. Since the KiBiz reform in 2008, the budget of 
the Kita depends very elastically on the number of children enrolled. It is therefore 
a central concern of every manager to sustain an even in- and outflow of children. 
Because the outflow is temporally fixed by the start of the school year for the oldest 
children, the intake of children must also be pegged to that same date. In 
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consequence, Kita slots become available in bulk in August, and only intermittently 
during the year, for example if families move. This practice of making slots available 
only once a year, which is entirely rational given the funding regulations of KiBiz, is 
incompatible with the right to public childcare at the child’s age of one.  
This is particularly noticeable for children born in winter and early spring. The 
break-off date of birth to be considered part of a year-group is November 1st of 
each year. The year-group composition matters, because different Kita group forms 
have a different staff ratio63. Younger children are cared for by more staff than 
older children. For parents of the so-called ‘winter children’ (Rinkl, 2015b) this 
temporal classification into year-groups causes problems, because their children are 
in tendency considered for the following year. This tendency is compounded by the 
fact that Kitas have to report their intake of children for the next August by March, 
and consequently finalise their intake selection no later than early spring – but 
often much earlier.  
Johanna: “our admission meeting is always in October . the previous year of the 
planned admission. We take in to August 1st, rarely below one year, because all slots 
are gone, well full, anyhow” (I17, 1:34-11:24) 
Some parents whose children are born in winter or spring, and who want a slot as 
early as possible, cannot apply in time. In most cases their parental benefit and 
leave stops after 12 months, which is again in winter/spring. Parents then have to 
bridge another 4-6 months until public childcare is available in August. Even those 
whose children are born before November 1st may struggle to receive a slot, 
because the city is more concerned with giving places to children above the age of 
one whose parents have already been waiting another year. The childcare in that 
provision gap is entirely familialised. As described above, grandparents are the most 
likely source of support for mothers in this phase of life (4.4.2.1). If given no other 
                                                     
63 The KiBiz has implemented three group forms: Form I is for 20 children age 2-6, with 4-6 children 
age 2. Form II is for 10 children below three (U3). Form III is for 25 children above age 3 (Ü3). The 
hours of skilled labour funded vary depending on how many hours (25, 35, 45h) are booked per 
child. (Landtag NRW, 2007, Anlage §19) 
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choice, these mothers remain at home without benefit, often to their own and their 
employer’s frustration.  
Given the scarcity of slots in West-German urban areas, parents whose children 
cannot be placed receive a written rejection from the municipal youth welfare 
authority, but this can take several months. With that document, parents can claim 
compensation for private childcare expenses from the municipality. Compensation 
does not cover parents’ lost income, as the right to childcare connotes the child’s 
right of early education, not the parents’ right to public services (BGH, 2016). Lost 
income is sometimes compensated after trial, but this is still a contested legal field. 
The trials and their broad media representation (for instance Spiegel Online, 2016) 
have supported a wider awareness amongst parents that it is possible to sue 
municipalities (I2), which has become more frequent in practice.  
Parents, trying to resolve the temporal incompatibility of the right to childcare and 
Kita-year thus resort to the court system as an opportunity to effect change. But 
even if they receive economic compensation, the inability to reliably plan the 
transition from parental to institutional care causes problems for parents and 
employers alike. The uncertainties parents face towards the availability of a Kita slot 
are passed on to the employer, who cannot know when an employee will return to 
work. This is a problem that the state could and should resolve to a higher degree 
than is currently the case.  
A more thought-through policy would consider the synchronisation of parental 
leave with public childcare entry times: The latest reforms did take parental leave 
durations into consideration by aligning the end of standard leave (12 months) with 
the timing of the right to public childcare (=1st birthday). But the legislator 
apparently underestimated the temporal constraints of the Kita-year in conjunction 
with the slot scarcity that became more noticeable in the course of the last decade. 
Put differently, efforts to synchronise policy temporalities did not consider the 
asynchronicity between individual birthdays and collective Kita schedules. Given the 
natural inevitability of the former, a ‘temporal buffer’ that translates children’s life 
time into Kita/school years is inevitable. Currently this buffer is familialised. 
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To close this gap in public provision, the right to childcare could be amended to the 
Kita-year following a minimal age of the child (1 year or 9 months), and parental 
benefits would need to be extended until the time that a childcare slot is actually 
available. The downside of such a policy is that parents would receive divergent 
amounts of parental leave, dependent on the birthday of their child, even if slot 
supply matched demand. This could be understood as unfair. Families who do not 
seek to give their children away early could also misuse the extension as a longer 
leave option. Provisions would need to be made to make the extended leave 
contingent on a timely Kita application. The ‘buffer’ would then be financed on the 
national level, as the Bund is responsible for parental benefits. 
As a second option, the Kita-year could be substituted by a more flexible system. 
Financial regulation of Kitas would need to be less dependent on the number of 
children in care. This alternative would, ceteris paribus, be less economically 
efficient and more volatile in terms of quality, because the number of children 
would fluctuate more relative to the number of staff. Given the overall scarcity of 
skilled staff, and the consequent power of workers on the labour market, a general 
flexibilisation of employment contracts seems unfeasible. Attachment theory 
further suggests that short-term relations between children and staff (=fluctuation) 
would be psychologically detrimental to child wellbeing. The particular nature of 
care work thus discourages temporary work contracts. Hence the cost of flexible 
provision would fall on the provider, not the worker. Here the ‘buffer’ would be 
financed by the federal states or municipalities, who are responsible for service 
provision.  
The political decision between those alternatives needs to weigh the costs and 
benefits of selectively longer familial care against more flexible institutional care. 
The first proposed solution benefits family-oriented parents and seems relatively 
easy to implement. It ‘only’ requires a refinance of extra parental benefits by the 
Bund, no added infrastructure expansion. In contrast, the second option serves 
work-oriented parents and employers by giving them more power over the ‘when’ 
of children’s transitions into institutional care. This option is ‘fairer’ by maintaining 
universal parental benefit durations. It offers public services suited to more 
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individual temporal demands by parents. In consequence, however, these 
flexibilities would necessitate larger public budgets for Kitas on the 
Länder/municipal level.  
Whereas both solutions defamilialised the ‘buffer’ between birthdays and Kita-year, 
the second option might be more desirable in the long term due to fairness and 
added temporal autonomy for parents and employers. In the short term, however, 
the additional substantive resources needed (e.g. skilled staff) are not available. The 
first option could therefore help as an interim solution for parents to close the gap 
in provision identified above.  
A third alternative, which I have not discussed at length, would be the expansion of 
KTP for U3, as this form of care is already more flexible than Kita. But this option 
also has downsides, as already discussed in 5.3.2.4. KTP is less economically 
efficient, but with additional professionalisation in terms of quality and wages, this 
mode of provision might have a very good potential to flexibly close the provision 
gap, offer a ‘close to family’ environment for U3 children, and thus serve as a win-
win compromise between third-way and neo-familialist interest groups. 
5.3.3.3 Opening Hours and Reconcilability 
Another problem in the temporal coverage of public childcare is found on daily and 
weekly scales: One of the major contestations of parents towards the current 
system are the limited opening hours, usually between 7:30 and 16:30. Statistics 
discussed above also showed that a large portion of public childcare is still part-
time, usually in the mornings. This excludes parents with non-standard work 
schedules. The flexibility high-praised and demanded in the labour market has not 
reached the Kita system.  
Remember (Figure 11, p.189): Elena and Markus had a combined working week 
between both parents of more than 90 hours, yet could reconcile their schedules 
because her (formally part-time) work of 40 h/week just fit into the opening hours 
of the Kita. This simple example shows why attention to institutional schedules in 
detail, and their synchronisation, is crucial to understanding reconcilability issues. 
More work in social sciences could be done to discern the consequences of 
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irreconcilability between structural (institutional) rhythms, and how some people 
occupying roles with synchronised schedules have advantages over people who ‘fall 
between the rhythms’.  
Another dimension of the reconciliation problem is adult education, because 
evening schools and apprenticeships are not synchronised with public childcare. 
Universities have only made small inroads in that regard. Nightshifts and dangerous 
work pose a particular problematic already before the arrival of a child, because 
pregnant women are banned from both during maternity leave (see p. 145). After 
the birth, returning into their previous occupations is often problematic, either 
because overnight childcare is unavailable, or because health hazards could still 
affect the child. These issues affect for instance workers in medical laboratories, 
logistics, or security. The position of parents within (or outside) the labour market 
clearly emerges as a central determinant for their ability to reconcile care work. It is 
not just the hours and wage level, but centrally the specific schedules and 
commuting times between work, childcare facility, and home, which matter. In 
other words, the synchronisation of employment and parenting schedules is 
essential to enable people to partake in both spheres. In times in which atypical 
employment is expanding, childcare is caught in a moral dilemma between 
accommodating parent’s needs for expanded opening hours, and children’s needs – 
as articulated in pedagogy – of a regular day structure and time together.  
The desirability of expanded opening hours is deeply contested. Whereas single 
mothers in my sample were desperate for expanded hours to be able to enter 
education or employment to have a financially independent future, upper middle-
class parents were deeply averse to the idea of “24-hour Kitas”. As Thomas said, any 
flexibility for childcare given to parents by Kitas would likely just be taken from 
parents again by expanding employer demands, “like a kind of race” of increasing 
flexibilisation (I24: 44:49-47:28). For Elena as a working mother, opening times at 
her Kita between 8:00-16:30 were experienced as “very stiff”. When she had to 
work longer, Markus or her mum jumped in. On the other hand she said she could 
understand the educators’ low tolerance for overtime in an already badly paid 
profession (I25, 49:29-51:23). 
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Thomas: “I have seen this now, the USA, that there is such an overnight supervision . 
there I have to say, then . then it is not a family format anymore . then it is something 
else, then one must decide . but maybe the people there are simply forced 
professionally, that they don’t have a chance of doing something else” (I25, 44:49-
47:28) 
Comments like that clearly illustrate professional parents’ perception of a changing 
working world, and resistance to the demands this world makes on families. As 
such, they described limitations to childcare hours as good, because they effectively 
imposed limits to employer demands.  
Looking back to the institutional constraints discussed above with regard to age-
groups and Kita group types, another interesting phenomenon became visible 
among more family-oriented parents: They did not take up the hours booked in the 
Kita, even though they paid for them. Ralf and Christina’s son spent approximately 
20h per week in public care, even though the couple had booked 45h. With regard 
to their second daughter, they had been discouraged from seeking a slot for a child 
older than two. At one point, the couple had considered to pay for a slot without 
actually using it.  
(I28b, 18:03-18:47) 
Responses such as these convey once more a sense of the urgency with which 
parents need a childcare slot – eventually – but also the pressure the system 
generates to seek one early. The above strategy of paying more hours than one 
takes served affluent family-oriented parents as a way to circumvent these 
pressures – at their own expense. 
Christina Yeah yeah, one can always pick him up. One can even not bring him at all 
hehe, well one only has to pay. hehe 
Ralf 
[Christina] 
We went through the idea once, the Kita manager was also willing to do 
that. [of course, she has less work then] . to pay in full, and then send 
nobody [and send nobody hehe] hehe for a whole year [exactly] 
Christina Yeah yeah, that was crass. Just to get a childcare slot . for [our daughter] 
after all we had . received none in the Kita where [our son] is . and there 
was well, they told us that . now, last sumer, I could have taken one, or 
something . otherwise you get none. And then we considered, whether we 
should pay for a year without sending her but uh . she would have gone 
along with that, the manager I mean 
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Within the same debate, childcare practitioners often hold a similar position as 
parents: 
Alexa: “societally it would need to change that employers have more understanding 
for family, and more for employees, who have a family . I think we are running into 
the wrong direction. I don’t have anything against extending opening hours, or to 
change them, and to say some need them more in the morning, earlier. we are open 
from 7:00, some need the evenings, until 18:00 or 19:00. But I slowly have a problem 
that now overnight is coming, because parents are also nurses, and so on and so 
forth . so I really have a problem with that, because the children are not regarded 
anymore. The children are not regarded anymore […] personally I think our society 
should rethink that children are important, and that children are part of things . and 
that we don’t just optimise opening times (Betreuungszeiten), but also create more 
space for parents to spend time with their children, without having a bad conscience. 
That is the key issue.” (I18, 8:32-10:10, emphasis added) 
Important here is again to emphasise the effects of feeling guilty as an indication for 
an irreconcilability not just between schedules, but also between the moralities that 
inform how parents should spend their time. 
In sum: Whereas there is a consensus amongst parents that slightly more flexible 
hours would be good, parents whose work is largely within current opening hours 
resist radical expansions to protect their family life, whereas parents who depend 
on atypical working times would need that coverage to be able to work in their 
occupations at all. Different schedules amongst occupational groups thus create 
divergent preferences to childcare availability. Whereas the schedules of work and 
family life are still reasonably well-synchronised for parents in more or less 
traditional employment and family structures, including gender roles, atypical 
employment trends and more diverse family types have undermined this 
reconcilability for many others. This is visible in the daily broken temporal interfaces 
of diverging institutional schedules. In other words, there is a disintegration of the 
Fordist alignment of ‘spheres’, which becomes noticeable in conflicting demands on 
human availabilities and flexibilities.  
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Measures to ameliorate conflicts emerging from a trend towards an adult-worker-
model need not just address technical problems of synchronisation, but also 
political opposition from families under traditional forms of social security. 
Narrower Kita opening hours make an indirect contribution to these forms of social 
security, because they limit legitimate expectations of flexibility from employers 
towards parents. Thus these schedules preserve aspects of the framework of the 
(gendered) standard working week, and the class compromise behind it. At the 
same time the inflexibility of parents, especially mothers, has been widely discussed 
as a limit to their emancipation through labour market participation (Streeck, 2009; 
Wanger, 2011; Morel, 2007; Weigt, 2006). The tension between advocates and 
opponents of extended opening hours must thus be contextualised in this broader 
conflict over the time family vis-à-vis paid work should take up in fathers’ and 
mothers’ lives. 
In addition to what I have discussed so far, another aspect of public childcare 
schedules should be mentioned. What children and practitioners do in the everyday 
of the Kita should not remain a black-box in the consideration of policy-makers and 
academics. The daily life in the Kita has its own schedule for children and 
practitioners, which can run into conflict with flexibilisation, as the following 
passage illustrates: 
Anna: “…we always arrived . 9:30, 10:00, 11:00 . and at some point the Kita said: no, 
we would like that he is present at 9:00 for the morning circle. And then we said that 
is absurd . if we are off work . if we have different working times, I have to work in 
the afternoons and evenings, there I don’t see my child, but have the mornings off 
[…] one can read everywhere . regarding U3 Kita . are you doing bad things to the 
children, well . everywhere one can read spend as much time as possible with your 
children . and now I get problems from you? […] there we first had to break up an 
imagine . parents who don’t bring their children at 9:00, there one is in a box 
(Schublade), there is something going from at home. They don’t get out of bed . uh, 
they have some kind of problems. And then we had to explain a life situation . that 
through the artistic-pedagogic occupations we have a . a completely different 
rhythm. […] that was difficult . uh, for the Kita . they then always [missing verb] child-
wellbeing – but in part that was ostensible […] it was a mix of thinking about the 
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child, but it is also more difficult for them to organise, albeit I don’t see it that way. It 
is more . well . in the way of thinking” (I22b, 0:00-4:00) 
The flexible needs of parents interfere with a collective management of children in 
the Kita. There is no consensus over the consequences with regard to child-
wellbeing, parent-wellbeing, and the appropriate temporal demands between 
children, parents, employers, and care workers. In the overall societal dynamic that 
Germans are experiencing in the last decade, whatever transition is happening has 
not yet solidified into a comprehensive new temporal order. The Kita structures and 
parts of the economy uphold the Fordist working week, with smaller adjustments, 
whereas another fraction of society is moving somewhere else. The question for 
politics is to what extent ‘flexibility’ can be a sustainable and healthy way for a 
society to go on together, or whether improvements for universal reconcilability 
require a stronger collective temporal grid with certain fix-points to orient 
expectations more effortlessly and harmoniously. 
Conceiving of social policy in explicit ‘everyday’ time budgets might have the added 
benefit of making political debate more relatable in an everyday context for 
citizens. A direct discussion of time budgets would force a clearer demarcation of 
(proposed) gender and class relations, and could help to democratically establish 
new valuations of activities, their monetary compensation, and scheduling needs, as 
well as images of a ‘good-life-balance’. 
5.4 Practitioner Perspectives: Quality Management between Text and Talk  
This last section of the analysis is dedicated to public childcare from a practitioner 
and provider perspective. The focus here is not on pedagogic practice, but on the 
managerial and administrative processes in Kitas. These processes entail 
coordination between managers, practitioners, and parents; and reporting 
requirements from Kitas to government and provider organisation, including quality 
management (QM), which is a topic I will focus on below. By QM, practitioners 
denote the manifold documentation requirements recent reforms have introduced 
as standard and required practice. The reporting of certain indicators, internally and 
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to the wider public, fits with the overall techniques of governing subsumed under 
the label new public management: 
“Although ill defined, the term ‘new public management’ has been applied to ‘a set 
of broadly similar administrative doctrines which dominated the bureaucratic reform 
agenda in many of the OECG group of countries […] Regulation and accountability of 
professional practice are reflected in the abundance of processes, procedures, 
monitoring and audit systems which feature strongly in much of the new public 
management schema. Increased scrutiny by the media has also exacerbated focus on 
benchmarks and performance indicators.” (Burton and van den Broek, 2009, p. 1328) 
New public management as a set of textual practices is a phenomenon to which 
Institutional Ethnography, and the concern how relations of ruling become 
institutionalised through texts, fits particularly well as a methodology (as discussed 
in 2.3.1). Dealing with administrative and managerial processes furthermore brings 
up the conceptual question whether one is talking about governing, policy 
implementation, or enactment. The most problematic term in this list is ‘or’. To 
clarify what I connote with these terms: governing should be understood in terms of 
Foucault’s gouverner/conduct (2.3.1), pointing to the how of ‘good governance’, 
and the importance of ideas and discourse in creating and distributing the morality 
and telos directing daily interactions. 
By implementation, the established literature tends to conceive of problems that 
policies are meant to resolve. This problem-solving logic is perpetuated in how 
implementation research develops 
conceptual bodies and research 
methods. A good example is given by 
Czaika & De Haas (2013) model of policy 
gaps (see Figure 19). The authors display 
policy as a sequential process from 
agenda setting, policy formulation, over 
administrative implementation, down to 
measurable outcomes. Implementation 




link” between parliamentary policy making and ‘street-level’ administration, the gap 
between “the state’s policy promises and the state’s policy products” (Hjern 1982 
and Brodkin 1990 in Schofield, 2001; see also Brodkin, 1997; Hjern and Porter, 
1981; Matland, 1995; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980). 
Writing about “how schools do policy” (Ball, Maguire and Braun, 2012), Ball 
criticises that whereas policy making is understood as a political (contesting, 
negotiating, and creative) process, implementation is too often theoretically 
reduced to compliance and effectiveness. Thereby implementation studies are 
limited to a normative type of enquiry that assesses the success of governments to 
bring about certain predefined outcomes. The contest, negotiation, and creative 
acts that take place during implementation are marginalised. To distinguish studies 
that thematise such local or translocal political co-construction from studies that 
follow the problem-solving logic, Ball uses the term ‘enactment’: 
“we want to 'make' policy into a process, as diversely and repeatedly contested 
and/or subject to different 'interpretations' as it is enacted (rather than 
implemented) in original and creative ways within institutions […] but in ways that 
are limited by the possibilities of discourse” (Ball, Maguire and Braun, 2012, pp. 2–3, 
emphasis added) 
Policy understood this way is both text (artefact) and discursive-interactive process, 
“contextually mediated and institutionally rendered”, complexly encoded and 
decoded, interpreted and recontextualised (ibid, p.3). Policies are not just 
ideational, but also material (as artefacts, as bodily enactments). Within networks 
of dialogical interactions, policies constrain possible creative responses in situ. They 
thus engender selectivities. These theoretical frames take us back to the dialogical 
constructivism I have outlined in chapter 2. The focus in this study lies on 
enactment, rather than implementation. This does not exclude speaking about 
problems and solutions, or evaluating reforms by their everyday outcomes - but it 
does so in consideration of how policies direct, limit, and enable local actors, such 
as managers and childcare practitioners, to do their work. 
In the following sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 I will discuss ideas and concepts informing 
the enactment of public childcare management on different levels. I will explain key 
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quantitative indicators used to measure policy outputs, including child assessment 
procedures, and how these function in the everyday of Kitas. In section 5.4.3 I will 
move on to governing styles and interaction, ultimately pointing to a conflict 
between standards of good practice and time budgets. 
5.4.1 Quantities and Qualities of Change 
The contemporary debate has highlighted the scarcity of public childcare slots in 
many German municipalities, most notably in cities. The right to public childcare for 
U3 has increased the pressure on municipalities to meet expansion targets. This is 
the case even more so since the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) (Bundesgerichtshof, 
2016) and the Federal Administrative Court (BVG) (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 
2013) have enabled parents to sue municipalities for compensation on lost earnings 
and additional private childcare costs if municipalities fail to provide public 
childcare. Whereas claims for compensation on lost earnings are expected to 
remain exceptional cases (Rath, 2016), the youth welfare agency of Cologne 
perceives increasing lawsuits for private childcare cost compensation as parents 
become more aware of the BVG judgment through the media (I2). As a result, the 
agency is under tremendous pressure from parents and higher-level government to 
expand provision in terms of slots, that is, of quantity. In consequence qualitative 
concerns often cannot receive the consideration that state agencies, providers, 
practitioners, and parents would like to see. As Burton & van den Broek (2009) have 
emphasised in their study on new public management and digitalisation in social 
work, an ‘application of mass production methods to human services’ brings up 
ethical concerns between the attention given to quantitative and qualitative 
targets. There is a concern that quantitative indicators by themselves are 
insufficient as steering instruments to enable constructive local enactment, creating 
a work dynamic of meeting indicators rather than substantive targets. Top-down 
micro management by indicators also prevents local stakeholders from more 
democratic forms of target-setting and cooperation. 
In Germany the debate over appropriate ages and desirable care forms 
(family/KTP/Kita) carries over into a debate on quality in childcare facilities; any 
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response to the former debate is dependent on how public care is designed 
qualitatively. Next to a scarcity of slots, therefore, Germans criticise the conditions 
under which public childcare is provided. The aim of this section is to convey along 
which ideas (incl. indicators) this critique takes place. 
A key quantitative indicator to assess quality is the staff-child ratio 
(Personalschlüssel), which is improving slowly in the long-term trend. For U3 
children, the ratio in the former East with 6.1 in 2015 and 6.0 in 2017 children per 
carer is almost twice as high as in West Germany, where it remained constant at 3.7 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015b, 2017). For Ü3 children, ratios improved in the East 
from 8.9 to 8.5, and in the West from 12.4 to 12.2. These results are still above 
Bertelsmann’s recommendation of 3:1 for U3 and 7.5:1 for Ü3 (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2017), which are similar to EU and German government recommendations 
(BMFSFJ, 2016).  
In practice, childcare managers I interviewed often only took two children below 
age one into a group, which is the same number as staff present. These children 
were referred to as “Armkinder” (arm children) who spent much of the day in 
immediate physical proximity to the carer, often in a baby carrier (I18, 35:59-37:49). 
The carer for children below two was always the same person, as recommended by 
attachment theory. This small example already conveys that staff-child ratios are a 
“necessary, but insufficient” (Bock-Famulla, Strunz and Löhle, 2017, p. 8) indicator 
for how quality should be enacted by practitioners. The interpretive space left open 
by abstract indicators needs to be filled in the everyday. As an example of how 
parents thought about quality, Imke and Thomas description is telling: 
Thomas … well proximity was the most important, so that is fits from the logistics 
and friends, and then it needed to have niveau. 
Imke Yes, I found the KTP carer myself online. She certainly did not have the 
educational level (Bildungsniveau), but she had heart. And I was friends 
with her a little. So I could trust her, and then I could also leave the child 
with her. Yes. 
Nina You said “niveau”regarding Kita earlier, what did you mean by that? 
Thomas Hm . niveau means first that the team fits, that there is a sensible 
leadership, who so to say also have a plan, what they want to do with the 
children and that the team is overall in agreement. That it is not like . so to 
say that there are people inside, who were ordered there, but who like 
working together, also because there is such a high stress (Belastung) with 
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the children uh . and that they, so to say, have a unity, because, that also 
tilts . that it is not completely mixed up . well, we occasionally notice that 
Tuesdays there is another carer […] where the children are outside often, 
there we also have had sick ones . she has a different format. So an 
education concept (Erziehungskonzept) . and also autonomy . in there, no 
neglect, to care, but not overdo that (kümmern, nicht bekümmern) 
(I24, 1:07:49-1:10:07) 
In Imke and Thomas’ narrative, quality (‘niveau’) is associated with the qualification 
of carers, a holistic professional conception, consequent leadership, and working 
conditions that moderate the stress of childcare work. Quality is hence something 
local Kita staff is responsible for. In conversation with childcare managers, it 
became clear that the U3 reform was difficult to handle in terms of quality, because 
the care for U3 children is rather different than for Ü3 children. Relating to a child 
with respect when changing nappies, or an inability to communicate verbally, had 
not been part of many educators’ qualification. When the reform came, said most 
managers, training programs were set up in insufficient quantity and speed.  
In NRW the expansion to U3 was accompanied by a relocation of afternoon care for 
school children into the schools (Horte). Hence in many facilities, staff who had 
previously worked with school children were suddenly asked to care for infants (I18, 
11:31-13:36). This adjustment did not only need reskilling, but was also experienced 
by some as a depreciation of their work. As one carer admitted, working with older 
children yielded “demonstrable results” such as drawings, whereas working with 
infants was perceived in terms of care rather than education (I19). I have already 
mentioned that care was seen as lower in status than education (3.4). Practitioners 
complained in general about the low recognition they received for their work. Many 
associated this with their professional status on apprenticeship level (not 
university). Not only did this status translate into relatively low wages and tariff 
classifications (5.3.2.3), it also impacted the recognition of their expertise and 
authority by parents (I19). 
5.4.2 Quality Management and Child Development 
In addition to staff ratios and qualification, quality in care is increasingly defined in 
terms of child development outcomes, as they are assessed in developmental 
psychology. This particular perspective has become institutionalised recently in the 
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form of quality management systems in Kitas, which routinely document children’s 
capabilities. Practitioners are thereby tasked to bring out children’s’ potential 
through good pedagogic practice. 
The KiBiz reform created the obligation for practitioners to monitor child 
development in a formal documentation system (Bildungsdokumentation, KiBiz 
§13b), the methods of which can be chosen by the individual provider or Kita. The 
obligation for evaluation has been implemented together with KiBiz §11 and §12, 
which prescribe a written pedagogical conception for each Kita, along with 
documentation systems to monitor quality improvements (Landtag NRW, 2007).  
The problem that childcare managers reported to me is that any intensification of 
documentation requirements costs time. Such ‘indirect tasks’ (mittelbare 
Tätigkeiten) related to childcare, in addition to illness, holidays, and training take up 
at least 25% of total working time of childcare practitioners (Bock-Famulla, Lange 
and Strunz, 2015, p. 25), which has a substantial impact on real staff-child ratios, as 
opposed to the formal ones summarised above. A study that aimed to measure the 
exact share of indirect work (Viernickel et al., 2013) concluded that due to the 
complexity and degree of differentiation of answers in their survey-based study, it 
was impossible to develop reliable statements about the share of indirect tasks 
relative to work immediately with the children. My participants suggested 
unanimously that the volume of indirect tasks had increased substantially due to 
higher documentation requirements. Whereas documentation and other policy 
changes were in principle viewed positively, the lack of additional staff to fulfil the 
requirements was seen as a loss of time available to children.  
Children’s development documentation is integrated into the everyday routines of 
Kitas. It assesses the child’s practices, ideas, creative products and problem solving 
capabilities, in line with the core competencies identified in the SOA (see p. 210). 
Assessment is meant to support development oriented to individual strengths. The 
documentation can be made available to primary schools if parents agree (Landtag 
NRW, 2007§13b). Documentation practices pose a formalisation of developmental 
observation that already existed. Whereas such observation was seen as important, 
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the formalisation of it, especially the quantification some forms introduce, is viewed 
critically.  
Barbara: “uh, well in principle we do it  like this, also with the development 
observation forms . uh, we enter the conversation with the parent, and operate 
there entirely without numbers. […] ultimately we are observing every day, and 
ultimately the educators are very well informed over the developmental stage of a 
child . the observation forms effectively only serve as a foundation to, uh, refine this. 
We use that in preparation for the parent-educator talk (Elterngespräch). Uh, 
because uh . what are the parents meant to do with numbers? [Nina:mh] . and 
numbers are very scary then, that quickly turns into the direction of marking [Nina: 
yeah-yeah] that means, this is for us always only a means to prepare the parent-talk, 
so that we can then reflect with the parents: what the child can already do well, 
where does the child still need support. And then is always the uh next question, 
which targets and measures can we implement in the Kita […] what can you do at 
home . completely adjusted to the living situation” (I15, 22:31-27:27) 
Practitioners recounted the experience that parents tend to focus on a child’s 
weaknesses rather than strengths, if categories are displayed quantitatively in 
scales or tick-off boxes, which practitioners connoted negatively as ‘marking’. 
Instead many favoured a written assessment in which they could qualitatively 
emphasise the strengths and contextualise them in an observation of the ‘whole 
child’ (I19). Practitioners were deeply concerned to create an account of a child that 
is holistic and well-reflected, and addressed the problem of time scarcity to 
appropriately carry out these documentation practices without cutting down the 
time of their ‘actual job’ of tending to the children’s needs (I17, 31-34:26). In many 
cases, they criticised the interest primary schools took in wanting access to 
developmental documentations when selecting children. Whereas the majority of 
parents do not share these documents with schools, practitioners indicated that 
some parents had started using them to promote their children to a school of 
choice.   
Childcare practitioners argued their negative attitude with recourse to a principle of 
‘taking them as they come’ and a respectful relation to children that footed in the 
understanding of children as subjects, not objects (I19). Practitioners with religious 
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affiliation called this the ‘Christian human image’.  Some perceive the rights and 
interest of children being neglected in discourses about childcare, and empirically it 
is rather obvious that whereas children’s rights are mentioned, children are rarely 
given voice in expressing what kind of childcare and educational possibilities they 
like outside the home.  
In contrast to holistic views of the child stands a pressure to qualify children as 
future workers. This follows from the political decision to posit the labour market as 
the central integrating institution into society. This view is not just abstractly 
relevant for policy-makers and employers, but personally conflicting for parents and 
practitioners. In order to give children the education they need to succeed in 
integrating into society they are tasked to direct and assess children’s development. 
That there is a conflict between different ideas of ‘development’ and educational 
styles becomes visible in the context of ‘Förderwahn’64. The meaning of the concept 
can be illustrated by the following examples: 
Julian: “… today it is unfortunately very performance-oriented, and that children 
have no or little time to . to complete their inner blueprint . because simply 
everything has to be controlled externally: parents always to have the power over 
this, like you are one year now – now you have to be able to do that, you are two 
now – you now have to be able to do that – uh, some children simply are – or I will 
put it that way: children have their own blueprint, and with some it just takes a this 
long, and with others that long . and uh . yes, therefore one always has to consider . 
we have a lot of parents who do . a great many things for their children. There is 
gymnastics, and swimming, always on one day. And family café, and mother café, 
and such things, which are of course also pretty nice . for the parents. Uh, for the 
children that is often simply too much. ” (I33, 29:59-32:46) 
While giving a range of examples that support the idea that Förderwahn is a 
frequent issue, Julian also asserted that this ‘trend’ had shifted. The existence of the 
term ‘Förderwahn’, which has a clear negative connotation, itself suggests that a 
critical attitude has gained purchase. Today, Julian suggested (I33, 39:15-40:39) 
many parents tried to “let their children be children”, and paid attention to giving 
                                                     
64 Literal translation: support craze, or nurturing madness 
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them “autonomy”. Whereas one sports course or instrument a week is still seen as 
beneficial, one should not overburden one’s child with parents’ ambitions. Other 
commentaries provide a mixed image, however, in how far the trend has passed: 
Alexa: “and of course also the Förderwahn, that is a big topic. […] since the PISA 
study I sometimes think: oh god, well . really, we get asked if we could not teach the 
children Chinese, […] . and it . it always become more . […] more . this support 
program, that support program . you could do this, or do that as well . and I don’t 
accuse the parents, the parents are afraid that their children will miss the boat . and I 
find that, well, I find that frightening sometimes . what is all demanded from 
children. There are children here who go to a course four times a week […] and that 
is free-time stress […] I will say, the play, and that . for children it is very important to, 
right, to process, to stick with things, to live out their own interests, that is not seen 
anymore – but only due to the fear, right, they need to be supported . that this [play] 
is the right kind of support, that is sometimes lost in the perspective of the parents” 
(I18, 28:25-33:09) 
The distinction Alexa makes between courses and play refers to the insights of 
Fröbel (5.1.1), who established free play as a key aspect of good pedagogic practice 
(Aden-Grossmann, 2011). The legacy of democratic/humanist thought is clearly 
noticeable. The centrality of play in ECEC marks one of the clearest distinctions to 
course-based, school-like education. The comparison between Kita and school also 
reconnects the anxiety of some practitioners in how far documentation translates 
into marking. The fundamental issue is the assessment of children in formal terms, 
which appear in documentation forms65. A source of ideas what constitutes 
performance comes from developmental psychology, the categories of which are 
then transformed into ranking categories (e.g. Figure 20). Julian’s reference to ages 
and abilities draws on models of developmental stages that can be found in most 
parenting advice literature, and derive from Piaget’s seminal work (1970). 
                                                     
65 The state initiative "Bildung durch Sprache und Schrift" (BiSS) and the Staatsinstitut für 
Frühpädagogik (IFP) have compiled forms that evaluate literacy, for instance seldak. Generally, 




Figure 20 Seldak example (Ulich and Mayr, 2006) 
Textual practices around the child, performed by practitioners, recreate a certain 
knowledge about children, which is focused on skill assessment. But interpretative 
spaces and the limitation of what is effectively put into writing shape what image of 
a child is conveyed. The reactions of parents, anxieties of practitioners, and interest 
of schools suggests that even in ECEC, these formalised forms of assessment begin 
to matter and shape a child’s trajectory into school, and consequently into life. 
Therefore it is concerning that practitioners and managers report issues with finding 
the time to responsibly discuss and fill out these forms. What regulation needs to 
consider is how these activities should be scheduled next to the core business of 
childcare, and that attractive and good quality working conditions require more 










5.4.3 Formalisation, Dialogic Coordination, and Participation 
 
Barbara: “a good educator has always already worked with a certain standard and 
uh . those standards are now set legally in a different way, which means uh […] the 
law now demands things, which a good educator has generally has always done . the 
standards and legal requirements […] quality management was not a topic 20 years 
ago . still we worked towards a complaint management then . not that a quality 
management handbook would have existed, right – that . if one worked with a 
certain attitude uh . that is not such a bi:ig change [long pause] [Nina: can one say 
now that…] more forms, many . uh [Nina: mhm] well . quality management always 
brings a lot of forms with it . uh . certain legal requirements bring many more forms 
with them . uh . the controls have gotten tighter [mhm] so . uh . the health and 
safety agencies come and do- [Nina: so it is . well . more formalised?] – it is more 
formalised . yes! . one can say it that way mhm” (I15, 6:32-8:03) 
Barbara’s statement sums up an experience all practitioners I interviewed had made 
in the last decade. Their work became more formalised.  In NRW, KiBiz §11 and §12 
prescribe a written pedagogical conception for each Kita, along with documentation 
systems to monitor quality improvements, to be administered by the providers 
(Landtag NRW, 2007). This means that more activities in practitioner’s daily working 
lives are now subject to written rules, to which the demonstration of compliance is 
equally carried out in writing. In the social sciences, formalisation has been 
discussed in terms of making cooperation possible and more efficient, but also as a 
set of practices through which representation work can be done, for instance by 
representing accountability (Brown, 2001). The formalisation of business processes 
is a key aspect of modern management: it is a precondition and accompanying 
element to the introduction of enterprise resource planning software and the 
automation of knowledge processing that informs accounting. As Brown informs us, 
documentation in workplaces creates the discursive artefacts (e.g. time sheets) that 
make accounting “auditable”, that is, legitimately link the knowledge used to run 
financial accounts with everyday practices (ibid). Importantly, artefacts like time 
sheets do not represent time-use in detached objectivity: they are created within 
the interpretive play technologies (paper forms, computer databases) allow people, 
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and are filled out with an idea in mind about their purpose. As such, toilet breaks 
are not recorded, whereas work that needs to be allocated to a certain cost centre 
is recorded. “Common artefacts” (Robinson, 1993) of daily life, such as forms, take 
on a key role in cooperation and coordination. Forms are furthermore part of 
institutional rhythms. They are part of an organisations temporality through due 
dates, processing durations, and recurring reporting cycles. Brown, drawing on 
Foucault (1978)66, acknowledges that whereas formalisation has often been treated 
in a negative light by academics, the relations of power formalisation impacts need 
to be analysed situatedly to assess their moral and political effects. 
As a facet of new public management, standardised written forms, either in paper 
or digital, are omnipresent in Kitas. Forms existed for children (development 
documentation, nappy changing protocols, application forms), temporary staff 
(time sheets, report portfolios, personnel reviews and certificates) and permanent 
staff (training records, especially for recurring mandatory trainings for health and 
safety: occupational health, hygiene, fire, first aid), to name a subset (I15, 10:40-
22:21).  
Johanna: “one cannot lead a Kita today without a . without a PC and software, and I 
don’t know what . that . that has changed […] [Nina: what software is that?] . that is . 
a special program. Well, ours is called Kitathek […] which essentially manages the 
whole Kita” (I17, 1:34-11:24) 
The necessity of computers has unsurprisingly increased in the last decades. 
However, as managers admitted, their use of specialist software was often 
restricted to admission management (for which the program “spits out” the forms, 
I17), and reporting interfaces to the state (KiBiz-Web). For many local practices, 
excel sheets were more practical, and were often used in printed form to be filled 
out during the day. The prevalence of paper is understandable. Given the general 
lack of offices in Kitas, save for the manager’s office, desktop computers are not 
present. Tablets could be used to replace paper forms eventually, without needing 
                                                     
66 See The History of Sexuality, pp. 92-102, for Foucault’s understanding of resistance as immanent to 
relations of power, and tactics as locally situated logics of struggle. 
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to make much space for them. To date, however, the degree of digitalisation in 
Kitas is relatively low. 
Next to the forms used in daily coordination locally, Kita managers were 
accountable to providers and state. Reporting requirements involve the 
booking/working hours of children and staff (Belegungszahlen, Fachkraftstunden), 
and health and safety certification, as mentioned previously, but also yearly public 
statistics, plus indicators providers directly demand from Kitas. Managers were 
accountable to provide these at certain times of the year, sometimes monthly, 
sometimes quarterly or yearly. 
Johanna: “huh, and the only there is another new uh . from here, from the parish or 
the Church, from the regional Church is . there had to be something filled in, also a 
small statistic, NKF, that is such a new . calculation-calculation system? Uh, there I 
have to, well target and current numbers (soll und ist-zahlen), and uh, planned 
numbers, uh, how often parent interactions […], how many colleaguges and such 
things, all such things . and uh, once a year I write a QM report just for the parish, 
that is a bit more detailed” (1:17:21-1:18:10) 
Johanna’s explanation reveals how quantitative indicators are recorded and 
reported to represent quality. The provision of target/planning numbers, and the 
visibility of gaps to current numbers, conducts the manager’s conduct towards a 
simplified idea of quality, expressed in indicators, that can be defined and 
communicated translocally. The reporting thus contributes to what kind of 
knowledge becomes available about Kitas, and how external actors perceive the 
Kita. Key indicators, for example staff ratios, then inform the statistical and 
governmental strand of public discourse, whereas personal experience of parents 
and practitioners inform another strand. Inbetween these groups, Kita managers 
have to reconcile these two kinds of knowledge towards a combined work 
knowledge that informs ‘good’ leadership. A striking comment about the extent, 
but also the representational effect of documentation as a tool of management 




Barbara: “every step . which we take in the Kita, for that there are also at least one 
to two forms, which means that everything has to be documented, because this is 
also included in QM, what is not documented was not done . right, so that is also a 
basic principle of quality management, only what is documented, is also . done […] 
there is also in internal revision from the AWO, where is it checked if all processes 
and all forms to the processes are present . right, and this report then also goes to 
the management” (I15, 28:31-29:53, emphasis added) 
This quote illustrates the mandatory character of documentation, and the pressure 
on Kita managers to demonstrate compliance with quality standards. While it is 
certainly possible to circumvent regulation, such instances were not reported to 
me. Rather, managers were concerned to present orderliness and rigour, even with 
standards they were frustrated with, as part of their image as capable, law-abiding, 
and upright professionals67. Great emphasis was placed in several occasions on 
explaining that harmony among colleagues, but also in the relation to parents, was 
important to care well for children. In the following sections I will discuss how 
managers sought to lead in order to create the greatest possible harmony. The 
instances in which accounts of managers revealed conflicts are consequently of 
particular interest, because they yield a pattern of causes that disrupt these efforts 
for harmonious coordination.  
Two key sources for conflicts are, firstly, unpredictability, and secondly, a clash of 
interaction styles. The former affects the friction between plannable and 
unplannable workloads, the latter of which are abundant in social work with 
children and families. The second source pertains to an ideal of participation and 
democratic (read: discussion-heavy) coordination among local stakeholders. This 
ideal clashes with the temporal constraints skill-shortages, restrictive funding, and 
formalisation requirements jointly generate. Simply put, practitioners criticise the 
lack of time to talk to each other as colleagues, to jointly plan the Kita work. Apart 
from functional aspects, discussion is important to practitioners as a way to 
harmonise interpersonal relations, and feel acknowledged and involved in creating 
                                                     
67 That the moral integrity of childcare practitioners is above-average important is also visible in 
extra regulation, such as the necessity to have a police certificate of good conduct.  
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a shared environment. Their understanding of good governance depends heavily on 
talking, whereas regulation increasingly emphasised writing. There is thus a conflict 
in how reality should be made meaningful between these two forms of language, 
which techniques should be used to coordinate daily interaction, and quite literally, 
who has ‘a say’ in how things should be done. 
5.4.3.1 Managing Unpredictability 
The key limitation of governing by standards and forms is their inapplicability to the 
unexpected. Among the first questions I asked practitioners was: “What is a normal 
work day like for you?” The question tended to result in laughter, followed by an 
explanation that ‘normal days’ did not exist in a Kita. Managers recounted arriving 
at work to remove dead rodents from the street, fix sinks, or console parents over 
the death of an unborn child (I17). Such relative singularities, in great variety, were 
a kind of regularity of local life. How the regular and the unpredictable meet in the 
everyday, and how this is experienced by Kita managers, is revealed by Barbara’s 
account: 
Barbara: “well there are no normal days in that sense . uh . tellingly . for example this 
morning a situation . I am here . one hour before my supposed begin of work . in the 
hope of being able to write a few emails, in peace, then already had a . a uh mother 
with a nervous breakdown in my office . and a mother uh who is having her labour 
induced today, with a fever-sick child […] on her arm. […] well I have recurring 
activities naturally, legal obligations I have to meet, paperwork I need to do, 
deadlines I need to keep, and uh . all that is interrupted by . uh, yes, the life that is 
rampaging around me […] if something happens, I need to be available at any time. 
We are a family centre, and I understand myself here that way . that I am the contact 
person for all families, not only through organised courses, but especially uh, contact 
person uh . when the shoe pinches (wenn der schuh drückt) . and hence the day is 
always very lively and actually uh not necessarity structurable by me . so I have my 
to-do lists for the day . bu:ut it is, well that is permanently interrupted by . 
something” (I15, 1:38-3:39) 
What Barbara describes as permanent interruption and a lack of structurability of 
her daily work must be viewed in context of how she makes herself available to the 
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people around her. As she adds to the previous statement, her “time scarcity is 
homemade”. While there are many demands on her representing and leading the 
Kita and family centre (see p.197), she points out that she could handle those well 
enough if she were to close her office door (I15, 3:52-5:55). But having her “own 
idea to one’s role”, she depicts her business as the intentional result of enacting a 
communication-intensive style of management. Next to the ‘open door for 
everyone’, this entails taking part in projects68. Given that she has the autonomy to 
decide whether or not she wishes to partake in these, she portrayed this as a 
positive stress. It is worth mentioning that Barbara had a very good relation to her 
superior managers, shaped by mutual respect and support for her own ideas. 
Time scarcities were also discussed with other Kita managers. On the question of 
how these came about, Johanna (I17) suggested that time management was a core 
issue, also psychologically.  
Johanna: “that I have to spontaneously decide very quickly, or that I am constantly 
the whole day somehow . hm, have to set priorities, and what is currently the most 
important . uh, so I would say that this really requires a great deal of flexibility and 
uh . not only I say that, but for example also my colleague who has the substitution 
[as manager], she says: I couldn’t do this, because I’m not like you. Well uh, you can 
adapt yourself more quickly to new things, you can also more quickly . react more 
confidently than I would and then say . and, actually what then economically uh . it 
does not make a big difference in earnings, what I get more as a manager” (I17, 
18:31-20:45) 
What resurfaces here as a key aspect of everyday experience is a conflict between 
expectations to meet predictable and standardised targets and the unpredictability 
of daily life with children. Dealing with multiple (spontaneous) demands requires 
flexibility, adaptability, and confidence. A point to which I will return in the 
following, and which has briefly featured in Barbara’s account, is the importance of 
communication to harmonise social relations in these local and translocal settings, 
but also the time ‘open door’ policies require. 
                                                     




5.4.3.2 Managing Participation 
All childcare managers reported an ideal of a participatory leadership style that 
involves a preference to ‘talking about things together’ as a form of coordination 
and legitimation. Many reported that these ideals were part of their pedagogic 
identity and thought them to be the only way amongst ‘us’.  
Alexa: “uh, it is the case that we really develop things together, that we also reflect 
the topics we have fixed, and then say again: haven’t we considered this nicely, but it 
wasn’t so optimal after all. We take a step back and look again how we can proceed 
now differently. So . it has to be that way. Well, especially in . in such a profession as 
ours it would not work differently, because the people who work here are wired that 
way (so gestrickt). So we naturally preferably want it all to be harmonious . and uh, 
yes, like to discuss everything through (durchdiskutieren).” (I18, 22:44-24:30, 
emphasis added)  
Barbara: “we all would like that we uh feel  comfortable in the team, but not such a 
pseudo comfort [Nina: hehe, well yes] one smiles at each other and has a grumble in 
the belly . but uh . a kind of comfort because we actively engage [mhm] . utter anger 
and uh . enter into conflicts, so . we always say we have to clean the air [hehe] and it 
does not work, that one somehow collects irritations and does not utter it 
(aussprechen) . [mhm] . because that only makes a bad atmosphere . uh . and the 
people who come into the house feel that too . because that . that is truly palpable 
then also in the work atmosphere [yes] . and that is uh . essential in working with 
children, because they feel this first if there is any kind of disturbance . in the air” 
(19:41-23:56) 
Face to face discussions fulfill an important function by providing the opportunity to 
(re)balance emotions between colleagues and other stakeholders. This aspect is 
decisive for the ability of the practitioner teams to maintain a harmonious 
environment for children to grow up in. These discussion-intensive forms of 
interaction recur in management/leadership/governance relations on different local 
levels: between teams and managers in the Kita, but also between managers in 




Alexa: “naturally there are conflicts […] because pedagogues naturally want 
something different than business administrators . that . that simply is so hehe . that 
are different species of human […] I believe there is a healthy dosage so that . uh . 
there are points, where we have friction, where the board wants something different 
than maybe . the Kita managers, who is here in place and naturally- who is in direct 
contact with the families, and in direct contact with the children, and colleaguges, 
and parents . uh, that is always the case. Who somewhere, in quotation marks, I 
don’t mean that negatively, only sit at the desk, and have a different idea of the 
system.” (20:15-21:43) 
As Alexa describes, and I believe this to be an essential point from the perspective 
of IE, the daily work spaces and interactions of pedagogues and off-site managers 
create substantially different experiences, and are informed (by previous education 
and by ongoing different experiences) by different work knowledges. This 
consideration must be expanded to policy makers, who are often even more distant 
from local relations of childcare. Work knowledges include different priorities, and 
possibly contrasting preferences over managerial styles and time allocations to 
different media of knowledge exchange. My study cannot cover these aspects in 
great breadth, but more research into this junction would be highly relevant. One 
example I gathered from U. Volland-Dörmann, CEO of the AWO Köln, is rather 
telling in how frictions between different work knowledges and styles of interaction 
can be bridged. 
Volland-Dörmann recounted the shift from GTK to KiBiz as not quite a revolution, 
but a substantial step away from the “conservative corner” Germany had remained 
in (I34, 48:40-51:16). Managing this shift as a provider included taking parents and 
employees on board. For parents, this centrally meant informing them of changes, 
whereas the discussion with pedagogical staff amounted to a deeper discussion of 
values, especially regarding the age appropriate care of U3 children. Rather than 
producing “a lot of paper”, she enacted change through an interactive process of 
“learning by doing”. A key change she perceived was the introduction of a service-
oriented market logic into non-statutory welfare provision, which required a change 
to the fundamental understanding of the AWOs work. Communicating change of 
that magnitude was done through a series of strategy days, throughout which she 
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“locked herself up with her employees for a day” (I34, 4:27-6:40 + 39:54-44:52). A 
first exercise was a role play in which Kita managers were asked to pretend they 
were parents looking for a childcare slot, and discuss which features would be 
important to them. This introduced a customer-oriented mentality to the 
subsequent discussions how the AWO’s Kitas should be reorganised to be “market 
conforming”. The latter was associated by Volland-Dörmann with the 45h booking 
time; on the one hand because it enabled to employ practitioners in full-time so 
that they could live off their earnings; and on the other hand it enabled parents to 
work fulltime, at  least those employed in standard hours demanded by tariff 
agreements up to 42h per week, including commutes. Hence the AWO Köln rejected 
the shorter booking times of 25h or 35h per week69. Implementing these changes 
required informing parents that booking 45h did not enforce using up those hours. 
Discussions with practitioners and parents were held in each single Kita by the CEO 
and senior department managers in person, and subsequent offers were made for 
senior management to return and support local managers and employees, should 
additional conflict arise. Volland-Dörmann insisted that personal interaction in 
developing processes and managing Kitas in the everyday was essential to 
motivation. Furthermore staff remembered changes better if they had been jointly 
developed, as opposed to being presented with written process instructions. 
Among Kita managers, who were often alone with certain problems in their Kita, 
networking was encouraged (I34, 1:23:00-1:25:59). The more frequent regulatory 
changes happened, the more complex it became to keep everyone on board. 
Especially since 2008, Volland-Dörmann suggested, the pace of changes had been 
fast. 
The time required for meetings and personal exchange is not calculated into current 
HR planning, as Barbara’s ‘open door’ exemplified: She reported that if she closed 
her office door and did her job to meet formal requirements only, she would have 
regular working time (I15, 1:38-3:39). However, she said that accepted (legitimate) 
relations among staff, parents, network partners, and children required an ‘open 
                                                     
69 I have discussed parents’ perspectives in sections 4.3.2.3 and 5.3.3.3. 
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door’ practice that enabled local communication. This poses a problem when the 
tasks of practitioners are expanded to include extra work due to 
formalisation/documentation, as well as other ancillary procedures relating to 
hygiene, staff development and networking that affect managers in particular. 
Looking at the frequent over-hours of managers and the involvement of parents 
into work at the Kita (also see 4.4.2.2 and 5.3.2.1), it is appropriate to say that the 
current childcare systems relies heavily on volunteer work, also from its paid staff. 
As intimated above, the role of formalisation can be enabling or restricting local 
agents, and normative judgment about its effects should be discussed situatedly. In 
the Kita context, QM was mostly reported as a change of practice only insofar as 
that previously existing tendencies had been regularised and put into written form. 
Consequently the underlying idea of improving quality and making Kitas 
accountable for quality was not disputed. Critique was voiced in terms of how much 
time these documenting procedures took away from the interaction with children 
and colleagues (I33).  
Complaint management was described as the best part of QM (I15). An established 
process of handling complaints included training staff how to respond to 
complaints, which was practiced locally through role play. These trainings included 
helpful sentences and ways of dealing with one’s own internal reaction and 
attitude. Further benefits of a set process were standards how to respond to 
complaints, the track ability of complaints,  means to ensure that complaints were 
responded to quickly, and that all colleagues, including the manager, were 
informed, so that repeated parent mentions of complaints could be situated 
appropriately (I15, 33:41-34:55). 
Negative perceptions of QM were not very directly voiced in interviews, but 
between the lines a certain kind of conflict becomes visible. Educators described a 
key attitude of their profession as one that emphasises local experience as expertise 
as a key complement to more centralised knowledges, such as their professional 
training. This is easily illustrated on the attitude, which seems to amount to a trope, 
that parents were the primary experts of their child. The point in the following is 
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not to assert whether or not this belief holds true, but to illustrate which kinds of 
conflicts practitioners faced in the relation towards parents. 
Alexa: “I can only say from my understanding that I luckily always had the attitude . 
that I, uh, that I don’t find that educators, despite them having the vocational 
training, uh . know everything better about children . who are here in the house. I 
believe that parents are the experts for their children, and it can only function 
together . so it can’t be that educators say, you bad ones, what are you doing? You 
do everything wrong with your children, or: you do everything right. Because this 
does not exist: right or wrong in education, that is definitely so – because children 
are very different, because family situation are very different” (I18, 24:36-26:31) 
Here it is worthwhile to point out that practitioners have rather limited power over 
parents; any cooperation needs to be voluntary. This type of ‘eye-level’ relation 
might in principle tend towards a more democratic style of coordination, as part of 
which expressions of mutual respect (who is the expert?) are exchanged equally. 
Secondly, knowledge based on local experience with individual children, the 
necessity to handle diversity in the everyday, needs to be reconciled with 
‘generalisable’ knowledges about children.  
Alexa: “… it is important to the parents that the children are well . at the same time 
conflicts emerge from that, because from a pedagogical perspective we have a 
different view on what is good for children than the parents. [for example:] we 
accompany the children during potty training (literally: while becoming dry) […] when 
the decision comes from the child. So that means . children start at some point, then 
they want to use the potty, then they get curious, they observe . and sometimes 
there are parents, who have the target that their child should be dry at 2.5 years. But 
realisticly, seen from the development psychological perspective, it is entirely 
sufficient if a child is dry at 3, and it is also okay if a child is 3 and 3 months or . it 
happens, it depends on the child.” (28:25-33:09) 
When I hear parents talk around me, especially young and relatively inexperienced 
parents, they tend to compare what their children can already do. Conversations 
with family education staff (I27) pointed towards anxieties by parents over their 
children’s development respective to their age. In the interviews in particular 
mothers frequently told me how biannual parent talks at the Kita had confirmed for 
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them how well their child was doing in a number of dimensions that development 
documentation assesses (e.g. I22, I24, I28). So despite the fact that practitioners 
have little formal power over parents, their judgment clearly mattered to them, as 
already discussed in section 5.4.2. This suggests that their status as professionals 
does to some extent give them authority in the eyes of many parents, if not all.  
Moving to the perspective of practitioners, the question what is good for children 
led more explicitly to a key concept of contemporary pedagogical discourses: 
participation. This does not just apply to parents, but also to the relation with 
children. 
Alexa: “we adults often arrogate to know what is best for children […] participation is 
a very, very big topic, that children help shape the everyday, and I’ll say: then they 
talk about excursion places, and we have already an idea – oh the kids are going to 
decide for this, right, well – and they decide for something else, and bring arguments 
why and how . so I always say: children are not stupid, they are just small. And these 
whole emotions, which they have, what is good for them, what they like, what gives 
them fun, that is like in an adult. And children express this, and can express it. And 
uh, sometimes there clash the adult world and the children’s world, and conflicts 
emerge from that, because we rather support the children’s world, and say we want 
to start from there” (I18, 28:25-33:09) 
Another phrase that is commonly uttered in the same line of thought is ‘to meet 
children on eye-level’ (Kindern auf Augenhöhe begegnen). Prompted to give an 
example of what that means, Julian described a range of problems he identified 
with enacting ideas about the participation of children in the Kita’s everyday: 
Julian: “much is heteronomous (fremdbestimmt), for example, one always talks 
about participation in the facility, but that is always a pseudo-participation […] where 
one for example gives children only two choices . [Nina: hm?] – do you want to drink 
something warm or cold? Right and uh . yes, I find the enactment in the everyday 
always rather difficult, because naturally there are also . that has to do with it that 
sometimes there is too little time, or staff shortage are the usual problems. With us it 
is difficult because of the group structure: the children are here 5h a day, the children 
have 5h time . uh, to let themselves be cared for  . and in these 5h are two meals . 
their nappies are changed . uh, there are offers, and then there is also free play . and 
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sometimes we also go out . so it is fully-packed . and sometimes there is real time 
scarcity . there is simply no time for other things, and then one simply decides over 
the children, uh . yes . because I find that in our facility, so it is the case that we 
include the children . very very much. I have for example not seen it that way in other 
facilities, where I did internships,” (I33, 17:44-20:49)  
To summarise on section 5.4: Quality in public childcare was problematised from a 
temporal perspective, which emphasised that additional documentation 
requirements reduced the time practitioners can effectively spend with children, 
and thus childcare quality. Secondly, practitioners experienced conflict between 
what counts as work (for how much time) and what is paid. Scheduling work with 
and without children poses a problem in everyday life. This is exacerbated by the 
degree of unpredictable occurrences life in a Kita brings with it.  
The experience of time scarcity is worsened by a local desire to coordinate relations 
through discussion-heavy, ‘democratic’ leadership and cooperation. This 
participatory ideal includes a perception of relations on ‘eye-level’. This equality in 
representation, however, does not necessarily capture the power balance between 
parents and practitioners: the former do sometimes perceive the latter as a source 
of authoritative knowledge. This is, however, not always the case, and often 
practitioners feel their expertise is undervalued. Secondly, the relation between 
practitioner and child is not egalitarian, even though efforts to see the child as 
capable are articulated frequently. 
In conclusion, it is important to see how staff ratios and other indicators are not 
only insufficient to assess childcare quality: they are connected to the accounting 
systems in public administration described in section 5.3.2, which do not (from the 
perspective of practitioners) adequately recognise the work volumes Kitas need in 
order to function in line with democratic leadership and participatory practices. 
There is thus a tension between ‘quality’ measured in staff ratios, and the more 
complex understandings of good practice informing the everyday enactment of 
childcare. These ideas about good practice act as a point of resistance against policy 
prescriptions. On this ‘battlefield of hegemony’, too, it is clear that third-way policy 
discourses have not displaced professional pedagogic discourses.   
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6 Conclusion: Hegemonic Struggle and the Value of Caring 
To recapitulate from the beginning, this dissertation set out to investigate 
reconcilability as a widespread complaint of working parents. Following the 
methodology of Institutional Ethnography, the assessment of conceptual needs 
happened subsequent to fieldwork and narrowed in on the leitmotivs 
‘Vereinbarkeit’ and ‘Kita-Mangel’. Two research questions emerged in the process: 
1. How do German parents and childcare practitioners experience family-work 
reconcilability as ‘time problems’? 
2. How have the reforms of family policy 2004-2015 shaped these problems? 
These questions drew particular attention to the widespread everyday 
problematisation of time (question 1). ‘Studying up’ from how parents constructed 
time problems, generative mechanisms were identified, many of which relate back 
to policy reforms in the last decade (question 2). Analysis further questioned how 
older/other structures of German society interacted with policy in informing 
everyday enactment. I addressed parental care in chapter 4, and public childcare in 
chapter 5.  
First, I illustrated the German standard life course with reference to finding the 
‘right time’ for parenthood within a career trajectory, and ‘too early’ motherhood, 
arguing for strong social selectivities that promoted a life course sequence of 
education-employment-parenthood (4.2). Drawing on life-course approaches, I also 
problematised how longer education created a rush-hour of life for professionals, 
which together with female biology and mothers’ professional aspirations limited 
the time to have more than the norm of two children. Social and biological age are 
not well aligned for professionals. 
Second, I moved on to discuss how parental leave policies shape a protected time 
after birth (4.3). I identified a ‘vicious circle’ between gendered expectations of 
employers that limited women’s professional opportunities and couples’ decisions 
for the lesser-earner to take longer leave. I concluded that policy measures to 
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enhance fathers’ participation in active care (two daddy months) were too limited in 
scope to substantially challenge established gender relations. Experiences of 
irreconcilability clashed with expectations of improved reconcilability raised by public 
discourses, leading to incoherence between ‘field and habitus’ (2.2.4), which reduces 
agents’ ability to orient strategically, accompanied by a sense of alienation (2.3.3). 
The gender-equal ‘ideal’ adult-worker-model is in practice not feasible, since business 
cultures maintain an ideal of the unencumbered worker. This discrepancy leads to 
perceptions of the adult-worker-model as dominant, rather than hegemonic, due to 
a lack of credibility/ legitimacy (2.3.1). Expectations exceed the availability of 
defamilialising childcare services, leaving families ‘stuck’ in a one-and-half-
breadwinner-model. In the transition away from the male-breadwinner-model in the 
last decades, I emphasised the problem of asynchronous spheres; i.e. how schedules 
and temporal norms in the ‘flexible’ working world do not match those of the ‘still-
Fordist’ family world. 
Third, I expanded on this ‘family world’ or ‘private sphere’, problematising the 
visibility and division of domestic work (4.4). I analysed participant accounts in 
terms of family myths, i.e. the legitimations of participants’ divisions of work, 
pointing out how these narratives mediated conflict between ideals and realities of 
gender equality. I emphasised how the time binds of specific tasks mattered to 
(dis-)empower agents, and how spontaneous care-giving remained familialised. 
Further I discussed how grandparents and volunteers contributed to shortages in 
parental and public care provision, and how the expansion of unencumbered adult-
worker-model could further decrease the disposable time for such support in the 
future. These tendencies support the diagnosis of a crisis tendency 
(unsustainability) in German social reproduction, if not an acute state of crisis. 
In chapter 5, I then narrowed in on institutional public childcare, especially in the 
form of the Kita. Fourth, I therein discussed a series of mechanisms or preconditions 
that shape the temporal experiences of parents and practitioners. I here discussed 
the institutional legacy of subsidiarity and non-statutory welfare providers, drawing 
out how ideological-social cleavages (intersectionality) continues to impact 
contemporary selectivities. I exemplified this on the strategies of the Catholic 
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Church, both in terms of slot allocation and provider politics (5.3.1, 5.3.2.2). I 
discussed in depth the funding of public childcare under KiBiz in NRW, drawing out 
the importance of local particularities of the decentralised system, such as in the 
height of parent contributions (5.3.2.1). In conclusion, I pointed out how strict price 
regulations and austerity budgets led to a chronic underfinancing of public 
childcare. Together with real economic factor shortages, notably skills shortage 
(5.3.2.3), the current regulation causes market failure in the shape of undersupply 
and insufficient impulses for growth. This judgments compounds the diagnosis of 
crisis tendencies made above, pointing further to an undervaluation of paid care as 
lamented by feminist (political) economists. 
Fifth, I drew out how a series of temporal problems follow from these mechanisms 
or preconditions. Struggles between neo-familial and third-way ideologies revolve 
around the appropriate age of children’s transition from familial to public childcare 
(5.3.3.1). The politics of this transition interact with the government’s agenda for 
female labour market activation, and have lowered the age of transition. This, too, 
is by many parents experiences as domination, not ‘consensual’ hegemony. In this 
transition, I further discussed issues of predictability stemming from slot shortages, 
and asynchronicities between the right to childcare, the Kita-year, opening hours, 
and parents’ working schedules (5.3.3.2, 5.3.3.3). These asynchronies, or various 
temporal scales, give a more nuanced account of change than the language of 
paradigms. Multifaceted implications of the timing of changes become more 
systematically accessible through this analytic lens. 
Sixth, I turned to practitioners’ and managers’ perspectives on new regulation, 
which corresponds to what academia discusses as new public management (5.4). I 
highlighted here constructions of service quality through formalised quality 
management. This style of governance relies heavily on textual assessment, both in 
the administration of Kitas, and in the documentation of child development (5.4.2). 
My participants problematised the growth of textual practices as taking time away 
from ‘core activities’ of childcare and the need for face-to-face coordination 
(strategy days, meetings). I added to this how textual, formalised governance is 
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limited to deal with unpredictable workloads and poses limits to local democratic, 
participatory styles of coordination (5.4.3).   
My findings suggest, in total, that even for the ‘most likely case’ of German 
professionals, the hegemony of the adult-worker-model remains in doubt. While 
ideas of economic independence and gender equality conveyed in public discourses 
are deeply influential in professional milieus, parents’ everyday experiences do not 
match with how ‘gender equal’ adult-worker life is supposed to be. The 
inconsistency between raised expectations and given experiences is most notable in 
the scarcity of public childcare for infants despite a formal right to a Kita slot since 
2013. Facts such as this undermine the credibility of the current German policy 
regime to realise its promises, and consequently its struggle for hegemony. The 
adult-worker ideology is under challenge by the previous conservative norm, as well 
as by left and pedagogical ethics that oppose the centrality of economic reasoning 
in the German discourse on reconcilability associated with the adult-worker-model. 
This result suggests, first, that Dorothy Smith’s (2.2.2) insistence to valorise local 
everyday experience as an emancipatory strategy against the “relations of ruling” in 
public discourse is crucial here to draw attention to everyday problems of gender 
quality and ‘good life’; secondly, it suggests that the German transition towards an 
adult-worker-model, as proposed by accounts of a paradigm shift (e.g. Fleckenstein, 
2011), is overstated and not yet certain. Not in the least a rise of right-wing political 
forces and their anti-feminist leanings should give second thought to the stability of 
the adult-worker ideology in German politics.  
The political question that follows this assessment must ask: If not a liberal-feminist 
hegemony around the ideology of the adult-worker-model, then what else? Is there 
a counter-hegemonic ideology, a “double movement” (Polanyi, 2001) visible that 
can draw on the gender-egalitarian strength of the adult-worker-model, while 
preserving the strengths and working with the historically-given capacities of a neo-
familialist model? 
In the conclusion of section 4.3.4 I arrived at the insight that the unencumbered 
adult-worker-model is not sustainable, and that in consequence one ought to 
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consider the shortening of the working week to redistribute paid and unpaid 
working time between genders, rather than ‘just’ activate mothers into the labour 
market. It seems rather clear that the political alliance between liberal feminists 
and employers, which Seeleib-Kaiser & Toivonen (2011) identify as the agents 
behind recent German reforms, is unlikely to support a shorter working week. 
Employers are unlikely to support any change to the male life-course norm. Mid-
level managers, who are responsible for the operational planning, have logical 
reasons as well to resist further pressures, such as parents’ wishes for more time 
autonomy. At the same time, more and more businesses are affected by skills 
shortages, and willing to make concessions to their staff, especially professionals. 
The current labour market situation thus opens spaces for change, kairotic 
moments which professionals (individually, or organised) can use to push for more 
family-friendly working environments. Furthermore, many employers and superiors 
are fathers (more often than mothers) themselves. Hence, it would be unwise to 
assume that economic interests of the ‘manager role’ necessary determine a 
person’s political views and actions. Participants’ recurring statements that 
superiors who were parents themselves ‘understood’ and were more open suggest 
that individual managers have some discretion, if not always the resources, to 
improve reconcilability.  
A strategically important landmark for change must thus be the ideas managers and 
employers hold about the working time models of their employees, and efforts to 
reconsider how workplace culture and coordination could accommodate workers 
with fewer hours per capita. Employer interests towards simultaneous or sequential 
models of reconcilability (4.3.1), i.e. part- or full-time,  have less to do with the total 
amount of labour available in each variant, but more with the amount of 
organisational adjustment that would arise from an adult-worker-model in which 
parents orient less to the rhythms of the workplace. Employers traditionally favour 
policies that give them control over employees’ availability and flexibility, and 
oppose policies that broaden the legitimate circumstances under which workers can 
take leave or reduce hours. The more temporal autonomy a worker has, the higher 
the risks and costs of organising workloads, which makes the enterprise less 
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competitive. But in the current situation, employers also face risks and losses due to 
a lack of predictability and open communication about life plans. 
What I suggest recurrently is that excessive flexibility (or individualisation) is a 
problem for enterprises, but also families and societies, when individual actions 
become so varied and unpredictable that environments cannot orient to that 
individual anymore, or that at least the costs of doing so increase exponentially. In 
other words, coordination problems multiply where people cannot form reliable 
expectations of one another. Asynchronicity between institutions furthermore 
generates more ‘broken interfaces’, i.e. less ‘kairotic moments’ in which enabling 
circumstances align. In effect, planning (strategic future-oriented action) becomes 
ever more complex and difficult, leading to alienation and problems of self-
realisation that reduce the potential for happiness or a ‘good life’ (2.3.3). It appears 
that the rapid paces of restructuring often found in working life, and spilling into 
other areas of life, have a tendency to overwhelm human capacities to cope with 
information and to orient individual action in tune with collective processes. 
Drawing on this position, a certain amount of scepticism appears appropriate when 
encountering demands for public childcare and parental availability to be further 
flexibilised, such as through an extension of Kita opening hours. From this sceptical 
position, flexibilisation is not a solution. What is needed, instead, would appear to 
be a new synchronisation of different spheres, that is, a better coordination of 
interfaces between human activities, but one that allows for collective temporal 
structures to act as an underlying grid for orientation. The standard working week 
once provided such a grid, in conjunction with the male-breadwinner-model. The 
downside of that grid was the economic dependence of women, a feature that is 
largely understood as unacceptable today. The key questions for further research 
should thus should be:  
I. What kind of collective temporal grid does a society need that enables 
human well-being   in a sustainable gender-egalitarian division of work 
within a ‘post-modern’ economy?  
II. What can a government/an enterprise/a parent practically do towards this, 
within the limits of their own influence? 
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Here I can only make a few guiding comments which direction such enquiries might 
take. With regard to the first question (I.), it is useful to ask how Germans imagine 
improvements. Inspiring here is their assessment of German culture in light of 
international experiences how work and family life can be reconciled. A good 
example are Elena’s and Markus’ perceptions of the Middle East and Scandinavia: 
Elena: “even though it is worked there a lot and hard […] there is not such a 
separation between profession and . and family life, so, and respectively it is 
perfectly okay if they call me and I say I am just picking up the children at the 
kindergarten, I will call back soon . no problem at all. With our German clients on the 
other hand . that does not come across well.” (I25, 21:08-22:26) 
Elena’s Scandinavian colleagues benefitted from an “informal business code” that 
meetings took place in the morning until 14:00, and that afterwards everything 
could be done remotely (I25, 22:35-25:07). The German ‘Präsenzkultur’ in most 
workplaces is detrimental to the abilities of encumbered workers to participate.  In 
an age of target-oriented pay and telework, this form of exerting control over 
workers is also technically unnecessary. As the Middle Eastern and Scandinavian 
comparison suggests, a relaxation of such norms would make it easier for workers 
to exert more temporal autonomy in their daily lives without the fear of offending 
their superiors or customers. 
But attention to possible improvements should not be limited to the working world. 
Within families, understandings of gender equality are clearly very important, and 
traditional gendered divisions of work are loosening. Several of my participants 
discussed that they could imagine a role swap, so that he would take the domestic 
role for a while (I24, I28). But crucially, and this is indicative for the segment of 
parents that strictly opposes commodification and further defamilialisation, they 
did not see a point in becoming a parent if they did not have time for a child: 
Thomas: we see it as unrealistic that we both . you are in the rectory, and I 
work fulltime[ 
Imke: [I find that . [ 




That ‘spatial’ solutions to take children along to work are not very satisfying was 
indicated by Anna’s experience: 
Anna: “I find that exhausting – the conflict . I have always the feeling at . at work I 
have . one is also in a different energy, or the focus is elsewhere. And the switch I 
always found exhausting . so this . children-energy I’ll say, and . then the switch into 
the working world . I struggled with this a lot in the beginning […] until today I am not 
somebody who naturally takes her child along to work, only if I have to, one has no 
supervisor or so, then . okay. My environment at the radio, they react really friendly: 
of course, take him along, and great – so . I notice that I am simply more tense as 
otherwise […] then I can’t give 100% attention to both, and that is . then each only 
gets 50%, and that is dissatisfying for me, professionally, as for the child “(I23, 0:08-
3:43) 
This links back into the point I made earlier that spatial arrangements like telework 
cannot reconcile temporal demands on parents, or put differently, the need or 
ability to concentrate on a task. The sufficient level of concentration, and in the 
long-term also expected success, one can sensibly assume is constructed in 
comparison (and competition) to colleagues. To the extent those are 
‘unencumbered’, a parent is likely to experience frustration. Anna’s account 
exemplified that ‘too much’ simultaneity of roles may not be desirable or possible 
at all, and that to some extent, sequential solutions or third-party childcare make a 
lot more sense to create a harmonious balance between professional and private 
roles. Along similar lines, Ralf voiced a perspective not uncommon among family-
oriented people who are sceptical about the family ministry’s reconciliation 
discourse:  
Ralf: “I could have imagined the role swap in a different way, so . that I would have 
cared more for the children, in that sense I don’t think it’s a question necessarily 
which sex one has . the first six months one as a man simply uh . G once tried to suck 
on my breast, that was not a good idea hehe . he got no milk, and it really hurt me 
hehe . so uh, the other question is, I think an image, that one can reconcile 
everything . uh, I don’t think that works. Everything has a price somewhere, so uh . 
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sure, one can then like Frau von der Leyen70, seven children and federal ministry and 
uh . once can easily deceive oneself, but I believe . I believe uh . that one somewhere, 
one only has limited resources, and those one has to allocate, if I say I want to spend 
much time with the children, then less time remains for work, and if I say . work is 
important, then less remains . the other topic goes down . uh, and . all that uh . 
somewhere . one always dies one death at that point.” (I28, 46:26-48:48) 
With regard to the longue durée of the mother-child linkage, a certain amount of 
concessions to mammalian biology might be necessary to accept, even for the most 
ardent post-modern gender scholar. And in the phase around birth, these 
differences (sex) matter. This suggests that sequential solutions (baby breaks) are 
important in the short-term. But beyond that phase, reforms in the 2000s have 
shifted the wider timings around early child- and parenthood, notably by shortening 
leaves and expanding public childcare for younger years (ages 1-3). We can 
understand these changes, abstractly, as recommodification. As for shifts in gender 
relations: the two daddy months are simply too short to make much of an impact 
on male careers – that is why they cannot significantly affect the gender order, or 
the expectations that flow from it. A larger share of non-transferable leave for 
fathers might improve this condition. But for now the father-breadwinner linkage is 
as firmly held in place by work culture as the mother-child linkage by family culture. 
What the discourse around reconcilability instead affects are expectations for 
something more – but these are not really met by experiences. Instead various 
cultural expectations clash, because there is not enough ‘right time’ to live up to 
those expectations.  
Time at home becomes ever more structured and curtailed by the time dedicated to 
work, resulting in bad consciences and an omnipresent awareness of ‘too little time’ 
(Hochschild, 2001). In a similar vein, the literature on inconspicuous consumption 
tells us that time scarcities for family result in garages full of unused camping 
equipment, because parents never found the time to take the children to their 
collectively anticipated family trip (e.g. Sullivan and Gershuny, 2004). 20 years after 
                                                     
70 Family minister during the time of the reforms, strongly presented in the media as the face of 
those political endeavors.  
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Hochschild published her early work, my study suggests that this dynamic has 
affected Germany as well. But at the same time Germans appear to defend the 
family’s time and space in society. Hochschild did not see that kind of political 
dynamic in the 1990s US, although her more recent work has thematised the 
growing importance of ‘quality time’ (Hochschild, 2012). Has Germany, the 
traditional conservative welfare state, responded differently to the same global 
dynamic of the knowledge economy and advanced capitalism? Are cultural 
appreciations and institutional frameworks different enough to ‘make a difference’ 
in where Germany is going with respect to the reshaping of home and work?  
The analysis above has quite clearly shown how the life-course timings discussed by 
academia and the family ministry matter in the sense-making of parents about their 
life choices. But their narratives have also revealed a critical issue: the association of 
family with dependability – and relatedly the perceived need of economic stability 
as a precondition for parenthood. But as already discussed in the literature review, 
the ‘old certainties’ of Fordism, which still shape the childhood memories of today’s 
young parents, are eroding. It seems worth contemplating that the imagined 
permanence of having children might serve as a way of coping with discontinuity, 
ephemerality, and risk in professional life. Furthermore, the construction of family 
appears quite gendered, simply because the (anticipated) consequences differ for 
men and women. This may explain why a survey amongst childless young people, 
commissioned by the magazine ELTERN, found that 70% of men, but only 61% of 
women wanted children (forsa, 2011). It seems that at the end of the day, especially 
“we” young female professionals often think that never is the right time for a child. 
Put differently, the ways in which family is anticipated or imagined can be 
insufficient in generating a sense of security and recognition, in particular for young 
women, to encourage (quite literally) parenthood. Family as an idea seems caught 
in an emotional ambivalence between love and security in dependable personal 
relations, fear of becoming dependent, and fear of failure to be dependable in a 
fast-moving world. 
In the bigger picture, the question comes to the fore to what extent a family-
oriented value system might pose a powerful alternative to the capitalist value 
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system oriented to material prosperity. Can family – understood as committed, 
loving relations of mutual support – serve as an end of all human activity that 
provides a more compelling target than prosperity can under the given zeitgeist 
shaped by economic crisis, international tensions, and global warming? Can 
conservative family models as part of a resurgence of right political ideologies be 
explained to some extent in terms of family making a revival as “society’s last 
bastion” (Frevert, 1989, p. 265; Schelsky, 1975)? And should left feminists be 
concerned that an association of feminism with liberalism in the German public 
(dominance of adult-worker-model) might lead to a counter hegemony that turns 
not only against liberalism, but also against feminism?  
These questions are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Implications for future 
research in the literatures addressed above are that micro-level studies of temporal 
experience can complement existing findings through a variety of contributions. 
Feminist political economy accounts were enriched by a discussion of a crisis of care 
in terms of alienation, focussed on temporal disempowerment and asynchronous 
social norms and institutions. Relevantly to feminist economics of care, care was 
discussed in terms of affective relations and attachment, and the organisational 
need for ‘time together’. Perhaps most centrally, the feminist welfare state 
literature around the adult-worker-model was situated in the German case, 
pointing to a co-optation by government and employers (Nowak, 2010, passive 
revolution). Here I made the distinction between ‘ideal’ and ‘unencumbered’ adult-
worker-models, and how reconcilability problems in the everyday undermined the 
hegemonic potential of liberal-feminist ideology. 
Adding to theoretical perspectives on the politics of time, I have pointed out that 
the coordination of a total division of labour, including both production and social 
reproduction, becomes exponentially more difficult with growing individualisation 
of schedules. Therefore I posited that not further flexibilisation, but the renewal of 
a collective temporal grid for society is necessary to enable people in all areas of life 
to work and live together. Temporal autonomy needs to be more than disposable 
time: it requires a temporal social structure which enables the participation in 
collective activities. Excessive individualisation of schedules is a problem for 
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effective social co-existence, because it makes mutual predictability more difficult. 
The result, on a practical and emotional level, is uncertainty and a greater necessity 
for time management, which at some point becomes inefficient and stressful. 
Improvements to the above set of problems requires time politics to bring biological 
and social age into harmony; organise work and care in such a way that more 
diverse life-courses can be supported, minimising downward social mobility; 
rebalance flexibility and time control so that personal commitments are made 
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8.1 Participant / Interview List 
Pseudonym / 
Name* 
File No./Interview Position 
Lena 13, 14 Job Centre Employee 
Imke and Thomas 24 Parent(s) 
Markus and Elena 25 Parent(s) 
Christina and Ralf 28 Parent(s) 
Elif 42 Parent(s) 
Vera 43 Parent(s) 
Michelle 44 Parent(s) 
Lamia 45 Parent(s) 
Amira 45 Parent(s) 
Sarah 46 Parent(s) 
Alia 46 Parent(s) 
Zehra 47 Parent(s) 
Aisha 47 Parent(s) 
Anna 22, 23 Parent(s) 
Inga 29, 30 Parent(s) 
Heike 21 Family Education (Familienberatung) 
Alice 27 Family Education (Familienberatung) 
Rebecca 52 Human Resource Manager 
Sibille 48, 49 Human Resource Manager 
Johanna 17 Public Childcare (Kita) 
Alexa 18 Public Childcare (Kita) 
Leyla 31 Public Childcare (Kita) 
Julian 33 Public Childcare (Kita) 
Barbara 15, 16 Public Childcare (Kita) 
Silke 19, 20 Public Childcare (Kita) 
Britta 19, 20 Public Childcare (Kita) 
Inge Losch-Engler 50 NGO – Landesverband 
Kindertagespflege NRW 
Mara 51 NGO – Landesverband 
Kindertagespflege NRW 
Hans-Georg Nelles 55 Blogger and Consultant: Väter-und-
Karriere.de 
Eva-Maria Helm 37, 38 NGO – Frauen gegen 
Erwerbslosigkeit e.V. 
Gisela Neumann 37, 38 NGO – Frauen gegen 
Erwerbslosigkeit e.V. 
Katrin Biane 40, 41 NGO – Bürgerzentrum Vingst 
Beate Mages 40, 41 NGO – Bürgerzentrum Vingst 
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Isabel Gronack-Walz 53, 54 NGO – Verband kindereicher 
Familien Deutschland e.V. 
Attila Gümüs 34, 35, 36 Politics – Landeselternbeirat NRW 
Ulrike Volland-
Dörmann 
34 Managing Director of Childcare 
Provider (AWO Kreisverband Köln) 
Katrin Wasser 39 District Youth Welfare Agency 
(Jugendamt Köln) 
Kurt Steinheuer 39 District Youth Welfare Agency 
(Jugendamt Köln) 
Karsten Betz 1, notes District Youth Welfare Agency 
(Jugendamt Köln) 
Karsten Fokuhl 2, notes District Youth Welfare Agency 
(Jugendamt Köln) 
* full names indicate named interview participants, first names only are pseudonyms for 
anonymised interviews 




8.2 Interview Guide Kita Managers (German) 
1. Wie verbringen Sie ihre Zeit in Beruf?  
a. Was sind wiederkehrende Tätigkeiten, welche Zeitbedarfe haben sie? 
b. Was passiert außer der Reihe? 
c. Wie entsteht Zeitknappheit? 
d. Wieviel Zeit bleibt für Privatleben? 
2. Haben sich diese Arbeitsrhythmen in den letzten 10+ Jahren verändert?  
a. Hat sich Ihre Rolle verändert?  
b. Passen Ihre persönlichen Leitbilder mit den beruflichen Anforderungen 
noch zusammen? 
3. Wie sind die politischen Reformen zum Kitaausbau bei Ihnen angekommen? 
a. Was mussten Sie verändern? 
b. Wie wurden Sie informiert? 
4. Wer sind Ihre Vorgesetzten, wie arbeiten Sie zusammen?  
a. Welche Informationen fließen zwischen Ihnen und in welcher Form? 
(Dokumente) 
b. Welche gemeinsamen Interessen oder Konflikte gibt es zwischen Ihnen? 
5. Wie arbeiten Sie mit den Eltern zusammen? 
a. Welche Informationen fließen zwischen Ihnen und in welcher Form? 
(Dokumente) 
b. Wie werden Kitaplätze vergeben? (Prozess) 
c. Welche gemeinsamen Interessen oder Konflikte gibt es zwischen Ihnen? 
6. Was denken Sie über den Kitastreick? 




8.3 Interview Guide Parents (German) 
1. Was ist „Familie“? 
2. Lebenslaufperspektive 
a. Beruflicher Werdegang (Lebenslauf durchgehen) 
i. Wie viele Stunden haben Sie in Berufsphase X gearbeitet?  
ii. Wie flexibel waren Ihre Arbeitszeiten in Phase X? 
iii. Wann haben Sie wichtige Entscheidungen zur beruflichen 
Veränderung getroffen?  
iv. Warum haben Sie sich beruflich verändert? 
v. Haben private Ziele für diese Veränderungen eine entscheidende 
Rolle gespielt? 
b. Privater Werdegang/Familienplanung 
i. Wollten Sie schon immer Familie?  
ii. Wie viele Kinder waren oder sind ihr Ideal? 
iii. Wann entstand der erste ernste Kinderwunsch? 
iv. Wie hat ihr Partner reagiert? 
v. Wie hat ihr privates Umfeld reagiert? 
vi. Wann kam das erste Kind? (ggf. Warum verzögert?) 
vii. Was war für sie ausschlaggebend, in dem Moment sich für ein 
Kind zu entscheiden? 
viii. Gab es damals zwischen Familienplanung und beruflichen Zielen 
Konflikte? 
ix. Wie haben sie diese gelöst? 
x. Wie hat ihr Arbeitgeber auf ihre Familienplanung reagiert? 
xi. Welche Unterstützungsmöglichkeiten gab es damals für sie, 
seitens ihrer Familie, Arbeitgeber oder der Öffentlichkeit? 
xii. Welche davon haben Sie in Anspruch genommen, welche waren 
wichtig? 
xiii. Wo haben sie gelernt, was Erziehung und Mutter/Vater sein 
bedeutet? Wo haben sie während der Schwangerschaft und nach 
der Geburt Informationen erhalten? 
xiv. Welche Personen haben regelmäßig als Ratgeber in Sachen 
Elternschaft agiert? 
  
 Person 1 Person 2 
Bezahlter Arbeit   
Hausarbeit   











a. Wie viele Stunden verbringen Sie heute mit: (Liste oben) 
b. Gibt es bei Ihnen eine feste Arbeitsteilung?  
c. Wie sieht die aus? 
d. Entscheiden sie das selbst, oder sind sie in dieser Verteilung von Dritten 
abhängig? 
e. Würden sie ihre Aufgaben lieber anders aufteilen? Wie sähe das Ideal 
aus? 
f. Welche Prioritäten haben sie in der Zeitverteilung? Was geht im Alltag 
vor? 
g. Haben sie „zu wenig“ Zeit?  
h. Wofür würden sie zusätzliche Zeit nutzen? 
i. Womit würden sie gerne weniger Zeit verbringen? 
j. Ist Geld dabei ein Problem? 
k. Fehlen ihnen Angebote/Services, um Arbeit abzugeben? (z.B. 
Randzeitenbetreuung) 
4. Kinderbetreuung 
a. Wie viele Stunden betreuen sie ihre Kinder selbst? 
b. Wie viele Stunden macht das jemand anders? Wer wie lange? 
c. Was kostet das? Ist das für sie viel Geld? 
d. Wer steht Ihnen in Notfällen zur Seite, z.B. wenn die Kinder krank sind? 
e. Machen sie sich Sorgen um die Zukunft ihrer Kinder? Wie begegnen sie 
diesen? 
f. In welche Formen der Kindererziehung und Förderung investieren sie 
gerne? Welche Aspekte von Förderung sind Ihnen besonders wichtig? 
g. Wie gestalten sie die Freizeit ihrer Kinder?  
i. Hobbies, Kurse etc. 
ii. Zeit mit den Eltern, allein, zusammen? 
5. Einschätzungen/Wissen 
a. Kennen sie diese Angebote? (Liste) 
b. Nutzen sie diese Angebote? (Liste) 
c. Beschäftigen sie sich mit Familienpolitik? 
d. Woher haben sie ihre Informationen? 
e. Aktiv: wie? 
f. Beschäftigen sie sich mit Geschlechterfragen und Gleichstellungspolitik? 
g. Woher haben sie ihre Informationen? 
h. Aktiv: wie? 





Betreuungsmöglichkeiten überlegt genutzt (in Std/Wo) Wo/wer? (Name) Warum? Kommentar  
Kindertagesstätte      
Private Elterninitiative      
Kindertagespflege      
Ein nicht berufstätiger 
Elternteil 
     
Beide Eltern nicht 
berufstätig 
     
Ein Elternteil in Teilzeit       
Beide Eltern in Teilzeit 
(nacheinander) 
     
Beide Eltern in Teilzeit 
(gleichzeitig) 
     
andere Familienmitglieder 
(z.B. Großeltern), Freunde 
     
Au-pair, Kinderfrau, o.Ä.      
Babysitter      
…      
Andere Angebote überlegt genutzt Wo/wer? (Name) Warum? Kommentar  
Familienbildung/Kurse 
(feste Termine) 
     
Familiencafé o.Ä. (flexibel)      
Familienberatung      
…      
Über Kinder reden mit: überlegt genutzt Wo/wer? (Name) Warum? Kommentar  
Familie und Freunde      




     
…      
